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ABSTRACT
Defining Efficient Water Resource Management in the
Weber Drainage Basin, Utah
by
Keith D. Wilde, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 1976
Major Professor: Dr. Allen LeBaron
Department: Economics
The Weber Basin Water Conservancy District is a state institution,
but its primary function is collecting money for the U.S. Bureau of Reclama!:ion, to pay for the Weber Basin Project.

Ditferent classes of water users

pay markedly different fees for identical Project services.

More than half

of the water developed by the Project is not used consumptively, yet supply
facilities continue to be built in the Basin because they are less expensive
to their owners than prices charged for the underused capacity of the Project.
Paradoxically, some Basin residents are bitterly resentful of both the District
and the Bureau, claiming that water rights formerly their own have, by
means of the Project, been stolen.

That is, both the enemies and the pro-

ponents of the Project adhere to the Western orthodoxy that water i.s scarce
and drought imminent.
The principal difficulty of this investigation lay in identifying the
nature of the problem, for the situation seemed full of contradictions.

xii

Consequently, the primary contribution of the dissertation is a n explanation
of Basin circumstances that accounts for arresting observations without
inconsistency or contradiction. The m ost important hypotheses are, therefore, e mpiri cal, or historica l and institutional.

Economics, ac cording to

RichardT. Ely a nd Frank H. Knight, is a set of principles concerning what
ought to be, not e mpiri cal description of what

~·

Cons iste nt with that per-

spective, once the nature of the prob lem is cle ar, application of economic
principles is a prescripti ve judgm ent of how the problem m ay be resolved.
The most important empirical hypotheses are as follows:

Water is

not scarce in the Webe r Basin; ne ither are storage a nd conveyance facilities.
All are abundant, even redunda nt.

Nevertheless, in co mbina tion with certai n

institutional a rrange ments a nd a sustained propaganda campaign, thi s very
abundance contributes to persi s tence of the attitude that water is scarce.
Re dundant facilities the reby encourage even more unneeded development.
Wha t appea rs on first exami nation to be a case of misallocated water
resources by discriminatory prices, turns out to be a proble m of distributing
the burden of paying for excess ive, unwanted public works.
free good in the Basin.

Water itself is a

Actual distribution of the repayment burde n is partly

ideological and partly pragm ati c ; partly a political choice and partly a
bureaucratic decision; partly a manifestation of agraria n poli cy and partly
what the traffic will bear.
If water is free, it is not an eco nomi c good, and not a subject for

economi c analysis . The Basin has an ample water supply, but water may

xiii

nevertheless be locally and periodically scarce.
fore one of conveyance and timing.

The water problem is there-

Control of timing requires storage.

veyance requires energy, as well as aqueducts.

Con-

In the Weber Basin, con-

veyance energy may be either the contro lled flow of falling (mountain) water,
or electrically powered pumps tapping abundant groundwater reservoirs.

The

water development problem is, therefore, an issue of a lternative capital
facilities for the control and delivery of water (itself abundant).

Efficient

resource allocation in water development is consequently relevant at the
vestme nt level; it is not a matter of pricing water.

!.!!-

In this case, the major

investment decisions have already been implemented, and the problem is one
of evaluating distribution of the repayment burden.
The relevant economics literature is principles of equitable taxation,
and of public utilities' pricing.

Application to the Basin situation produces a

conclusion that present arrangements are as equitable as could be devised.
F urther redundant investment (inefficient use of resources), however, could
oe avoided if the State Engineer's Office took a harder line on requests to
jrill new wells.

The information provided in this work could be the basis for

making such a program popularly acceptable.

(569 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Humanity, at least in the present era, seems to gauge its level of
satisfaction by progress,

1

and progress by increasing ability to extract more

and more desired output from fewer and less onerous or limited inputs.
Progress is, therefore, synonymous with technological development, and
technological progress is one way of solving wha t economics textbooks
describe as the economic problem. From this pe rspective, the emergence of
economics and scientific manage me nt in the e ighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a further step in technological progres s: it grappled with the
question of how social mechanisms could be improved to induce greater output
from existing resources , even without improved physical devices . Natural
resource economics as a special study is an effort to extract greater social
bene fits from existing public resources.
Ever greater efficiency is the objective of all efforts to apply and
improve technique, no matter of what variety. As an efficiency-promoting
technique, natural resource economics focuses on useful substances (especially public resources) that appear to be available in smaller quantities than

1

J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York: Dover Publi cations,
Inc., 1960); E . L. Tuveson, Millenium and Utopia (New York: Harpe r
Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964).

2

people find desirable. Such a substance, in the experience of the western
United States, is water.

Chapters IX-XI provide some details of the influence

that water scarcity has exerted on social behavior west of the Mississippi in
the last 150 years.

Combatting water shortage became a focus for social

institutions (and for the careers of many people) in the arid West.

Wben the

United States began looking seriously at its natural resource endowment in
the immediate post-World War II era,
on which attention was concentrated.

2

1

water was one of the critical materials
Extensive application of economics to

water policy issues stems from that period of time.

3

Given the background

of Western experience and the usual definitions of economic science, we
should not be surprised to find in virtually all economic approaches to western
water problems the implicit assumption that water is a scarce good.
If water scarcity is a casual pres umption in western water research,

it is a notion that should perhaps be cha llenged . For at least in utah's Weber
Basin, water is abundant.

Until that fact is accepted, efficiency analysis of

resource use in the basin is hopeless ly complicated and replete with

1
The Paley Heport; Resources for Freedom, Vols. 1-5 (Washington,
D. C.: U.S. Government, Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission, 1952).
2
For example, A Water P olicy for the American People (Washington,
D. C . : U.S. Government, Report of the President's Water Resources Policy
Commission, 1950).
3 stephen C. Smith and Emery Castle, eds., Economics and Public
Policy in Water Resource Developme nt (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University
Press, 1964), p. 1.

3
frustrating contradictions.

Water abundance is not a perspective that comes

ea sily, however, because everyone "knows" the West is dry.

Few water

specialists will suggest, or even e ntertain, a contrary view . Water is
obviously the subject of many problems and much effort in western states,
including the Weber Basin.

Nevertheless, a r eas onably complete under-

standing of physical and institutiona l circumstances in the basin fully justifies
the assertion of water abundance, and clarifies e normously the efficiency
evaluation of its water supply resources.

Like any other set of techniques,

economic principles produce satisfying results only when applied to situations
for which they were designed.

If economics is the science of scarcity a nd

water is not scarce, then economic analysis of the water situation in the
Basin must be premised on the scarcity of some other resource(s).

The

chapters that follow will demonstrate that water is abundant in the Weber
Basin; it is storage, energy potential, and conveyance facilities that are fit
subjects for economic analysis.
Utah is universally acknowledged to be one of the arid states;
husbandry of its water resources has long bee n a major preoccupation of its
people.

Application of scientific research to State water management, how-

ever, is primarily a phenomenon of this century. At first, such efforts
focused on physical relationships of water, soil, topography, vegetation,
population centers, etc., and on engineering projects to increase the work
done by available water.

More recently, attention turned to the effect of

human institutions on the productive and desired uses of water.

Examples of

4

the latter interest are the following grad uate studies completed at Utah State
University:
Donald H. McLean, "A Study of the Effects of Water Institutions on
Planning and Management of Water Resources in Utah," 1972.
Ph. D. Civil Engineering.
Kimber C. Webb, "Description and Evaluation of Institutions
Involved in Water Allocation and Distribution in Utah , " 1966.
M. S. Agricultural Econom ics.
Dilipsinha Pendse, "Weber Basin Water Conservancy Distri ct:
An Economic Appraisal," 1967.

M. S. Agri cultural Economics.

All three students devoted a major share of their attention to the Weber
Basin.

And all three theses contain the presumption that water is a scarce

resource needing efficient management.

McLean illustrates the pervasi ve-

ness of the water scarcity notion in the most striking fashion because two
m e mber s of his graduate committee were co-authors of the study that quantified the abunda nce of water in the Weber Basin.

1

The two agricultural economics theses approached from the perspective of economic efficiency in the pricing a nd distribution of water.

Webb

catalogued all significant types of water a llocating institutions in the state and

1

Frank W. Haws, Roland W. Jeppson, and A. Leon Huber, Hydrologic Inventory of the Weber River Study Unit (Logan, Utah: Utah Water
Research Laboratory, Utah State University, 1970). Haws and Huber were
members of McLean's committee.

5

concluded that the conservancy district had the greatest potential for economic
efficiency because of its relative flexibility.

Pendse followed this with a

closer exa mination of water conservancy districts, paying particular attention to the Weber Basin District, headquartered near Ogden. In the course of
his investigation, Pendse found that although the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (WBWCD hereafter) does indeed have some a llocative virtues, it falls down in other important respects, among which are the follow.

1ng:

1
(1) It is a price dis criminator, charging a higher price to urban

r esidents than to farmers for the same product.
(2) In the face of a water supply more than twice current delivery
contracts, and an apparently elastic demand, it charges a
prohibitively high price to municipal us e rs.
(3) The District has no power to be flexible in its prices, which are
cost-determined.

2

1

Dilipsinba Pendse, "Weber Basin Water Conservancy District : An
Economic Appraisal" (Master 's thesis, Utah State University, 1967), pp. 78-

82 .
2

There is a degree of inconsistency between (2) and (3). Pendse
evaluated the elasticity of municipal demand on the basis of an actual price
reduction by the WBWCD. After demonstrating that the District clearly does
have an element of pricing flexibility (in respect of fixed costs for treatment
and distribution facilities for municipal water), and that demand is elastic,
Pcndse contradicted himself by saying that the District can't lower its prices
because it would the n lack sufficient revenue to meet all of its fixed costs.
Pcndsc, p. 80.

6

(4) It requires long term (60 year) contracts.
(5) It cannot sell water for farms larger than 160 acres (320 acres
if jointly owned) by Federal Reclamation law.
Pendse' s conclusions also allow the easy inference of two other defects:
Sluggish sales threaten the ability of the District to meet its repayment
obligation to the Bureau of Reclamation; the WBWCD is a public utility, not a
profit-maximizing monopoly, and public utilities ' pricing prescriptions ought
to be applied, but apparently are not.

1

This list of blemishes suggested the following problems for further
research: Given that the policies of the WBWCD are less than optimal, can
a figure be attached to the social loss incurred as a consequence? What are
the manage rial objectives of the WBWCD, and could they be realized simultaneously with some or all of lower prices, non-discriminatory prices, and
greater flexibility in contract arrangeme nts? If the managerial objectives of
the WBWCD are simply incompatible with an e fficient pricing and contractual
policy, what would be the social consequences of overriding those objectives
and forcing the District to operate in the more truly public interest ?
Appendices I and III expand on these questions.

Both are approaches

to an efficiency evaluation of the Weber Basin situation, and both are premised
on water scarcity.

Appendix III is a revised version of Appendix I, attempting

to incorporate the evidence revealed in Appendix II that water is not scarce.

1

Price equal to marb>inal cos t.

7

The emancipation was not complete , howeve r, and the analysis and research
objectives of Appendix Ill have a vague, unrelated and scattered-purpose
appearance.

Much material in the present text is the fruit of investigations

suggested or specified by the Appendices.

The investigations uncovered more

difficulties: The discriminatory pricing policy is the outcome of an explicit
and legitimate design for distributing the burden of repayment to the United
States government for capital facilities operated by the WBWCD (the Weber
Basin project).

Estimations of demand elasticity effectively eliminated the

hope that significantly lower prices could solve simultaneously the problems
of repayment, water surfeit, and discrimination. Without such a solution, a
more efficient price policy necessarily conflicts with considerations of equity
in the repayment burden.

(The foregoing discussion is in terms of water as

the subject of pricing policy.)
Still another problem emerged in connection with the finding that
municipal demand is not elastic: Most towns in the WBWCD service area can
develop well-water of good quality at a significantly lower cost than buying it
from the District. Although water supply facilities are already in surfeit,
therefore, new ones continue to be buill.
The list of problems has grown quite long, but the issues can be
grouped into three types:
1.

Inefficient pricing and contractual policies,

2.

Redundant investment, a nd

3. Wealth and income redistribution.

8

Although they a r e thus separable by class, none of the problems can be
resolved in isolation from the others because t hey are interc onnected.

Price

discrimination cannot be eliminated without contravening a legitimate redistributiv e decision. Redundant investment is a consequence of that distributive decision (wells a re a cheaper source of water than the WBWCD). Further
unneeded investment could be avoided by lowering the District's price of
municipal a nd industria l (M&l hereafter) water.

To do s o, however , would

in volve the same kind of interfe rence with an accomplished distributi ve decision as would correcting the discrimination problem. And the distributi ve
decision was not simply an intra -basin one; it involved a transfe r of resources
from United State s taxpayers generally to r esidents of the Weber Basin.

That

transfer was justified on the basis of a firm repayment contract, and pre scriptions for efficient pricing in the basin would, if applied, almost certainly
e ntail a repudiation of the contract. Such a policy recommendation could not
be entertained se ri ously by a responsible decision-m aker.
The l egacy of Pends e's report, amplified by the results of several
months of further investigati on, bas the appearance of a hornets' nest of
irreconcilable conflicts. Ve ry little , if anything, can b e recommended a s a
clear improvem ent of the total poli cy mix. Understanding can be enha nced
significantly, however, and the apparent magnitude of the problem thereby
diminished s everal fold, by taking a diffe rent perspective.
Water is not scarce in the Weber Basin; it is abundant. Because it is
not s carce, water is not an economic good and consequently has no price .

9

Such statements have a ring of lunacy to Western ea rs.
supportable nonetheless.

They are quite

And their acceptance casts quite a differe nt light

on the complex of economic problems described above. If water is free,
the n the costs and prices associated with systems like the Weber Basin
Project are applicable solely to the dams, aqueducts, canals, pumps, etc .,
which control and deliver the water.

The water problem is, therefore, more

accurately seen a s a transportation proble m.

Relevant questions concern the

optimal use of storage and conveyance capaci ty, the investment decision,
paying for the fa cilities, and charging for their use. When viewed from this
perspec tive , it suddenly appears that the pricing policy of the WBWCD follows widely accepted principles of public utilities' pricing and just taxation.

1

Although this vantage point s uggests a more favorable evaluation of
WBWCD policies than s ee ms to follow from P e ndse's analysis, it accentua tes
doubts about the wisdom of the investment decisions tha t produced the We ber
Basin Project.

Many parts of the Project are in fact redundant.

The prob-

lems assoc iated with it relate to its capital facilities, not to the water tha t
flows in the m.

Even though water abundance in places like Willard Reservoir

(s ee map, p. 28) catches the eye of an interested observer almost immediately,
a ccepting the notion that water is fr ee requires an effort.

Pe rhaps it is espe -

cially diffi cult for an economist. If scarcity is one's specialty, and water his
assigned s ubject, it does not seem unreasonable that he should assume water

1

This will be demonstrated in Chapter XI.
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to be scarce.

He will not run into many established water specialists with

an interest in or capacity for disabusing him. Water Hustlers

1

cannot

accept the notion that water is abundant, or that the cost of a ny investm ent
in conveyance facilities is not a mply justified by its benefits.
Water scarcity is a faith in reverse.

Chapters IX to XI demonstrate

that the origins of what has grown into a water development fraternity lay in
a real need to have better control over the water resource in states west of
the lOOth meridian.

The attack on drought was eminently successful, but

necessarily e ntailed the creation of a set of techniques. Since effective
techni cal capacity resides in human beings, the successful attack also entailed development of a technical fraternity with a vested interest in preserving in Western people an attitude that water is scarce and drought is immine nt.

Members of the fraternity threaten water shortage at every opportunity,

even in conne ction with the ludicrous over-capacity in the Weber Basin.

2

In

an assignment of responsibility for overinvestment in Weber Basin facilities,

1

This term is borrowed from R. H. Boyle, John Graves, and T. H.
Watkins, The Wa ter Hustlers (San Francisco, California: The Sierra Club,
1971).
2

sce statements attributed to Wayne Eldredge (U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, Provo) and Wayne Winegar (WBWC D), in "Boat Paradise at
Willard Bay," Deseret News, 9 September, 1975. See also Appendix II.
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therefore, a significant share should go to the complex of values, expectations, and behavior that Ellul characterized as the Technological Society.

1

Technical progress in the abstract is the increase of power to effect
huma n desires.

Power is the control and direction of e nergy.

ultimate stuff of purposive human action.

Energy is the

Everything desirable is the outcome

or product of controlled , directed energy. The ultimate cost of everything is
the alternative uses of the ene rgy foregone by its creation . Materials, such
as concrete, steel, and water, may be abstracted from because mas s and
energy are interchangeable, accordi ng to 20th century physicists.

Controlled

energy (of which capital of all kinds is a form) is a vita l input to technological
progress itself.

The only element of progress that cannot be abstracted to an

issue of controlled energy is human inte llection.

2

But the stuff to which the

human inte llect applies itself m ay all be subsumed under a ques t to exert
power over the e nvironment (including the imposition or impression of order
and understanding).

3

1
Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 196 5) . Te chnical interest and the personal investment required to acquire technica l s kills is probably as strong an influence
in the widely observed self-gene rating acti vities of scie ntific bureaus as is the
political theory proposed by other a uthors. See Appendix II.
2
Not to be confused with knowledge, which is a n accumulation of
capital and definitely~ affected by technical progress in energy control.
3 Although the idea of this paragraph does not see m to be widely
applied in economics discourse, it is by no means nove l.
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Water is critical to plant and animal life. It is one of the most
ab undant substances on earth. Water doe:; not appear always in U1e forms
and locations most useful to man, however . But it can be transformed a nd
transported for desired purpos es if techniques of energy control are s uffi ciently advanced.

Given that condition, any amount of fresh water could be

imported to the arid West from the oceans. A lesser effort could bring water
to the region from other parts of the continent, as visioned in schemes like
the North American Water and Power Alliance.
More modest projects propose the total use of intrastate waters to
serve arable lands within the state.
planners in Utah.

Such has been the objective of water

Potentially arable lands have been exhaustively catalogued,

and work has been in progress for several decades to make a comparable
inventory of the State's water resources.

1

The Central Utah Project is an

interbasin transfer of water, representing a major o utlay of energy to take
water from where it is available to where it is most easily used--or wanted.
The next lower level of energy expenditure is intrabasin developme nt,
using the e nergy potential of water in mountains and high valleys to push it to
where there are lands and people to use it.

It is the level of the Weber Basin

Project, and the level which John Wesley Powell urged as reasonable for

1

As Chapter III will show, it is mainly retarded study of ground
water that prevents the preparation of a complete inventory.
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optimum development of the United States west of the lOOth meridian.

1

This

approach has the potentia l of making most e fficie nt use of available water,
land, and solar energy. It will be referred to hereafter as hydrologi c
e ffi cie ncy. Water depos ited by solar energy a nd atmosphe ric currents in
high mountains is a cheap source of energy, whi ch can be turned to useful
work with r elatively minor expenditure of additional energy--if institutions
a r e well-designed.

Early irrigation developments in the Mountain West were

criticized by Major Powell for violating this principle . Small-sca le developments, without a basin-wide plan, tended to use up t he available water in
high mountain valleys where small-scale dive rsion was easiest.

Efficie nt

basin deve lopment would fir st water the maximum possible acreage of lowland
plains , which have a longe r, hotter growirlg season.

But s uch deve lopme nt

could only be undertaken if the e ntire basin were under a single politi cal
jurisdiction, and it required the cooperation (or coercion) of every bas in
water us e r.
Instituti ons critica l to application of energy to water use include
politi cal jurisdiction, property rights in land and water,

2

and mechanisms

for transfe rring abstract rights to e nergy control-- the monetary and financial

1
see Chapter VIII for expansion of the ideas in this paragraph, and
for sources.
2

Legal definitions have imposed ineffi ciencies in the use of energy
applied to water because they have failed to recognize the nature of the water
problem as described here. See Chapter VII .
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system. Basin-wide control of the water resource requires cooperative
effort.

All of the above institutions must work harmoniously if maximum

service from basin water is to be achieved with minimum additional e nergy
input.

Assuring, or attempting to improve, institutional efficiency in the us e

of energy resources is the intended technical contribution of social science,
available energy potential and techniques other than economics to achieve
maximum desired effect.

In the context of intrabasin water development,

this definition seems to coincide perfectly with Powell's conception of
hydrologic efficiency.

1

Hydrologi c efficiency, however; is a macroscopic perspective whic h
abstracts from the distribution among individuals of the power released by
efficient effort.
institutions.

Distribution of power is affected by political and legal

The issue raised in the opening paragraphs was that institu-

tiona! arrangements can interfere with efficiency. This s uggests a question
of whether or not McLean and Haws have i n mind the same view of efficient
institutions as do Webb and Pendse. Assuming that McLean and Haws are
thinking of hydrologi c and energy efficiency, as engineers , then if Webb and
Pendse are talking about something e lse , what could it be? That is, if
economic efficiency is something different from hydrologic or energy

1
see the careful definition of economic efficiency in B. Delworth
Gardne r, State Water Planning--Goals and Analytical Approaches (Logan,
Utah: Utah State University, Utah Agricultural Experiment Station Bulleti n,
1966).
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efficiency (which Pendse seems to imply on his p. 3), economic efficiency
must be directed toward a goal different from maximizing aggregate energy
control.

The diffe rence, of course, is that economic efficiency is measured

in money, whereas hydrologic efficiency is conceived in physical units.
Economic efficiency reflects the interpersonal distribution of power in society
as it is expressed through market and other institutions. If e conomic efficiency requires a different prescription from hydrologic efficiency, it implies
a choice of less than maximum aggregate energy control.

Distributive

preferences, therefore, take precedence in electing economic effi ciency ,
over maximum aggregate physical welfare .

The rationality of such a choice

i s increased if the cost in foregone power of the distributive preference is
clearly understood.
To evaluate the efficiency of resource use in the Weber Basin, therefore, and to recommend improvements if needed, the fo llowing kinds of
information are essential:
(1) Hydrologic possibilities for the basin, given existing energy
potentials.
(2) Distributional objectives embedded in basin planning decisions
and expressed by contemporary basin residents .
lf distributive goals are found to be inconsistent with hydrologic efficiency,

an estimate of the energy loss would be useful.

Institutional means for

achieving distributive goals must also be scrutinized to assess their efficiency.

Economic methods provide at least two perspectives from which the

16

latter assessment may be made: One approac h assumes the semiautomatic
and impersonal mechanism of market society; the other re cognizes the deliberate a nd specific allocation of resources by politi cal resolution and administrative fiat.

Both approaches, price theory and public finance, must provide

answe rs to questions relating to physical efficiency (aggregate expendable
energy), and to distributive efficiency.

The decision over which approach i s

most appropriate will be more obvious a fter full exposition of the problem
situation, and is accordingly left to the final chapter.
Several arguments have been introduced . The kinds of information
required to support them , together with the chapters in which that information
is found, may be itemi zed as follows:
(1) Demonstration that water is abundant in the Weber Basin.
(Chapters III and V. )
(2) Demonstra tion that there is a fraternity with a vested interest
in maintaining a n illusion of water shortage.

(Chapters VII,

VIII, IX, X, and Appendix II.)
(3) Inventory of the faciliti es available for storage a nd conveyance
of water in the Basin.

(Chapters II and V. )

(4) Comparison of capacity to use for all parts of the system.
(Chapters II, V, and VL)
(5) Identification of institutional or other constraints to full use of
facilities.

(Chapters II, IV, and VL)
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(6) Elucidation of the intended purposes of institutions and
administrative deci:;ions, to assess their consistency with
actual results.

(Chapters VII, VIII, IX, and X. )

Possession of the foregoing infor mation wi ll allow a reassess me nt
of the set of problems adopted, inferred, and expanded from Pendse's thesis.
It will suggest the application of different economic principles than were pro -

posed by the arguments of Appendices I and III, and resolve the disconnected
appearance of those earlier approaches. Water abundance is the integr ating
idea, as well as the key to solving the problem .
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CHAPTER II
DESCRIPTION OF THE WEBER BASIN PROJECT AND
ITS OPERATION BY THE WEBER BASIN WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT

The Weber Basin Project (WBP) is a network of dams, reservoirs,
aqueducts, and canals constructed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation
to control for beneficial use the waters of the Weber River draillage basin of
northeas~err>.

Utah .

Tbe Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (WBWCD)

is a regional agency of state government through which residents of the basin
are committed lo repay lhe Bureau of Reclamation for construction of the
WBP.

The District acts as manager of the WBP facilities, and as a collection

agent for the Bureau. Geographic details and chronology of water development
in the Basin are important elements in understanding the political, financial,
and economic issues that revolve about the Project.

Geographical Description of the Weber Basin

The Great Basin of the intermountain west is land-locked; none of
the streams rising within it find their way to the ocean. Rather, they disappear into sinks or evaporating ponds.

The most spectacular of these is Great

Salt Lake, into which empty three of Utah's most important rivers--the Bear,
Weber and Jordan-Provo.

The headwaters of all three are located in a
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relatively sma ll area of the Uinta Mountains of northeastern Utah, but each
bas its own distincti ve drainage basin.

(Refer to the map, p. 28. ) The

Weber Ri ver picks up several tributary streams as it makes its way down
from the Uintahs through the mountain valleys of Summit and Morgan counties,
finally eme rging through the Wasatch Front into its delta, where it merges
with its principa l tributa ry, the Ogden River.

The Ogden rise s wholly in

Weber County, e me r ges through the Wasatch Front just a few miles north of
Weber Canyon, a nd joins the Weber immediate ly west of Ogden City.

From

this confluence at Slaterville, the Weber meande rs through the flatlands of its
de lta in We ber County to the Gr eat Salt Lake.

The Weber Basin thus con-

stitutes a s izable chunk of northeas tern Utah.

To the north of it Utah lands

are part of the Bear River drainage basin, a nd to the south of it lies the Provo
system.

To the West lie the deserts of the Grea t Basin.

On the east i s the

Colorado Hiver basin.
As the map c lea rly indicates , by far t he greater part of the Basin 's
territory is mountainous ; only between the east s hore of Great Salt Lake a nd
th e Was a tc h Front (the East Shore area) is there a flat land m a ss lar ge e nough
for a human s ettlement of significant size.

Unfortunate ly, the Great Basin

climate is of such a nature that a heavy proportion of its tota l precipita tion
falls on the mountains in the form of s now .

People who settle on the fl at lands

of the Basin, the refore , depend for wate r on the streams that bring down
snowmelt from the mountains.

The East Shore is one of the most favore d
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loeations in Utah because of its land base and water s upply--both provided by
the Weber-Ogden River System .
As it emerges from the mountain front, however , the Weber is
enclosed by high bluffs on both sides, which it does not escape until virtually
at its confluence with the Ogden.

This has meant that the higher lands of

Davis County (close to the mountains) could not be conveniently watered from
the Weber River.

The Davi s a nd Weber Canal Company has long had a diver-

sion near the mouth of Weber Canyon, a nd runs its cana l long the bluff on the
south (Davis) side until it finally escapes confinement near Roy (north of Hill
Field), and can then turn back down into Davis County (it goes as far as
Layton) . But the la nds in bright yellow on the map, and thos e in white on
which Hill Air Force Base and Ogden Arsenal are located could not be served
in this way.

For many years the same was true of la nds c lose to the moun-

tains both north and south of Ogden City (part of the green portions of the
m ap).

In fact, the only lands that could be irrigated from the Weber-Ogd en

without a very expensive conveyance system were lowlands near Ogden City
and the flatlands of west Weber County.

Unfortunately, the large area of low

lands near the Lake required drainage and sometimes flushing before it could
be used for farming.
Further south, the Davis County portion of the East Shore area contains a large share of the best agri cultural la nd, but can be watered from the
river only by means of a long canal, as explained above.

Hence, the early

deve lopme nt of Davis County depended on the sma ll mountain streams that
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rise on the west front of the Wasatch Range and drain directly into Great Salt
Lake.

Lower la nds were settled first and the available water appropriated for

them, l eaving the higher foothills without a source of water, even though the
mountain streams crossed them.

1

South Davis County is geologically distinct from North Davis.
Between the two F armington Bay , a n arm of Great Salt Lake, pushes a lmost
up to the mountain front , dividing the county into two se ctions just below the
town of Farmington. South Davis has a few mountain front streamlets of its
own , and a lso could conveniently dive rt water from the Jordan River, which
it did through the Bonneville Canal.

But it suffered from the fact that most of

the lands that could be served by this gravity canal were water-logged, or
very easily could be by a few seasons of irrigation.

Later on, a highe r canal

was built and water pumped into it to extend the area of irrigated agriculture
(Bonneville Pump Canal).

This was expensive, of course; it still could not

s e rve a lot of good arable land highe r up, and there we re complaints over
the quality of Jordan River wate r, which, by the time it reached South Davis,
had b een used and re - used all the way through Utah a nd Salt Lake Va lleys.

Chronology of Water Developm ent in the Basin

Irrigati on has been a coop erative venture in Utah from the begi nning
of its modern hi story.

1

Fairly long canals were needed to bring water from a

ny the doctrine of pri or and beneficial a ppropriation.

22
high e nough diversion point to get it onto the best agricultural lands. Streams
we re diverted by a weir; the system depended entirely on water that happened
to be in the streams at a given time.

As long as there was water in the

stream, it worked well enough, but stream flow was always highest in early
season when needed least, and very low in late season when needed most.
Only ihe very earliest appropriators would have water in late season, by the
prior appropriation doctrine.

Thus there was ample water for everyone's

diversion works in the spring, but as the season wore on, more and more
appropriators were forced to close their headgates.
Since late season water is vital to many crops, this put a severe constraint on the expansion of irrigated agriculture.

The only way of getting a

greater irrigation supply for late season was to store it up from ihe unappropriated early season flows.

Such an effort was expensive beyond the

financial resources of most cooperative ditch operators. Furthermore, any
undertaking of this kind intended for agriculture had to compete with farm
products grown elsewhere without the need for such expensive water.
Assuming the best reservoir sites to be used first, every time an additional
increment of the unappropriated early season flow was stored, the energy
expenditure per unit rose higher.

If such water was to be used profitably

in agriculture, it had to mean either that agricultural prices were rising,
other production costs were going down, or that profit margins in agriculture
were already comfortably large.

As long as Utah was relatively isolated,

with a growing population, some or all of these conditions may have prevailed.
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Nevertheless, it was severa l decades after Brigham Young establis hed
settlement before economic conditions in Utah (mostly a matter of population
pressure, probab ly) justified major wate r storage investments.
Until the later years of the 19th century, then, the extent of irrigated
agriculture in Utah was limited by lands that could be watered by s imply
diverting a stream to fields through a canal.

Possibly the first irrigation

storage reservoir in the United States was constructed in Cache Valley, Utah
in 1871.

1

Although there is still a Newton Dam at the same location, the

first effort was a primitive affair and washed out at its first severe test. It
was rebuilt and washed out frequently in the next few years as its ownerbuilders learned their engineering by trial and error.

By the late 1890's, it

had become a fairly reliable structure.
The first storage effort on the Weber River system was less costly
in terms of mistakes and failures--no doubt profiting from the experie nce of
the Newton Dam cooperators.

2

The Davis and Weber Counties Canal Company

was formed in 1884 to construct the canal running from the mouth of Weber
Canyon into Davis County, as described above . As a relatively late appropriator, the company had little or no water to sell by July.

Conseq uently they

1

L. J . Arrington and T. C. Anderson, " The 'First' Irrigation
Reservoir in the United States: The Newton, Utah, Project," Utah Historical
Quarterly, 1971, Summer.
2 Earl Harris, manager of the Davis and Weber Company, provided
historical notes, written by himself, from which the following account is
taken.
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began construction of a dam on East Canyon Creek in 1896 , for storage of
~pring

runoff water.

It was an imm ediate financial ;;uccess.

As a conse -

quence of brisk sales, the height of their earth fill dam was soon raised 25
feet, increasing reservoir capacity from 3, 85 0 to 8 , 500 feet.

In 1902, 17 feet

more were added to the height of the dam, increasing capacity to 13, 800 acre
fee t.

The combination of fertile soil, ease of working it in early spring,

proximity to both Salt Lake City and Ogden, plu s abundant full season water,
gave farmers served by the Davis a nd Weber Cana l Company advantages that
were not e njoyed in other parts of utah in the early part of this century.

Con-

s e qu e ntly, the Company's business expanded, more land was brought under
the ditch, and in May of 1951, construction began on a new, all concrete dam
to replace the old earth one . It was completed in 1916, a t a cost of $17,055.
Its storage capacity of 28,000 feet was double tha t of the old one . To this
point East Canyon Dam was strictly a profitable private e nterprise undertaken
with no ass istance from state or fede r a l governments.
The area served by the Canal continued to expand after 1916, but the
continued profitability of irrigated ag ric ulture is called in question by subsequent events.

Harris s ays that by the mid-twenties "it was again evident

that the Company still needed additional storage capacity to take care of the
additional acr eage that was being cleared to become part of the canal s ystem. "
Other water users and irrigation companies on the Weber system were also
inte rested in more water.

But apparently no one company or group of

companies felt a want sufficiently kee n to put up the necessary money .

The
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Bureau of Reclamation was brought in to construct Echo Dam on the Weber
Hiver.

lt was completed in 1931 after an outlay of $3,000,000.

The reser-

voir it created had a capacity of 74,000 acre feet, of which 40 percent was
subs c ribed for by the Davis and Weber Canal Company, the largest single
shareholder.
Shortly after completion of Echo Dam, which it called the Weber
River Project, the Bureau of Reclamation started Pineview Dam on Ogden
Valley.

This Ogden River Project was also unde rtaken on a cooperative

basis, between the Bureau and the Ogden River Water Users Association.
The dam and its 44,000 acre foot reservoir were completed in 1936. By
1941 the Project's other features, Ogden Canyon Conduit, Ogden-Brigham
Canal, and South Ogden Highline Canal were a lso in place.

1

The Weber and

Ogden River Projects grew out of studies initiated about 1921 by Bureau
engineers William Green and E. 0. Larson . Reclamation engineers had
studied the Weber Basin as early as 1903, and recommended developments
not far different from what now exist on the Weber and Ogden system, after
completion of the Weber Basin Project.

2

1

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Project Data (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).
2
This inlormation from the Bureau's Project History of the WBP.
The History consists of a mimeographed, loose- leaf volume for every year
since the project was started (1953 ), and was consulted in the Provo office
of the Bureau of Reclamation.
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There is a readily discernible continuity to water development on the
Weber system: from small private diversions to large private companies a nd
modest storage reservoirs to a combination of private and government effort
on larger reservoirs, and finally to full federal government finance and control of a large network of dams, r eser voirs, power plants, aqueducts, drainage ditches, etc . Active participation of the Bureau of Reclamation dates
from the early 1920s and has been continuous since that time.

The Bureau's

oft-repeated objective, as with other water development enthusiasts in the
West, has been to keep at it until every drop of available water is under control for beneficial use.

The WBP was intended to be the culmination of this

goal for one drainage system.
This chronology of water development is suggestive of an explanation:
during the years of Utah's relative isolation from other markets, irrigation
works were relatively small, but profitable.

As the 20th century wore on,

irrigation projects had to be larger to provide a significant increment to the
water supply, and they became increasingly difficult to finance.

Eventually

the federal government took them over as apparently the only body with
sufficient financial strength. For contemporaneously with the 20th century
growth in water supply facilities, the Utah market became less and less
isolated, and agricultural prices (real) generally were in a decline after
World War I, although they had a t emporary rise during and immediately after
World War II. Since the early 1950's interest in expansion of irrigation
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farming in the East Shore area had been deterr ed by low agricultural prices
and high, non-agricultural prices for land.

Relative Use of the Weber and Ogden Rivers

Notice (Figure 1) that a lthough the Weber River drains a larger
basin than does the Ogden, the Weber is also more fully used to irrigate
patches of land along its upper courses.

The Ogden serves only one valley

before reaching the East Shore area, whereas the Weber and its tributaries
serve five major ones and severa l smaller developments before arriving at
the canyon mouth.

By means of the Davis and Weber Canal a major portion

of the lands shown in green south of Ogden City are also served by the Weber
River.

Furthermore, all of the lands in yellow served by the Weber and Davis

Aqueducts get their water supply from the Weber Ri ver.

Lands shown in

green in the Hooper area, plus all others to the north can be suppli ed from
the Ogden River, or the combined Ogden-Weber.

The green patches in Box

Elder County, and those north and east of Ogden City were watered by the
Bureau of Reclamation's Ogden River Project in the 1940's.

They are the

only lands of the East Shore area that could be served more efficiently by the
Ogden than by the Weber.
As might be expected from these observations, the main pressure
from water users have always been for development of the Weber River,
since the best lands lay under it. Except for the relatively small patches
north of Ogden a nd in Box Elder County, the only lands that could be watered
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from the Ogden or combined Ogden-Weber are those of the lower delta .
These lands, the orange-brown portions on the map, have a very high water
table and are heavily infiltrated with salts.

They cannot be used without

extensive rehabilitation by drainage and flushing.

As there was good land

available higher up, farmers always were understandably more interested
in getting water for it than for the salt marshes bordering Great Salt Lake.
The maddening feature of the situation is that it is relatively easy to
get an abundant fresh water supply for the lowlands, whereas getting it to the
upper benches requires very expensive diversion and transportation works .
Pineview is by far the best reservoir site in the Weber-Ogden system. It
stores more water than all of the other mountain valley reservoirs combined .
(It a lso covers a magnificent artesian basin. ) It is not hard to imagine the
frustration that engineers must have felt in the face of such a cricumstance:
the most efficient dam they could build in terms of water storage per cubic
foot of fill was not really in demand, whereas a whole network of dams and
aqueducts are required to get a much smaller supply of water to where it was
wanted.
Hydrologists estimate that over 400, 000 acre feet of water is discharged into Great Salt Lake by the Weber River every year. Since the Ogden
contributes only about lGO, 000 a. f. of this, the Weber is far from being used
up.

1

1
Frank w. !laws, Roland W. Jeppson, and A. Leon Huber,
Hydrologic I:nventory of the Weber River Study Unit (Logan, Utah: Utah State
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Description of the Weber Basin Project

The Weber Basin Project was a uthori zed by Congress and the President in late 1952 and construction began early in 1953.

Water deliveries

through parts of the Project were first made in 1956. By 1968 most of the
facilities that appear on the map (Figure 1) had been completed.

Larrabee

Reservoir, which appears on the map near the headwaters of the Weber in the
Uinta Mountains, was not built. The map was taken from a 1963 version of
the Bureau's Definite Plan Report that the Conservancy District refused to
approve.

Larrabee would have been an expensive storage facility and did not

seem to be needed acutely.

The power plants at Wa nship and Gateway were

designed to provide power to pump water from the Davis and Weber aqueducts to higher lands on the benches (pumping stations on the map), and to
pump water out of Willard Reservoir to serve the reclaimed lowlands (orange)
through the Willard, Warren, and Layton Canals. Water for the aqueducts
is taken out of the river at the Stoddard diversion and carried by the Gateway
Canal and Tunnel to the west face of the Wasatch.

Slaterville Diversion

replaces previous diversion works a nd sends surplus water up to Willard
Reservoir.

Water was also supposed to have been diverted into the new Layton

University, Utah Water Hescarch Laboratory, 1966), Table 30; U.S. Department of the Interior, Geologi cal Survey, Lake Bonneville: Geology and
Hydrology of the Weber Delta District, Including Ogden, Utah, by J. H. Feth
et al. , Professional Pape r 518 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1966). Referred to hereafter as P.O. 518.
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Canal to serve lowlying lake plain lands.

But when the lack of inte rest became

apparent, the Bureau of Reclamation stopped construction of the Canal barely
south of the Davis-Weber Counties boundary line.

The WBP also created a

new diversion and canal in Ogden Valley (see map) to carry new water made
available by Causey Reservoir and to improve service to holders of existing
water rights.
The credo of enthusi astic water development promoters has been
"deve lop every last drop of water for beneficia l use. " That slogan was
expressed frequently during the planning and inve stment stages of the WBP,
but the actual project does not go quite that far.

Some of its planned features

were not constructed, as noted above, and others were built smaller than
origi nally designed.

More water could be developed, but it would be very

costly as there are no more good r e servoir sites available .
Control does not mean ne ces s a rily that a given unit of water is taken
out of the river and used for either irrigation, domestic, industrial, or civic
purposes .

Maintaining a flo w in the river is a l so productive of values, and

is part of control.
fish and wildlife.

Part of the cost of the WBP was justified as a benefit to
It is a non-reimbursable benefit, but because of it the

WBWCD must maintain a certain minimum flo w in the Weber River. A com plementary function is the generation of electri c power.

The WBP itself

includes two power stations, and Utah Power a nd Light has a major right of
long standing to a minimum flow in the Weber.

This means that relatively

high flows must be maintained even in winter, when consumptive use is
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comparatively light.

There is a further, less tangible, esthetic value in the

simple fact of having water running in the river, especially in the dry late
season.

Relative Use of Project Facilities

Employment of WBP facilities parallels the relative consumption of
stream flow from the two rivers.

Note on the map that Willard Reservoir,

Willard Canal, Slaterville Diversion Dam, Warren Canal, Layton Canal, and
Willard Pumping Plant are all designed to use the surplus Ogden River waters .
The same is generally true for the enlargement of Pineview Reservoir . These
facilities represent a heavy proportion of the total cost of the WBP.
also the features of the WBP that are used very lightly.

They are

Causey Reservoir

and Ogden Canal, both above Pineview Reservoir, are the only facilities on
the Ogden that are used to virtual capacity.

They provide supplemental water

(l ate season) to farmers and suburban residents of Ogden Valley . Lost Creek,
Wanship, and East Canyon Reservoirs, all on the Weber, made more late
season water available to lands already under the ditch.

They produce all the

water that can be pushed through Gateway Tunnel, and its capacity is sufficient
to keep both the Davis and Weber Aqueducts full.

The Davis Aqueduct runs at

it s irrigation capacity south of Farmington Canyon.
irrigation customers in South

D ~ vis,

There are potential

but no carrying capacity to serve them.

The remaining physi cal capacity is reserved for m unicipal water deliveries
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to the Conservancy District's treatment plant in Bountiful--water which is
as yet unsold.
Irrigation service to high lands in north Davis and south Weber
counties (aqueduct service areas) is significantly below capacity. It is building
steadily, however, on the basis of individual contracts with residential property owners rather than wholesale contracts with irrigation companies.

More

water could be delivered in Summit and Morgan counties, but no specific
project facilities (storage capacity is general) are lying idle as a consequence .
Except for redundancy in the lower lake plains system, part of which is highly
visible , the only ele ment of excess capacity which concerns Project managers
is in municipal and industrial water. Subsequent chapters will verify that
these two systems (M&I and Willard-Layton) are of greatest interest from the
viewpoint of evaluating the efficiency of resource use in the Weber Basin.
1
The Weber Basin Project has a declared capacity of 50 ,000 a. f. per
year for M&I deli very .

To turn this capacity to effective use required the

construction of treatment and conveyance facilities capable of delivering water
of culinary quality to urban residents.

Because fedcrallaw did not permit the

Bureau of Reclamation to participate in operations of that kind, the WBWCD
issued bonds to finance the necessary works. Accordingly, the District has
treatment plants at Ogden, East Layton, and Bountiful, plus a system of water

1

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Weber
Basin Project, Utah, Supplement to Definite Plan Report (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1959). Referred to hereafter as 1959 DPH.
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mains capable of deliverying culinary water to every town and city in the
East Shore ar ea.

To date, contracts for de li ve ry of M&I water sum to only

31 ,000 a . f. compared to the stated capacity of 50,000 a . f.

As will be demon-

strated in subsequent sections, thi s fact has m ajor financial significance for
th e WBWCD.

Synopsis of the Lake Plains Problem

Most of the wate r control capacity a nd over two-fifths of the total
capital cost of the WBP res ides in facilities designed to irrigate the lake plains
region.

These include Pineview Re servoir, Slaterville Diversion, Layion,

Willa rd a nd Wa rren Canals, Willar d Reser voir, a nd the Willard and Layton
pumping plants.

The whole of this syste m is used ha rdly at all , but of cours e

must be paid for.
The intent of this Willard-Layton system was to bring new lake plains
la nd under culti vation, a nd to improve the productivity of such as i s a lready
cultivated.
content.

Much of the land in thi s region i s nonarable because of a high salt

It requires dra ining and flushing.

The Bureau of Reclamation con-

structed some large drainage ditches through the area, into which far m e rs
could drain their own fi e lds.

Fewer of these ditches were built than pla nned

because it quickly became apparent t hat alm ost no one was interested in
reclamation farming.

As a conseque nce, a very large portion of the water

supply developed by the WBP evaporates from Willard Reservoir or flows into
Gr eat Salt Lake.

Water sports and game bird hunting are turning out to be the
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most significant benefits from this part of the system, and the Conservancy
District and others in the state are arguing that a larger portion of the Project
capital cost should be declared nonreimbursable.

1

Part of the land that could be served by the Willard- Layton system
was already under irrigation before the WBP was built.

It was classed by

Bureau of Reclamation planners as needing supplemental water.

Very few

WBWCD delivery contracts have been made with irrigation companies in this
region, however . Wayne Winegar, Secretary-Manager of the WBWCD,
attributes this lack of interest primarily to the fact that U &I Sugar Company
has a large water right which it rents to its client farmers on a seasonal
basis.

2

Potential customers understandably find this arrangement more

appealing than signing a 60-year repayment obligation with the WBWCD.

This

explanation for lack of interest in Project Water is not completely sati sfyini,
for it suggests that the need for supplemental water was not there in the first
place.

(The U&I right must antedate WBP rights by several decades.) That

suspicion is supported by some observations of Darrel Stokes, Davis County
Agent? Much irrigating is done in the lake plains area using waste water

1

"Boat Paradise at Willard Bay," Deseret News , 9 September, 1975.

2
This term is revealing. ll is, of co urs e , storage and conveyance
faciliti es that are rented. Getting water from the river is the problem, not
availability of water itself. The rental terminology is Winegar's but appears
to be common usage.
3

Personal communication, Spring, 1972 .
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from higher ground.
company.

The major canal in the region is owned by a Hooper

When they learned what their repayment obligation would be if

they contracted for WBP water, they found it more attractive to invest in
concrete lining for their canal ! Thus an unneeded investm ent is duplicated,
in part, because it was poorly designed and the potential customers can avoid
paying for it directly by making yet a nother investment.
The lack of interest in specifically reclamation farming is not diffi cult to understand.
owned.

Nearly all the land in the Jake plains region is privately

The units tend to he small, even with generous portions of salt grass

pasture (nonarable), and the ownership pattern is fairly scattered and complex.

Most of the owners are either non-serious part-time farmers, or older

operators "who have bought their last tractor and are accustomed to summering one head on ten acres of salt grass."

1

Such land owners are generally

uninterested in either serious reclamation farming, or in selling to would-be
farmers at a price consistent with commercial agric ulture. If drained a nd
flushed, these lands could be very productive for garden (vegetable) farming,
as one or two outstanding examples demonstrate.

(One showplace is the

J . K. Wheeler farm at West Farmington.) Part-time or semi-retired owner-

operators are not capable of the kind of effort that is required.
Serious potential farmers are deterred by e ffective barriers to land
assembly.

1

The current land owners, described above, are as disinte rested

The phrase of Wayne Winegar.
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in selling as they are in farming--except at exorbitant, speculative prices.
Unless they can retire on the proceeds of a sell-out, making-do or off-farm
employment appears to be their best alternative.

There are a few owners

who would be willing to sell at prices consistent with agricultural potential,
but their units are too small for economic operation, and are bordered by the
lands of owners who are holding out for speculative prices.

County Agent

Stokes estimated in 1972 that the cost of assembling an economic unit and
draining it was about $1500 per acre . Irrigation water from the WBP at less
than $3 per acre foot is clearly not the major deterrent to agricultural expansion under these circumstances.

Synopsis of the Municipal and Industrial Problem

Although no person or agency connected with the building or operation
of the WBP appears willing to come forth with a bald statement of the fact, it
is quite clear from official and published information that the municipal and
industrial aspect of the Project was designed almost solely as a repayment
mechanism.

The repayment contracts for irriga tion companies were designed

to provide water at a price that commercial agriculture could afford to pay
pre-construction agricultural economic studies were undertaken to determine
the value of water in agricultural production,

1

and the contract price

1
one such study was undertaken at Utah State University, independently from the Bureau. Walter U. Fuhriman, George T. Blanch, and Clyde
E . Stewart, Economic Analysis of Agricultural Potentials of Weber Basin
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established accordingly by Bureau of Reclamation fiat.

The remainder of

the r epayment bill is designed to be met by a combination of ad valorem
property taxes a nd sales of M&I water.

The contract price for M&I was set

to make up the difference between estim a ted revenues from the sum of irrigation fees a nd property taxes,
pricing details,

2

1

and total costs of the Project.

Pendse provides

but in general irrigation companies pay about $3 per acre

foot, wh ile M&I c ustomers (towns) are assessed $15 per acre foot.

Operation

and maintenance costs (a charge by the Bureau against the WBWCD) are also
born disproportionately by towns a nd cities . The 1959 DPR estimated O&M
charges for irrigation at $1. 40 per a. f., a nd a t the same time proposed an
assessment of $10 per a . f. against M&I users.
$12. 50 by 1973

0

(The latter figure was up to

)

Part of the operation and maintenance for municipal water must be
allocated specifi cally to WBWCD treatment and distribution facilities.

And

to pay off the bonds which it issued to construct its treatment and delivery
facilities, the WBWCD lays on another $16 .00 per a. f. to M&I users .

This

means that municipalities buying cullinary water from the WBWCD face a total

llcclamation Project, Utah, Special Heport No . 7 (Logan, Utah: Utah Agricultural Experim ent Station, Utah State University, 1952).
1
There is a one-mill levy on all real property within the boundary of
the WBWCD (see map). T here is legislative authority for expanding thi s by
1/2 mill if necessary.
2

Pends e, circa p. 70.
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assessment of $43. 50 per acre foot, composed as follows:
Repayment to the Bureau

$15 .00

Repayment of WBWCD bonds

$16. 00

Operation and maintenance

$12.50

Total

$43 . 50

By contrast, most municipalities in the East Shore can develop ground water
sources for $12-15 per acre foot.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that

the Conservancy District's M&l contracts have expanded only very slightly
since before construction of the WBP commenced .
Cheap ground water is the obvious cause of sales resistance to M&I
water from the WBP. It is a major manifestation of water abundance in the
Weber Basin, and in the East Shore area particularly.

Knowledge of the

region's ground water was slow to develop, and emerged only after the WBP
was under way.

Such information as there was had been developed by hydrolo-

gists of the U.S. Geological Survey a nd Bureau of Re clamation.

Federal

government officers knew more about ground water resources of the region
than virtually any state or local functionaries.

Circumstantial evidence sug-

gests they may have found it ad vantageous to sustain a degree of knowl edge
monopoly.
The WBP could not be paid for without major financia l s upport from
sources other than commercial agric ulture.

That meant enterprises and

individuals to whom water was not a major productive input to profit-oriented
operations.

Municipal and industrial customers were the obvious answer ,
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gi ven that major hydroelectric development--the traditional paying partner
of Reclamation--was not feasible.

M&I contracts at high prices would not

be possible if knowledge of ground wate r potential was generally available.
Hydrologists in the State Division of Water llesources and the Utah Water
Re search Laboratory suspect the Bureau and U. S. G. S. of having been less
than frank with state and local people about ground water resources in the
East Shore a rea prior to 1966, and even in the official report published in
that year.

1

On the other hand, hydrological investigations of south Davis County
did suggest meagre ground water resources in that region, and as will be
shown, south Davis was the principal source of popular support for the WBP .
Furthermore, it is quite clear that promoters of the WBP, both in and out of
the Bureau of Reclamation, were not interested in looking at ground water
as an alternative.
It is interesting that the Bureau of Reclamation would not begin con-

struction on certain parts of the Project until the Conservancy District had
signed firm, long-term contracts with customers.

Although applied to both

irrigation and municipal users, this policy did not affect all parts of the
Project with equal force.

It seems to ha ve been applied most rigorously in

re s pect of the high-line project on the Davis a nd Weber benches, and not at all
in the case of the Willard system.

1

P. P. 518.

A certain proportion of the anticipated
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cost of the high-line system had to be covered by binding contracts before the
Bureau would begin construction. When some anticipated customers in that
region demurred, the Bureau scaled down its pla ns accordingly, so that the
existing facilities a re not as large as intended at one point in the pre-investment stage. It is ther efore possible to say that, as signed up for in advance,
the Weber Basin Project is virtually fully used.

1

The previous section noted that rational cost cal culators have found
it advantageous to make further investment in water control and conveyance
faciliti es rather than to contract with the WBWCD for delivery of irrigation
water.

The same is true to an even greater degree in respect of M&I sup-

plies. Instead of expanding their contracts with the WBWCD, towns a nd cities
in the East Shore area have been meeting increased water requirements by
developing new wells. Already redundant water deli very facilities therefore
continue to be duplicated in the WBP s ervice a rea.

Major Conjectural Conclusions about the Weber
Basin Project Purposes and Operations

Special technological interests and chamber of commerce growth
promotion were prime movers in creation of the WBP. A reasonably demonstrated need for imported water in south Davis County was the plausible
excuse.

Costs of the high-line aqueduct system for Davis County (and the

1
Information in this paragra ph from Wayne Winegar, personal communication, Spring 1972.
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Uinta Bench in Weber County) were very high in proportion to potential
irrigation benefits, and to potential repayment capacity. Benefits and payment capacity were expended by means of the Willard-Layton reclamation
scheme in the first case, and by hi gh-priced M&I contracts in the second.
Actual beneficiaries of the WBP are primarily residents of the upper
bench lands of the East Shore, and they tend to be concentrated heavily in
south Davis County.
ephemeral.

Benefits from land reclamation have proved to be

The burden of repayment is falling disproportionately on people

living in parts of the Basin that were not even intended to receive major benefits from the Project.
The assertion of this section will be s upported in the pages that
follow, a nd reviewed again in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER III
HYDROLOGIC BACKGROUND OF WEBE R BASIN PROBLEMS

The problems of the Weber Bas in Water Conservancy District are
intimately related to various kinds and degrees of hydrological ignorance.
The state of professional knowledge was backward when the Weber Basin
Proj ect was in its formative stages, and public awareness was natura lly much
farther behind.

Legal institutions and interpretations based on obsolete

notions of hydrology probably had as much influence in spurring local desire
for the WBP as did physi cal conditions of water supply.

The financial prob-

lem of the Co nservancy District, mainly a failure to se ll enough municipal
and industrial water , is a direct cons equence of a change in water knowledge
during the decade of the 1950s. Seve ral other resentments and misgivings
about the WBP and WBWCD that came to light in the course of this investigation are explained by the same general problem of hydrologic innocence.
Because they play so prominent a role in the political-economic issues surrounding the WBP, selected details about water presence and movement in
the Basin are presented in this chapter for the benefit of readers with no
hydrologi c background.
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General Significance of Groundwater

Of the total world supply of water, 97 percent is in the seas a nd of
little or no practical value for human consumption. Of the remaining 3 perce nt, hydrologists estimate that 75 percent is bound up in glaciers and ice
sheets . Only three-tenths of 1 percent of the remaining 25 percent of fresh
water is in the form of surface water in lakes and rivers.

Except for small

amounts of atmospheric and soil moisture, all the rest is groundwater.

1

Another authority puts it this way:
Water is the most abundant substance on the earth . . . Scientists
estimate that the water in the earth's crust a nd in its a tmosphere
amounts to t hree times the quantity of a ll other materials combined
The seas and oceans contain about 97 percent of all the water
on earth. Snow, glaciers, and the polar icc caps account for about
2 1/4 percent. Water in rivers and lakes and the ground water
below the earth's surface, taken together, represent about sixtenths percent of the total. Water vapor in the atmosphere accounts
for only a small fraction of a percent . . . Actually, less than 3 percent of the fluid fresh water available at any given moment on our
planet Earth occurs in streams and lakes. The other more than 97
percent--an estimated 8 trillion acre-feet is underground. 2
This same so urce adds that groundwater reservoirs constitute the largest
storage of fresh water in virtually any country.

Underground water in U.S .

reservoirs exceeds by many times the capacity of a ll surface reservoirs,
including the Great Lakes.

A U.S. G. S. hydrologist has estimated that total

1
Gunnar Hoppe in the Introduction to Eriksson et al. , Ground Water
Problems (London: Pergamon Press, 1966).
2

Ground Water and Wells (Saint Paul, Minnesota: Johnson Division,
Universal Oil Products Co., 1972), Chapter 1.
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groundwater is about ten times annual precipitation, or equa l to total surface
runoff to streams and lakes for 35 years.

1

Utah and the Weber Basin are no exceptions to these general statements.

"The water stored underground in Utah is more t han enough to fill a ll

of the existing man-made reservoirs several times over.

The Milford-Beryl-

Enterprise Basin a lone probably contains about 25 million acre feet of water,
more than enough to fill Lake Mead. "

2

Hydrologic studies that will be cited

extensively below s uggest that enough water could be withdrawn from aquifers
in the East Shore area of the Weber Basin every year to equal the total production of the WBP--without even drawing down the underground reservoir
significantly.
Another significant feature of groundwater is its generally low bacterial content.

In Sweden, groundwater sources are " very much limited both

as regards number and capacity," yet the Swedes seek them out and take
e laborate measures to replenish them for the treatment effects a lone.

3

For

the same quali ty of water, measured by temperature, bacterial, chemical,
and physical factors, highly developed replenishment and recovery techniques
cost less than treatment plants for surface water.

1

"It may in general be said

Ibid., Chapter 2.

2
Hay Mar sell, Eighth Biennial rreport of the Utah Water and Power
Board, 1962, p. 49 .
3

Material in this paragraph from G. Winqvist, "Artificial Replenishment of Ground Water," in Eriksson et al.
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that wherever ground water of good quality exists in sufficient quantities, it
is preferable to s•1rface water for drinking purposes . " As it moves through
the ground to the subterranean reservoir the quality of water improves.
"Unfortunately little is known of the essential details of this process and the
subject is doubtless a large and important field for investigation and research." Some things are known, nevertheless: There is intensive
biological activity in the sand surface of the infiltration (recharge) basin.
"Below the surface of the sand • . . the number of bacteria decreases
rapidly.

At a relatively short distance from the infiltration surface no

bacteria can be found a nd the ground water is sterile from there on .

We

are not quite sure what happens to viruses under the same conditions
Virologists are unable to make proper investigation with available techniques.
"The general impression nevertheless is that a long detention time in the
ground is more favorable than the short treatment time in a surface water
treatment plant." Physical-chemical changes also occur, especially reduction in odor and taste.
filter beds.

This is attributed mainly to biological activity in the

The "treatment" is obviously affected by the distance the water

flows and the time it remains underground.

Heat capacity of the gravel and

sand obviously affects the rate of temperature equalization. Detention time
is considered to be the most important factor in quality improvement, however, and the author gives 200 days as a general guide to most satisfactory
results, provided that the raw water is of "normally good quality. "
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A Utah expert on groundwater, the late Dr. Ray E. Marsell of the
University of Utah and the State Water and Power Board, made the following
observations about the advantages of gToundwater development in 1962:
1n the most ins tances ground-water reservoirs are much larger
than most surface reservoirs, and they hold in storage large volumes
of water that can be drawn on as a reserve s upply during dry cycles
when surface supplies are depleted (the summer of 1961, for example). Thus ground-water reservoirs can be regarded as a n
insurance policy against drought! This water stored undergrou nd
is not subject to loss by evaporation as is the case with surface
reservoirs. For example: Utah Lake (a surface reservoir) loses
as much water by evapora tion as is used from the Lake both for
irrigation and industry combined, amounting on the average to over
300,000 acre-feet annually.
The large initial capital outlay required to build a surface
reservoir, often amounting to many millions of dollars, is unnecessary for a ground-water reservoir. Nature has provided the
la tter type practically free! The land covered by the body of water
of a surface reservoir, except for recreation, is withdrawn from

other uses and is generally very costly to acquire; on the other hand,
the land surface above a ground-water reservoir can be fully
developed for other purposes. Several of Utah's largest cities
occupy much of the surface of their respective ground-water reservoirs . No silting problem exists for ground -water reservoirs.
There are no dams to give way with the possible attendant great
loss of life and enormous damage to property. The quality of ground
water is less variable and the temperature more uniform. These
are only a few of the advantages of ground-water reservoirs over
surface reservoirs. 1

Retarded Development of Underground Hydrology

Although wells and springs have been used by man since prehistoric
times, only very recently has technology been available to extract an

1

R. E. Marsell, "Development of Utah's Ground-Water Resrouces,"
Eighth Biennial Report Utah Water and Power Board, 1960-1962, p. 49.
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understanding of what groundwater is where it occurs . One prevalent idea
in the past was that sea water flowed in und erground caverns to springs and
wells, and that it was converted to fresh water in the process. Successful
we lls were thought to intercept one of these underground streams.

The

general ignorance about groundwater has hamp ered the physical problems of
finding and using groundwater.

It has a lso he lped to perpetuate many arbi-

trary, inappropriate legal definitions.
Ground water has been divided into many legal classes,
including underground ri vers , underground lakes, percolating
water, diffused water, defined underground channel s, and springs.
Classifying water by inaccurate legal terms appears to be the principal cause of failure of many attempts to regulate ground water use
or to promote conservation measures. Some judicial decisions
resulting from this situation rest upon erroneous assumptions contr·ary to well-known facts about ground water .
Gro und water
law has been confused and inconsistent. 1
Until 1700 it was believed that precipitation alone was not sufficient
to account for all the water flowing in rivers--some of it must come from sea
water that moved inland underground to reappear through springs to supplement the fresh water in lakes and rivers (it was presumed to be desalted by
some unknown process in the transition). In the years just before 1700 Pierre
Perrault undertook studies of precipitation and runoff in the watershed of the
Seine lliver.

He found that precipitation was six times the outflow of the

river, proving that rainfall could easily account for stream flow, water used
by plants, and water percolating down beyond the reach of plant roots.

1
Ground Water and Wells, p. 11.
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Perrault's work was essentially the beginning of the modern study of
hydrology.
Hydrologic investigation depends heavily on the technique of welldrilling.

Drilled wells , as contrasted to dug ones, were an innovation of the

12th century.

In 1126 a successful well was drilled in Artois, France.

The

term "artesian" derives from the name of that community. Significant progress in well-dri lling was retarded for obvious reasons until well into the
Industrial Revolution.

According to Johnson Company,

1

the most significant

strides have been made in France , Engla nd, Germany, a nd the United States.
Systematic study of groundwater began only after well-drilling technology was fairly common.

The first undertaken in the United States was in

Wisconsin, between 1873 and 1879.

The U. S. Geological Survey was orga-

nized in 1879, but although it recognized water as a mineral resource within
its domain, the Survey did not begin groundwater investigations until 189 0.
Vigorous groundwater investigation and deve lopment in the United States did
not begin until about 1915.

In Utah it has been even more retarded.

In t he article cited above , Dr. Marsell gave an historical sketch of
groundwater d evelopment in Utah: It has bee n mostly a matter of trial a nd
error, he said, and most of the work was undertaken and financed by individual water users and well-drillers . Such development "is a lways slow,

1
rruormation on the history of groundwater investigation is mostly
from the Johnson Company handbook, Ground Water and Wells.

50

haphazard, inefficient, expensive, and wasteful.

The many costly failures

inherent in this method, tended in many instances to discourage further
development." However, well-drillers gradually acquired a store of useful
knowledge about those areas with which they were most familiar, and they
became the "expert" consultants on all matters of developing the client's well:
location, depth, size, pump, etc.

Nevertheless, "Utah has been slow--very

slow--to develop her ground-water reservoirs.

In large part, this has been

due to an almost complete lack of hydrologic and geologic data upon which
systematic and efficient developme nt must depend." Marsell makes the
observation that while the discovery a nd deve lopment of groundwater in Utah
has been in the tradition of individual freedom and enterprise, it has also,
for that very reason, been inefficient.
As consultant to the Water and Power Board, Dr. Marsell noted the
problems created for the Board by the paucity of information about groundwater in the state:
The water supply in a ground-water reservoir is like a bank
account and the water administrator, like the banker, must know:
(1) the capacity of the reservoir; and (2) the amount of useable
water in storage from which safe withdrawals can be made; (3)
the pumpage by wells and natural loss es by evaporation and transpiration (withdrawals); and (4) the most difficult of all hydrologic
factors to determine is the annual recharge to the reservoir--the
deposits in our "water bank account." For the 56 known and
probably ground-water reservoirs in Utah, complete data covering
these four hydrologic factors are practically nonexistent! In the
absence of such absolutely essential information, the administrator
of Utah's vast ground-water resources has been severely hampered
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in discharging his duties, and thus the deve lopment of our
ground-water resources has been seriously retarded. 1
Had it not bee n for the U.S. Geological Survey, Mars ell continued, the State
would have practically no basic information regarding its groundwater
s upplies . U.S. G. S. began investigations in Utah early in this century and
between 1906 and 1913 published five hydrologic-geologic reports on the
occurrence of groundwater in large a r eas of western Utah.

These laid an

excellent foundation for more detailed investigations that followed.

As of 1962

there had been published thirty-five investigations of groundwater in Utah,
virtua lly all of them prepared by personnel of the U.S. G. S. Furthermore,
a lthough there are fifty-six known or probable groundwater basins in the State
adequate and relatively recent studies we re lacking for forty-one of them as
of 1962.

Most investigations up to that time had been limited to areas where

groundwater was a lready being actively used for irrigation or municipa l
s upply.
Marsell insisted that while progress had been made, it was not
enough.

Vital information about pumpage a nd recharge was still (1962 )

unknown for virtually all of the state's ground wa ter reservoirs.

Well records

ha ve little significance unless the time s pan of the record covers about 100
years.

2

He spent a career urging the state to increase its effort in ground-

water investigation.

1
Ground Water and We lls, p. 6.
2

Personal communication.
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After 1935 the U.S . G.S. matched funds with the State Engineer in
groundwater inve stigations.
$5,000.

In 1935 the amount put up by eaeh side was

By 1962 it had grown only to $66, 500. According to Bob Murdock

of the State Water Resources Division, a colleague of the late Dr. Marsell,
these invcstigati vc resources compare to thos e expended by the state on
surface water "as horses to frogs in favor of surface water. "

1

He empha-

sized, however, that this comparison applied to investigation only, not to
development.

Technical Primer on Groundwater Hydrology

2

All groundwater, of course, originates in precipitation. Only a
fairly small portion of total precipitation finds its way into the groundwater
r eservoir. Some becomes s urface runoff imm ediate ly. Another part soaks
into the soil only to be drawn up by plant roots or soil capillarity a nd thereby
lost through evaporation and transpiration.

The remaining portion, which

soaks below the plant root zone, keeps moving under the influence of gravity
until it enters the groundwater reservoir or zone of saturation.

Once in the

zone of saturation water moves laterally through the pores of the subsurface

1

Personal communication.

2
T he .Johnson Company volume cited earlier in this chapter is the
source for these note s. It provides illustrations which interested readers
will find very helpful.

53

materia ls, and may reappear as surface wate r at elevations lower than where
it entered the groundwater reservoir.
Geologists refer to the earth's crust as the lithosphere.

Lithology

is, therefore, the study of the various la yers that occur in a cross section of
the crus t , or lithosphere.

(All of these materials are called rocks, whether

they be sand, clay, or granite.) The outer part of the crust is normally
porous to a greater or lesser depth, and is called the zone of rock fracture.
At greater depths lie consolidated rocks whi ch are unde r such great press ur e
that no space exists for water.

Within the zone of rock fracture the pores of

the lithosphere may be wholly or partially filled with water.

The lower por-

tion of the zone is obviously the mos t likely to be saturated with water, a nd
does constitute the groundwater r eservoi r.

The upper surface of the saturated

zone is called the water table. Above the water table there is water in among
the rocks, but they are unsaturated.
vadose zone.

This is called the zone of aeration or

Water gradually percolates down through this zone to the wate r

table, c ut capillary and molecular attractio n work counter to gravity to retard
its descent.

In case s where the water table happens to be near to the s urface

(as by a stream whi ch is fed from groundwater discharge) the roots of som e
plants extend a ll the way down through t he vadose zone to tap the groundwater
reservoir.

These a r e phreatophytes, which grow witho ut dependence on the

be ll of soil moisture , as the upper most level of the vadose zone is called .
Water in lower levels of the vados e zone, below the belt of soil moisture, is
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in dead s torage .

It ca nnot be used by pla nts (except phreatophytes, of

cour se) , no r can it be recovered by wells.
O nly that wate r in the zone of saturation (below the water table) i s

proper ly referred to as groundwater.

"The saturated zone may be viewed as

a huge natural reservoir or system of reservoirs whose capacity is the total
vo lum e of the pores or openings in the rocks that are filled with water.
Gr oundwater may be found in one continuous body or in several separate
strata . " The zone of saturation m ay vary in t hickness from a few feet to
many hundreds of feet , a nd usua lly co ntains seve r a l formation or strata within it. These strata will have differing degrees of perm eability for water .
Thos e with pores large e nough to yi eld water to wells or springs at a s uffi cie nt
rate to ser ve as a practical water s upply are called aquifers.

Clay, for

example , may be thoroughly saturated with water but cannot qualify as an
aquifer because water cannot move readily through its tiny pores .

The

presence of impermeable or ve ry s lightly permeable strata at particular
e levatio ns can ha ve a confining effect on the water table, which is controlled
to a degree by topography.

In fact, the water table tends to follow, generally,

the s hape of the land s urface.

If the water table should happe n to occur within

a permeable laye r, that layer is said to be a n unconfined aquifer, a nd the
water in it is sa id to occur und er water table conditions.

Hydraulic pressure

in a water table aquife r is equal to the depth in feet from the water ta ble to the
po int in question.

It is expressed as hydrauli c head in feet of water .
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Water in a n aqui fer may become confined under an impervious layer,
be low the water table . By the definition of the previous paragraph, s uch
water has a n hydraulic head.

If the confi ning layer were punctured , water in

the co nfined aquifer would te nd to ri se up to a leve l that is analagous to the
water table is a n unconfined aquifer.

The height to which it will actually rise

in a pipe is called the piezometric leve l.

Groundwater reservoirs of this

desc ription are called artesian aq uifers, and wells tapping them, of course,
are artesian wells.

"An imaginary s urface representing the a rtesia n pres-

s ure or hydraulic head throughout a ll or part of a n artesian aquifer i s ca lled
the piezo metric surface." If this s urface ha ppe ns to be above the land surface,
than a we ll tapping the artesian aquifer below will result in the water rising
we ll above the land surface--a flowing well.

![the well casing (pipe) is

extended high eno ugh to stop the flow, the water level in the pipe will be , of
course, the pi ezo metri c leve l.
Sometimes a localized, impe r vious layer (such as consolidated rock
or tight clay) occurs in the vadose zo ne, thereby preventing percolating water
from r eac hing the zone of saturation below.

A saturation will, therefore,

deve lop above the impervious layer and a condition analago us to a water table
aquifer obtains. Such phe nom e na arc ca lle d bodies of perched water.
In the place already cited , Marsell made some observations about
stages in the de velopment of groundwater r ese rvoirs that can be seen as easy
inferences from the foregoing tec hni cal account .

Mar sell described these

stages as typical of the patte rn followed in all of Utah's groundwater reservoirs :

56

In the initial stage , wells are few in number and practically
a ll we lls flow at the s urface , indicati ng that the aquifers or water
bearing layer s of gra vel a nd said s lope basinward and are fully
saturated , thus producing the hydrostatic pressure that brings t he
water , when tapped by wells, to the s urface. Some of the larger
diameter wells, at this stage, may flow with relatively large
volume. As many additional we lls are dri lled , the next stage is
reached where the pressure is sufficiently red uced so that some of
the former "flowing" wells of stage one fail to flow, particularly
in the upper margin of the reservoir. This does not mean that the
avai lable water supply is being depleted ! It merely indicates the
loss of head brought about t hro ugh lowe red pressure. The bodies
of grave l or sand (aquifers) that contain the water are still fully
saturated' The lower ing of a few inches of the water level in a
given we ll, when a nearby well is pumped, both we lls tapping ''confined " or "ar tesian" wate r in the s ame aquifer or aquifers, may
indicate the removal of less than a bucket of wate r from within t he
casi ng of the affected standing we ll, so sensiti ve is the water level
under hydrostatic pressure . In the third stage in the evolution of
development of our ground water r eservoirs , the number of wells
that cease to flow incre as es r a pidly a nd pumps are installed to lift
the wate r to the surface, which also greatly increases the amount
of water obtained from the we ll . Wells under four inches in
diameter cannot be equipped with deep well pumps so new wells
of larger diameter must be drilled . . . In the final stage of co mplete deve lopm ent no wells flow and the ground water reservoir
becomes a ''pumping field. " Now that the ··pressure" has greatly
diminished, natural lo sses are correspondingly greatly reduced
a nd the reservoir will now safely y ie ld fo ur to fives times as much
1
water as in any of t he earli er stages in the developme nt of the basin.
Mars e ll used the example of the Bo untiful district to illustrate these principles.

At the time of writing (1962) Bountiful was in stage three of develop-

m c nt.

We will see later that a significant part of the cons ternation that led to

the WBP was due to popular fear that mistook stage two for impending exha us tion of the groundwater reservoir.

Perhaps more important eve n than that,

1
Ground Water a nd Wells, p. 10.
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however, was obsolete legal terminology which interpreted stage two as
exhaustion.
A macroscopic perspecti ve on Utah geology is highly useful to understanding the reports of hydrologists: water runs downhill, except as lifted
by evaporation or transpiration. It is de posited as precipitation. In Utah,
most of it falls on the mountains.

From the mountains it flows downhill,

over the surface and through anything permeable in its course.

It will flow

into bedrock if there are cracks, but there are limits to the depths water can
reach because the rocks of the earth's crust become more dense with
increas ed depth, and eventually plas tic in the mantle. Some water is trapped
at great depths in bedrock chasms and will never reach the sea unless there is
a major geo logic upheaval.

The Great Basin is a similar kind of trap.

By

moving water can and does flow over and through the upper part of the zone
of saturation.
Bedrock is buckled and folded in Utah, and its broken edges proj ect
above the earth 's surface on mountain peaks.

Between these broken edges,

softening the r elief, is a great mass of unconsolidated (loose) fill.

When rai n

a nd snowmelt runs down the tilted bedrock, most of it r uns through this
permeable fill rather than over it.

Much o f it, therefore, winds up in the'

m ass of sediment that partially fills the troughs between the ranges of bedrock
peaks.

When the level of saturation is high e nough in these sediment-choked

troughs, the upper layer of water seeps through cracks and openings in the
jagged bedrock upthrusts, and makes its way into lower valleys until it
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reaches c i lher a conduit to the sea or an inland evaporating pan like the Great
Basin.
From this per spe ctive we s hould not be surprised to find that t he
mountain valleys of Utah have exce lle nt groundwater reservoirs.

One might

also predict that waters be low the desert fl oor of the Great Basin are of poor
quality, but perhaps relatively abundant.

The ma r gi ns of Great Salt Lake

represent the emergence of the water table, or zone of saturation, above the
s urface of the Basin fill.

1

Groundwater Inv estigations in the East Shore

Geologists define the East Shore area as the low-lying lands west of
the Was atch front, border ed on the north by the Lower Bear River Valley.
It is a well-defined groundwater unit, with three identifiable districts:

Bountiful district includes the area so uth of Farmington Bay; the Weber Delta
district extends to Bear Rive r Bay; above that is the Brigham district.
The principle service area of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
Distri ct is the region described above as the Webe r Delta and Bountiful
groundwater districts.

The WB WCD is essentially coterminous with the Webe r

River drai nage basin, with the additio n of what is here called the Bountiful

1

There a re dese rt valleys in Utah, defined by lower mountain ranges
tha t receive relatively little precipitation. These valleys do not ha ve good
groundwater reservoirs beca use of this low precipi tation, and for other
reasons explained by Mars ell. Eleventh Biennial Report of the Division of
Water Hesources (State of Utah, 1968) , pp. 67- 73.
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groundwater district.

The East Shore area of the WBWCD is , therefore , the

land lying west of the Wasatch Front between the City Creek spur a nd the
Pleasant View salient of the Wasatch Range.

This East Shore area is the

most important groundwater resources which are a major factor in the
WBWCD's problems.
Serious hydrologic study of the East Shore a r ea did not get unde r way
until a fter World War II.

It has bee n m ore or less continuous since that time.

The first major investigation was by Thomas a nd Nelson, who confined their
efforts t o the Bountiful District, and r eported their results in 1948.

1

A team

from the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Geological Survey carried out
an inte nsive cooperative study of the Weber De lta District in the early 1950 ' s.
Although their operations were te rminate d in 1956 , their results were not
published until 1966.

2

In the meantime a sma lle r scale study of groundwater

conditions in the whole East Shore area was publis hed as a cooperative effort
be tween the U.S. G. S. and the State E ngineer of Utah.

3

In 1970 a gr o up from

1
H. E. Thomas and W. B. Nelson, "Ground Water in the East Shore
Area, Uta h, " Twenty-sixth Biennal Heport of the Utah State Engineer (1948 ).
(This document if out of print a nd s car ce . I us ed an onion-skin carbon of the
original report in the State Engineer's Office.)
2
P. P. 518 . Some inte rim internal r eports we re produced, one of
which is the subject of Appendix IV.
3
R . E. Smith and J. S. Gates, Gr ound-Water Conditions in the
Southern and Central Parts of the East Shore Ar ea, Uta h , 1953 -1961. Utah
Geological a nd Mineralogical Survey, Water Resources Bulletin 2, 1963 .
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Utah State Uni versity published some more recent data about the East Shore
as part of a l arger study.

1

And in 1971 an exhaustive report on groundwater

in the East Shore was prepared by two hydrologists at the Salt Lake office of
the U.s. Geological Survey.

2

Since 1964, groundwater conditions have been

monitored constantly in connection with developing a State Water Plan.
3
Hydrology of the Weber Delta District

The District is like a bathtub containing a gigantic sponge whose contours fit exactly into the tub, except that it is too large in some dimensions,
so that part of the sponge sticks up out of the tub and spreads over the western
side.

The tub is made of consolidated rock--bedrock, through which water can

penetrate only if there are fissures.

The sponge is loose or unconsolidated

material, such as gravel, sand, silt, and clay, with varying degrees of
permeability.

1
F. W. Haws, R. W. Jeppson, and A. L. Huber, Hydrologic
Inventory of the Weber River Study Unit (Logan, Utah: Utah State University,
Utah Water Research Laboratory, 1970) .
2
E. L. Boike and K. M. Waddell, "Ground Water in the East Shore
Area; Box Elder, Davis, and Weber Counties, Utah, 1960-1969." United
States Geological Survey, Salt Lake City, Utah, Open File Hcport, 1971.
Prepared by U.S . G. S. in cooperation with the Utah Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Water Hights.
:sThe description of the Weber Delta District is drawn mostly from
the fundamental work of Feth eta!., P. P. 518 .
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Geologists believe that surrounding fault lines allowed the bedrock
floor to drop like a trap-door hinged near Farmington, thus forming a bathtub-shaped depression which is filled to overflowing with unconsolidated material.

The Wasatch Front is one obvious fault line; a north-south line from the

south end of Promitory Point to the southern boundary of the Pleasant View
salient and up Ogden Canyon. Inside these fault lines there has been a vertical, downward displacement of bedrock, leaving bedrock walls along the fault
lines.

These walls extend above the surface along the Wasatch Front a nd at

Little Mountain, but at other places are not high enough to completely contain
the unconsolidated fill which, therefore, spills over the s ide as in the sponge
analogy . Bedrock slopes upward gradually to the ''hinge" near the latitud e
of Farmington. It also slopes up somewhat toward the north end (Pleasant
View salient) as well as toward each side.

Except at Little Mountain and

along the Wasatch Front, consolidated rocks forming this trough are not
exposed .
Thickness of unconsolidated fill in the trough is estimated to range
from 9, 000 feet at its greatest depth to a feather edge adjacent to the mountains . The trough is 25 miles from north to south, and 15 miles wide at its
greatest ex tent (north of Ogden). Its southwestern portion is presumed to
extend und er Great Salt Lake . By these dimensions, the volume of unconsolidated and poorly consolidated material deposited in and overflowing the bedrock basin is estimated to be approximately 200 c ubic miles.

This sponge

a nd bathtub contain the groundwater reservoirs of the Weber Delta District.
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The unconsolidated material constituting the sponge has been laid
down over several millenia in interfingering wedge or lens-shaped layers of
sand, silt, gravel, and clay. Some of the layers have been deposited by
streams, others by lakes.

Lacustrine (lake) deposits tend to be of finer, less

permeable materials than fluvial (river) deposits.

(Alluvial fan reservoirs

are especially significant in Utah according to Marsell.) Some of the layers
of unconsolidated fill (formations in geologic terminology) are exposed at
different levels along the mountain front.

Some of the formations are per-

meable and allow passage of water; others are not.

Formations containing

coarse materials absorb water that falls on or runs across their surface.

The

water percolates down through these permeable formations until it reaches the
fine and less permeable clay and silt formations, and then moves along the
top of them laterally to a point of discharge (a spring or lake). Other more
recent layers, often quite impermeable, lie above.

Impermeable layers

blanket the surface in areas of artesian discharge. A puncture in the impermeable layer releases an artesian flow as the reservoir seeks to stabilize
itself. Only the more permeable layers of fill (sand and gravel), even in the
saturated zone, can be considered as groundwater reservoirs, because water

moves too slowly through clay and silt to be extractable in useful quantities.
Layers in the Weber Delta fill-body all tend to slope downward away
from the mountain front.

This means that the water in reservoirs is con-

fined, as explained above . Such confinement creates artesian pressures at
points where the land surface is at a lower elevation than part of the reservoir.
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In the Weber Delta district the approximate upper limit of artesian flow is
4, 300 feet .
yards.

Many rural homes below that le ve l have flowing wells in their

The 4, 300 foot contour excludes most of the urban area of Weber

County except a part of northwest Ogden City.
Authors of the Feth report estimated that th e "sedimentary prism, "
which is the sponge of our analogy, contains 170 million acre feet of water .
Precipitation is, of course, the ultimate source of water in the reservoir.
However, only a small proportion of the precipitation falling on the surface
area of the fill finds its way into high-yield aquifers . This is, of course, due
to impermeable layers separating artesian aquifers from the surface, as well
as to losses from runoff and evapotranspiration.

The main areas where re-

charge takes place are a narrow belt running the length of the district along
the foot of the mountains, plus about 1 1/ 2 miles of the Weber River channel
beyond the canyon mouth . In these areas a layer of coarse material is
exposed which then submerges and is covered by impermeable layers.

On

bench lands along the mountain front, th erefore, some precipitation percolates directly to a rtesian aquifers - -the excess after evapotranspiration
and replenishment of soil moisture.

Direct precipitation on flatlands west

of the mountain front contributes little or no recharge to deep aquifers, but
probably does to shallow, unconfined ones.
Precipitation on other areas can reach the reservoir, howe ver.

As

noted, 1 1/2 miles of the Weber River channel are a major recharge area ;
hence precipitation falling as far away as the Uinta Mountains at the eastern

64

edge of the Weber Basin can recharge the Delta aquifer by means of the
river . Snow a nd r ain falling on the Wasatch Range eventually contribute large
but unmeasured volum es of water to the basin by percolation through fractures
and joints in the rocks of the range.

Rocks of the Wasatch Front near Willard

and Pleasant View are of Cambrian limestone, which is cavernous and holds
large quantities of water which discharge into Willard Bay and into wells in
the area . "The Ca mbrian lim estone, where present, . . . undoubted ly is
recharged with wate r from snowme lt and transmits it to the unconsolidated
aquifers in the Willard area and probably a lso in the Weber Delt district. "

1

Some Precambrian metamorphic rocks outcrop in the Wasatch Range just east
of the Wasatch Fault zone where they constitute a major part of the eastern
boundary of the groundwater basin.

They "probably contain and conduct large

vo lumes of water which recharge the aquifers of the Weber Delta district.

,z

Conceptions of the poss ible extent of this percolation from the mountains
are e nha nced by the theory of geologists that the Wasatch fault is likely not a
si ngle break, but a zone of shattering, movement, and slippage a mile or
more in width.

In some places the frontal-fault zone serves as a channel

for warm, mineralized water which rises from great depths.
Although the bathtub and sponge of our analogy do extend under the
bed of Great Salt Lake on the west and south, the main artesian aquifers

1
2

P. P. 518, p. 13.

fbid .• p. 12.
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apparently are not recharged with salt water.

The western side of the Weber

Delta district has a bed of clay deposited by Lake Bonneville. Although
estimated to be less than 10 feet thick, upward leakage of artesian water
through this clay is very s low, as it extends many miles westward under the
present basin of Great Salt Lake . Geologists believe it is a seal separating
lake brine from artesian aquifers under the lake.

In some cases, however,

when artesian pressures have been reduced by wells near the lake, salt water
brine has backed up into some of the shallower aquifers.

These may be un-

confined aquifers, however, which are not the principle groundwater reservoirs of the district.
Feth et al. , estimated the volume of annual recharge at about 70, 000
acre feet, from t hese sources:
Weber River

16, 000 acre feet

Ogden River

2, 000 acre feet

Mountain front streams

3, 000 acre feet

Mountain front subsurface

30,000 acre feet

Precipitation

10,000 acre feet

Irrigation on flatlands

4, 000 acre feet

Canal seepage

2, 000 acre feet
G7, 000 acre feet

These figures are estimates calculated from past records.

Therefore, while

the average annual recharge from the Weber River may be only 16,000 acre
feet, it was estimated at 100,000 acre feet in 1952, whereas the lowest value
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known was 9, 000 acre feet in 1934.

Thus the average value estimated is

certa inly a long way from the median of the highest and lowest values on
record.
The greatest significance, however, attaches to the fact that in a
flood year, when the river overflowed its banks onto the surrounding recharge
surface, its capacity to recharge the main aquifers amounted to 100,000 acre
feet.

(Estimated average annual yield from the entire Weber Basin Project

was projected to be 210,000 acre fe e t.) This suggests that deliberate efforts
to recharge the aquifer s through the 1 1/ 2 miles of the Weber channel below
the mouth of the canyon might produce some spectacular results.

In 1953 the

Bureau of Reclamation conducted a recharge experiment in this area.

A pit

30 feet deep with an area of 3 1/4 acres received surplus flow from the Weber
River over a continuous period of 7 weeks.
cfs. per acre .

It absorbed water at a rate of 7

1

A problem with recharge pits is that they can be filled in or surfaced

with silt.

They need scraping out from time to time, a nd turbid water (flood

season) is a problem.

However, 1952 was a year of major flooding, hence

turbidity, yet a remarkable quantity of recharge took place in spite of it.

2

A de liberate effort to build a catch basin by means of scraping up clay beds,

1

2

Ibid .• p. 44.

E. J. Fjelsted recalls that flood waters ran into a gravel pit near
the canyon mouth, but never did completely cover the bottom . This led to
the test described in P. P. 518. (Interview with E. J. Fjeldsted in 1969.)
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building a dam across the channel, a nd moving out the residential and farming
area would surely result in a far more s ignificant amount of addition to
groundwater reservoirs than the equivalent expense could provide in surface
water.

On the other hand, flood control provid ed by the WBP makes recharge

a more attracti ve proposition due to fewer silting problems in flood season.
This benefit must be weighed in evaluating comparative costs .
When it is noted that the 100,000 acre feet of recharge in 1952 was
from the Weber River alone, there must have been a total of at least 150,000
acre feet of recharge in that year when the other sources are accounted for.
Some hydrologists believe that deliberate recharge efforts of the kind
described above could provid e a n increment to East Shore groundwater reservoirs that would equal the water supply potential of the entire Weber Basin
Project. F urthermore, the aquifers of the Weber Delta district have ample
reserves that could have been drawn down in seasons of low precipitation for
many years before a surface project of WBP magnitude was ever needed.
Feth eta!., estimated that 100,000 acre feet of water (a conservative figure,
they say) could be withdrawn from Weber Delta aquifers without any dewatering
(just reducing artes ian pressure).

Dewatering the Delta aquifer to 50 feet

below its upper surface (its abo ut 250 feet thick) would produce another
300, 000 acre feet.

Dewatering other aquifers of the district to the sam e

extent (50 feet below their upper surfaces) would produce another 400, 000 acre
feet (again on conservative estimates). Thus 700,000 acre feet of groundwater
could be withdrawn from the Weber Delta District aquifers without seriously
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depleting them.

In 1974 the consumptive use of water generated by the

Weber Basin Project was 115,000 acre feet, of which nearly 10,000 came
from wells in the East Shore area . In 1971 total use was only 84,000 acre
feet.

1
Readers may find water budget figures for the Weber Delta District

useful for context.

The water budget was estimated by Feth and company,

and appears on page 33 of their report (see Table 1).
One item of income in the water budget merits special comment.
Ogden City we lls at Artesian Park are under Pineview Reservoir.

The

New pump

wells were drilled by the Bureau of Reclamation in connection with the expansion of Pineview, and the pump house is at the edge of the reservoir.

There

is a contractual agreement between the city and the Bureau to empty Pineview
for regular inspections and maintenance.

Feth et al. , noted that there is no

connection between the aquifers of Artesian Park and those of the Weber
Delta district.

Ogden City has been using this source for a long time, and

expects to supply most of its requirements from them for an indefinite time
to come.

Hence, Ogden City does not figure as a competitor for the ground-

water resources of the Weber Delta District. As Ogden is by far the largest
city in the District, the groundwater supply left to other municipalities is
truly abundant.

1
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District: Summary of Operations,
1971 and 1974. Layton, Utah.
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TABLE 1
WEBER DELTA DISTRICT WATER BUDGET

1, OOO's

1, OOO' s

Entering

of A. F.

of A. F.

Leaving

330

Weber River

360

Weber River

Ogden River
Mtn. front streams
Mtn. front streams

160
35
35

Canals

10

Drains and sloughs

20

Mtn. front discharge
to GSL

15

Runoff from preci p. , on
salt barrens

35

Ogden City Wells from
Artesian Park
Precip. below 5, 000 feet
Groundwater inflow from
mountain front
Total

15
350

30
950

Evap. a nd evapotran s:
Irrigated crops

170

Saltgrass pasture

160

Cattai I areas

60

Dryland crops

45

Salt barrens

40

Water surfaces

25

Lawns, townsites, etc.

20

Subtotal
Discharge unaccounted
for--leakage to GSL
Total
Source: P. P . 518, p. 33 .

930

20
950
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Political Overtones of the Feth Report

Some hydrologists beli eve that the authors of the Weber Delta study
were deliberately extreme in the conservatism of their estimates of groundwater pote ntials, especially in respect of recharge.

The investigation was

sponsored by the Bureau of Reclamation as part of the Weber Basin Project,
and was made between February 1953 a nd July 1956, prior to the completion
of any of the major e lements of the WBP.
page 3 of the report.

This acknowledgm ent appears on

But publication was delayed until 1966, by which time

most of the WBP structures had been completed.

Senior author J. H. Feth

was a staff member of the U.S. Geological Survey, but all the others, D. A.
Barker, L. G. Moore, C. E. Veirs, and R. J. Brown, were employed by the
Bureau of Reclamation.

L. G. Moore is still with the Bureau, doing ground-

water studies for the Central Utah Project at the Bureau's Provo office.

He

confirms that data for the report were generated in the 1940's and 1950's.
Hydrologists in Logan and at the Slate Capital have expressed
sympathy for the hypothes is of Bureau of Reclamation duplicity expressed in
Appendix II.

Frank Haws of the Utah Water Research Laboratory worked for

the Bureau in the early 1950's and was acquainted with J. H. Feth.

He says

that Feth was concerned at that Lime about the evidence of abundant groundwater and its potential effects on the Weber Basin Project. The Utah Water
Lab received pre-publication copies of the report and Haws says that virtually
none of the figures on groundwater from those early versio ns found their way
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into the final product.

A suggestion that the Bureau possibly sat on the Feth

study until the WBP was complete, a nd then cooked the figures, has bee n
made to a few hydrologists at the State Capitol.

Their response was a shrug

and a comment that such practice would be "nothing new for the Bureau."
Haws suggests that the State government does not believe much of what it is
told by the Bureau anymore, and cites as evidence its duplication of investigations a lready done and published by the Bureau (particularly in respect of
the near lli ver basin).
Throughout the 19G6 version of the Feth report, repeated emphasis is
given to the notion that groundwater cond itions c hange as man alters the
natural flow of water.

The pre fac e notes that the groundwater conditions

reported show the situation after modification by man--namely irrigation
recharge, well-drilling, drainage of land.

Twice in the text of the report the

a uthors observe that their exposition of groundwater sta tus as of 1953-1956
will serve as a benchmark from which to demonstrate increases in groundwater availability as the WBP progresses.

1

Alongside this forecast of

increased groundwater is the disclaimer that their knowledge of aquifer
capacities and recharge is incomplete and subject to change.
When evaluated in light of other circumstances surrounding the WBP,
these confessions and professions of ignorance and expe ctation are suggestive .
Why was publication withheld for 10 years if it was intended to demonstrate

1

P. P. 518, pp. 3 and 33.
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increases in groundwater as the WBP was completed? Did someone fear that
such honesty might catch them by surprise--with no s ubstantial increase in
groundwater? Earlier versions had the annual average groundwater recharge
at a considerably higher level than the 60-70,000 acre feet reported in the
published form.

Without further testing, the estimate was rounded down to

the published figure.

1
L. G. Moore noted in 1971 that large new wells in the

Weber Delta District have altered the understanding of its groundwater
resources from that presented in the Feth report.

No one can a rgue very

successfully against this position that the Bureau and Geological Survey have
drawn for themselves.

It has to be true, in general, that knowledge is in-

complete, and that even if it were perfect at one point in time, knowledge of
things as fluid as water must be subject to change.

Nevertheless, defenders

of the WBP such as Wayne Winegar, DeLore Nichols, and Rex Greenhalgh

2

must be grateful for the a rgument provided by the Feth report when they are
challenged on the inconsistency of such a n expensive construction project with
the abundance of groundwater with which the East Shore area is so obviously
endowed.

They are quick to respond that the abundance is only a facet

because of recharge provided through WBP facilities.

1
2

They may be right.

Personal communication.

Nichols will become more familiar to readers in Chapter IV.
Greenhalgh was, at the tim e he pro vi ded information for this investigation-1969--se nior officer in charge of the WBP at the Bureau of Reclamation's
regional office in Salt Lake City.
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Neverthe less , eve n without a conscious des ire to have a demons tration of
Project recharge, there was pl e nty of reason to sit on the report for 10 years,
fo r eve n the m odified figures fina lly reported would have cas t serio us doubt
on the eco nomic wisdo m of going a head with the WBP had they been public
information in 19 56 or 1957.
The Fcth report was generated completely from within the Reclamation--Geologic Survey burea ucracy .

It provides no counter- evidence against

the hypothesis of Appendix II that bureaucratic self- interest was a principal
so urce of the WBP.

On the contra r y , it lends pla usibility. Documents pre-

pared by the B urea u of llcclamat.ion a nd found in the Sta le Engineer's Office
provide expli c it co nfirmation lh allhe Bureau had ample knowledge of gro und wate r abundance.

The same material confirms a n infere nce made in Chapter

V from the 1959 CPR abo ut municipal a nd industrial water s upply.

These

documents were discovered after the conjectures which they support had
a lready bee n written into the text and appendi ces . Because of their importance
as evidence, major portions of the documents are reproduced as a n Appendix
lo th is chapter (see Appendix lll).
Knowledge of East Shore gro undwater is very recent, neve rtheless ,
and from the evidence available in 1949 the WBP would not have appeared as
redundan t as il did in 1959.

ll was t he south e nd of the district that feared a

water s hortage , and hydro logic study of the Bountiful District during the 1940's
had not yie lded a n optimistic forecast of groundwater potential.

The
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conc lusions of Thomas and Nelson were no doubt an important element in the
selling of the Weber Basin Project.

Bountiful District in 1948: Thomas a nd Nelson

The groundwater situation that emerges from this report is quite
different from what we have seen of the Weber Delta District. In the first
place, there seems to be no bedrock trough comparable to the bathtub north
of Farmington.

Bedrock appears to slope away from the Wasatch range

toward Great Salt Lake with no significant barriers in the form of fault lines
in bedrock.

The sponge of unconsolidated materials is, therefore, fr ee to

drip away toward the western side.

The materials of the sponge are not so

favorable to water retention as thos e of the Weber Delta District either.
Especially in the eastern portion of the district they are mostly an undifferentiated mixture of coarse gravel, rocks , boulders, sand, and clay.

This

material becomes progressively better differentiated into layers of coarser
(permeable) and finer (less permeable), but the layers themselves are far
from being the even s trata portrayed in the pictures of the Jo hnson text
(referred to above).

Instead, they are inclined to be le ns -shaped a nd

irregularly defined, both vertically a nd horizontally.

Furthermore, even in

the western part of the district the imperm eable layers are permeable in part,
allowing groundwater to filter upward to be lost through springs and evapotranspiration.

Thus, although Thomas and Nelson identify s hallow, intermediate,
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and deep artesian aquifers, they are of the opinion that confining layers
between the three are permeable in varying degrees throughout the district.
The authors say the district is divisible into two main portions by
the upper Bonneville Canal, which pumps water from the Jordan River to
about the 4, 500 foot level in South Davis (:1bout 8th Street East in Bountiful).
Water spread by this canal recharges the shallow artesian aquifer, and is,
therefore, withdrawn in part by we lls in the western portions of the district.
Above the Canal, groundwater occurs under water table conditions, and we lls
in that region, in the 1940's, did not tap artesian aquifers (in spite of efforts
to develop s uch wells before and during the period of the Thomas and Nelson
study).

Water-spreading experiments by Bountiful City over a few years

preceding the report led the authors to conclude that such water percolated
down to an impermeable layer, ran along over top of it, and surfaced again
in springs, water tunnels, and shallow wells in and around Bountiful City
before it had got as far as the recharge area for the shallow aquifer just below
the Bonneville Canal.

This means, they infer, that water in the deeper

aquifers of the district enters through a recharge area that is above the recharge basin of the Bountiful experiment and then moves down and westward
under the confining layer referred to in the previous se ntence.

Even though

under a confining layer, however, water in this region is not readily developable because it occurs in a large mass of unarticulatecl debris--mud and rocks
of the kind deposited by some spectacular floods and mud-rock slides in Davis
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County during this century.

As noted earlier, good wells require a bed of

relatively clean gravel.
·;he best part of the Bountiful District aquifer runs generally northsouth at the longitude of Woods Cross where there are several alluvial fans
from mountain front streams.

West of this good section the groundwater

r ese rvoir suffers from lack of definition; small pockets of good water-bearing
strata arc connected poorly with each other through layers of semi-permeable
fine sand and silt.

This general but poor permeability means that water is

lost from the reservoir by
it.

seepa~e,

and also that water moves slowly through

The latter fact accounts for a high degree of well interference in the di s-

trict.

Discharge from one well can have a marked effect on the water level in

neighboring wells, leading to coni'licts over water rights and fears that the
district is running out of water.

In the region of the good alluvial fan aquifer,

described above , there is little well interfe rence.

The largest and deepest

wells in the region further west have the least interference problem, probably
beca use they tap several water-bearing strata, and also because the intermediate aquifer is a better one than the shallow one.

(The deep one is only

inferred by the authors . Only a few wells were deep enough to suggest its
existence at the time of their study.) Well interference is even worse in tho
eastern r egion of the district. Some wells that flowed strongly when new later
had their water leve l drop to 23 feet below the surface after other wells were
opened around them.

This is consistent with the authors' conclusion that the

shallow wells in that region are tapping a reservoir that has very little
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confinement pressure.

Bountiful City was thus presumed in 1949 to be

loca ted over a major recharge area, but able to tap only an indifferent
aquifer .
T homas a nd Nelson concluded that the strata unde rlying So uth Davis
County constitute a n inefficient groundwater reservoir . Ther e is not much
recharge to it directly from the mountain fr ont streams . Its aquifers tend to
be small, poorly confined , and interconnected . Water, therefore, moves
through it slowly, a nd then escapes . "Westernmost wells may be discharging
water whi ch e ntered the artesian r eservoir half a ce ntury ago . " Changes in
the amount of water in storage are transmitted quickly to other parts of the
reservoir by mea ns of changed hydra ulic press ure .
a large highly permeable fill.

This is not indi cative of

Quite a lot of wate r is lost through springs and

evapotrans pirati on in the far west, where the depth to water is only 5 feet .
Arte s ian aquifer s do ext end under Great Salt Lake, but not much water moves
into the m .

" Thus most of the water e ntering the gr ound water reservoir of

the Bountiful District is discharged within that district by natural and artificial
means. "l

The problem was co mpounded by ineffi ci ent us e of such groundwater
a s was available.

Development of artesian wells s tarted in 1885 with a 10-

inch diameter, wooden- cased well a ugured to a depth of 58 feet.

Several

others were developed in the same way, but practices soon changed to

1

Thomas a nd Nelson, p. 164.
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incorporate the use of 1 1/2 to 2-inch iron pipe as casing material.

By 189 1

a Census of Irrigation reported 53 artesian wells in the district, all of them
1 1/4 to 2 inches in diameter. None was deepe r than 170 feet.

ln 1904 the

region of flowing wells was described as a be lt 1 to 2 miles wide and 3 miles
long, between the Woods Cross and Centerville Post Offices. One quartersection is described as containing 30 flowing wells running 20 to 100 gallons
pe r minute from 2-inch casings, at depths of 100 to 175 feet.
suface was 1 to 12 feet above the ground.
wells were kept running.

Piezometric

This surface was lowered if a ll the

This describes precisely the kind of situation defined

as inefficient in the long statement from Marsell quoted earlier.

F ewer and

larger wells would allow for pumping, eliminating seepage losses from excessive artesian pressure.

By 1946 the number of wells had grown to 1, 310,

of which 930 were used for irrigation, 200 for domestic purposes, 4 for
municipal supplies, 40 for industria l supplies, and 50 for stock.
; , 040 of the se flowed at the surface.

1

About

About 680 had diameters of 2 inches or

less, 520 of 2 1/2 to 4 inches, and 20 cased wells ha d diameters of 5 to 12
inches.
Nearly half of the wells in existence at the time of the Thomas and
Nelson study were drilled prior to 1910. But use of groundwater east of the
artesian area described in the previous paragraph did not really get under way
until after 1900.

1

.

Pumped wells did not appear until after 1920.

Ibid .• p. 178.

Thomas and
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Nelson estimated that since 1932, the discharge from all of these wells
together was two to three times what it had been in 1890, when there had
been about one-fifth as many wells.

They estimate the average annual dis-

charge from artesian wells at 11,000 acre feet, and that from pumped we lls,
drains and tunne ls east of the artesian area at 2, 000 acre feet.

Total average

annual draft on the groundwater reservoir was, therefore, estimated to be
13 , 000 acre feet.
Inflow of water to the district was estimated to be an average of
31, 000 acre feet per year, from these sources:
Tributary stream flow

18,000

Bonneville Canals

4,000

Precipitation over recharge area

9,000

Total

3 1,000

When the discharge from wells is subtracted from this supply fig ure, the
18 ,000 acre feet remaining is about the same amount as the authors estim ate
to be consumed by irrigation from streams plus wastage to Great Salt Lake
and evapotranspiration losses:
Surface water irrigation

12,000

Discharge from wells in irrigation season

11,000

Discharge from wells in non-irrigation season

2,000

Discharge from springs

1,000

Stream outflow to Great Salt Lake

3,000
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Other losses, including evapotranspiration
Total

2,000
31 ,000

If the last four ite ms are considered as wastage, then the potential for

increased supplies from sources within the Bountiful District appears limited
to 8, 000 acre feet.

The authors infer that since water levels in observation

wells were about the same in 1946 as they had been in 1936, storage in the
groundwater reservoir had not been drawn down over the intervening period.
(See quotations from Marsell. As long as some wells are flowing, the reservoir is not being depleted.) Nevertheless, during prolonged dry periods,
such as the early 1930's, the yield from flowing wells was considerably
reduced, due to less recharge and hence to less water storage in the reservoir . But the fact that artesian flows and well yields increase in good water
years is evide nce , said the authors, that the groundwater reservoir was not
over-developed.

1n dry years, however, some well s would have to be pumped.

Thomas and Nelson conclude their report with observations about the
future of water s upplies for the Bountiful District: Bountiful City cannot
expect to develop good wells in or near the town, they said . Increased water
for the industrial area growing in the Woods Cross region can be obtained
from the artesian aquifer, but it will probably have to be pumped, and that
will draw down the hydraulic pressure and reduce the flow of nearby wells .
That would not please existing well - owners, and the State Engineer has already
discouraged the drilling of large new wells, under the assumption that the
groundwater reservoir is approaching the limit of its "economic" development.
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The water wasted from wells in the non-irrigation season could be elimi'lated
by plugging uncappable wells. Natural losses from springs and evapotr2nspiration could be mostly eliminated by pumped wells in the far west region.
Because of the inefficiencies of the reservoir, a lready recited, pumpag! as
recommended might no t increase appreciably the amount of water storUf·e,
a lthough it would eliminate some waste.

Increasing the storage would depend

on being able to increase recharge by artificial means.
One of the inefficiencies of the reservoir noted by the a uthors i :> that
the streams that bring water to the district do not pass over a very larg•! or
very permeable recharge area.
artificial recharge.

Improvement of this situa tion calls for

There had been two major efforts at this in the pre·.,ious

decade, one near Centerville, the other at Bountiful.

The one at Centerville

coincided with an increased fl ow from wells below it, but nothing could be
proved conclusively about recharge.

In the Bountiful case recharge cou:.d be

demonstrated, to t)1e water table aquifer only. Recharge to the shallow
artesian aq ulfer occurs from irrigation out of the upper Bonneville Canal.
For artificial r echarge of deeper aquifers , water should be spr ead
somewhat farther east , perhaps in areas as high as 4, 600 feet : n
a ltitude . These areas include much of the city of Bountiful and the
residential areas farther south, near Val Verda; water spreading
in the part of the recharge area above 4, 600 feet altitude will s• ,rve
chiefly to increase the water supplies available from the Provo shore
gravel, as shown by the experiment of the City of Bountiful. 1

1
Ibid. ' p. 187
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The authors note that Bountiful City made provisions for obtaining the
e vidence that the increased water in the aquifers tapped by their wells did in
fact come from their own recharge efforts.
lf all of these efforts were undertaken, said Thomas and Nelson, the

increment to water supply in the Bountiful District would still not likely surpass 5, 000 acre feet per year.

The district wa s already using 70 percent of

the water that it received from all sources every year.

Conservation mea-

sures could not be expected to elimina te all natural losses, and even with
outstanding success could not increase the available water supply by more
than 20 percent, or 5, 000 acre feet.

Furthermore, the City of Bountiful and

45 other applicants had already filed for permission to develop more water
than that in the immediate future.

Thus Bountiful District had no more than

enough water for its immediate requirements, e ven if it could implement
immediately a first-rate conservation program.

They concluded that for its

future requirements, if the district has to have any growth, South Davis
County must import water from outside its drainage basin, and noted with
approval that the Bureau of Reclamation had plans under consideration to
bring in surplus water from the Weber River system.

The first paragraph

of the Thomas and Nelson report merits quotation in full:
The Bountiful district in Davis County, Utah, which is less than
10 miles from the heart of Salt Lake City and is rapidly becoming
an integral part of the Sale Lake metropolitan area, cannot achieve
the development that its location merits unless its present water
supplies are increased. The district is a fertile agricultural area
favorably situated between the largest cities in the intermountain
area and athwart the major routes of transportation and
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communication, but development of its residential, industrial, and
agricultural potentialities will be r estricted until existing water
reso urces are supplemented by importation from other drainage
basins whi ch now have surplus water supplies . This conclusion is
reached in the accompanying report by the Geological Survey , prepared in cooperation with the Utah State Engineer and the Davis
County Water Users Association, based on a two-year investigation
of the existing water supplies . 1
As may be imagined, this conclusion has key significance for the history of
s ubseque nt water development in the East Shore area.

Monitoring Groundwater in the East Shore Since 1953

The reports on the Weber Delta and Bountiful distri cts discussed thus
far were fundamental geologic documents.

Since that time groundwater

inves tigations have been confined to reporting on changes in water level or
quality, a nd to such changes or additions to the geologic description of the
region as a re revealed by recent well-drilling activity.

The Smith a nd Gates

study cited above was published in 1963, and reviewed groundwater conditions
for the whole East Shore between 1953 a nd 1960 . Starting in 1964 the State's
Division of Water Resources (formerly the Water and power Board) has
published a n annual review of groundwater conditions in the known r eservoirs
of the state, in connection with the program of developing a state water plan.
The Bolke and Waddell report, a lso cited above, presents a swnmary of
changes over the decade 1960-1969 , and also records the results of recent
experimental well-drilling by the Geological Survey in the East Shore area.

1
Ibid., Summary.
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Smith and Gates make some general observations that have not been
established clearly from other sources: U. S. G. S. began regular observations
in the East Shore area in 193 5. Most of the actual measurement since 1952
(to 1961) has been done by the Bur eau of Recla mation in connection with the
Weber Basin Project.

Precipitation in the mountains of the region is three

times that which falls on the level or iP..habited portion. Seventy percent of the
total precipitation falls between October and April--which means that most of
it is snow.

Evapotranspiration in the mountains is as little as one-quarter of

the total precipitation, whereas it is aE much as three times the precipitation
at the lower levels.

This gives a perspective of the importance of mountains

and of snow to the water budget of the East Shore--and by extension, to the
whole state. Smith and Gates also note that the as-yet-unpublished Feth
report attributes one-half of total recharge to the Weber Delta reservoir to
seepage from bedrock of the Wasatch Range . They suggest this is probably
a good guess for the whole of the East Shore area, while noting that Thomas
and Nelson did not discuss in detail the recharge area of the Bountiful District.
From the measurement data supplied by the U.S. G. S., the Bureau of
Reclamation and the State Engineer, Smith and Gates present a hydrograph of
groundwater levels from 1936 to 1960. From 1936 to 1953 there was no significant upward or downward trend in gro undwater levels. But from 1953 to
1960 there was a definite downward trend.

This they a ttribute to two causes:

in the first place, the period coincides with a drought.

This would account

for a diminution in recharge, but not for lower water levels unless withdra wal
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exceeded recharge.

The authors therefore attribute most of the decline to

pumpage from large diameter industriLl and municipal wells .
would account in part for heavier than no rmal pumping.

The drought

There were two areas

of especially heavy pumping, and it waa in those areas where the water level
showed the most significa nt decline--the Woods Cross region and the area
surrounding Hill Air Force Base (including Sunset, Clearfield, West Point) .
An area of noticeable but lesser decline was the North Ogden-Plain City
region.

There were no large pump wells in that area, but there were large

concentrations of flowing wells (always of small diameter).

This experience

demonstrates the effects of pumped versus flowing wells on the water level,
say the authors . During the long period of stable water levels there were no
or very few pumped wells.
pressure.

Pumps draw down the water table or artesian

Smith a nd Gates cite Mars ell's argument that efficient use of the

groundwater reservoir required its conversion to a pumping field, eliminating
a ll flowing wells, and conclude that the recent decrease in hydraulic pressure
indicates better use of the reservoir.

[t was not accompanied by diminution

of yield from the large pump-well field:3.
The data comparisons provided by Smith and Gates are nicely designed
to show the influence of water deliveries to the East Shore by the Weber Basin
Project.

The benchmark data are from 1955; the WBP started major water

deliveries to the area studied in 1957, a nd the check-point data were collected
as of 1959 .

They divide wells in the region into three types, and then lump

two of them together.

Flowing wells of the 2-inch casing variety and small
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diameter (less than 6) pump wells toget.her discharged about 40, 000 acre feet
annually between 1955 and 1959.

This information was provided to the authors

by F. M. Warnick of the regional

Bure ~ u

of Reclamation office in 1960. Any

significant difference in groundwater u:;e must, therefore, have to be from
the third type of wells-large diameter pump wells used for municipal, industrial, military, or irrigation supply.
ble, however.

That difference turned out to be negligi-

Discharge from large pump wells was estimated at 12,400 acre

feet in 1955, and at 12,700 in 1959.
The location of discharge changed over the period, however.
Davis County share of large diameter

~umpage

The

increased from 9, 600 acre feet

to 11,800, while the Weber County por1ion dropped from 2, 800 to 900 acre
feet.

Of the 2,200 acre foot increase in Davis County, 1, 700 was attributed

to the Woods Cross-Bountiful area, whtle 1, 400 of the 1, 900 acre foot change
in Weber was due to decreased use in t he Hill Air Force Base region.

Ogden

City started receiving water from the WBP in 1957, and from that time to
1959 accounted for 1, 300 acre feet of the diminution around Hill Field.

The

Bountiful District also started to import major quanitities of Weber Basin
water during this period, but augmente::l them with groundwater rather than
substituting one for the other. The authors quote F. T. Mayo of the State
Engineer's Office to the effect that in ar eas where good groundwater is available, pumpage from large wells for municipal and industrial supply will
probably increase as long as the cost

o: developing a nd producing it is

than the cost of treated water from the Weber Basin Project.

less
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Use of groundwater in the East Shore after the introduction of a significant increment of surface water from the Weber Basin Project is therefore
about t he same as before- -be tween 52 , .)0 a nd 53, 000 acre fe e t per year.

fn

Weber County there appears to have bee n substitution to one for the other, a t
least in respect of municipa l - industrial s uppli es , but in South Davis there was
greater use of water from both surface and underground sources. Smith and
Gates note that Jordan River water via the Bonneville Canals fell off rapidly
after the introduction of Weber Basin water in 1957. Use of these canals was
discontinued e ntirely in 1958.

Thomas and Ne lson had estimated the inflow

from them at 4, 000 acre fe et in 1948 , and Smith and Gates say that it declined
gradually from tha t figure be tween 19413 and 1956. One of the complaints of
South Davis County bad been that the Jordan water was of poor quality, a nd,
after the Thomas and Nelson study added a degree of confirmation to this,
they apparently began to substitute more a nd more groundwater for it, until
the Davis Aqueduct brought the m a better surface supply.

De liveri es of

irrigation water to the Bountiful district through the WBWCD have a mounted
to 14 , 000 acre fe el in recent years, so that the increment to surface water,
net of the discounted Bonneville supply , is no more than 10,000 acre feet, as
of 1974 .

1

Since there has been conside.rable s uburba n expansion in South Davis

since 1960 , it see ms safe to infer that ' he net increment to surface water i n
that area in 1900 was less tha n 10 , 000 acre feet.

1
see annual reports of the WBWCD.

One of the most s ignifi cant
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us es of Weber Basin Project water has been an urba n irrigation system in
a nd a r ound Bountiful.

Proj ect waters have been spread over s urfaces

described by Thomas a nd Nelson as im portant recha rge areas for aquifers
of the Bountiful District.
The 1971 report by Bolke and Waddell provides a perspective on the
us e of groundwater in the East Shore a r ea from 193 9 to 1969. Their investigative results ar e combi ned with those of earlier studies in Table 2 . Several
inferences are possible from the table, a lthough it lacks some of the potentially most inte r esting data.

The trencis in groundwater us e that we re i solated

by Smith and Gates have not been carri ed forw ard by Bolke a nd Wadde ll.

They

do te ll us, however, the groundwater levels in the Bountiful District rose over
the p eri od of their study by about 5 feet , while declining an average of 10
feet in the Weber De lta District.

They a ttribute the difference to decreased

withdrawals in Bountiful, combined

wi t :~

Weber Basin surface recharge, and

to increased pumping in the Weber Delta District.
The following paragr aph is paraphrased clos e ly from the Bolke and
Waddell report: In the Bountiful Distri ct, wa ter levels in 1969 showed a
general recovery from low levels r eached in 1961. Water leve ls declined
nearly 40 feet from the early 1950 's to 1961 in parts of the district, but they
ha ve since recovered about 30 feet.

La rge fluctua tions of water le vels a re

characteristic of areas in the Bountiful District where withdrawals frum we lls
are greatest.

The rapid rate of r ecover y in the fir st half of the decade was

due to decreased pumping, whi ch in turn was due to the importation of water

TABLE 2
GROUNDWATER USE IN THE EAST SHORE AREA

Wells

1939
No . of
Acre
wells
feet

DAVlS
Small
Big, Pump
Total

1946-52
No. of Acre
wells
feet

1,190
20
1,310

WEBFR
Small
Big, Pump
Total
EAST SHORE
Small
Big, Pump
Total

Years
1955
No. of
Acre
wells
feet

1959
No. of
wells

9,600d

Acre
feet

1969
No. of
Acre
wells
feet

11, 800d

14, ooob

900d

2,800d
25,000c

-!,400

26,000a
26,000

26, 400e
12, 600fd
39,000

CI

40,000"
52,400

40,000g
52,700

3, 100h

12,00o~, j
26 ooo'· J
38: 500j

~Boike and Waddell, citing State Engineer

~Smith a nd Gates, citing F. M. Warnick, in 1960

All from Thomas and Ne lson
c
.
dF e th et al. (P. P. 518) c1ted by Boike and Waddell
Smith and Gates
~Y inference (calc ulation) from 2 and 3
Adding 2 and 3

·:Eolke and Waddell
1
Bolke and Waddell. This includes 5, 500 from wells
used mostly for irrigation. Smith and Gates gave a
.figure of 100 a . f. for this classification.
lrsrael Staker, State Engineer's Office. Water
Rights Division gave these April 6, 1973.

00

<£>

90

by aqueduct from the Weber River.

TLe rate of recovery was slower during

the latter part of the decade because the pumping again increased to about the
same level as that prior to 1960.
The low water levels in 1961 0ccurred after a long period of below
average precipitation, as well as after a period of heavy withdrawal from
1957-59.

In 1969, after 3 years of wit.<'1drawal about equal in amount to that

for 1957-59 , and only a slight increase in annual precipitation, water levels
remained considerably above the 1961 levels.

This may be due in part to

urbanization in the recharge zone of the aquifers in the eastern part of the
Bountiful district.

Urbanizatio n has resulted in a large amount of lawn

watering, predominantly with s urface water brought in from outside the area.
This has very likely increased the amount of recharge from the surface,
because the area previously was not irr igated a nd the only source of surface
recharge was from precipitation directly on the area.

Elsewhere in the dis-

trict, water level fluctuations coincide more closely with changes in precipitation.
Boike and Waddell conclude that the general decline of water levels
in the Weber Delta District from 1960
drought that lasted from 1952 to 1962.

'.O

1969 was mostly attributable to a

Most of the decline occurred in the

first half of the decade of study, and s lowed a lmost to a stop after above
average precipitation began in 1963 .

These influences were combined with a

general decrease in groundwater withdrawals and the plugging of some old
flowing wells.

The period of heavy groundwater use withdrawals noticeable in
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Table 1 in Appendix lV, therefore, coincides with a drought, as well as a time
of rapid urbanization.

Even through the dry period, however, many wells con-

tinued to flow, as did springs, and discharge through pheatophytic vegetation
actually increased. This means that the groundwater reservoir is still being
used inefficiently--i.e. , it is over full.

The same is apparently true of the

Bountiful District, for none of the investigators has ever reported a cessation
of leakage through springs, flowing wells, and phreatophytes in that region.
For the whole East Shore area, about one-third of the total groundwater discharge was still through small diameter (flowing) wells in 1969.
Since 1939 the flow from these inefficient artesian wells has been cut
in half.

There are about 1, 300 fewer such wells in service, and flow from

them has been decreased by about 30 percent in the Bountiful District and by
60 to 75 pe rcent in the Weber Delta District.

This reflects an improvement in

efficiency of reservoir use that is due at least in part to deliberate efforts of
the State Engineer and the Division of Water Resources (Water and Power
Board).

New wells tend to be large, pump wells.

annually from 1964 to 1969.

Well construction declined

The amount of water discharged from pumped

wells hit its peak in 1967 and declined in 1968 and again in 1969.
The Boike and Waddell report is based primarily upon investigative
drilling.

They learned that the artesian aquifers of the East Shore area

extend under Great Salt Lake at least as far as Antelope Island, tending to
confirm the supposition of Feth eta!., that 20-70,000 acre feet annually
leaves the a rea as underflow to the lake.

Their results also confirm the
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opinion of earlier investigators that the quality of the groundwater reservoir
deteriorates as its distance from the mountain front increases. Aquifers are
smaller, less well-defined, and of finer, less permeable materials. These
factors inhibit the flow of water through the reservoir and make it difficult to
develop high capacity wells.
The most spectacular news the authors have to report, however, is
the development of a major artesian well east of Bountiful in the region where
Thomas and Nelson presumed groundwater to occur only under water table
conditions.

This well had a head of 51 feet above the land surface and flowed

at 1, 000 gallons per minute. Bokle and Waddell presume that water comes
from precipitation on the mountain front and is confined beneath "poorly permeable mud-rock flow deposits." Similar conditions may occur locally at
other places along the mountain front, they add.

They specifically rule out

any possibility that aquifers tapped by this well are recharged by surface
irrigation or artificial spreading.
Thomas and Nelson concluded that the Bountiful District must have
an augmented supply of water from outside.

That supply has been provided,

but discovery of new aquifers suggests it may not have been needed, or that
less was needed than is available.

The extent of the District's internal

resources has not yet been measured.

Until the costs of developing a nd

operating wells go up significantly, however,

it

is not likely that Bountiful will

be a customer for more M&I water from the WBWCD.
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The Hydrologic Inventory of the Weber Basin by Haws e t al., agrees
in essential details with what has b een reported here from other sources . It
is the best single source of information pertinent to the thesis of water
abundance.

1

1

Haws, Jeppson, and Huber.
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CHAPTER fV
WHENCE CAME TiiE WEBER BASIN PROJECT?

The previous chapter has presented evidenc e that water, especia lly
groundwater , is abundant in the East Shore area. Subsequent chapters will
detail some cases of misallocated resources in the Weber Basin that stem
directly from over-investment in water-controlling facilities. Still later , a n
effort will be m ade to explain why problems of the Weber Basin varie ty exist.
T hi s chapter has the more limited objective of proposing a n explanation of
how a mammoth facility like the WB P came to be built over an area that
a lready had abunda nt alternatives at lower cos t.
Historical, institutional, and ideological background are an essentia l
e le m ent in the transformed perspe cti ve of Western water problems proposed
in Chapter l.

Identifyi ng the problem is an essential part of economic prac-

tice, and cannot be taken for granted.

Economic principles have been

developed a nd refined to prescribe effici ent policies for many of the economi c
problems that commonly arise in we stern democratic societies. It is necessary only for the practitioner to apply the appropriate principle. Selecting
the principle to be applied is primarily a matter of interpreting the subject
problem.

(Assuming that the examinations a nd certification of schools of

economics assure competence in economi c principle s among their graduates,
the major hurdle to developing professional skill lie s in the identification ,
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se le ction, and interpretation of economic problems. J Because the interpretation of a water problem is the principal issue of this dissertation, supporting a rguments must b e selected for their bearing on that interpretation.
If a common perspective can be established, selection of the relevant economic

principle(s) should be obvious.
Readers conditioned by experience to expect a format in which proble m interpretation is handled briefly in the introduction, while the text is
de voted to technical application, may taste a strange flavor in the approach
ta ken he re. It can be defended as sound scientific procedure, nevertheless.
The following idea may be useful: Psychologists, neurophysiologists, and
philosophers of science are asserting with increasing clarity and confidence
that our perceptions of empirical reality are governed to a significant degree
by preconceptions in the mind of the observer.

1

Karl Popper's description of

the pa ttern of growth in objective knowledge is this tetrad:

P

where P

1

1

--->

TS

--->

EE

--->

P

2

is an initial problem, TS a trial solution, EE a process of error

elimination, and P

2

the resulting situation with new problems.

Problems,

says Popper, are observations that conflict with our notions of the way things
1 Mi chae l Polanyi , The Study of Ma n (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1958); Michael Polanyi, Science , Faith and Society (Chi cago:
The Uni versity of Chicago Press, 1964); Sir J ohn C. Eccles, Facing Reality
(New York: Springe r-Verlag, 1970); Jacob Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The
Wes te rn Intellectual Tradition (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960) ; Arthur
Koestle r, The Sl eepwalkers (Baltimore, Maryland, Penguin Books, 1968).
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are or ought to he.

This conflict causes us to ponder why, and to postulate

hypotheses that suggest possible explanations.

These hypotheses, to be use-

ful, must be worked into a form which allows them to be tested by further
observations.

This process of logical criticism of hypotheses and empirical

testing, is the stage of error elimination. Reality is too enormous to be
encompassed by any one observer, or to be described by any one scientist.
No account of empirical reality can be complete or unbiased by selection
criteria, therefore.

Hypotheses do not arise from gazing at the whole of

reality and endeavoring therein to perceive regularities, in the tradition of
Francis Bacon and the inductionist-empiricist school, but as an effort to
explain disturbing observations . Data selection by innovative scientists is
governed by tests they devise to check the adequacy of their new explanations .
Several seeming aberrations provided problems that were examined
in the investigation reported here . One of them was an apparent s urfeit of
water in a region that is supposed to be water-short.

Another, closely related

to the first, was a notion that revenues of a particular firm (the WBWCD) were
not greater than or equal to its costs.

Previous investigations by economists

had found evidence of price discrimination, and of inflexibility in the pricing
and transfe r of water to and among users.

These observations conflicted with

certain principles of economic efficiency. An usual and accepted practice
would have been to call attention to these violations of principle, and to recommend appropriate policy changes.

An estimate of the social costs of such

departures from efficiency might also have been made, as a means of

97
evaluating the potential importance of policy change.

As Appendices I and II

illustrate, attempts such as these were made in respect of the Weber Basin
case. Successful resolution was frustrated, however, because prescriptions
deemed adequate to solve some of the inefficiencies were see n to exacerbate
others.

Nothing short of the explanation presented in this work has been found

adequate to account for all of the anomalies (violations of principle) observed
in the case.

The hypothesis to be tested is the explanation of what

~

in the

Weber Basin case, and others s imilar to it.

Sources for Background to the Weber Basin Project

The Bureau of Reclamation apparently keeps a formal, written
history of its major projects. A copy of the Project History of the WBP is
located in the Provo Office of the Bureau, in the custody of Wayne Eldredge,
project historian. It is a mimeographed document, occupying multiple looseleaf binders (one volume for each year during the construction period).

Mr .

Eldredge a nd other staff of the Provo Office were very cooperative in making
it accessible for this investigation.

E . J. Fjeldsted of North Ogden -Pleasant View has custody of
minutes and correspondence of the Davis-Weber Counties Municipal Water
Development Association (D-WCMWDA, hereafter) . He was secretary to the
organization and became secretary-manager of the WBWCD when the DWCMWDA realized its objective of winning federal approval of the WBP.

Mr .

98

Fjeldsted kindly loaned his records and provided verbal testimony about origins of the Weber Basin Project.

They were the primary source for Appendix

II.

The third important source was DeLore Nichols of Farmington, and
files of the Davis County Agent.

Nichols was Davis County Agent during the

1930's and 1940's, and led the campaign among county water users to get the
Davis Aqueduct system. He acted as secretary to the Davis County Water
Users Association (DCWUA), and left its traces in the office of the County
Agent when he retired in 1956.

Through the cooperation of the current Agent,

Darrel Stokes, s uch of those traces as appar ently survived were gleaned from
various repositories in the Davis Co unty Court House and used as an auxiliary
to the verbal and written recollections of Mr. Nichols.

They are the source

for developments in the Weber Basin Project promotion prior to formation of
the D-WCMWDA.
Other sources were personal recollections of District, Bureau, and
State officials, newspapers, and files of the Utah Water Users Association .
There is a ctistinctive difference in perspective on the WBP, depencting on
whether the observer is a state or local person or a Bureau official.

Local

people see it as not only a great event (which in local terms it undoubtedly is),
but also as a unique one.

Nichols' testimony and papers especially and to a

le sser degree those of Fjeldsted, reveal a feeling that there were extraorctinary hurdles to be overcome in winning the WBP, and that to do so
required heroic efforts on the part of local people to make Bureau officials
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take a n active interest in the Project--even to the extent of tricking them into
it.

Several people in the State with first-hand knowledge about the WBP pro-

fess to believe that the Bureau had to be cajoled and goaded into taking on a
project with the vast interlocking dimensions of the Weber Basin Project,
because its previous experience had been limited to "building a dam and a
ditch. " Juxtaposing that point of view to the blase, business-as-usual interpretation of the exact same events in Bureau reports, reinforces an observalion made by a former Bureau employee at the outset of this investigation :
The Bureau is very skilled at getting big projects authorized by inducing local
people to agitate for them as if they were their own idea, and desperately
needed for local sur vi val.

1

This is a n important conjectural hypothesis in

building toward an interpretation of the Webe r Basin case.
The following account is a brief summa ry of conclusions reached in
writing a draft history of the Weber Basin Proj ect from sources described
above.

Genesis of the Weber Basin Proje ct

Serious efforts to build the WBP did not begin until very near the end
of World War ll.

At that time the Utah Water Users Association was orga-

ni zed, with the stated objective of coordinating a nd spearheading water

1
Harold His key, currently Dean of the College of Business and Technology at Southern Utah State College, Cedar City, Utah, and, at the time he
made this statement, a fe llow student of the author at Utah State University.
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deve lopment in the State (see Chapter X). It was a tax-supported lobby and
think-tank, including as members the State's senior water experts and
enthusiasts. The Utah Water and Power Board, and the Division of Water
Re sources were its child and grandchild.

The main theme at initiatory meet-

ings of the Association was how tough it is to get money for water development projects, and how important it is, consequently, to work together in
getting financial assistance. A clue which may reflect the most important
proximate stimulus to a sudden burst of water development interest in
northern Utah is this statement which occurs several times in papers of the
UWUA and the Davis County WUA: "The Bureau of Reclamation is going to
be spending half a million dollars annually, and we have got to be organized
so that we can get our fair share. " The plans for Bureau spending were
almost certainly public information--quite possibly announced as part of a
post-war economic stabilization policy to absorb workers released from the
war effort. Not only would reclamation projects absorb workers directly,
they were also expected to provide new farms for veterans.

The ideals of

agrarian democracy, and the old tradition of free land for veterans were still
operative in post-war America.

1

The potential of such a program for local

development was obviously not lost on the UWUA, whose members included

1

see Chapter IX, and issues of Reclamation Era from the mid-1940's.
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dedicated technicians like John A. Widtsoe,
E . J. F jeldsted .

l

and civic growth promoters like

2

Regardless of budget generosity, the Bureau would not have been
If an

able to construct vast projects without state and loca l cooperation.

e nthu siastic clientele was not ready a nd waiting, the Bureau would have nee ded
to create one. Such measures were not likely necessary, for a water de ve lopment lobby has been in existence since the 189 0 's (see Chapter X).

But

there can be little doubt that word of new Bureau spending capacity r ej uve nated
interest among the old campaigners.

Thus at least part of the inspiration for

the WBP must be attributed to federal government initiative, if only in a very
general way.
One of the first actions of the UWUA was to organize for rational
water development.

The state was eli vided into districts according to geo-

graphic a nd hydrographic characteristics. UWUA members tben took responsibility for initiating and fostering water user associations in each county of
their respective districts.

The Weber Basin lies in what was District No. 2

of the UWUA . Among UWUA meinbers from District No. 2 were E. J .
Fjeldsted, manager of the Ogden Chamber of Commerce, and Orson
Christensen, manager of the U&I Sugar Co. refinery at Garland .

(Their

1
A soils and irrigation specialist, dedicated to " making the desert
blossom as the rose," and pres ident during his career of both Utah State Agricultural College and the University of Utah.
2

Manager of the Ogden Chamber of Commerce.
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influe nce o n the WBP will be noted in later pages.) The UWUA was formed
with the assistance of enabling legis lation.

Its legal status was not clearly

understood eve n by its own m e mbers , but it was expected to be an advisor to
the State, a nd did receive State support.
included a State law , extant in 1945,

1

The enabling legislation probably

permitting cou nty commissioners to

a llocate money to their county water user association.

Budget support for

UWUA activities came at least in part from dues paid by counties .

Co unty

associations were expe cted to see that the ir respective county commission
paid up.

If they did not, the UWUA threatened to withdraw its support for

county water development programs tha t depended on State or federal aid.
The Davi s County WUA was formed in February of 1945, at the
initiative a nd with the assistance of the UWUA .

2

Its a ntecedents as described

thus far c learly suggest a n e le m ent of paternity from o utside the county.

All

co unty wate r user associations were requested by the UWUA to make an inventory of their water resources and requirements, to make a list of potential
developm e nt proj ects, a nd to give them priority rankings.

The new Water a nd

Power Board would consider the top-ranking projects from each county, a nd,
if possible, provide supplementary financing for them o ut of its state fund.
There was a clear understanding among UWUA people t hat if s tate resources
proved inadequate, there was no recourse but to the federal government.
1
2

In

Evident from s tatements in minutes of the UWUA , 1945.

A representative of the UWUA was in c harge of the first meeting,
according to minutes of the DCWUA.
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fact, one of the chief reasons for organizi ng as they did, a nd for creating the
w a te r and Power Board, seems to have been a felt need to demonstrate that
since state resources were exhausted, desperate ly needed water development
must be financed federally.

This is consistent with the notion quoted above,

that federal agencies have money to spend, and we must assure ourselves of
a fair share.

This motive coincided nice ly with the interest of dedicated

water evangelists, and the fact that the Bureau of Reclamation was one of the
we ll-endowed agencies.
As represented in its minutes a nd correspondence, activities of the
DCWUA were consistent with the above interpretation of post-war events.
Once organized, its first move was to take inventory of its water reso urces,
declare them inadequate, and cast about for a lternative sources of extra
supply.

They considered more conservative use ; they considered spreading

surplus (?)water to recharge groundwater reservoirs.

They even helped

finance a groundwater investigation of the Bountiful district by the U.S.
Geological Survey.

But by early 1946 they had, to their own satisfaction at

least , e liminated every possibility but one : they had to have an extra supply
of water, and the only place to get it was from the Weber River .

This would

require a n investment greater than what local property could support, a nd
greater than what could be financed as a small project through the Utah Water
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and Power Board.

Thus, within a year of its organization, the DCWUA was

knocking at the door of the Bureau or Reclamation.

1

Although this account reveals clear elements of promotional activity
by a lobby with interests much broader than the Weber Basin, many, if not
all, of the participants had (and continue to have) an interest in making it
appear that the WBP was built in response to urgent need expressed by popular demand at the grass roots.

Unfortunately, this desire conflicts with

a nother of comparable intensity: the craving to be recognized as far-sighted
leaders who fought for and won a great divic improvement in the face of
popular apathy and the misgivings of budgetary authorities . Different indivictuals feel these two emotions to differing degrees, a circumstance which
fractured what might otherwise have been a common front, and led to important information about what really went on in the creation of the WBP.
Coincident in time with the writing of Appendix II, DeLore Nichols
came to Logan looking for the D-WCMWDA records on which it is based.
Nichols wanted to have a history written of how the WBP came to be built, and
was more than willing to assist in locating sources for anyone willing to undertake the writing.

He was especially anxious to give verbal testimony in respect

of events which he said were likely not available in any written traces.

Nichols

made little effort to conceal the fact that one of his chief motives was personal

1
They did not wait for the report of the groundwater investigation,
which was due in 1947.
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vanity. He believes the Weber Basin Project to be a great net benefit to the
East Shore area, and wishes to have the contribution made by him and his
associates adequately recognized. No reason has emerged to cast doubt on
his claim to an important paternal role in the WBP.

The fact that the most

vocal popular support for it came from south Davis County had an important
influence in shaping the Project. Nichols was an undisputed leader in organizing and articulating that support. Nevertheless, the written evidence he
was able to dig out from the Davis County Court House does not always agree
with the interpretation of events that his memory prefers.
Although the Davis County Water Users Association has clear and
obvious antecedants as reported above, Nichols would have its origins in the
grass roots of Davis County during the drought and depression years of the
1930's.

Traces found in the County Agent files do demonstrate that there was

a bona fide interest in water development within Davis County dating to at
least the mid-1930's.

They do not suggest that it amounted to anything close

to desperation, however. Furthermore, it was an agricultural interest
exclusively. There was ample water for the part of the county served by the
Davis-Weber Canal, but very little for the higher bench lands. According to
Nichols, a group calling itself the Davis County Correlation Committee was
formed in the mid-1930's to increase the efficiency with which various publi c
agencies could provide service in the frequent personal crises that accompanied the drought and depression. Out of that experience, says Nichols, a
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conviction was formed by the group that one of the critical needs of the County
was a more abundant and reliable water supply .
While this story is certainly plausible, it is not inconsi stent with the
conjecture that the idea a nd any action that stemmed from it was contaminated
by sources outside the County.

(Nichols insists that the Davis group has

precedence in the idea of the WBP.

While acknowledging the importance of

the D-WCMWDA in the lobbying campaign, he believes his own group should
get credit for initiating the Project, which he unquestionably views as a grass
roots phenomenon.) The Weber River Project was built by the Bureau of
Reclamation in the middle '30's--about the same time as Nichols says he and
his buddies became interested in their project.

1

A water committee per-

suaded the County Commissioners to buy rights to 5, 000 a. f. in the new Echo
Reservoir for Davis County. As Nichols tells it, this water committee ha d
to urge the commissioners to act , and they were not fast enough to get the
10,000 a . f. they had wanted because of competition from other water users.
They couldn 't even use the 5, 000 a. f., however, because there was no way of
transporting water to the upper part of Davis County where it was wanted.
Getting a water supply was the first part of his campaign, according to
Nichols.

The next part was obviously a transportation facility.

Accordingly,

so he says, he cons ulted Bureau of Reclamation engineer H. E . Wilbert about
the possibility of constructing a system similar to the one built by the Bureau

1

Chapter II describes both of these projects.
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at the mouth of Ogden Canyon, as part of the Ogden River Project.

1

This

would swing water across the mouth of Weber Canyon onto the Davis Bench,
from whence a canal parallel to U.S. Highway 89 could carry it at least as
far south as Farmington Canyon. Nichols implies that this proposal was his
own idea, and that he solicited Wilbert's he!p as a technical expert to assess
its feasibility.

It is certainly not an impossible direction of causation, hut

circumstantial evidence suggests it is implausible.
One argument against it is that Nichols also claims that he and his
group "made Oly a big man." Reference is to E. 0. Larsen, Director of the
Bureau's Salt Lake office during the initial stages of the WBP . Nichols maintains that his group had to wheedle, cajole, and browbeat the local Bureau
people into taking on the Davis project.

He says its magnitude frightened

them, but that by allowing themselves to he pushed into it by the DCWUA,
Larsen and his staff was able to greatly expand the sphere of their activities,
and thus became fat and influential bureaucrats (lots of trips to Washington).

While this account is consistent with Nichols' version of the source of the WBP
idea, it is not consistent with widely recognized facts about the Bureau of
Reclamation, or even with other parts of his own testimony. He knew, for
example, that the Bureau had its eye on the much larger Central Utah Project,
and says that one of the arguments he used in persuading them to take on the
WBP was that they could build this much smaller one while they were waiting

1

Chapter II describes both of these projects.
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for resolution of interstate conflict over the Colorado River to clear the way
for the CUP. Nichols' claims to influence over the Bureau are far out of
proportion to any incentives that he would have been able to offer them.

It is

clear from the Bureau's records, and even Nichols' own, that they had far
bigger ideas for the Weber Basin than his, and that their plans preceded his
in time.
While the facts of Davis County water rights in Echo Reservoir, a nd
of communication between Nichols and Wilbert on a means for transporting
water to the Davis bench need not be disputed, the limitations of Nichols'
memory and hi s evident interpretive prefere nce make it just as pla usible that
the direction of causation was opposite to the way he see s it in retrospect.
Selling Davis County a batch of water it could not us e was certainiy a way to
get its residents thinking about a transit system that Bureau engineers already
had in mind.

1

Having planted the seed, the Bureau let it germinate during the

war and then came back to reap the harvest.
The above conj ectur e about the origins of Davis County interest in a
system similar to the Davis Aqueduct and Gateway Tunnel is not essential to
the hypothesis that the Bureau was prime causative agent in the Weber Basin

1
vol. I of the WBP Project History says they had it planned since
early in the century.
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Project. It is consistent with Nichols' own statements. Quite possibly there
are elements of truth in both views.

1

According to Nichols, pre - war plans advanced to the stage of proposing an import of 15,000 a. f. from the Weber River to serve bench lands
in north Davis only, and the development of mountain front streams and
groundwater for south Davis.

Post-war thinking, under the stimulus of

UWUA and the prospect of large federal expenditures, soon graduated to
grander designs.
One year after their organization was launched, the small group of
men who met as directors of the DCWUA had drawn up a set of eight alternatives for Davis County water development.

Two of these oore known to be

under study by the Bureau of Reclamation: One of the two was a huge canal
along the shore of Great Salt Lake, to intercept fresh water seepage and
reroute it to south Davis County where it would be used to improve the quality
of water in the Bonneville Canals .

2

The other was a high canal from the

Weber River to serve the upper part of Davis County, from Weber Canyon to
North Salt Lake. Although the organization did make occasional statements
that all wa ter needs, city included, were part of their concern, none of the

1
There is some support for the notion that water was truly scarce in
south Davis County. See especially the section on Prior Appropriation and
Artificial Shortage in Chapter Vll.
2 According to Darrell Stokes, Davis County Agent, a lot of irrigating
is done in the lake plains region with waste water. Compare the testimony of
F. M. Warnick in the Appendix to Chapter Ill included in Appendix IV.
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eight a lte rnative progra ms had a nything to do with c ulinary or industrial
water .

One of th em was the development of groundwater in South Davis

County, howeve r.

The County and the City of Bountiful were at that tim e

giving financial support (matching funds) to the Thomas a nd Nelson U. S. G. S.
investigation.

Nevertheless, without waiting for the hydrologists ' report the

DCWUA selected another of their eight a lternative s and set out to get it.
By April of 1946, they had selected t he high line canal from the
Weber River as their fa vorite project, and called a mass meeting (enough to
fill the Davis County courtroom) to present their conclusions a nd ask Bureau
representatives to take on their proj ect (which the Bureau, of co urse, already
had under study) . Nichols insists that this m ee ting (May 3, 1946) was a signal
event (no minutes have survived), a nd that it was des igned to draw the sympathe ti c inte rest of the ilureau.

The correspondence a nd minutes that have

survived do s upport his belief that he and hi s c hie f cohort, Jos. W. Johnson
of Layton, were wooing the Bureau.

Hi s re cords contain ample eviden ce (but

no realization) that it was a courtship of the kind in which the pursued pa rty
thinks he is t he pursuer.

The Bureau proved to be an overwhelming lover.

Apparently there was no r esponse from the nureau for some time,
a nd early in 194 7, Nichols a nd Johnson began writing the Utah Congressional
de legation for assista nce in prodding the Bureau.

Shortly thereafter, they

had a n a ppointment with the pres ide nt (Wm . A. Wallace) and secretary (Tom
Jensen) of the UWUA at the Reclamation Office in Salt Lake City (January 22,
1947) . Imm ediate ly thereafter they ca lled a mass meeting (Februa ry 3, 1947)
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with some prominent water promoters as guest speakers . At the meeting a
petition was drawn up requesting the Bureau to "begin immediately a detailed
and complete study to obtain a feasible water supply from the Weber River."
After a few days of gathering signatures, the petition was sent to H. E.
Wilbert of the Burea u, along with a letter thanking him for having been
present at the meeting to explain the county water development program to the
people! "Comments were favorable," said Johnson.
had been working on a plan.

Clearly, the Bureau

They then went up to Davis County, presented

their plan, and asked the county residents to ask them to carry it out .
Immediately thereafter Nichols and Johnson began to worry about
getting assis ta nce from people in Weber Co unty a nd in the lake plains region.
Their corresponde nce from that tim e is suddenly cognizant of a "need" for
culinary water as well as irrigation.
the b luff"

1

Meetings were called with people " below

to talk abo ut reclamation and drainage--another new interest--and

they attended a meeting of the Weber County Water Users Association to try
for their s upport.

Nichols began worrying about the kind of local organization

"acceptable " to the federal government for repayme nt of reclamation projects-and how people who did not want water could be excluded from repayment.
(Apparently the "water shortage" was a few buckets short of desperation.)
The evidence is quite c lear that when Davis County asked for a conveyance
facility of the kind they now have in the Davis Aqueduct, the Bureau came back

1

Lands of the lake plains region.
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with a proposal to develop the entire Weber Basin--a project they had been
contemp lating for some time, by their own records.

But they then got the

DCWUA to ask them to make necessary preliminary investigations for the
WBP--probably even told them how many signatures the petition had to have.
The Davis County promoters continued to view themselves as fortunate
but unsecured suitors.
selling job to do.

They were anxious to please, awar e that they had a big

Instead of simply watering the Davis bench, a project to

which they had long been committed, they now had to sell reclamation of lowlands, and municipal water supplies.

Furthermore, they had to get the

cooperation of people in three other counties.
Nichols and Johnson were now in the company of big thinkers. A feeling emerges from the traces that they were not completely at ease in this
company.

They seem to have worried a little about the giant size their proj-

ect was taking, a nd make repeated reference to the possibility of building it
piece by piece.

That is, " it is alright to make plans for the WBP, but we

want to get our aq ueduct first; other groups can lobby for their own benefits. "
For reasons detailed in Chapter VI, that attitude must have been distressing
to the Bureau people.
In a letter to their Congressman in November of 1947,

1

Nichols and

Johnson expressed their sense of awe and pride in th e direction and dimension
their project had taken:

1
Jos.

w.

Johnson to Wm. A. Dawson, November 6, 1947.
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When we first started on this water program for Davis County, we
did not vision that it would develop into a five-county program [to]
. . . develop the entire water resources of the Weber and Ogden
Rivers . . . The plan is to develop a full water supply for the cities
and towns and also for irrigation. 1
They added , as in nearly a ll letters of that period, that not all of the program
had to be developed at once; they could get their piece first and the other parts
co uld come a long as wanted.

The same letter makes it clear that the DCWUA

was the only active lobbying group for the WBP at that time.

The Weber

County Water Users Association never did take an active part, although there
was a little show of support from the association in Morgan County.
The letter to Dawson also notes that Region 4 of the Bureau had by
that time thrown its full resources into the Weber Basin Project--but that even
so it was short of sufficient resources to complete the preliminary investigation.

The Department of Interior was having a hard time with Congress over

its budget a t that time.

Also, work on the Central Utah Project, the favored

Reclamation baby, was bogged down in a hassle over interstate rights to the
Colorado River.

Thus the Weber Basin Project was an excellent opportunity

to keep the Regional Office at full strength, and even to expand it.

Bureau

officials nurtured the Davis County interest carefully, suggesting that they
send petitions to Washington to demonstrate their desperate need for the Project.

This was done on several occasions.

The arguments in the petitions do

not have the ring of true desperation, however.

They claim that more water
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is vital to local growth, and prove it by claiming that if they had another dry
year like 1934, half of their lawns would dry up.

(Later they accentuated the

severity of this problem by claiming that all their lawns and shrubbery would
dry up.) The local Bureau further strengthened their base of political support by saking the lobby for money to finance its investigative program in the
winter of 1947-48.

The DCWUA persuaded its own County Commission to put

up $2, 500, and tried unsuccessfully to get the other three counties to do the
same.

(The Bureau spent $1,100 of the local money a nd returned the rest.)

The Bureau threatened to take away some of the drilling machines for work
on another project; Nichols and company alternately begged and demanded
that the machines stay put.

They did.

While the South Davis group were fixing themselves ever more
firmly on the hook, working themselves into a thirst they could really taste,
the Burea u was making careful plans for a much larger project in which their
clients really had only a marginal interest.

Nichols and Johnson complained

about the length of time the investigation was taking, a nd were told that it
really was not feasible to build what South Davis wanted without going ahead
with the full project at once.
plained.

The Davis group cUd not like this, and com-

They wanted their own part of the project, now.
In these circumstances, bigger-thinking lobbyists were required, a nd

soon appeared.

In October of 194 7, Orson Christensen, a director of UWUA,

chairman of the Reclamation and Irrigation Committee of the Associated Civic
Clubs of Northern Utah, a nd manager of the Garland U&I Sugar Company plant,
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invited members of his committee in each of the northern counties to a
planning meeting to discuss their program. One of the letters went to Jos.
W. Johnson, as president of the DCWUA. Johnson missed the meeting but
wrote back to Christensen suggesti ng that the Civi c Club 's Reclamation and
Irrigation Committee might consider the promotion of culinary water supplies
for Davis Co unty and the Ogden area: "It's an urgent, acute need," he said.
A copy of Johnson's letter was also sent to E. J. Fjeldsted, manager of
Ogden Chamber of Commerce, secretary of the Weber County WUA and a
director of the UWUA , with a request that Fjeldsted consider Ogden's culinary
needs a nd s uggest a program to "solve the ac ute problem." Christensen gave
his blessing to this idea, as chairman of the comm ittee, a nd Fjeldsted sprang
into action.

As it happened, Ogden City Engineer Win Templeton had a report

all ready on the "ac ute needs" of Ogden City.

Fjeldsted invited Johnson to

bring "two or three key men in Davis County" up to Ogden for a strategy
meeting.
Such was the genesis of the Davis-Weber Counties Municipal Water
Development Association (D-WCMWDA).
like a shot.

1

It leaped into existence and took off

Nichols and Johnson were a lmost immediate ly l eft in the dust,

protesting plaintively from time to time about the scope of the big WBP and
its retardant influence on getting their project built.

The D-WCMWDA did

things in a bigger way; it got lax support from cities and financed its own

1
vant .

This is the point at which Appendix II become chronologically rele-
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"investigation" of culinary needs .

1

Such an investigation, said the Bureau,

was essential to getting approval of the Project, for M&I supplies could not
be provided as a part of it unless by specific request and documented need.
Predictably, Templeton's report claimed to demonstrate urgent need, but its
arguments are not very persuasive (see Chapter VI) .
The D-WCMWDA, like the WBP, is supposed to have originated out
of "dire need" for more water in the East Shore.

The concern of agricultur-

alists like Nichols and Johnson in south Davis seems to have been genuine
enough, but the origins and tactics of the D-WCMWDA frequently appear
staged . The exchange of letters between Fjeldsted, Christensen, and Johnson
has a phony ring.

Why did chambers of commerce--and Joe Johnson--realize

so suddenly that they were in desperate need of more culinary water supply
facilities? Part of the answer is found in their propaganda , which they may
have partially believed: " The Bureau of Reclamation is going to develop the
full resources of the Weber and Ogden Rivers for agriculture.

If we don't

get a share for municipal and industrial use, it may be forever too late a nd
urban growth will be strangled." There is ample evidence that such a perspective was never justified . But it was such a large element in the WBP
promotion that Bureau of Reclamation officers have to have been aware of it.

1
win Templeton, Consulting Engineer, Davis-Weber Counties
Water Development (Salt Lake City, 1949). Although a printed report, copies
are not easy to find. The copy used for this project was found in files of the
State Engineer.
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While no written confirmation has turned up, circumstantial evi de nce sug gests that the Bureau may well have been the source of the idea.

1

On the other hand, chamber of commerce promoters like Fjeldsted
a nd Chris te nsen would not likely have been averse to colluding in a little
exaggeration to forward their virtuous cause.

Both of them were prominent

in the Utah Water Users Association. As such, they were big thinkers,
growth promoters, and zealous believers of the doctrine that water resource
development is an unmitigated good.

Their preoccupation was snaring a large

chunk of federal spoils for the state.

"Utah must get its fair share" is a

r ecurrent phras e in UWUA minutes.
By Nichol's admission and the evidence of his files, the DCWUA had
run out of gas.

It was small, ha d little or no financial resources, a nd was

r eally not very interested in features of the WBP other than the Davis Aqueduct
and its necessary adjuncts.

Their interest was in irrigation, whereas even at

that time it must have been clear that the East Shore had a promising urbanindustrial future.

As Chapter VI will de mons tra te, the Bureau had to have

political supporters with more financial muscle.

It had identified municipal

and industrial water sales as the feasible . mea ns of paying for the Project,
which meant they had to have strong urban support.

Chamber of Commerce

interest must have been an obvious target for a merc handising e ffort.

The

exchange of letters which provides the only apparent record of D-WCMWDA

1
Chapter VI presents the argument for this conjecture.
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origins is not believable as it stands. It is probably a cosmetic performance,
reflecting decisions already made in verbal consultations among Bureau,
UWUA, and DCUWA representatives.
The story about dire and urgent need for culinary water, a nd the fear
that Weber Basin development would leave no allowance for urban-industria l
expansion, a ppears from the records of both the D-WCMWDA a nd the Bureau
to have been a complete fabrication.

Furthermore, it can also be shown that

civic (chamber of commerce) support was vital if the project was to succeed .
As this realization was forced upon them, the Davis group may have conceded
a prominent role to the D-WCMWDA as the only means of achieving their own
limited objective.

Consistent with his paternalistic perspective on the WBP,

Nichols says of the transfer of lobbying responsibility to the D-WCMWDA,
"we let them in. "
Lobbyists need every potential supporter they can muster.

Nichols

and Johnson, and their DCWUA, were accordingly treated polite ly by Fjeldsted
and company.

They were informed of Association activities, consulted from

time to time, and encouraged to maintain letter-writing to the Utah Congressional delegation.

But it is quite obvious tha t Nichols and Johnson feel that

they were left on the sidelines of the promotional campaign , and that their
role as initiators is not adequately recognized.

Neither has ever bee n asked
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to serve on t he WBWCD Board of Directors.

1

As a possible expla nation for

this obvious slight, Winegar proffered the following: "Joe was a ditch-rider
all his life!" The implication seemed to be that Nichols and Johnson were not
big leaguers .

Thei r attention was riveted s o tightly to building an ambitious

irrigation ditc h that they were unable to grasp the vision shared by Bureau
engineers a nd sophisticated water hustle rs--except in retrospect.

As Nichols

reported to his Extension Director at the end of 1950, "We started out m e rely
to secure 20 to 25 thousa nd acre feet of water for the county, and are e nding
up by planning to store all the water of the Webe r Ri ver to supply o ur counties
a nd a part of the fifth . . . I fee l that this is a great accomplishment. " (As
reported, it was also an exaggeration of Nichols' initial plans . He has be en
reported a lready as having written in terms of 10 to 15 thousand acre feet in
the mid-1940's.

In fairness to Nichols it should be emphasized that as County

Agent his freedom to engage in political acti vities was somewhat constri cted.
As it was, he apparently took a n early retirement because of disagreem e nt
with his Director over the legitimate scope of his politicking.)
All the evidence examined seems to be consistent with the following
explanation for the origin of the Weber Basin Project: It was a successful
effort by a small group of civic a nd s tate growth promoters to carve out as

1
wayne Winegar volunteered this information in a di seuss ion with
the a uthor a fter a meeting with the DCWUA had clearly revealed Nichols' and
Johnson' s desire to be recognized for their contribution to the WBP. Nichol s
and Johnson had calle d the meeting to discuss the possibility of using DCWUA
fu nds to pay for writing a history of t he Project.
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large a share for Utah as they could of national resources.
special importance to water.

They attached

They knew that the East Shore was not dying

of thirst, but were confident that the easy conveyance of water to all parts
of the region would stimulate growth.

They seem deliberately to have averted

their gaze from the possibility of piece-meal development via groundwater.
ll could always come later; the opportunity for a major Reclamation Project
was now.

(Once retired from the WBWCD, Fjeldsted turned his attention

immediate ly to groundwater development, and manifests absolutely no embarr ass ment over the now apparent fact that groundwater could have been developed fir s t.) They used scare tactics to drum up the necessary public support,
and, as with most salesmen, ta lked themselves into believing their own
propaganda.

(Thus Fjeldsted could speak of the WBP as a respons e to "dire

need" for mor e water at the very time he was having trouble getting towns to
take water from the Proje ct becaus e they could drill wells less expensively./
At the le vel of the s tate organization the water hustlers were aware that they
were in a contest with other states over federal spoils.

The Davis group

seem, by contrast, to have looked on the Bureau as a gold-bearing eagle to be
tricked or cajoled into dropping a little on them.

For people in organizations

like the Bureau a nd the UWUA it was a case of scratching each others' back.

1

Fjclds tcd is presumptive a uthor of Weber Basin Water Conservancy
Di s trict: Seven Year Summary, which was published by the Distri ct in 1957.
That publication, which was the apparent jumping-off place for several
inve stigations of the WBP, this one included, stressed that the Project was
built as a dire necessity.
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U they could jointly sell a project to Congress, both gained.

That is tbe

change in perspective that seems to have occurred as the conduct of lobbying
activity passed from the DCWUA to the D-WCMWDA.

The traces suggest,

nevertheless, that Bureau people understood the process more clearly than
the most sophisticated of the local spoilsmen, whose zeal for growth made
them willing tools.
The self-serving instinct of government bureaucrats is not hard to
understand; neither is the chamber of commerce fervor for local expansion.
Nor is the probably genuine concern of a county agent for a water supply to
some of the potentially most desirable lands in his district (in this case the
D..t vis bench).
Basin Project.

But there is something more at work in affairs like the Weber
It is commitment to a kind of secular religious movement

whose members share a special technologic interest in water development.
Reference has already been made to the Sierra Club publication which labelled
them The Water Hustlers.

1

Promotional tactics used in the Weber Basin case

follow exactly the pattern identified in that book as the usual program of water
hustlers. One of their chief mottos is to "make the desert blossom as the
rose." Another is that "water is the life-blood of the land." Their frequently
stated objective is to "put every drop to beneficial use for man." Disciples of
this movement are found in many places throughout the United States.

Many of

1
n. H. Boyle, ,J . Graves, and T. H. Watkins, The Water Hustlers
(San Francisco, California: Sierra Club, 1971).
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them are in agencies like the Bureau of Reclamation (Ellis Armstrong who
served briefly as Commissioner during the Nixon administration, is a good
example); many others are in lobbying organizations like the National Reclamation Association (of which the UWUA is an affiliate).

The problem with the

water coterie is the same as with many others in this age of overspecialized
barbarism ,1 they believe that their own special interest and competence is a
panacea.

To them, water development is good, period .
The origins of this secular religion, and its significance to the Weber

Basin case a nd efficient resource management generally, will be examined in
Chapters VIII, IX, and X.

The intent of this chapter has been to show that the

WBP was authorized and built on a flimsy foundation of local support, dredged
up by means of poorly demonstrated claims that desperate water shortage was
imminent.

(Even Bureau of Reclamation officials acknowledge the narrow

base of support.

Director Rex Greenhalgh of the Salt Lake Region volunteered

that only about 1 pe rcent of eligible voters cast ballots in any of the plebescites
that committed Basin property owners to pay for the Project.) The water
hustling theme was brought in here as a suggestion of why a small group of
people would work with obvious dedication for a questionable cause.

Appendix

II should be read in connection with this chapter, as it provides examples of
flimsy and devious a rguments.
1
For a n explanation of this term, read Jose Ortega y Gasset, The
Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1932). Of
related interest are Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society, and C. P.
Snow's lectures on The Two Cultures.
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Nevertheless, although thick varnish is evident on the story told by
WBP supporters, there is a small kernel of truth.

There was some concern

over water scarcity in south Davis County, although it may have been artificially created (see Chapter VII).

Initial support for the WBP did come from

south Davis, a nd it is the region tha t has benefited most from the Project.
The next two chapters will demonstrate that this outcome is the r es ult of
deliberate design.
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CHAPTER V
WHO GETS THE WATER?

Previous chapters have presented argum ents to support the proposition that water a nd wat erworks a r e generally plentiful in the Weber Basin.
This one will provide more details of the nature, location, a nd dimensions
of water abundance, a nd demonstrate that benefits of the Weber Basin Project
tend to be concentrated in one corner of t he region.

The following chapter

uses planning documents a nd operating reports of the Bureau and Cons ervancy
Distri ct to show that the repayment burden is a lso highly concentrated--but
not in quite the same way as benefits.

Chapter VII will restate a nd interpret

the politi cal and eco nomi c problems of the Weber Basin case.

Ir rigation Service to Project Lands

Table 3 presents a 1959 inventory of la nd r esources in the Weber
Basin, with plans to serve a portion of that land with wate r from the Weber
Basin Project.

1

Although pr eproj ect aspirations were for developing th e total

wate r resources of the Basin for beneficial us e , later reports, s uch as this
one, claim only that "almost a ll " the water was actually being developed.

1
Bureau of Reclamation, " Weber Basin Project Utah , Supplement to
Definite Plan Report, December 1959, " Salt Lake City, p. 17. This source
is re ferred to hereafter as "1959 DPR."
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TABLE 3
PROJECT LAND SUMMARY (ACRES)

Reg!on and Land Class

Total Area
Classified

Full
Service

Irrigable Area
Supplemental
Service

Total

Mountain Valleys
Classes 1-4

25,414.9

23,095 .3

23,095.3

Class 6

12,744.4

23,095.3

23,095.3

16, 699 . 0

14,801.7

31,500.7

73,588.4

16,699.0

14, 80 1.7

31,500.7

Classes 1-4

72,352.4

25,2 85 .5

32,858.3

58 ,143.8

Class 6

29,681.2

105, 853. 1

25,2 85 .5

32,858.3

58,143.8

159,750.5

41,984.5

70,755.3

122,739. 8

41,990

70,750

112,740

Right-of-way
Subtotal

466.1
38,625.4

East Shore Foothills
Classes 1-4

61,983.2

Clas s 6

8 ,446. 8

Right-of-way

3,158.4

Subtotal
East Shore Lake Plains

Right-of -way
Subtotal

3,819.5

Total Project Area
Clas ses 1-4
Class 6
Right-of-way

50, 872.4
7,444.0

Subtotal, rounded 21 8 ,100
Source: 1959 DPR, p. 17.
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1

The 1949 Bureau report which won Congressional approval for the
WBP had projected that 285,000 acre feet of water would be developed,
245,000 of which would provide irrigation to 70,400 acres of new land and
supplemental water (late season) to 30,800 acres already under partial irrigalion.

The remaining 40,000 acre feet was to be for municipal use. Of the

lands to be irrigated with the augmented water supply, 39,000 acres required
draining a nd/ or leaching before they could be used for agriculture.

(Thirty-

two thousand acres of delta lands were contaminated with salt.)
Table 4 summarizes the acres of classified farmland that were to be
irrigated through facilities of the completed project.

No new lands were to

be irrigated in the upper valleys by this plan, and of lands to be benefited in
the East Shore Area, more than half lay in the Willard and Layton blocks
(48,300 acres compared to 41,340).

2

Table 5 shows Bureau estimates of how much water the irrigable
lands "should" receive (presumably based on calculations of maximum
physical productivity) compared to the capacity of the WBP to serve them.

1
weber Basin Project, Utah. Development of the Potential Weber
Basin Project, Utah. Bonneville Basin. Report of the Regional Director,
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Region 4, Salt Lake
City, Utah, July 15, 1949. Presented in U. S. Senate by A. V. Watkins,
September 23, 1949. S. Doc. 147, Blst Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D. C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 24, 45, 46. This source is
referred to hereafter as S. Doc. 117.
2
Bob Hensley, WBWCD engineer, April 11, 1973.
Hiverdale block have been cancelled.

P lans for the
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TABLE 4
PROJECT IRRIGABLE AREA (UNIT--ACRES)

Area a nd Block

Supplemental
Irrigation
Service
Lands

Total

4 ,110
7,290
6, 710

4 ,110
7,290
6 , 710

4,990
23,100

4 , 990
23,100

86 0

2, 730

3 , 590

5,0 00
2,200
1,590
560
280
1,740
5,040
3,180

680
4,380
1 ,130
1,440
83 0
1, 460
1,410
160

5 , 680
6,580
2,72 0
2, 000
1,110
3,200
6,450
3 , 340

600

2,6 50
3,420

3 , 250
3,420

11,140
9,800
4 1,990
41,990

11,050
16,310
47 , 650
70,750

22, 190
26 , 110
89 , 640
112,740

Full
Irrigation
Service
Lands

Mountain Valley area
Weber River Valley service area
Oakley block
Summit blocks
Morgan blocks
Huntsville- Eden service a r ea
Huntsville-Eden block
Subtotal
East Shore area
Davis-Weber service area
Riverdale blocks
Aqueduct serv icc area
North Davis blocks
Kaysvi ll e-Farmington blocks
West Farmington blocks
Centervi lle blocks
Woods Cross No. 1 blocks
Woods Cross No . 2 blocks
South Davis blocks
Uintah Bench blocks
Ogden service area
South Ogden blocks
North Ogden blocks
Willard-Layton service a r ea
Willard blocks
Layton blocks
Subtotal
Total project area
Source: 1959 DPR, p. 18.
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TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF PROJECT IRRIGATION WATER REQUIREMENTS
AND SU PPLY

Diversion
req uire ment
(acre-feet
12er acre)

Location
Mountain Valley area
Weber River Valley
service area
Oakley block
4.36
Summit bl ocks
4.36
Morgan blocks
4 .3 6
Huntsville-Eden service area
Huntsville-Eden block
4.36
Subtotal
Eas t Shore area
Davis-Weber ser vice area
Riverdale blocks
3 .27
Aqueduct service area
North Davis blocks
3 .08
Kaysville-Farmington
blocks
3.08
West Farmington blo cks 3.08
Centerville blocks
3. 08
Woods Cros s No . 1 bls. 3.08
Woods Cross No . 2 bls. 3 .08
3. 08
South Davis blocks
Uintah Bench blocks
3 .08
Ogden service area
So uth Ogden blocks
3 .08
North Ogden block
3. 08
Willard-Layton service area
Willard blocks
3.27
Layton blocks
3 . 27
Subtotal
Total project area
Source: 1959 DPR, p. 39 .

Project wate r require m e nts
(ac r e-feet annual!;):)
Average
Suppleproject
Full
mental
supply
service
service
(acre-ft.
la nds
la nds
Total a nnua l!;):)

1,700
2,6 00
5,3 00

1,700
2,600
5,300

1,500
2,400
4,800

6 ,400
16,000

16,000

14,600

2,600

400

3,000

2 , 700

14,500

900

15 ,400

14,100

6,400
4,600
1,700
800
5,000
14 , 600
9,200

2, 100
1, 800
1,400
2, 000
2 ,900
3, 400
300

8 , 500
6 , 400
2 ,100
2,800
7,900
18 ,000
9,500

7, 800
5 , 800
2,800
2,600
7,200
16, 400
8, 700

1,700

1,800
2, 000

3,500
2,000

3,200
1,800

34,200
30,100
125,400
125,400

8 , 800
9,000
36 , 800
52,800

6 , 400~

43, 000 39,300
39 ,100 35,800
162,200 148 ,200
178,200 162, 800
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More than half of the Project water is slated for the Willa rd a nd Layton
blocks (82, 100 a. f. compared to total s upply of 162, 800).

The requirement

for lands served by the Davis and Weber Aqueducts (including the Ogden Service area) is low relative to others because of the hilly terrain of bench la nds.
A discount for lands too uneven for farming is more important to this calculation than the porosity a nd absorptive capacity of the soil on be nch la nds as
compared to lake plains.

1

Table 5 shows how much water the Bureau planned to develop as of
1959, whereas Table 6 shows how much capacity was actually in place by the
time construction ceased i n 1970. Some comparisons are in order: Note
that the Oakley block was not built,
planned.

2

but that Summit block is la rger than

Constructed supply for the Huntsville-Eden block was built larger

than projected requirements in 1959--and it i s virtua lly all sold.
dale block was not built, but the Roy block has been added.

The River-

Kaysville-

Farmington has larger capacity than projected in 1959, while We st Farmington is smaller.

1
2

Centerville capacity is larger than planned, as is South Davis,

lbid.

This may have something to do with Larrabee Reservoir, which
appears in Figure 1. That map is 1963 vintage, prepared for a nother revision
of the Definite Plan Report which the WBWCD r e fused to approve. It revised
costs upward to over 105 million dollars and included Larrabee. I have another m ap (B. of R. Region 4 Map No . 526-412-1) which shows Larrabee as
a " future extension." It is dated 1951. This set of circumstances s uggests
to me that the Bureau planned Larrabee all along, if they had time on their
hands, and that the Oakley block really depended on it, although Larabee did
not appear in the text or on the map acco mpanying the 1959 DPR.

TABLE 6
WEBER BASIN PROJECT STATUS OF IRRIGATION WATER CAPACITY PLANNED, CONSTRUCTED, SOLD

Irrigation Blocks

1959 D . P. R.

Under
Constructed unit
notice
capacity
1971
1970

Sold as
of J uly
1971

Available
1971

0
3,190.0
3, 961.2
7,151.2

0
310.0
1, 338. 8
1,648. 8

Changed
unit
noti ce
1974

Sold as
of Dec .
1974

Available
1974

Upper Valleys
Weber River
Oakley
Summit
Morgan
Subtotal
Ogden Ri ver
Huntsville-Eden
Causey
Pineview
Subtotal Upper Valleys

1,700
2, 600
5,300
9, 600

6,400

16,000

0
3,500
5, 300

~

0
3,500

~
~

6,900
( 6, 025)
(875)

6,900
(6, 025)
(875)

15,700

15, 700 13' 968. 2

6,817
(6, 025)
(792)

83
0
(83)
1, 731.8

4,300
~

6,043
~
~
15,700

3,467.0
3,940.2
7,407.2

33.0
359. 8
392.8

6,042.5
1,247.0
7,2 89 .5
14,696 . 7

0.5
610.0
6 10.5
1,003.3

....

"'
0

TABLE 6--Continued

Irrigation Blocks

1959 D.P. R.

Under
Constructed unit
capacity
notice
1970
1971

Sold as
of July
1971

Available
1971

0
149
11,414.4
9,23 8.0
3,605.2
4,006 .0
2,429.9
4, 261. 7
20 , 653.3
1,300.0
9,171.7
66 ,229 .2

0
0
3,985 . 6
162.0
2,094. 8
-41.0
370. 1
-601. 7
121. 7
0
1,028.3
7,119. 8

Changed
unit
notice
1974

Sold as
of Dec.
1974

Available
1974

73,6-1.9

149.0
12,007.7
9,368.4
5,694.9
4, 182.6
2,597.6
3,649.5
20,602.3
1,300.0
9,240.0
68 ,792.0

0
3,392.5
31. 6
5. 1
82.4
202 . 4
10.5
172.7
0
960.0
4,857.0

---

1,000.0
3,705.0
4,705.0

78,354

75,497.0

East Shore Foothills
Weber River
Riverdale
Roy
North Davis
Kaysville-Farmington
\Vest Farmington
Centerville
Woods Cross No . 1
Woods Cross No. 2
South Davis
South Ogden
Uintah Bench
Subtotal

3,000
0
15,400
8,500
6,400
3,100
2,800
7,900
18,000
2,500
9,500
77,100

0
200
15,400
9,400
3,700
4,000
2,800
3,800
20,775
1,300
10,200
73, 575

Ogden River
South Ogden
North Ogden
Subtotal

1,000
2,000
3,000

1,000

1,000

~

~

Subtotal Foothills

80,100

78,280

78.054

4,705

0
149
15, 400
9,400
5,700
3,965
2,800
3,660
20,775
1,300
10,200
73,349

4,705

1,000
~

4,705

70,934.2

0
0
0
7,119.8

4, 265.0

0
0
0
4,857.0
>-'

"'>-'

TABLE 6--Continued

Irrigation Blocks

1959 D.P. R .

Under
Constructed unit
capacity noti ce
1971
1970

Sold as
of July
1971

Available
1971

Changed
unit
notice
1974

Sold as
of Dec.
1974

Available
1974

Lake Plains
Layton
Willard- Warren
Subtotal
Total Project
Sources:

39' 100
43,000
82 ,100

6,000
____§_,_QQQ
14,000

~
6,660

1,000

0
2, 041. 1
2,041.1

178,200

107' 980

100,414

89 ,943.3

1,000.0
3,618.9
4, 618.9

6,360

0
2,995.1
2,995 .1

700.0
2,664.9
3,364.9

13,470.5 100,414

91,188 . 8

9,225.2

700

1971 Annual Report, WBWCD, Table 12
1974 Annual Re port, WBWCD, p. 28
1971 Status Summary of irrigation plan, supplied by Tom Cook, WBWCE

,...
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but Woods Cross No. 2 is smaller by more than e nough to compensate.

A

similar transfer has occurred between the Uintah Bench and South Ogden
block, served by the Weber River.

North Ogden block has been built larger

than planned using slack resources from other parts of the project.
In both the Upper Valleys and the East Shore Foothills, the quantity
of water sold as of July 1971 was about 90% of constructed capacity (89 percent
for upper; 90.6 percent for foothills).

Comparing the Ogden and Weber Rivers,

above Slaterville Di version in 1971:
Capacity

Sold

Upper

6,900

6,847

Foothills

4,705

4,705

Tota l

11,605

11,522

Percent Sal es/Capacit;)::

Ogden River

99%

Weber River
8. 800

7,152.2

Foothills

73,575

66,229 . 2

Total

82,375

73,3 81.4

Upper

89%

Before considering the highly significant Willard and Layton portions
of the Project, there are some noteworthy observations that may be inferred
from a comparison the 1974 portions of Table G with the 1971 columns: When
water is under Unit Notice, it means that the Conservancy District is obliged
to pay for it (see Chapter VI).

Payments to the Bureau of Reclamation are on
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the basis of Unit Notices , therefore, rather than on physical capacity of
Project facilities.

The Bureau has no i nterest i n bankrupting the WBWCD,

on which it depends for repayment, a nd therefore cooperates by delivering
Unit Notices at a rate consistent with the Di stri ct's ability to se ll the water.
It does keep the pressure on , howe ver , as can be ascertained from the excess
of Unit Notice availability over actua l sales . The co lumn of Changes in Unit
Notice , 1974 shows how the Bureau helps the District shift its payment
burdens to accord with sales potential. The Morgan block, for example, had
its Unit Notice r educed by 1, 000 acre feet fr om 1971 to 1974, while that of
Huntsville-Eden was raised by the same figure . There is still significant
excess capacity in Morgan, but the WCD is und er less pressure to sell it
because District management was able to arrange for sale s out of P ineview
in Ogden Valley.

The expansion of sales in thi s valley is due to s uburba n

residential growth, and many contracts are of the relatively remunerative
Class D variety exp lai ned by Pe nd se.

A s imilar switch of paym e nt obligation

occurred between the Layton and Centerville blocks , with the latter taking
over 300 acre feet from the former.

In this case the change put the Center-

ville unit noti ce higher than its constructed capacity.

This probably means

that Centervi ll e irrigators are paying the M&I repayment price (or Class D)
for the extra water, s ince it is using aqued uct capacity that was rese r ved for
that purpose .

1

One further item of note is the sale of over 2 , 000 acre feet in

1
Inferred from comments of Wayne Winegar in 1972 .
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the West Farmington block between 1971 and 1974. Winegar said in 1972
that that quantity was sold, but the 1974 annual report implies
Bureau does not agree with the sale.

1

that the

This may mean that the water was sold

by the WCD to the Farmington Bay Bird Refuge while the Bureau thinks it
should be reserved for agriculture.

If so, it reflects, perhaps a remnant of

Reclamation ideology (see Chapter IX) in conflict with reality as seen by a
beleaguered business manager.
A comparison of constructed capacity with sales suggests that the
only weak points, except for the Willard-Layton system, are the Morgan and
North Davis blocks--assuming the Bureau eventually accepts the West Farmington sale.

The Uintah Bench surplus is expected to be taken up gradually

in Class D residential contracts--although full use might be threatened by
paving over large areas for parking lots.

The new surplus in Pine view is no

doubt welcome slack, and will be taken up by suburban expansion. A similar
fate probably awaits the Woods Cross No. 1 exces s in light of Winegar's statement, cite d in the previous chapter, that there are only two commercial
farmers left in the Woods Cross district, whereas the re were two rural wards
there in the 1930's.

The large surfeit in North Davis is due to the rental

water of U&I Sugar Company, noted earlier.

The WCD is buying, or plans to

buy, this water from the company. District officials claim they are not

1

Weber Basin Water Conservancy District 1974 Summary of Operations, p. 28 . Referred to hereafter as "1974 Annual Report. "

136

anxious to sell the water in this block for irrigation as they see more lucrative opportunities for it in pressuri zed lawn-watering systems like that of
Bountiful.

(They are obliged to sell it as irrigation water , at the low agri-

cultural prices, if anyone wants it before it is sold for something else.)
The surfeit in Morgan seems to be real a nd relatively permanent, a
conclusion reflected by the Bureau's decision to reduce the unit notice by
1, 000 acre feet.

Morgan County is rural, isolated , and stagnant.

It will be

some time before it feels the pressure of suburban or recreational expansion,
and it does not have a flourishing agricultural economy--a status it shares
with many Utah counties.

WCD water is competitive in price with private

sources, but no one is interested.

Some of the capacity available to Morgan

could probably be transferred to Summit, where there seems to be more
concern over potentia l shortage. Summit, although further from the East
Shore, may have better prospects for recreational development tban Morgan,
and therefore fac es a more dynami c situation in respect of water demand.
It is noteworthy that the only one of the irrigation blocks considered

thus far that is seen as a problem by WCD management (Morgan) is also the
one that is most exclusively agricultural.

The malaise of agriculture is also

the culprit in the truly surplus portion of WBP- -the Willard-Warren-Layton
system.

Other portions of the Project have escaped serious embarrassment

because of recreational, industrial and suburban development close to the
Wasatch Front (or to Uintah's in the case of Summit County).

We will see in

Chapter VI that current plans for using the water developed by the Willard
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system also depend on non-agricultural uses.

The fortunes of the WBP

have obvious ly been heavily influenced by the transformation of the utah
economy during and after World War II, from rural-agricultural to urbanindustrial.

There is some evidence that promoters of the WBP saw this trans-

formation coming, although many of them clearly had an almost single-minded
agricultural perspective.

It will appear in retrospect that the post-war period

was a unique opportunity for the Bureau to build the WBP--one that had not
existed before, and would be dead before the end of the 1950's.

" Times

changed" for agriculture with the dawn of the 1950's. So said a veteran farmer
in the Lake Plains district when asked why there was not a ny interest in irrigation water from the Willard system . But before awareness of thi s transformation could permeate the consciousness of public decision-makers, construction of the WBP was under way.
Readers will note that water under unit notice for the Upper Valleys
is equal to constructed capacity, and that it falls short of capacity by only
226 acre feel (0 . 3 percent) in the East Shore Foothills.

This suggests that

the comparisons above of sales to constructed capacity are an indication of
the degree of persuasion imposed by the Bureau of Reclamation on its sales
and repayment agency--i.e. , full pressure.

Reduction of the Morgan notice

by 1, 000 acre feel is an exception to that rule, however, which is obscured
in the totals by the creation of a unit notice for Pineview in Ogden Valley .
What does this change do to the comparison by river basin?
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Capacity

Sold (1974)

Percent Salef!Caeacit~

Ogden River
Upper

6,900

7,289 .5

Foothills

4,705

4,705.0

Total

11,605

11,994 . 5

8.800

7,407.2

Foothills

73,575

68,792.0

Total

82,375

76,199.2

103.4%

Weber River
Upper

Obviously it does not change capacity at all.

92.5%
It does make more sales

pos,;ible out of the Ogden sy,;tem, enhaneing somewhat artificially its sale,;/
capacity ratio.
Figures in Table 6 for Upper Ogden are given in the fashion of their
presentation in the source documents.

This presentation suggests that the

intended (1959) water supply for Huntsville-Eden was strictly a matter of surface water from Causey Reservoir.
up.

By the late 1960's that capacity was used

Water can be taken from Pineview Reservoir for use in Ogden Valley

either hy pumping, or by diversion of surface or groundwater that would or
could have been used below the dam.

That is, as long as there is water in

Pineview Heservoir to serve rights holders below the dam, the Conservancy
District can divert and sell as much as it pleases out of the Ogden River above
the reservoir.

It can therefore hold storage in Causey for late season supply
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only, and divert the Ogden directly to serve Huntsville-Eden at all other times
of the year. It is quite conceivable that this pattern of development could be
extended well beyond the current unit notice of 1857 acre feet.

Pineview Occupies the Only Good Reservoir Site

Chapter II contained a statement that there is plenty of unused water
in the Ogden River, and that Pineview is the only big mountain reservoir in
the whole WBP.

Table 7 shows that Pineview develops 110, 000 acre feet of

water (a net of 66,000 a. f. over the 44,000 a. f. capacity of Old Pineview
built in 1941), whereas delivery capacity of the irrigation blocks below it is
only 4, 705 acre feet (Table 7).

M&I use out of Pineview is negligible.

1

Total

consumptive use of existing Pineview storage is well under 10,000 a. f. of the
66,000 of hitherto unappropriated water.

2

There are no Project power plants

on the Ogden River, although preproject plans estim ated that up to 10,000 a . f.
might be used to increase generating capacity of Utah Power a nd Light's
Pioneer plant.

3

Deducting these maximum releases from Pineview still lea ves

almost 50,000 a . f. for residential and recreational expansion in Ogden Valley ,
almost certainly more than it can eve r use.

1
2
3

The data in Table 6 suggest,

nemonstrated below.

nemonstrated below.

s.

Doc. 147, p. 54, and 1959 DPR, p. 9.

TABLE 7
CAPAC ITY AND ESTIMATED COSTS OF PROJECT FEATURES

DescriEtion
SUMMARY
RESERVOIRS AND DAMS
Pineview Dam and Reservoir (enlargement)
Wanship Dam and Reservoir
Wi llard Dam and Reservoir
Lost Creek Dam and Reservoir
East Canyon Dam and Reser voir (enlargement)
Causey Dam a nd Reservoir
DIVERSION DAMS
Stoddard Diversion Dam
Slaterville Diversion Dam
PUMPING PLANTS
Willard p umping plants
Layton pumping plant
Lateral system pumping plants
DE EP WELLS
CANALS AND CONDUITS
Gateway Canal and tunnel
Weber aqueduct
Davis aqueduct
Layton Canal
Wa rre n Canal (enlargement)
Willard Canal
Ogden Valley Canal and Di version Dam

Total
Estimate

~uantit:z:

110, 000
62, 100
215, 000
20, 000
52, 000
7, 500

ac.
ac .
ac .
ac.
ac.
ac.

700 c . f. s.
1, 150 c. f. s
500
260
100
26
11. 8
5
23
18 . 4
15
11
8. 6

c. f.
c. f.
c. f.
c. f.

mi.
mi.

mi.
mi.
mi.

mi.
mi.

s.
s.
s.
s.

ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.
ft .
ft.

Previous
Official
Estimate

4,600,000
6 , 836,000
15,774,000
5,824,000
3,548,000
4,950 ,000

4,422,000
6,821,000
10,387,000
4,064,000
2,283,000

373,000
750 , 000

3 73,000
744 ,00 0

6 , 334 ,000
512,000
184 ,000
804,000

2 , 512,000
388,000

7,600,000
1, 533 ,000
10,547,000
1,897,000
802,000
3 ,413, 000
800,000

7,800,000
1, 490 ,000
9,322,000
1, 817 ,000
697,000
3 , 479,000

685,000

........
0

TABLE 7 --Continued

Descri[>tion
LATERALS
Layton Canal lateral system
Warren Canal lateral system
Weber aqueduct lateral system
Uintah Bench laterals
South Ogden laterals (supply lines)
Davis aqueduct latera l system
North Davis laterals
West Farmington laterals
Ricks Creek laterals
Bountiful Subdistrict Reservoirs
Woods Cross laterals
DRAINS
POWERPLANTS--HYDRO
Gateway pow e rplant
Wanship powe rplant
GENERAL PROPERTY
Recreational de ve lopment
Operation and maintenance housing
Operation and maintenance equipment
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION COST
Future year capacity
TOTAL PROJECT COST
Source: 1959 DPR, p. 14.

Total
Estimate

Previous
Official
Estimate

13,500 ac.
5,500 ac.

1,496,000
267,000

1,102,000
257,000

3, 000 ac.

1,141,000
187,000

1,210,000
70,000

4, 850 a c.
2,890ac.
495 ac.

2,489,000
840,000
150,000
775,000
1,780,000
7,060,000

2,212,000
688,000
86 ,000
618,000
1,239,000
5,626,000

1,066,000
481 ,000

1,039,000
520,000

2,545,000
92,000
200,000
97,350,000
158,000
97,500,000

1,375,000
88,000

~uantit_y

4,100 ac.

4, 275 kw.
1,425kw.

73,413,000
100,000
73,513,000

...

>-'
>-'
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however, that planners did not foresee as late as 1959 the coming change from
agricultural to re sidential use of Ogden Valley.
The unused storage capacity of Pineview ReselVoir changes the image
suggested in previous comparisons of capacity use between the Ogden and
Weber Rivers.

If Willard Reservoir is the embarrassment of the WBP,

which it undoubtedly is, Pineview is the irony.

Consider the comparison of

costs and capacities of Project reservoirs available in Table 8. These data
demonstrate effectively the superiority of the Pineview site . The irony lies
in the limited application possibilities for Pineview water.

Table 6 reinforces

an obvious inference from the map, that between Pineview Dam a nd Slaterville
Diversion there is little but canyon and city, leaving very limited land resources
for expansion of irrigated agriculture.

The Ogden River Project of 1941

diverted Pineview storage north to Box Elder County via the Ogden-Brigham
Canal (along the Wasatch Front and around the Pleasant View Salient) and to
South Ogden via Ogden Canyon Conduit and South Ogden Highline Canal.

Diver-

sion north along the Wasatch Front is easier than diversion south, because of
the Uintah Bench which lies between the mouths of Ogden and Weber Canyons .
But either direction requires an expensive aqueduct because of high, porous,
and hilly terrain. Diversions are obviously limited by the capacities of s uch
conveyance facilities as exist, unless more are built. No new ones were
planned for this area as part of the WBP. The capacity sales of irrigation
water in the North and South Ogden blocks (Table 6) suggests this may have
been a mistake. But planners probably estimated that potential use was too

TABLE 8
RELA TIVE EFFICIENCY OF WBP RESERVOIRS

Height
(ft.)

Dam
Length
(ft.)

Wanship

156

2,100

Lost Creek

220

1,100

East Canyon

245

Causey

Name

Type

Reservoir
Storage Ca12acit~ (a. f.)
Active WBP Share
Total

Combined
Cost($)

Cost per
a. f. of
WBP Storage

$
59,000

59,000

6,836, 000

115.86

20,000

19,925

19,925

5, 824,000

292.30

52,000

48,000

20,000

3,548,000

177. 40

Earth and Rock

7,500

6,400

6,400

4,950,000

773.44

Earth a nd Rock

110,000

110,000

66,000

4,600,000

69.70

Earth

215 ,000

195,000

195 ,000

15 ,774,000

80 . 89

Earth and Rock

62,000

Earth a nd Rock

400

Concrete Arch

200

800

Pineview

91

520

Willard

34

76,560

Sources : 1959 Supplement to Definite Plan Re12ort, WBP, Tables, pp. 6, 69, 86, Summary Sheet 7
Back End Paper, 1974 Annual Report, WBWCD

.......w
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limited to justify an investment in new conveyance capacity. Of course, the
water is there to sell out of the river if any group wishes to arrange their own
conveyance.
Consumptive use of less than 5, 000 a. f. does not make a very large
dent in a water supply of 66,000 a. f.

Pineview Reservoir was clearly not

authorized primarily to augment the water supply to existing irrigation facilities between the mouth of Ogden Canyon and Slaterville Diversion. Although
they had other uses in mind for the Pineview water, Project planners did not
call attention to relative magnitudes, suggesting they may have felt some
embarrassment. In contrast to their grand designs for shifting water from
here to there in the Weber system, and for the combined Weber-Ogden below
Slaterville, this is their meek comment on the Ogden below Pineview: "Water
from Pineview Dam would be released as needed in the Ogden River channel
and used for irrigation downstream in the area west of the Wasatch Front.
Some of this water would also be utilized to provide part of the exchange water
for lands in the delta area. "

1

(Emphasis added. ) Ten years later the situation

was much the same, if a little more specific.:
The enlarged capacity of Pineview Reservoir will be operated
to increase the irrigation supply for lands both north and south of
Ogden River in the service area of the Ogden River Project. It will
also provide irrigation water for diversion from the lower Weber

1

s.

Doc. 147, p. 25.
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River at the Slaterville Diversion Dam and will make additional
water availabl e for municipal and industrial purposes in the
Ogden area .1 [Emphasis added.]
The latter source confirms that the supplemental irrigation supply to the Ogden
River Project (see Chapter II) was planned to flow through existing pipeline s
and canals to a r eas in the South Ogden and Weber-Box Elder Conservation
Districts.
These Bureau statements invite an inference that diversions at
Slaterville are to be secondary to those at the canyon mouth.

In fact, that has

turned out to be very nearly true, but it is hardly an accurate description of
the authorized Project's real intent.
The additional M&I wa ter mentioned in the quotation above is
released from Pineview dam .

2

Given that Ogden City has a 10, 000 acre foot

contract for M&I water, by far the largest of s uch WBWCD contracts, one
might reasonably expect that it is delivered from Pineview as just described.
Such is not the case, however.

Ogden City buys 8 , 500 a . f. of treated water

from the WBWCD's Plant No. 2 on Old Post Road in Ogden--water that comes
across the Uintah Bench via the Weber Aqueduct!

3

Furthermore, more than

half of the irrigation water delivered to the conveyance system of the South

1
2
3

1959 DPR, p. 8.
Ibid.

By i nference from tables on pp. 12, 18, 24, 29 of the 1974 Annual
Report (WBWCD).
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Ogden Conservancy District comes through the Weber Aqueduct.

1

In 1974,

Ogde n City used only 10 a. f. of its contracted 1, 500 a . f. of untreated water
(versus 429 a . f. in 1971), so not much was released from Pineview for that
purpose.

2

The intended use of Pineview storage can be inferred quite easily by
looking closely at the map.

Note that water was to be diverted both north and

south from the Slaterville dam.

Broken red lines identified as Layton and

Willard Canals run fairly closely along the boundary line between Foothill a nd
Lake Plain lands as classified in Table 6.

The irrigable acreage in the Lake

Plains region is given at over 58,000 acres in Table 4, of which over 25,000
was not receiving water as of 1959. Water from Pineview could obviously
run by gravity to lands under either the Warren or Willard Canals, and could
be pumped into the Layton Canal directly from the river.

Without Pineview,

any surplus flow of the Ogden could only be stored in Willard Reservoir, from
which it must be pumped to the Willard, Warren, and Layton service areas.
And, of course, total storage would be less in the absence of Pineview, limiting the Lake Plains acreage that could be irrigated.

1
1959 DPR, p. 9 and Table 3 of this paper. Note that in Table 3
South Ogden appears under both the Weber and Ogden Rivers.
2

1974 and 1971 Annual Reports, WBWCD.
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Location of WBP Irrigation Service

It is instructive to look at Figure 1 in connection with Tables 5 and 6.

The Oakley Block that was not constructed (probably in connection with the
rejection of Larrabee Reservoir) extends from north of Kamas to about Peoa.
The Summit Block includes the lands in green below Wanship and Lost Creek
Rese rvoirs.

The Morgan Block is obvious, as is Huntsville-Eden.

1

In the East Shore area, the Riverdale Block was to have included the
river valley area from the mouth of Weber Canyon, around the b end below Roy
and Ogden Airport to the boundary of Riverdale with Ogden City.

This region

has long been served by the Davis-Weber Canal, and residents would not have
had much interest in more irrigation water in the face of rapid suburban
growth.

The Uintah Bench Block is the yellow area north of the Weber River,

served by the Weber Aqueduct.

Adjacent to it is the South Ogden Block , which

receives WBP from both the Weber Aqueduct and the South Ogden Highline
Canal (Pineview water ).

The South Ogden Block starts at the mouth of Ogden

Canyon and runs in a wide belt around the east and south of Ogden City, encompassing South Ogden and Washington Terrace.

The North Ogden Block is

a slightly narrower belt running north from the canyon mouth against the
Wasatch Range, bulging as it reaches the North Ogden area, and continuing in
a wider belt to the west of Pleasant View.

1

These details are confirmed by Map No. 526-412-5871 in 1959 DPR.
The next three paragraphs use Map No. 526-412-4836 from the 1959 DPR.
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North Davis block is the area in yellow south and east of Hill Field.
It extends south to the latitude of Layton (north of Holmes Creek) where it is
bounded by the Kaysville-Farmington Block.

Note that the great bulk of Davis

County farmland, the green area between the broken red line denoting Layton
Canal, Hill Field, and the yellow lands a long the mountains, is not included
in the WBP irrigation blocks.

The Kaysville-Farmington block covers a small

part of the area , south of a line running roughly northeast through the center
of Kaysville.

From that line south, all of the irrigable and potentially irrigable

lands of Davis County are included in the remaining Foothills blocks (see Table
5) . The big green area of North Davis County is served by the Davis-Weber
Canal, a nd other companies, who could, of course, buy WBP water and divert
it through their own facilities.

(They do not, in fact.? The big yellow

patches, Ui ntah and North Davis blocks, are the only parts of the East Shore
Foothills where irrigation sales are lagging behind delivery capacity.
Some further comparisons from Table 6 are enlightening: current
irrigation capacity of the total aqueduct system appears to be 73,375 a. f.
(subtracting 200 a. f. for Roy Park, which is served by a well, from the East
Shore Foothills Weber River subtotal). Of this capacity, 26,900 a. f. is
allocated to t he North Davis and South Weber bench lands (summation of South
Ogden, Uintah Bench, and North Davis blocks), and 46,475 a. f. to South Davis

1
Frank Haws s uggests that the Davis-Weber Cana l Company could
compete with the WBWCD for M&I sales. It has an ample water supply, which
is increasing as land is taken out of agriculture for other purposes.
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ColUlty.

Thus, South Davis has access to the lion' s s hare of the water, and

a lso makes more complete use of its larger portion.

Willard-Layton System for Use of the Ogden River

The Willard block includes lands lying west of Willard Canal and
north of the Weber River . Those lying west of Layton Canal and south of the
Weber River, to the latitude of Kaysville, are in the Layton block. It was
land in these two relatively huge blocks that was to be reclaim ed by drainage,
and irrigated by trapping the surplus flow of the Weber and (especially) Ogden
Rivers.

Recall fr om Table 4 that of total land to be benefitted by the WBP in

the East Shore area, 48,300 acres lay in the Willard and Layton blocks, compared to 41,340 acres in all other blocks combine d.

Consistent with that was

the calculation that more than half (82, 100 a. f.) of the East Shore water
supply to be deve loped by the WBP (162, 200) was de signated for the Willard Layton blocks.

P lanning documents understandably did not emphasize that

this ha lf of the Project water would be of no us e to any lands other than the
Lake Pla ins . And we have already seen that both the 1949 and 1959 planning
documents quite clearly down-played the fact that Pineview Rese rvoir was useful a lmost solely as a s upply of water for the Lake Plains.

The actual con-

sumptive use of Pineview is shown in a subsequent section to be limited to
about 5, 000 a. f. annually . Since active WBP storage in Pineview is gi ven as
66, 000 a. f. (Table 8), abo ut 60, 000 a. f. of it per year has nowhere to go but
down the river to either Willard Reservoir or Great Salt Lake.
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With the obviously limited potential of Pineview in mind, the overcapacity In the Willard-Layton system takes on an even more ridiculous
aspect.

Note again in Tables 4 and 5 that the potential for use of irrigation

in the Lake Plains was estimated by Bureau planners to be limited to 82 , 100
a. f. per year .

That included both supplemental services and the biggest

estimate they could make of reclaimed lands.

To meet that need they con-

structed reservoir capacity of at least 250, 000 (215, 000 in Willard; 66,000,
less other uses, in Pineview).

Notice from Table 5 that estimated total irri-

gation requirements for the entire WBP were 178, 200 a. f.

Compare that to

the 366,325 a. f. of active WBP storage capacity in Project reservoirs,
reported in Table 8.

(The amount under unit notice as of 1974 is given in

Table 6 at 100,414 a. f.) A subsequent section of this chapter will demonstrate
that facilities for use of the Weber ill ver are employed to virtual capacity, so
that the bulge of storage over use is located in Pineview a nd Willard.

F urther-

more, even if the lake plain lands had been developed as intended, the water
storage developed to serve them was three times their estimated maximum
requirement (250, 000+ compared to 82, 100).
The standard reaction of water hustlers to this kind of argument is,
"b ut when (if) a dry year comes, etc." As will be shown in the next paragraph,
that is the line they are using to minimize the apparent surplus in Willard
Reservoir.

Table 6 shows constructed capacity in Lake Plains blocks to be

only 14 ,000 a. f. in contrast to 1959 plans for 82, 100 a. f.

If legitimate, this

figure means that of planned conveyance facilities, only enough were actually
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constructed to handle 14, 00 a. f. in a season.
compares to a unit notice of only 6,360 a. f.

That constructed capacity
(And it has been reduced from

8, 000 a. f. by increasing the unit notices of other blocks.

Notice in Table 6

that several blocks have higher unit notices than their planned capacity as of
1959.) The unit notice figure compares to irrigation sales contracts of
2, 995. 1. None of that contract amount is sold to irrigation companies,
according to the 1971 and 1974 Annual Reports of the WBWCD.

The only other

consumptive use made of Willard water is about 1, 000 a. f. per year to Great
Salt Lake Mineral and Chemical Company.

(Their contract as of 1974 was

for 2, 000 a. f., but they do not yet use all of it.

The company's operation is

located near Little Mountain, and a special canal had to be constructed to
deliver the water.) Remunerative, consumptive use out of Willard Reservoir,
for all purposes, therefore, appears to be less than 5,000 a. f. per year .
In spite of these figures, which are gleaned from its own publications,

Bureau spokesmen were claiming in 1972 that only 56,500 a. f. of Willard system water was regarded as "not under unit notice. " In a footnote to the figure
of 14, 000 a. f. for constructed capacity (see Table 6 and its sources) of the
Lake Plains block, the Bureau's "Status Summary" acknowledged that there
was "an additional supply of 56,500 a . f. available in the Slaterville Diversion
Service Area for irrigation, low priority municipal and industrial, and fis h
and wildlife purposes. " The Bureau therefore acknowledges only 70,500 a . f.
of the Willard Storage as part of the WBP supply.

When asked why this

reported supply was so low in comparison to Willard capacity, Wayne
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Eldredge responded that it was because of "exchanges" with other parts of the
system. Ogden River water, he said, is diverted to the Weber side.

1

Recently a newspaper reporter was successful in drawing a more detailed
explanation from Eldredge: Forty-four thousand acre feet in Willard Reservoir is reserved for these exchanges in the event of a drought year.
This amount of water can be pumped out of the reservoir to serve
farms in the Plain City, West Warren and Hooper areas which are
entitled to upstream water. The upstream water can then be diverted
to the areas which would be hard-hit by dry spells--mainly in southern
Weber County and northern Davis County. Due to an almost constant
succession of good water runoff years since the reservoir was built,
there has not been too much occasion to crank up the ponderous
machinery for water exchange purposes. But the storage is there
when needed. 2
Wayne Winegar admitted in 1972 that water had never yet been pumped backward in Willard Canal.

2

Use of the 44,000 a. f. of "exchange reserve" as

described by Ellis is not very probable.
irrigated using non-WBP facilities.

The lands it would serve are already

The figure of 44,000 is probably calculated

by adding up all of such lands in the areas named (see map) and multiplying by
the estimated requirement per acre for a full water supply. Willard water

1
Eldredge is located in the Provo office of the Bureau of Reclamation.
Ellis (see next footnote) calls him "contract repayment specialist for the
Bureau. " I talked with Eldredge on July 21, 1972. Because he was apparently
being deliberately vague, and because more assistance might be wanted from
his office in the future, the issue was not pursued further at that time.
2

Dexter C. Ellis, "Boat Paradise at Willard Bay," Deseret News,
September 9, 1975.
3

Per sonal communication in reaction to my written account of statements he made in February 1972 interview.
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could reach the areas named by Eldredge, via WBP facilities.

His explanation

visions diverting the entire available flow of the Weber into the Davis-Weber
Canal (and to any other rights-holders with diversion works above Slaterville,
with the exception of the Hooper canal) to serve the main agricultural region
of Weber-Davis counties (the large, central green area on the map). Ogden
River water could then reach the Hooper area by way of Slaterville and the
Layton Canal.

Assuming that the Hooper Canal does take its water from the

Weber above the confluence at Slaterville, this is the one way in which Ogden
River water can reach lands normally served by the Weber.

To suggest that

Plain City and West Warren could be similarly rescued from a drying up of
the Weber is misleading at the very least.

Both of those regions are obviously

on the Ogden side of the river system, and the only way in which it may be
said that they are watered by the Weber is that the surplus flow of the Weber
mixes with the virtually unused Ogden at Slaterville, so that some Weber
water reaches the Willard-Warren region through facilities designed to divert
the Ogden.

Because it is only the Weber River that is heavily used, it is only

the Hooper area that should be counted in adding up the potential for exchanges.
Furthermore, even if the full 44,000 a. f. were allowed as exchange, it is
unlikely that Willard water would need to be pumped back.

There is the regular

flow of the Ogden, plus 60,000 a. f. of unused storage in Pineview Reservoir.
Of course, there might be a series of really dry years, which would mean less
storage in Pineview. Experience of the past 4 decades, including recent
fluctuations in the level of Great Salt Lake, suggests that normal facilities a re
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quite adequate without such exchanges during most of the drier years.

For

disasters of the kind visioned by water hustlers it is probably necessary to
look for a drought cycle with more than 150 years between peaks.
The Willard Reservoir situation may be summarized in this way:
Constructed capacity was 215,000 a. f., of which 195,000 a. f. was described
(Table 5) as active storage.
capacity is only 189 ,000 a. f.

Because the dike has sunk by 4 feet, current
1

For some reason the amount of dead storage

has also decreased to 16,900 a. f.

2

(perhaps due to sedimentation), so that

172, 100 a. f. could be pumped out of the reservoir in one season, if it were
full at the beginning.

But even if all other irrigation sources were suddenly

cut off entirely, the most it could deliver for beneficial application would be
44,000 a. f.

As we have seen, the likelihood of that event, which would

include no flow in the Ogden River (as well as the Weber) at Slaterville, is
extremely remote.

Sales of Storage Directly from Rivers

WBP storage does not have to be sold through WBP canals and
aqueducts. Some of it is sold from Project wells (see map) and some directly
from streams via the diversion works of old rights holders.

1

The figure of

rn 1972 Winegar and Eldredge were giving Willard a capacity of
196, 000 a. f. , because the dike has " settled a little."
2

The figure Eldredge gave to Ellis.
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336,325 given above suggests there is capacity for a lot more sales directly
from streams than does disappear that way. A table in the 1974 Annual Report
of the WBWCD provides a helpful perspective.

The following data, which

report actual deliveries or disposition of water, are drawn from it.

TABLE 9
1974 WATER SOURCES
Gateway Tunnel
Gateway Canal Deliveries
Great Salt Lake Minerals and Chemicals
Ogden Valley
Wells
Roy Well
Stream Inlets
Plain City Laterals
Weber River Irrigation
Ogden River Irrigation
Weber River Misc. M&I
Ogden River Misc. M&I
Total, All Sources

73. 862
1,207
1,314
5,394
9,452
149
4,212
3, 568
6,944
6,515
1,759
856
115,232

Source: 1974 Annual Report, p. 12.

This gives an indication of what facilities were used to deliver Project water.
The use of that water is broken down as follows:
M&I Replacement

2,615

Wasatch Front M&I

29,498

Irrigation, Operational Spills and Losses

83 , 119

Total
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The list of

~

actually tells a great deal about the locations to which

water was delivered by the WBWCD, and even what much of it was used for.
The sum of Ogden River and Weber River Misc. M&I is the same figure (2615)
as is given for Total M&I Replacement.

This water, therefore, represents

upper valley sales of WBP rights to groundwater.

1

Gateway Canal deliveries

are to high lands in Morgan County between Stoddard Diversion and Gateway
Power Plant. GSL Mineral and Chemical is water from Willard Canal
through a special canal to the company's operation near Little Mountain.
Water to Plain City Laterals no doubt goes through Willard Canal also, and is
part of the irrigation sale from the Willard unit. Ogden Valley is the WBP
Eden Canal service system. Stream Inlets feed the Davis aqueduct. Weber
River and Ogden River Irrigation are a little more difficult to identify, but in
general it can be shown that Weber River Irrigation is almost solely an upper
valley use, while Ogden River Irrigation is mostly delivered at high levels
along the Wasatch Front.

There is no significant withdrawal of irrigation

water from either river after it emerges from the mountain front, until
Slaterville.

2

1
see Pendse for explanation.
2

Readers may wish to skip this next section, which justifies conclusions reported in Table 11 below.
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The WBWCD publishes a n itemization of its de li veries to irrigation
compani es .

1

Once these companies are located it is quite easy to infer the

point of origin of their WBP water.

2

By grouping the companie s according to

se le c ted geographi c a r eas , it i s possible to sum the amounts of water de live red
to each into a pa ttern of r egiona l wate r di stribution.

The results a r e

reported in Tab le 10.
Tab le 10 s uggests that there are .'!2_ significant sa les to irrigation
companies out of the Ogden or We ber River s between the Wasatch Front a nd
Slate r ville Diversion.

Companies served out of the Ogde n River are located

e ither in Ogden Valley or along the high line cana ls that run north a nd so uth
from the mouth of Ogden Canyon .

The sum of deliveries to the se companies

(8 , 483 . 0 a. f.) is greater than the figure of 6, 515 a. f. given in Table 9 for
Ogden Rive r Irri gation .

This means tha t a part of the deliveries to co mpa nies

necessari ly came out of the WI3P Huntsville-Eden Cana l.
of the Ogde n River above Slaterville was 11,909 a . f.

1

3

Total irrigation o ut

Since compani es took

1974 Annua l Re port, p . 27; 1971 Annual Report, Table No. 10.

2
compa nies were located geographically on the assumption that their
address i s a reliable indica tion of the area they service. Sources employed
to locate company headquarters we r e as follows :
(1) Stuart Richards, Lynn Davis, and Richard Griffin, Irrigation and
Canal Companies of Utah (Logan , Utah: Utah Sta te University,
Agricultural Experime nt Station). No date attached, b ut Stuart
Hichard s estimates "about 1965 . "
(2) A list of WBWCD c lient companies provided by th e Distri ct , about
19H9.

(3) Ogden Oty telephone directory, l%H.
3 'J'able 9; the sum of Ogde n Vall ey and Ogden River Irriga tion .
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TABLE 10
IRRIGATION COMPANY USE, BY REGIONS, 1974 (ACRE FEET)

Upper Valleys
Summit County

1,122.00

Morgan County

2,6 12.50

Weber (upper Ogden)

3. 891. 00

East Shore High Line Diversio nsa
Ogden River

4 ,592.00

Weber Riber

29,353.17

East Shore--Lower Diversions
Roy Park Well

149.00
4 1,719. 67

10% Loss

4,G36.22b
46,355 . 89

aSouth Ogden Co nservation District receives water from both Pineview a nd the
Weber Aqueduct. Its contract with the WDWCD is for 2, 300 acre feet, of
which 1, 300 is designated as Weber River water (see Table 6 and F. Haws,
A Study of Water Institutions in Utah (Logan, Utah: Utah State University,
Utah Water Research Laboratory , 1973), p. 35). Deliveries to the District
in 1974 were 2, 070 acre feet. Using the 13/23 ratio suggested by the
information here provided, 1, 170 a. f. of that total have been assigned to
b the Weber Ili ver in this tabulation.
This figure is copied from the 1974 Annual Report, not cal culated.
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8 , 433 a. f., individuals must have taken the other 3 , 426 a. f.

The most likely

place for them to have gotten it is out of the Ogden Valley (Huntsville-Eden)
Canal of the WBP.

There are no sales to companies between the mouth of

Ogden Canyon and Slaterville, therefore, and sales to individuals in that region
are highly improbable and certainly negligible.

There are no Project diver -

sion or delivery works in that region, so that individuals would have to have
their own.
Irrigation companies served out of the Weber are located either in
Summit and Morgan Counties, or in the service area of the Davis-Weber
Aqueduct.

Weber River Irrigation (Table 9) cannot include sale to companies

in the East Shore area because there are no such sales except to companies
served by the adueduct, the water for which is included under Gateway
Tunnel in Table 9. All water in this classification must therefore be sold to
companies in upper valleys, or to individuals. Summit and Morgan sales to
irrigation companies in 1974 summed to 3, 734 a. f. (Table 10), compared to
Weber Ri ver Irrigation of 6, 944 a. f. in Table 9.
individuals of 3, 209 a . f.
Morgan.

This implies deliveries to

Most of this is probably absorbed in Summit and

The only opportunity for irrigation sales directly out of the river

below the canyon mouth is in the South Weber-Riverdale area.

As noted

earlier, there were plans for a WBP irrigation block in that region.

Any

indi viduals who do buy WBP water in that area must pump it directly from the
river, or have their own weir and canal - -an unlikely or at least infrequent
event.
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Table 10 accounts for only 46,355.89 a. f. of the total of 83,119 a. f.
given in Table 9 for all irrigation and losses.

This means that :!:_ 35,000 a. f.

of irrigation water must be accounted for in sales to individuals. In 1968
the total of Class D (individual) contracts in Davis, Weber and Morgan Counties only, was 32,103.1 a. f.
about 35, 000 a. f. for 1974.

1

This is quite consistent with the total figure of

Except for landowner s living right on the river

or reservoir, the only way the WBWCD can deliver on such contracts is
through its own constructed facilities.

This means that nearly all individual

irrigation contractees are served by the Davis-Weber Aqueduct and its
laterals, or by the Ogden Valley Canal.

The previous paragraph attributed

3, 209. 5 a. f. to individuals in Morgan and Summit, however, where there are

no WBP delivery facilities.

The source cited here gives a total of 2, 360 . 2

a. f. for Class D contracts in Morgan County as of 1968.

That leaves less than

1, 000 a . f. (compared to 3, 209. 5) to be made up by Class D contracts in

Summit County and increments since 1968.
The foregoing arguments account fully for all water deliveries through
WBP fa cilities.

More specifically, they justify a conclusion that any irrigation

sales directly out of the rivers between t he mountain front and Slate rville
Di version are negligible.

Weber JUver Irrigation is consumed by companies

and individuals in Summit and Morgan Counties, while Ogden !liver Irrigation

1
0btained from "Mi nutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of
Dire ctors of the WBWCD for the Purpose of llearing Class D Assessments for
Davi s, Morgan and Weber Counties, May 24, 1968." Each individual assessment is itemized and described.
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is divided unequa lly between high line diversions a long the Wasatch Front,
and Ogd e n Valley.

The data of Table 9 may now be rearranged a s follows in

Table 11.

TABLE 11
WBP WATER USE BY REGIONS, 1974

Mountain Valleys:
Gateway Canal
Ogden Valley Canal
a
Ogden River Irrigation
Weber Ri ver Irrigation
We ber River Misc. M&l
Ogden Hiver Misc. M&t'
Subtotal

1,207
5,394
1,923
6,944
1,759
~
18 ,083

East Shore Foothills:
Ogden Hiver Irrigationa
Gateway Tunnel
We ll s
Roy well
Stream Inlets
Subtotal

4,592
73 , 862
9,452
149
~

92,267

Lake Plains:
Great Salt Lake Min. & Chern.
Plain City Laterals
Subtotal
TOTAL, All Regions

1,314
~
4,882

115,232

a Ogden Hi vcr Irrigation (6, 515 in Table 9) is here divided between the mountlain valley a nd the mountain front in the way s uggested by Table 10 and the
b accompanying text.
Include s Pinevi ew water released directly to Ogden City treatment plant-only 10 a. f. in 1974 .
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Table 11 shows that of all water delivered by the WBP in 1974 (the
total for 1971 was 83,878 a. f.), 80 percent went to the East Shore foothills,
16 percent to upper valleys, and only 4 percent to the lake plains. None of the
irrigation water goes to the large green area of agricultural land (see map)
in north Davis and south Weber Counties.

Total use of the Ogden above

Slaterville is in the order of 12, 000 a. f. per year, and more than half of that
is used above Pineview Reservoir. Between Pineview and Slaterville, use of
the Ogden is virtually limited to the 4, 705 a. f. of constructed capacity given
in Table 6.

Weber River Facilities Used at Virtual Capacity

By contrast with the gross overcapacity of the Ogden River system,
the Weber facilities are being used almost as was expected. Notice in
Table 8 that combined storage attributable to the WBP reservoirs at Wanship,
Lost Creek and East Canyon is 98,925 a. f.

Table 6 reveals that constructed

capacity for irrigation use of this storage is 82,375 a. f. (8,800 in upper
valleys; 73, 575 in the East Shore).

Comparing storage to capacity for irriga-

tion delivery leaves a ·margin of 16,550 a. f. available for M&I deliveries--if
reservoirs filled to capacity every year. Irrigation contracts currently sum

to 7, 407. 2 a. f. in upper valleys of the Weber, and to 68,792 a. f. in the East
Shore (Table 6), leaving margins of 1,392.8 a. f. and 4,783 a. f., respectively.
Of the East Shore surplus, 3, 392. 2 a. f. is designated for the north
Davis block.

The only other large block of surplus is 960 a. f. for the Uintab
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Bench (see Table 6).

This Uintah Bench s urplus is gradually being taken up

in Class D contracts as suburban expansion takes over the bench.

The north

Davis surplus is less likely to move, however, although some of it will
gradually be taken up with suburban expansion.

(There are limits to this,

as residential and commercial use of land is less water-consumptive than
agriculture. ) The excess in upper valleys seems likely to be relatively
permanent also, as Chapter IV suggests. It should be noted here that the
irrigation capacity of upper valleys cannot be transferred to the East Shore,
and vice versa.

This is because capacity refers to conveyance facilities,

not to a quantity of water. On the other hand, the excess of storage capacity
over total irrigation deliveries, 22, 725. 8 a . f. could be delivered to the East
Shore area.

1

This could be arranged because irrigation is a seasonal use,

and there is ample capacity in Gateway Tunnel and Canal to deliver any
excess storage to the East Shore during winter months.

2

Perusal of WBWCD annual reports reveals that full storage capacity
is not achieved every season.
capacity is not needed.

1

This could be deliverate in part, since full

Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that

This figure is calculated as follows:
Excess of storage over irrigation capacity
Unused irrigation capacity: Upper Valleys
East Shore
Total

16,550
1,392.8
4,783
22,725.8

2
capacity of Gateway Tunnel is 435 c. f. s ., which works out to
almost 315,000 a. f. per year, if run to capacity 365 days.
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at the present time there is about 22, 000 a. f. of storage capacity that is not
being used for irrigation. It is therefore available for municipal and industrial purposes.
Prior to the 1959 revision of the Definite Plan Report, official
Bureau of Reclamation plans had called for an ultimate M&I delivery of
40,000 a. f. per year, all of it to come through the Davis-Weber aqueduct
system to the East Shore.
50, 000 a. f.

The 1959 DPR revised the target upward to

Part of the increment, 7, 500 a. f. , was to come from the Ogden

system, released directly to the Ogden City treatment below Pineview Dam.
To date, that use has not materialized beyond a few acre feet per year, and
Ogden takes most of its WBP water from the Weber Aqueduct.
is not a significant source of M&I water at the present time.
by the WBWCD have passed 30, 000 a. f. , however.

Thus the Ogden
Total M&I sales

Comparing that figure to

the plus or minus 22, 000 a. f. of the previous paragraph suggests that facilities on the Weber system are virtually used up.

(The implied deficit is made

up by wells, as explained in the next section.)

Municipal and Industrial Water Use

The previous section has noted that official plans of the Bureau of
Reclamation have always called for M&I water to be produced primarily out
of the Weber system.

That is consistent with the location of the Davis-Weber

Aqueduct in relation to towns and cities of the East Shore. From the 1955 to
the 1959 versions of the Definite Plan Report, however, total estimated cost
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of the Project increased from $70,340, 000 to $97,500, 000.

1

At the same time

it was discerned that more M&l water was also going to be required than had

previously been calculated. Instead of 40, 000 a. f., it was estimated that
M&I use would rise to 50,000 by 1975.

2

By 1959 there was fairly clear

evidence that the East Shore was changing from an agricultural to a residential and commercial region.

No doubt it was also evident that interest in

Ogden River water for irrigation was not high. The 1959 DPR therefore
projected that of the 10,000 a. f. increment to M&I sales, 7, 500 a. f. would
be taken from the Ogden, released directly to Odgen City's treatment plant
at the foot of Pineview Dam.

(That is the

.£!!!l way of expanding

M&I sales

out of the Ogden system without building new conveyance facilities . ) The
remaining 2, 500 a. f. would be run through the regular WBWCD treatment
and distribution facilities, from Weber storage.
Bureau plans therefore call for 42,500 a . f. of water to be available
for M&I use "from the Weber River and from independent small streams
along the Davis aqueduct . . . "

3

The previous section noted that only 16,550

a. f. of storage capacity was left over for M&I after projected irrigation
capacity was fully used.

That leaves 25, 450 a. f. to be made up from

1

Bureau of Reclamation, Weber Basin Project, Utah: Supplement to
Definite Plan Report (December 1959), p. 104.
2

Based on an estimate of per capita requirements, plus population
growth estimates of the Bureau of Economic Research at the University of
Utah.
3
1959 DPR, p. 42.
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"independent small streams" along the Wasatch Front in Davis County. In a
chapter on "Water Supply" the 1959 DPR says that 8, 700 a. f. of rights in
these streams is to be purchased or otherwise appropriated and either diverted
into the Davis Aqueduct, or used above it.

1

The 1974 Annual Report of the

WBWCD shows that the actual increment to its supply from those streams
was 4, 212 a. f.

2

Available storage on the Weber, plus the small Wasatch

Front streams, therefore, do not come close to the total projected deliveries
of M&I water from the Weber system.

While a perfectly valid inference

from the Bureau's own planning documents, this conclusion seems to be
deliberately obscured, or even denied, in the chapter on Municipal and
Industrial Water from which the first quotation in this section was taken.

The

amount of water that seems to be available for M&I use does not even come up
to the total of current contracts, as summarized in Table 12.
The solution to this riddle is tucked away in another chapter of the
1959 DPR, called "Designs and Estimates. " A portion of that chapter discusses Project Wells.

3

These wells, of which there are eight, are all

located in the East Shore area and are explicitly designated as suppliers of
M&I water.

They have a combined capacity of 48 c. f. s. If pumped constantly,

those wells could therefore deliver 34,750 a. f. per year . Added to this, the

1
Ibid.' p. 23.
2
3

Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid . ' p. 85.
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TABLE 12
MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL WATER SALES, BY REGION

Acre Feet Contracted

Region
Davis County, Kaysville South
Hill Field and West Layton
Northwest Davis County
Roy
Ogden City
Other Weber County
TOTAL

6, 511 a
288
5,509
3,200
10,000b
5,365

30,873

a

bincludes 2, 750 a. f. to Chevron Oil.
Includes 2, 000 a. f. to Great Salt Lake Mineral and Chemical Company.

16,500 a. f. of storage capacity left over from irrigation is just about right
to make up the 50, 000 a. f. total projected for M&I sales. It is also noteworthy that project wells are capable of fulfilling the entire current contract
requirements for WBWCD M&I. Indeed, they frequently do.

According to

the manager of the WBWCD, Gateway Canal is frequently closed down during
winter months for repairs.

(It is located on a mountainside which shifts fast

enough to cause perennial problems with fractured lining in the canal. Annual
reports of the District often show pictures of the repair operations. ) Mr.
Winegar says that water customers never know the difference.
The previous section noted that WBP storage capacity on the Weber
system is 98,925 a. f., and that 68,792 a. f. of that is under contract for
irrigation.

This section has revealed that current M&I contracts total to
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30,873 a. f.

Virtually none of this M&I comes from the Ogden side.

There-

fore, current contracts, ostensibly for Weber River water, sum to 99,665
a. f. , or more than the storage capacity of project reservoirs. Were it not
for wells, the Weber side would be short of water, even for current sales.
Pump wells do not represent a potential energy or delivery capacity in the
same ways as water behind a dam.

Presumably wells are not pumped unless

to do so is less costly for some reason than to release water from a reservoir into a delivery system.

From this reasoning it is justifiable to conclude

that WBP storage on the Weber River is very close to being fully used.

Ex-

pansion is possible, but only because of project wells.

The Location of M&I use

Please refer again to Figure 1, and to Table 12.

Note that the first

entry in the table includes the areas of South Davis that is blanketed by WBP
irrigation blocks. The second corresponds roughly to the North Davis WBP
irrigation block. Northwest Davis includes towns in the green area of the
map which does not receive WBP irrigation water. Roy City is really a part
of this area.

Except for the Roy Park well (149 a. f.), this green area is not

part of the WBP irrigation service at all, yet it buys 8, 709 a. f. or 28 percent
of the M&I water. Ogden City buys a third of the M&I water, but gets none
of the irrigation. There are some M&l sales in the area of the South Ogden
and Uintah Bench irrigation areas, but none to North Ogden. South Davis
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County, which has 63 percent of the irrigation capacity of the aqueduct
system, buys only 21 percent of lhe Project M&I water.
While the map is still handy, notice that several WBP wells are
located in the green area of the Weber Delta District--where there are M&I
sales but no irrigation deliveries.

1
The 1959 DPR remarks that groundwater

development had figured in the 1955 version only in connection with drainage.
Now, however, it was planned to develop six deep wells (combined capacity,
26 second-feet) as standby capacity for municipal use.

The map used here is

from a 1963 revision of the DRP (never approved), and it shows eight wells.
The 1974 Annual Report of the WBWCD lists eight wells (not all in the same
locations as on the amp) with a combined capacity of 48 c. f. s. Apparently
the consciousness of groundwater has been developing gradually.
The information provided to this point makes possible some inferences about the contest between the WBWCD and area municipalities over
groundwater development. We know that there is abundant, high-quality water
in aquifers of the East Shore area.

We also know that knowledge of this

resource has had a retarded development, but that the Bureau of Reclamation
was privy to the most advanced information on the subject.

The Bureau

changed its plans for M&I development in 1959 to include high capacity wells.
The stated capacity of WBP wells in 1974 is sufficient to meet current M&I
contracts. Some of these wells were developed right next door to towns in

1

Ihid .• p. 85.
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the green area (Figure 1) which had already bought much more expensive
M&I water from the WBWCD--on a long-term contract. When the towns
decided to duplicate this inexpensive source themselves, the District tried
to block them. It is hardly surprising that some town officers thought they
had been cozened. Furthermore, municipalities s uch as Roy, Clearfield,
Sunset, Layton, and Clinton are buying 28 percent of the expensive M&I water
which subsidizes the cheap irrigation water of the WBP, yet none of the cheap
water is delivered in the region that surrounds them.
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CHAPTER VI
WHO PAYS THE BILL?

Summary

Appendix II demonstrates that Congressional authority to bui ld the
Weber Basin Project was based on a presumption that municipal and industrial
water users would pay for a major share of the total costs, while using a
relatively minor portion of the water.

Examination of the various revisions

of the WBP Definite Plan Report verifies that this intention has been maintained in practice. Subsidization of irrigators by industries and householders
1
was critical to getting the Project authorized . Warne acknowledges this as
usual practice in Reclamation projects.
Ability to pay on the part of the whole project area is the first criterion for the Bureau in serious evaluation of prospective developments.

The

next problem lies in assessing relative shares of the repayment burden.

This

is also done on the ability to pay principal.

Careful studies of the agricultural

economy are made to assess the repayment capacity of irrigators .

2

As much

1
wm. E. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973 ).
2
This was the explicit purpose of a study by W. Fuhriman, G. Blanch,
and C. Stewart, An Economic Analysis of the Weber Basin Proclamation
Project, Utah (Logan, Utah: Utah State University, Agricultural Experiment
Station, 1952).
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of the total cost as possible is attributed to federal benefits--hence nonreimbursable. The remainder must be borne in some other way. First
hydroelectric power generation, and then municipal and industrial water sales
were the methods devised by the Bureau of Reclamation to handle the balance
of the repayment burden.

The ability and willingness to pay of power and

domestic water users is, therefore, critical to the success of Reclamation
projects.
In the Weber Basin case, success was jeopardized from the start by
the availability of groundwater in the East Shore area. All available evidence
suggests that the Bureau of Reclamation knew more about the groundwater
situation than anyone else, at least as much as did U.S.G.A., since Bureau
staff did most of the U.S. G. S. work.

Certainly not as much was known of

groundwater potential in 1950 as in 1970--but more than enough to justify
some concern.

The Bureau would not commence construction until the

WBWCD was in place and had signed up a minimum quantity of M&I sales under
firm 60-year contracts. When the WBWCD tried to block municipalities from
drilling wells in the East Shore area it was behaving in perfect consistency
with a time-honored Reclamation principle that M&I and power users should
subsidize local agriculture. Application of the principle was complicated in
this case because most of the irrigation benefits were going to South Davis
County, while municipalities in North Davis and Weber Counties were getting
stuck with most of the bill.

Many water managers in those municipalities are

resentful, and believe they (the municipalities) were hood-winked or railroaded
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by promoters of the WBP--including representatives of the Bureau in the
latter classification.

The personal files on which Appendix II were based

provided the first suggestion of this, and pertinent sources examined since
have all tended to reinforce rather than refute.

The question is not whether

a snow job actually took place, but whether the ends justified the means.
One of the more anomalous features of the whole situation is the
attitude of Bountiful City. According to published reports and statements of
District officials,

1

almost 20, 000 acre feet of irrigation water is supplied

to the Bountiful area every season by the WBP and WBWCD facilities.

Much

of it is spread directly over what is believed to be a major aquifer recharge
area, by resident irrigation. Because groundwater is abundant and cheap in
the area, Bountiful City is understandably reluctant to buy more Weber Basin
M&I water at $43. 50 per acre foot.

The city signed up for 1, 000 acre feet

M&I in the preconstruction sales campaign, and has not subscribed for a
gallon more since then. It is resentful even of that contract.

The WBWCD

built the largest of its three treatment plants in the area, anticipating that it
would be the most active purchaser of water.

(A very reasonable supposition,

as Chapter III suggests.) Because of its greater capacity it costs a third
more to operate than either the Ogden or Layton plants--yet runs at one-third
of capacity.

To summarize, the Bountiful City area gets up to 20,000 acre

feet per year of the subsidized irrigation water, and buys 1, 000 acre feet of

1
wBWCD Annual Reports, 1971 and 1974; interviews with Wayne
Winegar, Secretary-manager, in February and May of 1972.
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the M&I water that was supposed to pay the bills. For the irrigation water,
which is pumped to it by the WBWCD, it pays only $2 . 23 per acre foot as its
repayment assessment. In percentage terms , Bountiful gets 18 percent of
the goodies (cheap irrigation) but buys only 3. 4 percent of the M&I water that
carries the burden of repayment (based on current total sales contracts for
both kinds of water).

By contrast, Ogden City buys one-third of the subsidiz-

ing commodity and gets none of the subsidized one. Ogden also has plenty of
water of its own--and furthermore, knew it in 1948, when South Davis County
was presumably dehydrated.
These relationships have apparently never become widely understood.
Winegar said in 1972,

1

that Jay Bagley, an experienced Utah hydrologist, had

recently castigated the WBWCD publicly for holding Bountiful so tightly to its
M&I contract in the face of abundant groundwater. Bagley's criticism was
based, said Winegar, on a just-completed thesis by a Utah State hydrology
student. He (Bagley) charged that Bountiful was being forced to subsidize
Kamas Valley farmers.

Evidence presented here, combined with that of

Chapter IV, suggests that, if reported accurately, Bagley' s perspective is too
narrow.

The upper valleys did receive some be nefits, but they have not been

without some compensating costs--if only psychic pain. And Bountiful is
hardly in a position to be casting stones.

1

Personal communication.
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Evidence presented in Chapter V demonstrates that south Davis
County has been a chief beneficiary of WBP water. On tile other hand,
municipalities in North Davis and Weber buy most of the M&I water which
foots tile repayment bill.

Chapter IV showed that it was south Davis that was

short of water in the first place, and it was south Davis people who initiated
tile agitation that culminated in authorization of the Weber Basin Project.
They tilought they had to have water from the Weber River, knew it was expensive, tried to get State help, were turned down and referred to the Bureau
of Reclamation.
immediately.

The Bureau, always anxious to get a new job, went to work

They already had plans on the shelf--bigger plans than just a

pipeline to soutil Davis.

They also had an Act and a history to live with.

They

had to have land reclamation, big benefits, an ironclad repayment obligation
and capacity.

The Willard-Layton system provided the potential benefits, but

they had to go after municipalities for the repayment money.

They got that

support by going to chamber of commerce boosters and other local promoters
with a zealous interest in water development generally.

The idea was sold on

the basis of its stimulation to local economic growth--combined with threats
that water and growth would soon run out.
There is little reason to doubt that the WBP has stimulated growth.
But the evidence is clear that Davis County (particularly the South) has been
the major beneficiary, while at the same time finding it possible to justify
refusal to pay a fair share of the bill.

The Bureau of Reclamation has

probably refrained from making a big issue out of this because it allowed the
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Project to proceed while sitting on the knowledge that it was at least premature
and quite possibly redundant.

Details of the Argument

The remainder of this chapter has two objectives: to present further
evidence about the proposed and actual beneficiaries and sponsors of the WBP,
and to assess the financial status of the WBWCD.

The latter objective is sig-

nificant because it was thought at one stage of this inve stigation that the District was in financial difficulty, and that economic analysis might be of service
to its management in optimizing net revenues . Variations on that theme
occupy a major portion of Appendices I and Til. It now appears that that
objective was based on ignorance of important institutional details.
Experience after 1920 with water use rs who defaulted on their repayments to the Reclamation Fund, forced the Bureau of Reclamation to evolve
more careful means of financial control. One of their major instruments is
the water conservancy district law. Bureau lawyers drew up the essential
features of this law and through the influence of water development lobbies
had it incorporated into the Water Conservancy Acts of all the Reclamation
states.

1

All of these acts are designed for the establishment of local govern-

ment bodies with power not only to enter contracts with the federal government

1
Frank Haws, "A Study of Water lnstitutions in Utah," September
1973, Utah Water Research Laboratory, Utah State University, Logan, Utah,
p. 38.
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(read Bureau of Reclamation), but also to raise the money from within their
boundaries for the repayment of those obligations. Bureau represe ntatives
guide the establishment of these Districts and take care to assure that they
are able to perform the necessary function of keeping the Bureau in business.
The Bureau is a very patient finance company, but also very firm.
By the terms of the contract between the Bureau and the WBWCD,
repayment obligations start at various times and run for 60 years thereafter.
The full WBP will not be under repayment obligation until at least 1990, and
perhaps not even then.

Construction of Project facilities was begun in 1953

and continued to 1969. Different facilities, therefore, have become available
for use at different times. As they become available, the District and the
Bureau, by terms of the contract, agree jointly on the location and extent of a
development unit.

This unit is made up of blocks or districts in which either

irrigation or M&I water is available for distribution.

The Bureau then issues

a unit notice, describing the locations, the amounts of water available, the
assignment of repayment obligation to each of the two classes of users, and
a 60-year repayment schedule for the unit.

The first unit notice became

effective in 1956, and the most recent (No. 7) in 1970. Once the WCD
receives a unit notice, it does not have to immediately begin making repayment for the full amount of water that is available to it by means of that notice.
Each block within it can have a development schedule of up to 10 years before
it must be paying for its full allotment.

That is, the Bureau tells the District

that it was 10 years to sell a given amount of water in certain areas. Once
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that objective is well on the way to being achieved, the Bureau gives it
another 10-year (or less) selling job, going on in this way until the full capacity
of the Project is sold.

The Bureau wants to collect its money; it wants repay-

ment to be quiet and relatively painless; it does not want to bankrupt its repayment agency or stir up resentment headlines because such events would
threaten the future of Reclamation.
Terms of the contract required that if the project were terminated
before completion, the District would be handed the full bill, to be paid in
60 installments. Nevertheless, in 1970, the Blll'eau and District came to a
much softer arrangement. It calls for repayment of a smaller total ($78
million versus $81 million) than projected in the 1959 DPR, because construction was halted before all planned featlU'es had been built. But instead of
having to start making payments on the full quantity of water in the notice,
the District gets 20 years to build up to the full annual payment. By the terms
of the District-BlU'eau agreement, the District becomes responsible for an
additional1,000 a. f. of M&I and 1,500 a. f. of irrigation water every year
until the full allotment is sold. In the case of M&I, that condition will not be
met until1990, when the full 50,000 a. f. projected in the 1959 DPR will
finally come under repayment.

The final installment on that last 1, 000 a . f.

of M&I will not be due until 2050.
According to Wayne Eldredge, historian for the Weber Basin Project,
when the repayment bill hits its peak, the WBWCD will be turning over about
1

Provo Office, Bureau of Reclamation.

1
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$1.5 million per year. On the basis of current sales as given in the 1974
Annual Report, the present repayment is about $1. 1 million annually.

Several

things are working in favor of the District. Inflation is making its prices
look much better in comparison to alternative sources .

(See the contrast in

well costs between 1972 and 1975 in Chapter XI.) The agricultural payments
it is not getting from the Willard- Layton area seem likely to be replaced by

industrial sales, and allowances for recreation and wildlife. Irrigation sales
in north Davis and Weber are eltpanding via contracts with city subconservancy
districts. Irrigation contracts in other parts of the Basin are increasingly
of the Class D variety--a retail contract which brings the District a much
higher price than wholesaling to irrigation companies.

1

In 1970, Class D

contracts accounted for more than a third of total irrigation sales. All of
these reflect the transformation of important parts of the Basin from an
agricultural to a residential, industrial-commercial, and recreational region.
These uses, while not more consumptive of water, are easily capable of paying higher prices than farming.

The increased property valuation works in

favor of the District, for it gets a 1-mill levy on the total assessed value
every year.

From 1965 to 1969 that increase brought an average annual

increment of $14, 500 to District revenues.

The 1960 agreement to start

paying for an annual addition of 1, 000 a. f. of M&I and 1, 500 a. f. of irrigation
water means about $18,750 per eyar.

1

The increased tax revenue is,

see Pendse's thesis for pricing details.
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therefore, almost enough by itself to make the additional payments, even if
the water is unsold. Inflation alone, through i ncreased property values

(tax

revenues) and costs of alternative M&I supplies is probably enough to keep
the District on easy street.
The contract between the District and Bureau is a very paterna listic
document, reflecting the Bureau's half century of experience preceeding the
WBP. It does not just call for repayment; it specifies exactly how the money
is to be obtained and handled. It allows the Bureau to specify prices, in unit
notices, and tells the District what it must do to water users who defa ult on
payment. It also directs the District to set up special funds for emergency
repairs and rebuilding worn-out parts of the Project, and allows the Bureau
to overrule the District on the investment management of these funds.

The

Bureau appears to have some element of veto power over the agencies to which
the District sells water, and the uses for which the water is intended.
While it may have other uses, the water conservancy district as a
western institution apparently owes its birth to the Bureau of Reclamation,
who designed it for their own purposes. Once such a district has a contract
with the Bureau, that district is a repayment tool of the Bureau. It should
hardly be looked upon as an agency of the state government, responsible to
the state for its allocation decisions.

This research project was initiated out

of a general effort to improve the allocation of Utah water resources, to
develop a state water plan. Specialists employed by Utah have been frustrated
in this objective by constraints on the freedom of the state to control what
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appear hydrologically to be its own waters. Those constraints are mainly
imposed by the Bureau of Reclamation.

1

A water conservancy district with a

Bureau of Reclamation contract has federal water to sell. It is only nominally
an agency of the state.
Appendices I and Ill assumed a stance of helping a state water institution solve some of its financial and merchandising problems.

That perspective

was inadequate, based on ignorance of the institutional facts.

The Weber

Basin Water Conservance District has not been and likely never will be in
serious financial difficulty. It is only a tool of the Bureau of Reclamation for
getting back part of the money it invested in the Weber Basin Project. Similarly, it has been the Bureau that was stuck with an inventory it could not sell,
not the WBWCD. It is the Bureau's water; they developed it, they are
financing it, and it is they who must live with the consequences of redundancy.
Appendix II provides some details of the Bureau's method of financing
the WBP, as revealed in Senate Document 147, Weber Basin Project, utah,
1949. It shows that promoters of the WBP justified it on the basis of large
benefits to swamp land, and intended that it be paid for by urban residents.
Written in 1970, Appendix II cast doubts on the reliability of official statements
about why the WBP had been built at all, and suggested that the Bureau of
Reclamation used a small and gullible chamber of commerce group to win

1

Paul Gillette and Bob Murdock, Utah Department of Natural
Resources, personal communications 1969-1972; Frank Haws, "A Study of
Alternative Methods to Modernize Water Institutions," September, 1975,
Utah Water Research Laboratory, Utah State University, Logan, Utah.
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authorization for a project that the Bureau wanted to build. The idea had been
sold on the basis of a flimsily demonstrated "dire need" for water.

Further

investigation revealed that there had been a reasonably intense concern over
water scarcity, but that it was confined (except for a few individuals) to the
southern half of Davis County.
A group from south Davis approached the Bureau; the Bureau wanted

to build the WBP and seized upon this opportunity to get support for it. But
they had to have more support, for what they wanted to build was far larger
than what a few promoters in Davis County even dreamed of.

To get its proj-

ect, the Bureau had to have a major benefit to reclamation of land for farming,
and it had to have repayment capacity. It may be that under the circumstances
of the late 1940's it simply would not have been able to help south Davis unless
reclamation on a fairly signficiant scale were involved. Regardless of intentions, however, there is clear evidence that they proceeded as if this were
true.

The 1949 benefits to reclamation agriculture were high, swamping all

other features.

Every revision of the Definite Plan Report scaled down the

significance of agriculture in comparison to other features.

Swamp land

reclamation provided the benefits, city water users and property owners
provide the repayment revenues (most of them in North Davis and Weber
Counties) and South Davis gets the most significant increment of benefits.
The Bureau's own publications provide the figures to support these assertions.
Appendix II shows that in 1949 benefits to the Willard-Layton irrigation blocks were projected to be at least half of total project benefits. At the
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same time, irrigation benefits were projected to be $5,979,000 out of an
annual benefit of $6,995,000 for the total project.

Layton-Willard was to have

half the land and half of the water in the intended reclamation project.
In the 1959 DPR, total irrigation benefits were estimated to be only
$3,600, 600 annually, and of that total $1,539, 900 were to be "indirect."
Total project benefits, on the other hand, were calculated to be $9, 128,900
in 1959. Thus the ratio of irrigation (reclamation) to total annual benefits
dropped from 6/ 7 to 1/ 3 in the decade between authorization and completion
of the first phase of the Project.

1

The annual benefit/cost ratio is also more modest after 10 years .
In 1949 it was 3. 35 to 1. 0. In 1959 it was down to 2. 8 to 1.

2

Over that

period of time, the nature of benefits had also changed significantly. In 1949,
direct benefits to agriculture compared as 0. 8/1 against costs.

By including

indirect benefits this was brought to 1. 6/ 1. Also in 1959, the benefit/ cost
ratio for M&I was 1/ 1.

This discouraging performance was made up in huge

benefits against low costs for fish and wildlife management, and recreation.
The change reflects both an acknowledgement that the agricultural "benefit"
(to swamp lands) was somewhat ephemeral, and the success of the Bureau in
getting Congress to authorize some new kinds of (nonreimbursable) benefits
to water development.

1
see Chapter XI, " Financial Analysis, " 1959 DPR.
2

same sources as for previous paragraph.
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The problem of the Bureau was complicated over this period by
inflation of construction costs, while agriculture was stagnant at best.

Total

costs of the Project in 1959, as shown in Table 13, were estimated to be
$97,500,000. In 1949, they were projected to be $69,534,000 for features
similar, although not all identical, to those in Table 13.

1

Table 14 s hows how

the Bureau worked around the problem of rising costs and flagging agricultural
interest. Virtually every item in the table merits comment: notice first of all
that these figures are cost allocations to the various uses.

No pretense was

even attempted that these allocations reflect the cost of specific facilities for
specific uses.

The facilities constructed are listed in Table 13. They are

used jointly for all the purposes suggested in the allocation of costs . lf a
cost can be tied to a specific use, such as recreation, it is. Otherwise the
Bureau uses an internal method of legerdemain called "separabl e costsremaining benefits. "

2

Although not explained in the Definite Plan Report , it

seems to be based on a calculation of what the costs would be if the facilities
were constructed for one purpose alone, and a conclusion that that figure
represents the alternative cost of the benefit provided by the Project. He nce,
that amount of cost should be fairly borne by the beneficiaries of that partic ular
water use.

This is a variation on the method reported in Appendix II and

1
Table 13 is from 1959 DPR Summary Sheets , p. 2. A corresponding
table appears on p. 39 of the 1949 S. Doc. 147.
2

1959 DPR, p. 105.
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TABLE 13
COST OF WBP FEATURES

Construction
Pineview Dam and Reservoir

$4,600,000

Wanship Dam and Reservoir

6,836,000

Willard Dam and Reservoir

15,774,000

Lost Creek Dam and Reservoir

5,824,000

East Canyon Dam and Reservoir

3,548,000

Causey Dam and Reservoir

4,950,000

Stoddard Diversion Dam

373,000

Slaterville Diversion Dam

750,000

Pumping plants
Deep wells
Gateway Canal and tunnel

7' 030,000
804,000
7,600,000

Weber Aqueduct and laterals

2,861,000

Davis Aqueduct and laterals

16,581,000

Layton Canal and laterals

3,393,000

Warren Canal and laterals

1,069,000

Willard Canal

3,413,000

Ogden Valley Canal

500,000

Drains

7,060,000

Power plants

1,547,000

Recreational facilities

2,545,000

Operation and maintenance housing and equipment

292,000

Future year capacity

150,000

TOTAL

$97,500,000

aBased on actual cost of work completed,bid prices of work under way, and
estimates for work yet to be undertaken on the basis of October 1959 prices .
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TABLE 14
COST ALLOCATIONS AND REPAYMENT, WBP

Construction Costs

1949

Item

1959

Cost Allocation

$40,234,000

Irrigation

$56,251,000

18,744,000

25,405,000

Subtotal

~58,978,000

~81,656 ,000

Flood Control

5,900,000

6,558,000

Recreation

4,656,000

4, 738,000

p0,556,000

~15,844 ,000

$69,534,000

$97,500 ,000

M&I Use

4,548,000

Fish and Wildlife
Subtotal
TOTAL
Payment of Costs
Irrigation Costs
Water Users

$30, 102,000

$24,456,600

Interest Componenta

9, 372,000

18,714,500

Sales of Surplus Energy

1,626,000

2,417,800

$41,100,000

$56,251,000

$18,744,000

$24,515,100

10,662,100

Tax Revenue
Subtotal
Municipal and Industrial Costs
Water Users
Tax Revenue b

889 ,900

Subtotal

$18,744,000

$25,405,000

Flood Control

Nonreimbursable

Nonreimbursable

Recreation

Nonreimbursable

Nonreimbursable

Fish and Wildlife

Nonreimbursable

Nonreimbursable

~See explanation in text.
Tax revenues left over after WBWCD has made its bond retirement payments.
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1
repeated in the 1959 DPR of estimating the benefit to municipal water
supply by using as an alternative cost the price of building the same facilities
for M&I use only.

(There is not a word in Bureau benefit/cost analyses about

groundwater development as an alternative.)
The 1949 document made this comment about relative allocations:
"The allocation to municipal use was based on the assumption that municipal
use would have a prior right to a firm water supply and thus would require
greater proportionate use of storage and conveyance facilities than irrigation. "

2

Thus, says the 1949 report, each purpose will pay according to its

proportionate use of project facilities.

Table 14, by its allocation of costs,

presumes the ratio of use to be 1:2 (roughly) in favor of irrigation. On the
other hand, total M&I water was projected to be 40,000 a. f. in 1949, while
irrigation water developed would amount to 245,000 acre feet--a ratio of 1:6
in favor of irrigation.

Chapter V shows that the actual plans of the Bureau

had an even worse ratio than this: M&I capacity of the Weber storage and
delivery system was planned to be only 16, 500 a . f.

It is true that any forsee-

able demand for M&I water could be met out of Pineview, but little was foreseen for the Ogden side, and all the treatment facilities were designed to use
water from the Weber.

1
2

To say that M&I use was even expected to employ

1959 DPR, p. 43.

S. Doc. 147, p. 108.
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project facilities to one-third of their capacity, as cost allocations in
Table 14 clearly imply, does not seem justifiable from the Bureau' s own
documents.
The cost allocations of Table 14 are purely arbitrary, designed to
pay for the project and at the same time keep the price of irrigation water
low enough to justify its use by commercial farmers.

Notice that although

the cost allocated to irrigation went up from $40 to $56 million, the repayment obligation of irrigation users went down from $30 to $24.5 million--a
reflection of cost inflation combined with agricultural decline.

The increas e

in total costs from 1949 to 1959 was $28 million, whereas the calculated
ability of agriculture to pay had declined by $5.5 million. A net increase in
revenue of $33.5 million, therefore, had to be found from other sources.
They found $5.3 million more of nonreimbursable benefits, and close to
$12 million in property taxes. They also squeezed a little more out of energy
sales--possibly because they foresaw little use of the Layton-Willard pumping
plants.

That gave them at best a little over $19 million against their deficit

of $33.5 million.

The only available source was M&I users.

Their burden

was, therefore, increased from $28 to $43.2 million--just a little more than
enough to cover the deficit ($15. 2 versus $14.5 million).
These figures for M&I payments are calculated by adding the the
explicit figures allocated to M&I the item called interest component in the
table. Under the 1949 plan, M&I users would pay off their $18,744,000
allocation in 40 years, at the rate of $468,600 per year. After that, they
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would go right on paying at the same rate for 20 more years, generating an
additional $9,372,000 to be applied against the irrigation allocation.

This

was justified in Senate Document 147 by a comment about the M&I investment
being paid for out of a fund that was designed to provide interest-free capital
investments for agriculture. In 1959 there is an explicit interest charge to
M&I users, and it is turned back to help pay the cost allocation to agriculture.
That is not

!!:! lieu of the

20 years of extra payments in the 1949 report, how-

ever. M&I users still must pay for 60 years.

Furthermore, the amount of

M&I water "needed" was revised upward by 10,000 a.f. to a total of 50,000
a. f. in 1959.
The tax portion of the repayment burden will fall most heavily on
municipal residents as well, because it is a 1-mill levy on the assessed value
of all property in the District. And that is not all. In order to sell the water
designated as M&I by the Bureau, the WBWCD had to construct treatment
plants (at Ogden, East Layton, and Bountiful) and water mains at its own
expense.

These facilities are in place, and the District can deliver treated

water to any municipality in the East Shore area. It issued $5,400,000 in
bonds to pay for this construction.

Principal and interest payments on this

part of the M&I water are high enough that the District must charge as much
for repayment of its own facilities as it pays to the Bureau.
Bureau repayment is $15 per acre foot.

That is, the

1be District lays on another $16 for

bond payments, and then must get an additional $12 . 50 in operation and maintenance and delivery cost could have been avoided if groundwater had been
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developed for municipal use.

This system was built to process and distribute

a water s upply limited by official estimate to 16,550 a. f. (Chapter V).
The method of Bureau planners is quite clear: irrigation water at a
price farmers can (and will) pay is a necessary condition. Other water users
and beneficiaries of water abundance can pay the bill. A major irony of the
WBP situation is that urban residents of south Davis County are getting a
large share of the cheap water, while refusing to pay for the expensive stuff.
They can thumb their noses at the Bureau because they have been able to
develop their own groundwater instead of having to buy it at three or four
times the price from wells developed by the Bureau and the WBWCD.

The

Bureau knew better than any other group (except its parent and guardian, the
U.S. G. A.) the groundwater situation in the East Shore. It clearly intended
to sell groundwater to municipalities, because it did not even plan to meet
more than a third of its projected M&I contracts with surface storage.

This

implies that Bureau officers based their plans on hydrologic studies s howing
poor groundwater potential in south Davis County. That being the case, the
WBP could be paid for by gouging suburban residents of an area that was bound
to grow if water could be supplied .

The initial strategy depended on support

from Ogden City, which did not really need Weber River water, but which did
have a large urban population.

South Davis municipalities could be counted on

to sign up for increasing quantities of high-priced WBP water as they grew
with Salt Lake City.

The plan backfired when the hydrologic studies proved

to be inadequate. Wells continue to be developed in south Davis County, and
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Bountiful City has never been interested in expanding its pre- project contract
for 1, 000 a.f. of M&I water.
There were a reasonable number of people in south Davis who were
concerned to get an augmented surface water supply for the county.

Events in

Davis County since the WBWCD commenced operations do lend credence to the
argument of those people that water was a constraint to further growth of the
county. Recent growth is apparent to anyone who keeps his eyes open while
driving along U.S. Highway 89 from Salt Lake City to Ogden (the Davis
Aqueduct is visible along the mountainside just above the highway), but Table
15 provides some figures to add a degree of precision to the impression.
Assessed valuation figures in the table demonstrate that although it is avoiding
payment for part of the benefit it receives from the WBP, south Davis County
will pay an increasing share through the growth of its property values.

Subsidization of South Davis is Probably Intentional

As shown in Chapter IV, popular support for the WBP originated in
south Davis County, the only part of the Basin for which a plausible argument
of water scarcity could be made.

This section will show that the system

desired by a group in Davis County was not economically or financially feasible.
It had to be subsidized in some way.
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TABLE 15
COMPARATIVE GROWTH INDICATORS FOR THE WEBER BASIN

Davis

Morgan

30, 867
112,550
265%

2,519
4,600
83%

6,745
6 , 500
-3.6 %

121. O%

57.3%

57 .2%

Weber

Swnmit

Population
1950
1974
% D.

83,319
134,500
61%

Personal Income
% D. 1960-69

67.8%

Assessed Valuation ($000)
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1974
% D. 1950-74

25,745
38,207
55,972
74,944
105,345
133,466

6,797
7,029
7,121
8,151
10,204
12,582

12,731
11,954
13,200
16,264
20,747
29,112

418%

85%

129%

67' 119
80 ,3 82
105,102
118,141
148,773
170,285

Source: Utah Foundation, Research Report, No. 283, June 1970;
and Statistical Review of Government in Utah, 1975 Edition.

154%
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The map on the next page (Figure 2) is taken from a pre-project
study of agricultural potentials in the proposed service area of the WBP .

1

As it shows, lands served by the Davis and Weber Canal were already fully
served and were not in the project.

(Compare this non-project area to the

green areas of Figure 1.) It was mainly bench lands that were dry, plus the
low-quality lands of the lake plain. Farmers in the far south of the county
were not happy with the Jordan River waters supplied by the Bonneville Canals
(see Figure 2 and Chapter III), and so were interested in a higher level supply
of better quality.
The County had recently acqulred rights to 5, 000 acre feet of storage
in Echo Reservoir through financial support of the Weber River Project of
the 1930's.

(See Chapter II.) But they had no way of getting it to the un-

watered bench lands and to the south end of the county.

Prior to World War II,

a representative of the Bureau of Reclamation, Harry Wilbert, had shown
Davis County Agent, DeLore Nichols, the physical possibility of a high level
aqueduct, similar to the one that was eventually built as part of the WBP.
Building such an aqueduct and getting water into it at the rugged mouth of

1

W. Fuhriman, G. Blanch, and C. Stewart, An Economic Analysis of
the Agricultural Potentials of the Weber Basin Reclamation Project, Utah .
Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State Agricultural College, Logan, Utah,
December 1952. The map is on page 6. One of the authors, Walter Fuhriman
of Brigham Young University, says that the principal objective of the study
was to assure that irrigation prices for WBP water would not be set at a level
too high for commercial agriculture in the region. (Personal communication. )
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Location of the Lake Plain and Foothill areas , Weber Basin.
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Weber Canyon would be a very expensive means of transporting only 5, 000 a. f.
of water, however. If such a conveyance system were to be constructed at all,
the cost of building it large enough to handle any potential need for water in
the area it could serve would be marginal compared to later duplication.

On

the other hand, such an extensive system for only 5, 000 a. f. of water would
be hard to sell to budget scrutineers, regardless of its potential capacity.
(Nichols says that the County had to fight to get a share in the Weber River
Project. Judging by the evidence from the WBP, however, it is not implausible that the Davis water in Echo Reservoir was in fact another skillful sale by
Bureau representatives. It certainly provided a goad or irritant to help stir
up interest in the WBP, which by its own admission had been part of Bureau
plans for decades.)
A feasible high level conveyance system for Davis County required
additional storage on the Weber River . Just how much storage depended on
the potential of Davis lands to use more water.

Lands under the Davis and

Weber Canal needed no more. Higher lands in north Davis, and most of south
Davis could use more, however, and the aqueduct was the most plausible way
of getting it to them from the Weber River.

The lands were accordingly

surveyed and tested, and it was determined that they could use 62, 100 a. f. of
water if fully employed in agriculture.

1

(That would entail replacing waters

of the Jordan River supplied through the Bonneville and Bonneville Pump

1

See 1959 DPR, p. 39. Also Table 16.
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Canals . ) Since the county already t.ad a right of 5, 000 a . f. in Echo Reservoir, something on the order of 57-60, 000 a. f. of additional storage was
needed to serve all the agricultural potential of eastern and southern Davis
County. And that was the carrying capacity (adjusted for peak season use)
that should be built into the aqueduct.
Notice from Table 8 that the increment to storage capacity is provided precisely in Wanship Dam (Rockport Lake) . A reasonable project to
provide a full water supply to south Davis County and the whole of the Davis
high lands might have included these features on the existing WBP:
Wanship Dam and Reservoir
Stoddard Diversion
Gateway Canal and Tunnel
Davis Aquedu ct
Total Actual Cost

$ 6,836,000
373,000
7,600,000
16,581,000
$31,390,000 1

Something like this system was what south Davis water enthusiasts wanted,
and its components were the first ones built. Water was flowing in the Davis
Aqueduct by 1956, 3 years after construction commenced.
As an irrigation project it did not make economic sense, however .
The Bureau's own calculation of the construction repayment capacity of irrigation blocks under the Davis Aqueduct were as s hown in Table 16.

1
2

2

The ability

From Table 13.

Except for the third column, this information is from the 1959 DPR,
p. 96. "1970 Constructed Capacity" is from Table 6.
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TABLE 16
DAVIS AQUEDUCT IRRIGATION

North Davis

1959
1959
Estimated
Average
Requirement Annual Supply

1970
Constructed
Capacity

Total
Repayment
Obligation

15,400 a. f.

15,400 a . f.

$2,931.0 mil.

14, 100 a. f.

KaysvilleFarmington

8,500

7,800

9,400

1,078.9

West Farmington

6,400

5,800

5,700

836.4

Centerville

3,100

2,800

4,000

446.6

Woods Cross No.

2,800

2,600

2,800

1,175.4

Woods Cross No. 2 7,900

7,200

3,800

707.4

18,000

16,400

20,775

2,962.8

62,100 a . f.

56, 700 a. f.

61,875 a. f.

South Davis

$10,138.2 mil.

of agrtculture to repay construction costs, even over a 60 -year period, was
thus only 1/ 3 of the system's cost.

The Davis Aqueduct system , even as

rationalized by additional storage capacity, had a benefits-to-costs ratio of
only one-to-three! And it was the only part of the WBP which can possibly be
said to have sprung from unsolicited popular request. If the additional storage
capacity of Wanship Reservoir were left out of the calculation, total costs
would have been reduced to about $24 million, but irrigation capacity would
have been limited to the 5, 000 a. f. of storage rights which the County already
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had in Echo Reservoir--less than enough for the projected demand from the
two Woods Cross blocks. Repayment capacity would, therefore, have been
less than $2 million (sum of repayments from the two Woods Cross blocks).
Without the additional storage, therefore, the benefits-to-costs ratio of a
water supply system which might legitimately be said to have originated from
popular demand was something like one-to-twelve.

1

The Bureau of Reclamation had learned in the 1920's (see Chapters
IX and X) that one answer to this kind of problem was to find a paying partner
for irrigation.

The best one was hydro-electric power, but they had also used

municipal and industrial water supplies. In the Weber Basin case, Bureau
planners calculated that their best alternative, although far from perfect, was
M&I contracts. But this meant that M&I users along the upper Davis bench
and in the southern communities would have to pay over $20 million if the
Davis project were to be paid for by residents of its service area.

Was it

plausible to expect that towns and farms above the Davis and Weber Canal
(see Figure 2) and south of Kaysville could repay over $31 million if farms
could provide only one-third of the total?
Existing towns in the area were few and puny, with a combined popula tion of less than 10,000 people.

2

They already had a collective water supply

1
south Davis origins of the WBP are the subject of Chapter IV and
Appendix II.
2
win Templeton, Davis-Weber Counties Water Development, a report
submitted to the Davis-Weber Counties Municipal Wa ter Development Association, February 1949. Templeton was a Salt Lake City consulting engineer and
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of at least 4, 2 77 a. f. per year.

1

If the proposed aqueduct system were built,

further urban expansion could use water relinquished from irrigating farm
land.

2

Once full-service capacity was developed, therefore, full-supply would

remain a relatively permanent condition.
In circumstances of ample supply it is difficult to gouge consumers.
Since 10,000 M&I users were consuming less than 5, 000 a. f. per year in
1948, the potential for major M&I contracts at high prices was severaly
limited.

They were only possible if M&l were currently in significantly short

supply, and if an expanded M&I clientele could be forced to pay a much higher
price for water released from agricultural use. Bureau tactics were aimed at
getting maximum pre-construction commitments for M&I payment, but they
also tied every water user to a 60-year contract. Substitution of irrigation
for M&I contracts would, therefore, be impossible.

Long-term contracts

would not prevent actual physical substitution, however, for contractees pay
for 60 years regardless of whether or not they use their water. Once an area
has been clearly and irreversibly converted from farming to residential,

one of his major clients was Ogden City. His report is further described
and evaluated in Appendix IT.
1!hid. Extrapolated from Templeton's figures for August, the month
of lowest stream flow.
2
Bureau planners calculate a full-service water supply for M&I to be
roughly the same as for the same area in agriculture. Utah State hydrologists,
however, say that residential and commercial development are less consumptive, per acre, than agriculture. This information from Frank Haws, Utah
Water Research Laboratory, Utah State University, Logan, Utah.
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commercial, or industrial use, therefore, the water that is unused for agriculture can be sold again for M&I. Repayment contracts accumulate, therefore, rather than s ubstitute, and a ny time the use of water shifts permanently
the Bureau can gouge--so long as it is in control of the only available water.
Although the Project's promoters tried to make a strong case for
iminent municipal water shortages in the area, their arguments must have
been a little forced.

The Templeton report cited above estimated existing

supplies of at least 4, 277. 5 a. f. of municipal water in the agricultural service
area of the proposed aqueduct.

ln the pre-construction sales campaign,

municipalities in that area signed WBWCD contracts for an additional 2, 409
a. f.

1

(see Table 19). By the time the Davis Aqueduct was in service, there-

fore (1956), the water supply to communities in its irrigation service area
was at least 6,686. 5 a. f. The State Engineer's Office calculated 1960 munici pal water use in that area to be about 5, 000 a. f . (Table 18). Over the same
period of time, population in the area had jumped from 10, 000 to 25,000
(Table 18)--a growth of 150 percent. lf 25, 000 people used 5, 000 a. f. in
1960 (0. 20 a. f. per person), it is unlikely that 10,000 people were using more
than 2, 500 a. f. (0. 25 a. f. per person) in 1950, for the same purposes. Supply
must have exceeded use in 1948 by a ratio that was close to 2:1.
It is clear from the figures of the previous paragraph that municipal

water supplies in the proposed aqueduct irrigation service area were more

1

There were no additions to this total until 1964.
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TABLE 17
URBAN RESIDENTlAL POPULATION OF DAVIS
AQUEDUCT AGRICULTURAL SERVICE AREA

Place

1948a

1950b

1960c

1970d

1975e

BoWltiful

5,500

5,969

17.039

27,865

30,800

Centerville

1,100

1,267

2,361

3,247

4,366

East Layton

210

216

Farmington

1,600

1, 468

Fruit Heights

150

124

N.A.g

North Salt Lake

300

261

1,655

2,133

3,121

684

945

1,268

2,102

264

1, 098

3,132

3,217

5,900

7,050

47,148

55,905

51, 176

60,506

West Bountiful
Woods Cross

300

N.A.g
1,951

Val Verda

714e
2, 534
355e

884
3,870
495

(Uninc.)

Totals

9,160

Total South Davise

a

10,253

25,049

b Templeton.
WBWCD, "Brief of the Weber River Basin Reclamation Project," Presented
to Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, D. C., June 1951.
cU. s. Census figures published by Bureau of Economics and Business
Research, University of Utah, on preliminary results of 1970 Census of
dPopulation.
Ibid.
eDavis County Population Projection, prepared by Davis County Planning
[Commission in 1967.
Nol incorporated in 1948.
gCensus data for incorporated places over 1, 000 population only.
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TABLE 18
AVAILABLE SUPPLY AND WATER USE, MUNICIPALITIES
IN DAVIS AQUEDUCT AGRICULTURAL SERVICE AREA
(ACRE FEET)

1948b

1960c
WBP
Use
Share

19 68
WBP
Share
Use

1970
WBP
Use
Share
f

Place

(Supply)

Bountiful

2255.8

2478

980

3137

1000e

6920

1000

Centerville

774.2

N.A .

200e

350

225e

2120

450

East Layton

78.0

16

16

58

130

63

Farmington

483 .9

844

200

484

200e

990

200

36e

125

66

715

50c

995

100

Fruit Heights
North Salt Lake
West Bolll1tiful
Woods Cross
Val Verda
(SDWID)a

48.4
121.0
N.A.
516.2
N.A.

Hill A.F . B .

~

Totals

4277.5

22.5

22.5

275

35+

5 .1

191

191

192

136.6d

640

250

190

100

431

lOOe

505

100

987g

360e

530

299d

3280g

360

N.A.

225e

3760h

225e

N.A .

225

5003.5
(8700)

2294.5

9692
(5932)

2276.7 15,705

28 14

aUnincorporated suburban area between Bountiful and North Salt Lake. The
South Davis Water Improvement District buys both irrigation and M&I water
bfrom the WBWCD; 360 a. f. was its original contract for M&I.
Templeton.
eState Engineer, " Projected 1975 Municipal Water Use Requirements, Davis
dCounty, " 1962.
Municipal reports to State Engineer (incomplete obviously) plus personal
e communication with city water managers. Research conducted in 1969.
lrom WBWCD sources--actual M&I contracted amounts.
hState Enginee r's projection. gMostly for irrigation.
An equivalent figure can realistically be inserted for other years.
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TABLE 19
M&I CONTRACTS FOR WBP WATER IN DAVIS AQUEDUCT
IRRIGATION SERVICE AREA

Place
Bountiful

Pre-Construction
Commitments
1000 a. f.

a

1974b
Contract Amount
1000 a. f.

Centerville

200

450

East Layton

38

63

Farmington

200

200

Fruit Heights

36

66

North Salt Lake

50

100

West Bountiful

200

250

Woods Cross

100

100

Val Verda (SDWID)

360

360

Hill A. F. B.

225

225

Totals

a

2409 a. f.

2814 a. f.

From "Municipal Water Allotments under Contract. " Personal communicabtion from WBWCD, January 30, 1969.
From "Summary of Municipal and Industrial Water Use- -1974."
Page 24
of WBWCD Annual Report, 1974.
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than adequate in 1948. Ardent water promoters might a rgue against this that
it is peak season water supply that counts.

That is true, but the Templeton

figures cited were based on August supplies.

This means that the actual

annual supply was greater than calculated above, for August is the month of
minimum stream flow (possible exception of September, a month of lighter
use).

The higher flows of other months could be held in reservoirs for sum -

mer use, if surface flows were the only source of water . Investment in
municipal catchment basins and/ or reservoirs would have been significantly
less costly than the Davis Aqueduct system, if municipal supply had been the
primary consideration.
Per capita use for 1968, the year for which the most reliable data
are available, was about 0. 34 a . f. (using Table 18, exclusive of Hill A. F. B .,
and a population of 47,000 extrapolated from Table 17). In preparing the
projections of 1975 municipal water use in the area, State hydrologists appear
to have used a figure of 0. 28 a. f. for per capita water use (Table 18).

1

Com-

pared to the 1968 figure of 0. 13 a. f. per capita for actual municipal use , a
projected requirement of 0. 28 seems a little excessive. Even the 1960 figures
which showed per person use of 0. 20 a. f. were inflated by non-culi nary use in
several instances (note the 1948 and 1960 columns in Table 18). Since 1956

1Lawrence P. Beer, "Projected 1975 Municipal Water Use Require ments, Davis County," Water Resources Branch, State Engineer's Office,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1962 . Mimeographed. The water use projection given
by Beer for the relevant municipalities has been divided by the 1975 population
total for those communities listed in Table 19 to get the quotient of 0. 28 a . f.
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several of the communities have segregated culinary from yard and garden
use. In part, this has been due to their contracts with the WBWCD. Because
of the high fixed cost of WBP water, the towns have used it first, keeping
their own resources in reserve. Also, since the WBWCD water is treated,
they use it for culinary purposes and their own water for yard and garden
irrigation. In several cases it is quite clear (Table 18) that towns were able
to substitute WBP water for their own supplies completely in early years of
the Project's service. Overall, and in individual cases, there was no pressing need for augmented supplies of municipal water in the Davis Aqueduct
irrigation service area in 1948.

This is clear from figures supplied by the

WBP promoters themselves.
Davis County was obviously in a favorable location for urban growth,
from both the north and the south. Nevertheless, total M&I requirements as
a net addition to irrigation use could not in 1950 have been expected to grow
very much over what the WBWCD was able to sell in the pre-construction
campaign, in the Davis Aqueduct's irrigation service area.
called for full irrigation service.
in Utah.

Project plans

That means roughly 3 acre feet per year

Land taken over for urban development can no longer be used for

agriculture; hence, its water supply becomes available for M&I purposes. In
the South Davis communities, figures provided by a water demand study in
the mid-1960's show an average lot size of 0. 086 acres per capita.

1

Using

1
B. Delworth Gardner and Seth H. Schick, Factors Affecting Consumption of Urban Household Water in Northern Utah, Bulletin 449,
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the figure of 0. 13 a. f. per capita from the previous paragraph, municipal use
was about 1. 5 a. f. per acre in 1968. The excessive figure of 0. 28 a. f. per
capita, attributed above to the Beer projection, works out to a per acre
requirement of 3.3 a. f.

The Bureau of Reclamation used 3. 08 a . f. per acre

as the agrtbultural requirement for lands in the Davis Aqueduct service area
(Table 5).

The agricultural supply is, therefore, ample for conversion to

M&I use.

As demonstrated in Appendix II, the promotional campaign for the
Weber Basin Project was fought mainly by people of the chamber of commerce
type on the presumption that municipal water supplies for urban and industrial
growth would be a net addition to irrigation requirements. Their initial
rallying cry was that the WBP would develop all available flows of the Weber
and Ogden Rivers for agriculture, leaving none for urban-industrial expansion. It seems likely that hydrologists of the Bureau and U.S. G. S. could have
disabused them of this notion had they wanted to. Once the East Shore was
provided with full delivery facilities and storage capacity, it would have a full
water supply. Urban-industrial expansion would necessarily come at the
expense of agriculture, and would use the water released from irrigation
duty.

Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, 1964.
The average per capita lot size for the towns in Tables 17, 18, and 19 is
o. 086.
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Bureau planners must have known this. Since they could not
realistically expect to sell much more total quantity of water in the aqueduct
service area than the full irrigation supply, their hopes for growing M&I contracts must have been based on the presumption of monopoly power. If they
controlled the only water supply, then urban-industrial expansion would allow
them to re-sell former irrigation water as high-priced M&I. If they could
not count on such monopoly power (i. e. , if they recognized that groundwater
was a realistic a lternative source), then the amount of M&I contracts they
could sell in a pre-construction campaign would be just about all they could
count on until other sources of water became at least expensive as their own.
As already noted, the pre-construction M&I campaign realized contracts for 2, 409 a. f. in the Davis Aqueduct irrigation service area. If the
Project for upper and southern Davis County were to be self-sustaining, its
few small towns would have to pay $21.2 million (see above, pp. 195-196, of
this section) over the next 60 years, or more than $350,000 per year. At a
volume of 2, 500 a . f., that implied a repayment assessment of $140 per a. f.
before treatment, conveyance, operation and maintenance costs. It is a
ludicrous figure beside the agricultural repayment of' about $3 per a. f.
Furthermore, no interest has been included with the calculations above.
Reclamation law is very liberal with agricultural users; they usually pay no
interest on moneys advanced by the Reclamation Fund. But non-agricultural
portions of Reclamation projects are generally required to pay interest; they
are the "paying partners " of reclamation, and must keep the Fund replenished.
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Actual terms of the WBWCD's contract with the Bureau of Reclamation call
for M&I payments to extend over 60 years , although the principa l amount is
s uppo sed to be paid off in 40 years.

The remaining 20 years of payments are

explicitly designated as an interest eq uivalent. If a similar kind of calculalion had been made above, t he M&l repayment assessment wouid have been a
third greater, or $186 +. Such heavy and obvious subsidization of one group by
anoth er as these hypothetical conditions clearly imply, might be difficult to
sell.

Certai nly someone would ask for cost justification for the difference
(The truth is that there is little or no cost difference between WBP

in price.

water delivered to the three WBWCD treatment plants and water delivered
e l sewhere a long the aqueduct for irrigation. A Bureau spokesman argued that
Project facilities had to be built more strongly for M&I us e , because winter
operation is required.

Wayne Winegar scoffed at this, and added that parts of
1

the system should have been built more heavi ly than they actually were . )

If

tbe M&I contract price had been $186 instead of $15 per a. f. , it is doubtful
that the pre-construction campaign co uld have garnered commitments to
2 , 000 a. f., given the evidence presented above that the situation of towns
was far from desperate.
To get the necessary total revenue of $21. 2 million, plus interest,
the Bureau had to have either high price or high volume. An initia l volume of

1

Personal communication with officers of the WBWCD a nd Salt Lake
Regional Office, Bureau of Reclamation.
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only 2, 409 a. f. and 10,000 people placed them in a very awkward spot.

It

called for a price so excessive that expanded sales would almost certainly
be deterred by the development of alternatives about which the Bureau was at
least as well-informed as anyone else. At a price more competitive with
long-run a lternatives, high volume was the only way of making the Project
feasible, and with a start of 2, 409 a. f. it would take a long time to build up
to the necessary annual revenue of about $4 70, 000 (adjusted for interest as
above). If it could depend on absol ute control of incremental water s upplies,
so that any M&I expansion must be served by the WBWCD, the Bureau could
expect 1975 deliveries of less than 11,500 a. f.

1

(based on a 1975 population of

60,0 00, per capita use of 0.1 5 a . f., and the initial 2,409 a. f.).

To raise a

revenue of $470,000 , this quantity would have to be priced at about $41 per
a. f. --still excessive, especially in terms of 1950 general pri ce levels. At
410 per a. f., which is a figure Bureau planners seem to have believed they
could realistically count on,

2

total revenue would only be approaching a fourth

of the annual requirement 20 years into Project operation.

Even if the full

capacity of the Aqueduct were devoted to M&I service to a completely urbanized
upper and south Davis County, the 61 ,000 a. f. so supplied would have to bring
$7.70 per a. f. --and would imply a population of 400,000 people!

1

Notc in Table 19 that the actual contracted amount in 1974 was only

2, 814 a. f.

2

(At 0.15 a. f.

s.

Doc. 147.
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per person.

Using the 1964 density of 0. 086 acres per capita, reported by

Schick, and the a r ea of 27,740 acr es reported in Table 4, the population
ca lculates to about 323 ,000. ) As the repayment fee of $15 which was eve ntu ally es tabli shed fo r M&l, volume would have to be 31,333 a. f. per yea r for
60 years.

To get that volum e on pe r capita use of 0. 15 a. f. would require a

population of 209 ,000.

But there were only 10,000 people in the a r ea in 1950,

and to build up to 200 , 000 would realistically t ake longer than the 60 years of
the required repayment period.

Furthermore, ne ither local promo ters nor

the Bureau intend ed to convert the co unty into a completely urbani zed region.
Long-term Bureau objectives were agricultural development.

Even

the loca l c hamber of commerce promoters for esaw a n agricultura l fut ure for
the East Shore.

The T e mpleton report, cited earli er, noted that although

water for urba n- industrial expansion could be obtained from irrigation water
source, "it would r esult in a loss of irrigated acreage , which cannot be
afforded." They wanted industrial growth with no loss of agricultural produ clion.

T hi s greedy a nd unrealistic pe rspecti ve is no doubt what led t he m into

the e rror of ass uming that M&I water must be a net addition to irrigation us e .
It is possib le that Bureau personne l s hared the same misapprehe nsion.

It

seem s to have been part of an American e thos that has not been severely
challenged until the last decade .
The Davis Aqueduct project, as envisaged by the original local
promoters of the WBP (see Chapte r Vll) was not financially or economically
feasible, eve n assumi ng a n absolute monopoly over future water s upplies.
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This s uggests that at least one r eason why Bureau planners t ransformed the
south Davis "reques t " (Chapter VII) into the behemoth that emerged, was that
they had to di sgu ise its high cost and get financi a l support from outside the
region that would gain most from the proje ct.

1

1

This account has ignored an industri a l contract with Chevron Oil
Compa ny for 2, 750 a. f. The co mpany ope rates a r e finery in the so uth end of
the county. While this contract i s an impor tant source of r evenue to the
WBWCD, and was one of the pre-construction comm itments, it could hardly
be used for extrapolating water use based on suburban expa nsion . It is
probably regarded by the co mpany as a form of lo cal taxation, since cheaper
water was alm os t certainly available eve n in 1950. One possibility was the
Jordan fti ver water from the Bonneville Canal, which was to be discontinued
as an irrigation source a s soon as WBP became a reality. Only 750 a. f. of
the compa ny's contract amount is for treated water.
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CHAPT.EH Vll
RESISTANCE TO HYDROLOGIC EFFICIENCY lN THE WEBER BASIN

T he introductory chapter ca lled attentio n to the idea that technique
is the ultimately limiting resource, because matte r and energy a re transformable into each other. Applicatio ns of e nergy can transform and
transfer materia ls from one thing to another and from place to place . The
most daunting cha llenge to huma n ability to exert power over energymatter transformations appear s at pres e nt to be t he limitations of human
physical structure wlticb confine us to the biosphere in which we have
evol ved.

Nevertheless, s ignifi cant applications of controlled energy to

the transportation of water are possible without going to extremes in
creating water out of e nergy and e lem entary materials.

Water i s one of

·the most a bundant substances on earth, a fact which no doubt had a great
influence on the evolutionary direction of plant a nd animal life.

Life is

dependent on water because it is premised on water, wltich means necessa rily that there is Jots of water around.

Wltile it is slightly odd to say we

are fortunate to have water abundance, therefore, it is true that wi thout
technological mastery of energy so urces hum a ns must not stray far from
where water of a ppropriate quality is accessible without th e interposition
of tools .
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Arid regions may be ·defined by the reasoning above us areas where
water is not easi ly accessible in abundance without the interposition of controlled e nergy . Much of the United States west of the Mississippi fits tbis
descr iption. A great dea l of scientific and technical effort has been exerted
to make water more accessible in this region.

Given that controllable energy

is the limiting resource, those e fforts have, in general, been directed toward
getting the greatest water accessibility per unit of energy expenditure.
One of the most obvious sources of e nergy has been the hydrologic
cycle in combination with high mountains.

Water is deposited by solar e nergy

mostly in the highest elevations of the Mountain West.

From the glaciers and

mountain valleys it moves at varying rates through or over the unconsolidated
valley fill to the oceans or to continental evaporating pa ns.
represents a n energy potential.

Elevated water

That potential can be controlled for beneficial

use by arresting the normal downward flow of mountain water, and by diverting and storing it for use at other times and other places.

Diversion and

storage themselves require purposi ve e ffort and adequate techniques of e nergy
control, but maximum use of the energy potential represented by mountain
water is obviously one of the least ex pe nsive ways of augmenting accessible
water in terms of actual expenditure of other sources of controlled energy.
This fact was r ecogni zed clearly by John Wes ley Powell, who defined
efficiency in the use of western water resources as making optimum use of the
e nergy potential of mountain water.

This idea, which is termed hydrologic

effic iency in this work, has maximum application at the level of drainage
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basins. Inter-basin transfer of water requires energy expenditure other than
that provided by the potential of a body of elevated water to move itself to a
lower place through humanly contrived alternative channels. It is true that
the energy potential of a rapidly falling river can, in the twentieth century, be
harnessed to lift a portion of the river flow into another drainage basin, via
hydro-electric power. Nevertheless, there are other uses for hydro power,
and it is energy-inefficient to use such sources for pumping before the full
intra-basin hydro potential is used.
In recognition of this principle, Powell advocated that political boundaries in the West be conterminous with boundaries of hydrographic basins.
As Chapter VIII recounts, he was successful, for a time, in getting Western
settlement arrested while the Geologic Survey attempted to map all the water
courses and drainage basins of the arid region.

His objective was to have

settlement and political jurisdiction consistent with maximum hydrologic
efficiency. He failed, of course, but the crazy quilt of water management
problems that have plagued Western development provides ample confirmation
of his foresight.

Efforts of the State of Utah to develop a Water Plan are a

tacit recognition of the chaos he predicted.
Planning efficient use of hydrologic potential is a complex and
ambitious undertaking.

Water location and movement depends on a great many

variables, Including climate, topographic and geologic structure, soils and
vegetation. Application of these elements of physical hydrology is hampered,
since the failure of Powell's ambitious plan, by political, legal, and economic
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1nslitulions.

Even conducti ng t he r eq ui s ite investigations, let alone imple -

menting a hydrologica lly effici e nt plan, has proved to he very difficult
because of opposition from individua l or special-group inte rests, a nd sometimes from popular opinion.

It would be hard to devise a better example of

divergence between indi vidual a nd collective interest than a drainage basin
in the arid Mountain West.

As Powell saw it, a colle c ti ve approach to

western settlement was a technological necessity, if e nergy efficiency and
hence maximum aggregate wealth were the objective.

Attitudes and institu-

tions in 19th century America favored la issez-faire, however , a nd the cost
of this preference was a decrement to hydrolog ic effi ciency.
Commitment to a State Water Plan in the last decade was probably
symptomat ic of a resurgence of interest in tec hni cal effici ency as aga inst
laissez-faire.

(It can hardly be said that voters of the Mountain West are

insensitive to the creeping collectivis m that is implied by state planning in
respect of a ny reso urce . ) The r ecent preference for technical (hydrologic)
efficiency may reflect a real need for access to more water if ever y member
of a larger populati on is to cons um e water at the same pe r capita volume as
formerly, or it could be the manifestation of politica l s uc cess by a technological i nterest group.

A society that places its faith i n technical progress,

a nd accepts the specia li zation that seems to attend it, is vulnerable to the
interests of the gro ups in whom it recog ni zes special expertise . Utahns

~

have been sold on greate r hydro logic effi ciency, therefore, without really
needing it.

More likely, they have committed themselves to the idea somew hat
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unwittingly.

They have generally endorsed economic growth with the popula-

tion expansion which it both entails and permits . Given that frame of mind,
they wi ll have gone along easily with arguments that progress require s more
water supply development.

Economic growth in recent American experie nce

has meant industrialization and urbanization.

These changes necessarily

entail changes and improvements in water conveyance facilities, but it is far
from axiomatic that they require development of more controlled water (see
Chapter VI).
Laissez-faire in the American system of resource allocation has
frequently meant lobbying a nd influence peddling in various legis lative bodies.
The rise of government-supported science and technology (for which Wallace
Stegner gives John Wesley Powell major credit--see Chapter VIII), added to
the number and variety of special interest groups looking for a share of the
national wealth.

(This is not to say that technological interest groups have

not augmented the national wealth.) As a fraternity of water development
specialists has grown in the U.S., its objectives have meshed, in part, with
those of local people who favored water development for personal or group
reasons other than professional purposiveness or technical interest.

The out-

come has not a lways been as perfect as hydrologic purists would like, so that
there always seems to be room for improvement.

In the histori cal traces of

the Utah water development group a common theme is disdain for the piecemeal nature of past developments and the need for comprehensive water
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planning.

(The WBP was s een by this group as a properly comprehensive

devel opm ent.)
Inc remental development of water supplies need not violate the object ive of hydrologic e fficiency if it is based on the adequate knowledge of water
movem ents in the basin, and a hydrologically competent plan for ultimate use
of water and related resources.

Probably the most significant barri er to

ac hi evi ng planned efficiency through increm enta l development has been ignorance of the groundwater portion of the hydrologic cycle.

Chapter III has

s hown that knowledge of groundwater in general is a r ecent phenomenon, and
that Utah has been very backward in applying its techniques to her own groundwater r esources.

Several of the obstacles to efficient water use recounted in

this c hapter will be eas ily recognized as stemming from ignorance about
groundwate r, a nd fa ilure to recognize the principle that it is not water, but
techniques, ene rgy, a nd instruments of control that are scarce.
Wa ter enters an intermountain dra inage basin from a bove.
the basin s upply is deposited as snow in the mountains.

Much of

From snowbanks and

glaci ers , water moves downward over bedrock to a sink. Water development
means arresti ng and changing the natural direction of that flow, whether it is
above or through th e unconsolidated fill of the basin.

Development requires

purposi ve effort a nd controlled energy expenditure of varying quantities.

If

r eaders keep this in mind, it will be apparent in what follows that popula r
conceptions a nd judicial interpre tatio ns of water a nd water rights in Uta h
have been inaccurate. There has been no shortage of water.

It is easy access

to water that has becom e scarce as the region became more heavily populated.
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If access is not easy , greater effort must be expe nded in transporting water

to where consumers want it.

Few people prefe r more to les s effort.

He nce

inequality of access has been a source of conflict, a nd a reason for rationing.

The Prior Appropriation Doctrine a nd Artificial Shortage

By the 1930 's groundwater development in Utah had reached a stage
where it was taken seriously, a nd rights to its us e wer e be ing contested.
Adj udicating these disputes was difficult in the absence of information abo ut
t he location, extent, and nature of such water.

Accordingly, a state law

passed in 1935 provi ded that: (1) all waters of the State, including groundwa te r, belong to the public, subject to existing rights; (2) these rights are
ba sed on the prin ciple that first in time is first in right; (3) claimants of
rights to the use of groundwater must file noti ces of such claims with the
State E ngineer; (4) new right s can be initiated only upon appli cation to the
tate Engineer; and (5) the State Engineer is responsible for administrati ve
s upervision of all public waters .

1

Thomas and Nelson found that the number of claims to artesian flow
filed under this law exceeded by three times the number of flowing wells
repor ted to the 1891 Cens us.
o ut supporting records.

Many of t he c laims were based on memory with-

The 1891 cens us could easi ly have missed some wells,

and some owners may have been claiming on the basis of dug (water table)

1

Reported by Thomas and Nelson, p. 166.
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wells that had existed in their vicinity. Several claims to artesian flow
antedated by decades the earliest documented record of flowing wells in the
Bountiful District. Some of these claims, say Thomas and Nelson, were no
doubt "in error." Nevertheless, they do demonstrate that groundwater was
serious business to residents of South Davis County in 1935 (by contrast to
1891) and that contests over its use could be expected.
When Utah groundwater development reached the point that rights to it
were contested, the prior appropriation doctrine was interpreted to mean the
right to a particular hydraulic head that may have obtained when the well in
question was first developed. In effect it protected well owners against
increased pumping costs rather than actual loss of water.
been recognized by at least a few people.

This must have

The principle that seepage and

artesian flow means underdevelopment must have been fairly widely understood at that lime, at least by specialists.

There was justifiable uncertainty,

however, over just how great a volume of water was contained in a given
reservoir, and how much could be drawn from it each year without encroaching on that volume.

The Thomas and Nelson study of the Bountiful District

suggested that the fully developed stage might be. imminent, even though there
was still a significant artesian pressure.

1
According to DeLore Nichols the

prior appropriation doctrine began to be clearly and deliberately applied to
artesian pressure after the drought of 1934 (presumably in connection with

1

Personal interview.

Nichols is introduced in Chapter IV.
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the law of 1935 referenced above). Ten years later, however, residents of
South Davis County were fighting with the State Engineer to have it applied
more forcibly.

As might be expected, they wanted to protect their own

economic interests (avoid pumping costs), which required maintenance of
artesian head. State Engineer Ed Watson, on the other hand, was trying to
promote efficient use of groundwater, and was not inclined to favor the old
owners' cause.

The old owners had judicial precedent to lean on, and Watson

was opposing a lay misconception, shared by judges , in asserting that new
wells did not take away any prior well-owner's water.

The law has been used

to protect the economic value of a misconceived property right (like grazing
permits or market quotas) rather than the right to a given volume of water.
By this means, the law contributed directly to the water "shortage" in South
Davis County that was, in turn, one of the proximate causes of the Weber
Basin Project.
Stanley Green, a veteran observer of the East Shore hydrologic
picture from the vantage of his position in the State Engineer's Office and also
his residence in Bountiful, provided some perspective on the South Davis
County water "crisis" of the 1940's/ Water rights were being poorly administered, he said.

Philips Petroleum in South Davis, and Union Stockyards in

Weber County had each bought up many old flowing well rights.
demanding full artesian pressure, and getting it.

1

Personal interview, 1969.

They were

Each was a major water
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u~: er;

Unio n Stockyards had considerable farm land a nd Philips operated a

refinery.

They demanded their "accustomed rate of flow," based on the

claims of their old well rights.

This was not very r easonable to expect in a

dry period, but the courts uphe ld it in a judgment between Ogden City and
Union Stockyards . Green described the atmosphere in Davis County (South)
as tense, anxious, a nd fearful.

To many residents it appeared that indigenous

water s upplies had been stretched to capacity. Indeed they had been if the
administr ative practices described above were to continued.
Green' s recollection of the situation in South Davis is embellished by
two l etters fo und scattered among old papers in the office of the Davis County
Agent.

The first in time is from a group calling its elf the South Davis Water

Users Protecti ve As sociation, to the Sta te Engineer.

1

They complain that

. recent practice of t he State Engineer in gra nting temporary permits fo r new
we lls constitutes a threat to the water right of prior appropriators.

The

group say they cannot a ccept the argument that a temporary permit will prove
whether or not ex isting a rtesia n rights are being violate d and, the refore, contribute to more efficient development of the groundwater resource . In the
first place, t here a re too many new wells for the Engineer's test to be conclusive. One well probably does not have much e ffe ct on prior appropriators,
but several a re bound to have an effect.
appropri ator has no recourse .

1

In that ci rcumstance the prior

He can prove that his artesian pressur e is

Merrill Parkin, Secretary to Ed. H. Watson, August 5, 1946.
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going down, but he cannot identify the villain . Furthermore, temporary
permits tend to become permanent.

It is hard to tell a man he will have to

plug a well when he has just gone to the expense of drilling it, a nd the
petitioners doubt that the State Engineer has the intestinal fortitude to do it.
It is better to grant no temporary permits, they say.

Consider each applica-

tion on its own merits and in light of any challenges to it.

The petitioners

acknowledged that State law permitted the issuance of temporary permits,

1

if the State Engineer believes there is unappropriated water and no likelihood
of impairing existing rights. Nevertheless, they assert , we know that our
underground basin is already over-appropriated from our own experience , and
we have the support of a study by the U.S. Geological Survey.

(This was 1946,

and the Thomas and Nelson investigation was not published until 1948. )

2

The othe r letter is dated 6 months later and expr esses the atitutde of
Bountiful City Council towards the petition described in the previous paragraph:
It is the opinion of the City Council that it is the office and duty of

the State Engineer to report and act upon findings in the underground
water basin and that it would be foolish for him, or any other individual or group to issue statements or make demands, until a ll the
facts a r e presented. That is the purpose of the underground water
survey now being conducted by the U.S. G. S. and in which the City of
Bountiful and the County of Davis are participating. To ask the State

1
2

They ci te Section 100-3- 5 of the 1943 Utah Code.

rnformants at the State Capitol said that most of the investigati ve
work for Thomas and Nelson report was done by Thomas and Ray Massell in
the early forties.
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Engineer to refuse to consider new applications for water in one
part of the basin, when there are at least 8 second feet running to
waste in another part, would seem to us rather inconsistent. 1
This exchange does support the idea that there was a real concern over water
shortage in South Davis, but it also demonstrates that at least some people
viewed it as an irrational phobia.
The South Davis "water crisis" of the 1940's was, therefore, a
judicial creation, but did impose some real costs.

The problem was not a
2

shortage of water, however. Veteran well drillers have apparently never
experienced a drying up of the groundwater resource, and they have a very
good idea of where to drill and what to expect.

3

J. S. Lee, now retired, says

it is possible to get a good well in almost any region of Utah, including the
desert floor.

(That does not mean any given 4 x 4 spot, of course.) Efficient

1
wilfred H. Williams, Recorder, to DeLore Nichols, Davis County
Agent, February 6, 1947.
2
consultants were J. S. Lee and his son, Kenneth, of Salt Lake City,
J. Virgil Stoddard of Hooper, and Hugh Wheelock of the consulting firm
Templeton, Linke, and Alsup.
3
Groundwater experts at the State Capitol seem to agree that because
of the retarded development of groundwater studies in Utah, well drillers are
the best source of information about the location and extent of such water.
This advice was given by Ray Marsell and Bob Murdock of the Division of
Water Resources and by Harold Donaldson of the State Engineer's Office.
Well drillers have, individually, important personal knowledge of where and
how to develop a well, but the synthetic services of hydrologists are indispensable to infer from that atomistic knowledge the boundaries and content
of groundwater reservoirs. Thus, Virgil Stoddard recommended Dr. Marsell
for such knowledge, saying that he would like to read Marsell's book himself.
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procedure for those times would have been major efforts in groundwater
research a nd law reform.

More enlightened legal interpretation would have

relieved the anxiety in South Davis while the true extent of its water resources
was being gauged more accurately. Once reasonably complete knowledge of
hydrologic patterns is known, water and land development can proceed on a
piece-meal, incremental basis. In the absence of State action to reform its
laws and explore its water resource, water resource, water development
promoters in Utah have gone to federal agencies for surface water and hydrologic surveys. As Dr. Marsell said in the 1960's, Utah would have virtually
no groundwater information were it not for the U.S. G. S.
While there has been significant progress in hydrologic studies over
the 3 decades since the south Davis "water crisis," the legal interpretation
that caused it is yielding only very slowly. A decision by the State Supreme
Court in 1969 (Louis Wayman, et a!. vs. Murray City Corporation and State
Engineer) endorsed a "rule of reasonableness" in ajudicating disputes over
loss of artesian pressure.

The lower court ruling which was over-turned had

required Murray City to, in effect, guarantee the plaintiff a certain flow of
water from his wells.

This, said the high court, is as unreasonable as to say

that the plaintiff should guarantee the flow of Murray City because they both
tap the same groundwater reservoir.

The action arose out of the fact that the

flow of Murray City's wells had fallen to about 220 gallons per minute from
the 750 gallons per minute to which the City was entitled by established rights.
The City had, therefore, with the permission of the State Engineer, plugged
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its old flowing wells and drilled a new well which produced an excellent now,
but from which it extracted no more than its old right of 750 gallons per
minute. Development of the new well coincided with a noticeable decrement
to the fiow of the plaintiff's wells . To have upheld the lower court decision
would have, in the opinion of Chief Justice Crockett, enforced a penalty on
anyone who took pains to maintain his wells in good condition, since there is
abundant evidence that the grounwater reservoir in question is by no means
fully developed.
While this ruling is a step in the right direction, it does not clear the
way for efficient development of groundwater reservoirs completely. It
applies directly only to action on the part of existing rights holders to preserve
the full amount of those rights, even if the effect of such action may cause discomfort to other rights holders. It does not say that the courts would uphold
the granting of new rights that had an exactly similar effect on old rights
holders . The Chief Justice did cite a decision in Colorado which ruled that
priority of appropriation does not give a right to inefficient means of diversion
(Crockett's emphasis), and did suggest that the court recognized the necessity
of developing groundwaters efficiently for the public benefit.

He made special

note that rights of the individual sometimes must yield to the rights of the
group, and implied that in cases of the kind before him the interest of the State
in making efficient use of its water resources should prevail over protecting
inefficient appropriators from having to pay a share of the cost of State-wide
development.
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Application of this " rule of r easonableness" could solve the problems
of equity involved in more vigorous groundwater development.

Existing well

owners are probably protected by law from suffering an extreme loss of
artesian pressure, but this new ruling seems to open the way to gradual
deve lopment of the groundwater reservoi r toward the point where it becomes
a pumping field.

Nevertheless, as of 1972 no one had brought a suit to test

how far the courts are willing to go in the direction inferred here, and wouldbe groundwater developers appear to be just as intimidated as if nothing had
happened.

1

Basin-Wide Planning and Upper Valley Resentment

Efficient development of a drainage basin requires, among other
things, near-perfect knowledge of the basin 's hydrologic cycle plus legal
authority to g uide the pattern of land use and water diversion.
was enunciated by John Wesley Powell (see Chapter VIII).

That principle

Policies a nd pro-

grams of the State Engineer and the Division of Water Resources (formerly
Water a nd Power Board) have been nudging Utah in the direction of conformity
to that principle.

Utah's Water Conservancy Act was intended to be a major

step in that direction.

2

The conservance districts which the Act provides for

1
This is the observation of Bob Murdock, Utah Division of Water
Resources.
2

section 73-9-1, Chapter 9 of Title 73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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have received the approbation of economists for the flexibility which they
allow in the transfer of water from one use or location to others.

1

Since peak

efficiency requires management of the complete water resource, groundwater
as well as surface, the potential contribution of basin-wide conservancy districts depends to a significant degree on the extent of their investigative and
developmental resources and their authority over water rights. In Utah
those powers are shared among several agencies. Such powers as it does
have have provoked controversy for the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and it has incurred some ill-feeling in efforts to have the sope of its
powers defined.
Proximate reason for the Weber Basin Project was the transfer of
water from the Weber River to parts of the East Shore Area--particularly
South Davis County.

This had to be flood storage water, since all other was

assumed to be appropriated.

Putting storage reservoirs in the mountain

valleys made it possible, by building greater storage than was needed by the
East Shore area, to provide additional water to usable lands in the mountain
valleys. Such lands situated below a reservoir could receive late season
water through pre-existing irrigation company canals.

These areas are

shown in green on the WBP map. The legend calls such spots "irrigated land,

1
Pendse, "Introduction."
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part of which requires additional water." Some new lands might also receive
a water supply, such as in regions below Lost Creek or Causey Reservoirs.

1

All of the green-colored areas are potential beneficiaries of the
project.

2

Some of them would have to receive the benefit by means other than

surface water, since they lie above project reservoirs. Such lands are the
Park City region in the headwaters of East Canyon Creek, Upper Chalk Creek,
Echo Creek, and, in the absence of Larrabee Reservoir, the Rhodes Valley
.
3
regwn.

Precipitation that falls on the upper drainage basin must eventually
find its way to the creeks and river beds, following them down the valleys,
through the canyons and eventually into Great Salt Lake.
the earth as well as over it.

Water moves through

In the absence of man, the saturation of ground-

water aquifers and the rate of evapotranspiration will remain roughly constant as a long-run ave rage.

This means that streamflow at a place like the

mouth of Weber Canyon should be roughly a constant annual average.

When

man interferes with this cycle, by extracting water from streams or aquifers

1

This section and the following one draw heavily on information provided by Wayne Winegar, Secretary- Manager of the WBWCD. An interview in
February 1972 was recorded on tape. A draft interpretation was submitted to
him for correction and comment. A second interview filled in gaps, corrected
inaccuracies, a nd veri fied that interpretations, while not necessarily shared,
were not based on false impressions of what Mr. Winegar said.
2
Not all of them were expected to take water from the WBP, however.
As Figure 2 makes clear, major portions of the East Shore were not in the
Project, since they already had adequate supply facilities .
3

Local road signs refer to this area as Kamas Valley.
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j,,r any

UH<:

wl thin th<: upper basin, he reduces the flow at the mouth of Weber

Canyon by increasing the total evapotranspiration, and dilutes the water by
increasing its biological and mineral content. But the flow is reduced by
much less than the total volume of water that has been used in the upper
basin because some of it seeps back into the stream.
If a man diverts part of a stream for some consumptive, beneficial

use, the doctrine of prior appropriation protects his right to that original
quantity.

When subsequent appropriators drill wells (or divert the stream)

at a point above the prior appropriator, their activity must eventually encroach
on the streamflow to which his original right entitled him.

State law forbids

this, and the State Engineer is empowered to decide when a right is in danger
of being infringed and to disallow any further rights.

1

However, original

rights to surface water were based on the normal stream flow.

Since the river

does not flow at flood stage all year, water rights had to be based on lateseason flows.

This means that flood stage waters were essentially unappro-

priated, and a right to them could be granted to someone willing to provide
storage.

Such a storage facility would make it possible for new rights to be

issued without infringing the rights of prior appropriators.

For the water

extracted by new rights holders could now be replaced out of the flood waters
held in storage above prior appropriators.

1

Thus, even as applied to surface water, the prior appropriation
doctrine guarantees ease of access, or a certain level of energy expenditure,
rather than a certain quantity of water.
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In the context of the Weber Basin Project, this means that storage
in Wanshlp Reservoir makes it possible to iss ue new rights to water in the
Peoa or Oakley area--water which if extracted before such storage existed
would have dried up the river in the area above Coalville.

Pumping new wells

near Oakley still has the effect of reducing the groundwater that would normally
find its way into the river above Coalville, but that water is replaced, and the
streamflow maintained, by the floodwaters stored in Wanshlp Reservoir.
A problem could conceivably arise , however, that existing storage
facilities could not resolve.

No doubt there are several surface water diver-

sion rights of long-standing in the Rhode s Valley area.

The granting of new

rights for wells in this region could conceivably dry up the river in that very
location to the extent that the prior surface rights are infringed.

In such a

case there is no possibility of replacement since there is no storage facility
higher up from which to release wa ter into the river.
Larrabee Reservoir was designed to serve.

This is the function that

The possibility of such a cir-

cumstance has not been lost on residents of the Kamas-Oakley region who do
claim to have lost water to new right holders.

The State Engineer, however,

has ruled that they haven't lost any of the water to which their rights entitled
them.

What they have lost, or could lose if there is more groundwater

development, is ease of access to their water.

This does or will impose real

costs on them, and is an understandable cause for resentment.
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Landowner,; in Hhode,; Valley mw5t pay the WBWCD's 1 mill lev/ on
the assessed value of their land; there is no storage reservoir above them ,
and they co uld face increased costs of water diversion as a consequence of
the Weber Bas in Proj ect.

Nevertheless, if the State Engineer's measurements

are r easonably accurate , the exist ence of downstream flood storage does increase t he amount of wate r available for diversion in this upper valley . If
an increment to available supply was not really needed, on the other hand, the
WBP repr esents a needle ss expense to Valley residents . In that respect,
they are not worse off than other taxpayers in the Basin, however,

2

If Larrabe e Reservoir (Fi gure 1) had been constructed as planned,

and its cost spread over the entire basin (falling most heavily on urban residents of the East Shore--see Chapter VI) , farmers in Rhodes Valley might be
happier,

They would then have an obvious increment to surface supplies and

would never have to wo rry about increased diversion costs (i.e. , drilling and
pumping). While this might have advantages for favored individuals (Rhodes
Valley fa rmers), however , it would be a foolis ly expensive way of developing
a water s upply eq ui vale nt to what may be had via groundwater development.

1

This levy is one of the District's principal revenues; it is considered
at le ngth in Chapter XI.
2
An attribu te of the WBWCD whi ch causes some understandab le but
unjustifiable resentment is the fact of its holdover storage, according to
Winegar. It is able to provide a better supply to its cus tomers than is avai lable to senior rights holders, yet its rights are of the lowest priority.
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Furthermore, as the next section demonstrates, it is far from certain that
Larrabee would in fact dissipate resentment of the WBP in this valley.
The idea of Larrabee Reservoir has an esthetic appeal to proponents
of water conBervation and hydrologic efficiency. It would constitute a
satisfying element in the water hustler's quest to develop every drop of water
for beneficial use.

1

Rex Greenhalgh of the Bureau' s Salt Lake office said

that Larrabee was one of his favorite features of the whole Project.

2

Below Wanship Reservoir, valley lands along the Weber are clear
beneficiaries of the WBP.

More water than before is available to them, at a

heavily subsidized price.

(Winegar says the average cost of water developed

by the Project is $8.00 per acre foot.

The repayment assessment to irriga-

tion users, however, is only $1. 10 in Summit County, and $1. 40 in Morgan
and upper Weber counties.) Most of the new water developed for upper valleys
is a late season supplement to lands already irrigated.

Because of the short-

ness of the growing season, there is some question that it was needed.

3

Summit County residents generally do not hold warm feelings for the
WBWCD. Wayne Winegar attributes a major share of their resentment to the
increased precision of water use measurement which has accompanied the

1
see Chapters IX and X.
2
3

Greenbalgh, interviewed in 1969.

This is the opinion of Frank Haws. Sluggish sales of the water
reinforce this view.
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creation of a water conse rvancy district.
car e ful meas urement.

Efficient management requires

Winegar says that one of the conseque nces may be that

water users are held to the amount of their right, whereas they have been
accustome d to lavish and unrestricted use.

This interpretation is consistent

with the water hustler's credo that water is scarce and drought imminent. It
implies a need for conservation and efficient use.

Frank Haws doubts that

water measurements (a function of the State Engineer) since 1950 are significantly more accurate than they were before the WBWCD commenced operation.
Whatever its r e al source may be, Summit County resentment of the District
and the P roject does not appear to be based on economi c loss, such as can
be shown for Ogden City, for example .

1

Similar feelings prevail in the upper valley of the Ogden Ri ver, wi th
even less apparent reason.

Causey Reservoir , high on the South Fork of

Ogden River, provides the WCD with 7, 000 a. f. of a nnual storage.

The WBP

replaced an old canal with the new Ogden Valley Canal which extends from its
dive rsion point on the river across the valley to Eden.

The irrigation water,

provide d at $1.40 per a. f. repayment, has m ade a significant contribution to
lands served by the canal.
not to be .

There is no complaint over the price.

There ought

The reservoir and canal cost over $6 million and develops only

6 , 000 a . f. of irrigation water to be sold at $1.50 per a. f. , plus 1, 000 a . f. of
M&l water to be sold at $15. Over 60 years, total repayment at this rate will

1
see Chapter VI.
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by only $1,404,000 . In spite of this subsidy, the old residents of Ogden
Valley are r esentful instead of gr ateful.

The WBP dedication was held in

Ogden Valley, and as major beneficiaries of it, a considerab le turnout of
local r esidents was expected.

Only a handful appeared.

Before the Burea u would begin constructing any portion of the WBP,
it insisted on having a certain proportion of long-term contracts for the water

to be developed.

A few years later, when the Project was nearing completion,

Ogden Valley farmers complained that they had been sold too much water, a nd
asked to be released from part of their contractua l obligation. By this time,
the r eside ntia l potential of the valley was becoming apparent and the Conservancy District indicated a willingness

1

to rewrite some contracts if the

petitioners would make formal application to the Board of Directors . Apparently this flexible attitude satisfied the protesters, a nd none made application to be released from part of his obligation. In 1970, the WCD declared all
irrigation water in Causey to be sold , reserving the remainder for M&I contracts, which are increasingly in demand.

At the present time, only 300 a. f.

of M&I water is left to be sold.
From the facts above , it seems reasonable to conclude tha t Causey
Rese rvoir and Ogden Valley Canal have been a clear benefit to valley land
owners and residents.
e rvoir.

Available surface water is augmented by Ca usey Res-

Grounrl water can now be developed at elevatio ns where it previously

1
Based on the expectation of higher revenues from residential contracts.
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would have infringed prior rights, because of the possibility of replacement
with former waste waters stored in Causey and Pineview reservoirs.

Be-

cause Pineview is a large reservoir, and because the lower basin has surplus water, the WCD naturally wishes to replace as much groundwater as
possible out of Pineview.

This could lead to a complaint similar to that

expressed in Rhodes Valley, were it not for the existence of Causey Reservoir.
With Causey in place far above any projected areas of settlement, any threat
that groundwater extraction above Pineview might infringe older surface rights
in the same region is immediately quelled by the ce rtainty that replacement
water is ready and waiting.

Tims, Ogden Valley water users not only have a

considerably enhanced water supply, but also every reason to consider it a
very secure one.

Furthermore, it is there by virtue of a substantial transfer

payment from other water users of the Weber Basin, and the U.S. Government.
However, they are neither grateful nor contented . And in spite of the
safeguards recited above, the ostensible issue is replacement of water granted
to new rights holders, according to Winegar.

They claim their water is being

sold out from under them--water that ca nnot be replaced by means of the
Ogden Valley Canal.

This is not very consistent with their protest of a few

years ago that they had been sold too much water.

They profess to believe

that more r ights to water will be granted than is ava ilable in their part of the
basin . If the State Engineer's Office and the courts perform their proper
function, this is an irrational fear.

Because of Causey Reservoir, they do not
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even sta nd to lo se by in creased diversion costs (drilling a nd pumping), as may
happen in Rhodes Valley.
It may be that th e real source of resentment is the suburba ni zation of

Ogden Valley.

Both Causey and Pineview reservoirs add to the attraction of

the Valley as a residential area, as does the availability of ampl e subsidized
water to residential lots.

Winegar says that when old rights holders in the

Valley are reminded of the ways in which they are subsidi zed by the WBP,
they pass it off as an unintended bonus.

They profess to believe, he says,

that Causey Reservoir was created specifically as a fish , game, and recreation resource.
Whatever its source, Ogden Valley resentment of the WBP does not
appear to stem from direct economic losses to individuals that are attri butable
to the Project.

Water is clearly abundant in this valley, as it is in upper

va lleys of the Weber.

WBWCD delivery contracts in Ogden Valley have

exceeded expectations, and not much was expected in Summit County.

Upper

valleys of the Basin are, therefore, not a subject for serious conce rn from
the viewpoi nt of either water scarcity or sluggish sales (the perspective of
Appendices I and III.

Resentment in the East Shore Area

Municipalities in the East Shore area have not been anxious to buy
their incremental culi nary water supplies from the Conservancy District.
They have preferred to drill their own wells, where possible . The reason
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given most frequently by municipal officers for this preference (next to price)
is fear of being dependent on a centralized organization that is dependent in
turn on an aqueduct, tunnel, and dams.

"Where would we be," they ask, "if

some of those facilities were to fail?" Winegar's response is that this has
already happened, but that few people were aware of it. In 1971, for example,
the Gateway Canal and Tunnel and the treatment plants were closed down for
6 weeks while fractures in the canal were repaired.

The District's delivery

commitments were fulfilled by pumping water from its eight deep wells in the
East Shore area.

1

Winegar claims that more irrigation water is not sold in the East
Shore area partly because farmers are not ve ry good cost and utility calculators. Several farmers have expressed an interest in more water than they
can get from their irrigation company, he says, but refuse to buy it from the
WBWCD because they feel the price is too high. Winegar responds by taking
the potential client through an alternative cost calculation, based on the fact
that they own marketable shares in their irrigation company--a capital value
on which they are getting no interest. By this means he can demonstrate that
water from the WCD costs less than what they are already paying. It is not an
argument that wins him many sales. Probably the Conservancy District's

1
while Winegar cites the wells as a counterargument to municipal
sales resistance, they are not a subject that supporters of the WBP should find
comfortable to explore thoroughly with critics. As will be seen in the next
section, they provide best evidence of the redundancy and high cost of the WBP,
as well as the arbitrary and inequitable way in which it is being financed.
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requirement of a 60-year contract is the real deterrent.

Why make a commit-

ment to 60 years of payments when the extra water may not be wanted 10
years from now? This is a perspective which water hustlers cannot entertain,
for to them it is axiomatic that water will be even scarcer tomorrow than it is
today.
There are several irrigation companies that could serve residences
built right next to the company ditch (the 1-acre, semirurallot) if only they
had the extra water to sell.

Winegar says there are a great many such poten-

tial customers, but they cannot get water because companies refuse to contract with the WBWCD for the necessary supply.
commitment as their reason.

They cite the long-term

Winegar points out to them that the potential

new customers are willing to buy shares in the company, pay the same assessment as old customers, even sign long-term contracts.

The company could

then use the money received from sale of new shares to improve the quality of
service to its old customers.
company will do it.

Everyone would be better off. But not one

This example, and the one of the previous paragraph

suggest that East Shore residents in general do not share the water hustlers'
conviction that water is running out.

They buy houses on long-term mortgages,

as a hedge against inflated costs, but apparently are not convinced that water
is a nonrenewable resource whose price can only go up.

That is, popular

opinion seems to accord with the view taken he re that water is still a free good .
Original plans of the WBWCD called for purchase of Mill and Barton
creeks, consistent with the objective of macroscopic basin management for

239

hydrologic efficiency.

Negotiations were proceeding as planned, and the deal

about to b" consummated, when rights holders abruptly changed their minds
and sold the streams to the City of Bountiful.

Bountiful has ever since held

them in reserve, and Winegar is not aware of any beneficial use that has been
made of them.

1

WBWCD management has attempted to re-negotiate the issue

from time to time, without success.

Winegar regards this attitude as dog-in-

the-manger, citing the remark of a Bountiful attorney: "We might make a deal
with the WCD if the District can guarantee that none of the water from the
Bountiful creeks will ever be used in Centerville . " This attitude is anathema
to water specialists, who are committed professionally to hydrologic efficiency. The purpose of large management organizations like conservancy districts is to shift water around from where it is not wanted to where it is,
and back again if occasion demands (or, as economists might say, from lower
to higher uses).

Pragmatic water users, from the perspective of self-or

narrowly defined group interest-may be justified in taking the cautious view
that once used in another place, water is a hard thing to get back.

Water

hustlers cannot consistently fault them for this, for it has been the standard
line of Utah water promoters when speaking of Utah's rights to the Colorado
River vers us its actual use by California.

1
Depending on the price offered by the WBWCD, this may have been a
perfectly rational decision. It would make no sense to sell the creeks and buy
water at arbitrary high prices from the District.
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Winegar sees a dog-in-the-manger a ttitude also in the failure of some
irrigation companies to shut down their canals during prolonged rainy periods.
By diverting water through their canals that runs unused to the sink, they are
reducing the quantity of floodwaters available to be trapped in WBP reservoirs . This is, of course, inconsistent with conservation and hydrologic
efficiency.

(The WBWCE always shuts off its canals during a rain.) The

companies do have rights to the water they waste in this way.

Because of the

limited size of their reservoirs they cannot store water for late season delivery.

They gain nothing by dumping and flushing their reservoirs in tbis

fashion, but neither would they lose anything by shutting off their diversion
works once reservoir was filled. If they gain anything at all, it can only be
the satisfaction of knowing they have diverted a flow of water that would have
gone to the WCD.
Winegar acknowledges that people in this area have long been accustomed to using water lavishly--a partial explanation for what appears above,
through his eyes, as pure meanness and antisocial behavior. He cites, as
an example, an experience of the U&I Sugar Company.

The Company has a

large water right, and offers water to its client farmers on an annual rental
basis. For a long time, however, it had trouble getting paying customers.
The problem was found to lie with ditchmasters employed by irrigation companies.

As long as the companies ' shareholders were getting their full right,

the ditchmasters would pay no heed to anyone who took water not his own.

Few

farmers were interested in paying U&I Sugar for water they could take for free .
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Ditch control was tightened and the Company is now renting successfully.
This example is not suggestive of scarcity, but of the necessity of exerting
an unusual effort to contrive scarcity so that the product may command a
positive price. It is certainly symptomatic of an easy attitude toward water,
an attitude which ardent water conservationists and developers abominate.
The examples of this section and of the previous one are all consistent
with the perspective of water abundance.

The Conservancy District is com-

mitted to the ideal of hydrologic efficiency, of water conservation.

This ideal

necessarily entails a significant degree of centralized, macroscopic control
(true of technological development in general). Residents of the Weber Basin
are suspicious of big, remote government, and they know the Conservancy
District to have close connections with Washington, D. C.

They resent its

attempts to control Basin water resources, and clearly do not feel a need for
more water that is sufficiently acute to be worth submission to central direction.

Winegar attributes their resentment to precise measurement of water

rights and use. It seems more probable that the real source of resentment
is the implication of central planning and control that measurement represents. When water is abundant, why bother with big, bureaucratic organiztions to ration it? In other words, the Weber Basin does not heed hydrologic
efficiency, water specialists to the contrary notwithstanding.
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Hydrologic Efficiency and the East Shore
Groundwater Controversy

All available evidence suggests that the extent of groundwater
resources in the East Shore area was poorly understood at the time the Weber
Basin Project was authorized.
~

dueled as

Major groundwater investigations were con-

of the Project, with consequences as reported in Chapter III.

Initial planning projected minor well development, to be used solely for local
irrigation.

1

The Bureau of Reclamation would hardly have premised the

financial feasibility of the WBP on M&I sales (as it most definitely did--see
Chapter VI) if it had known in advance the potential for well development.
Once the program of investigative drilling was underway, however,
the evidence was apparently very clear.

"In 1954, when the District realized

the threat of these wells to the sale of their [sic] own water, it petitioned the
state for the right to draw 330 c. f. s. from the ground in an effort to tie up the
remaining unappropriated water. "

2

District and Bureau management must

have been truly alarmed, for 330 c. f. s. is the equivalent of almost 240,000
a. f. per year--roughly the same figure as the projected surface supply to be
developed by the entire Weber Basin Project!

(See Chapter V and Appendix

ll.) By 1960 municipalities were into the act, and found they could develop

1

see S. Doc. 147. Also Merrill K. Ridd, "A Conservancy District
in the Great Basin," a research proposal submitted to the Ford Foundation in
1960, p. 7. Mimeographed copy in files of the State Engineer.
2

Ridd, p. 9.
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groundwate r for about one-quarter the price of District water, "often taken
from the ground water basin at or near the same point. "

1

The District's 1954 effort to appropriate groundwater was not in vain
altho ug h not entirely successful either.

The State Engineer approved thirty

wells at that time, to be developed as part of the Weber Basin Project.

2

But

the Engineer's Office refused to acknowledge the District's claim to be manager of all unappropri ated water in the basin.

3

Utah water rights have been

premised on beneficial use since the days of Brigham Young.

The beneficial

use principle was designed to prevent monopolizing by prior appropriators
with greedy intentions.

The State Engineer applied the principle to ihe Con-

servancy District: it will be granted rights only to such unappropriated
waters as it can demonstrate physical capacity to control for beneficial use.
Apparently the management of the WBWCD in its first decade of
operation viewed the Conservancy District as a kind of water czar , or in more
self-serving terminology, the arbiter of efficient allocation . Such an idea
does follow from the principle of hydrologic efficiency within drainage basins,
as advocated by John Wesley Powell.

Furthermore, the WBP has been touted

as the last word in water development for the basin: the frequently announced

1

fbi d.

2

"Reclamation Bureau Airs Well Program, " Deseret News, 0
February 1961.
3

rn 1974 the District had eight deep wells in operation, with a combined capacity of 48. 1 c. f. s. By that ratio, thirty wells would produce 180
c. f. s .
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objective of its promoters, in and out of the Bureau was to bring every drop
of unappropriated water under control for beneficial use. It was to be government by drainage basin, so far as water was concerned, as Major Powell bad
urged (see Chapter VIII). An ardent water hustler like E. J. Fjeldsted, first
Secretary-Manager of the District, would have viewed this kind of political
power as the benign use of modern technology in the service of progress and
a better life for all. Had it not been for the groundwater embarrassment, this
image might have been more salable.
As events transpired, the District made a grab for the newly discovered groundwater. It was a rational action, from the perspective of its
own financial solvency, and was not inconsistent with long-held tenets of hydrologic efficiency. But under the circumstances it looked greedy, unwarranted,
and ominously autocratic.

Furthermore, the District was understandably

reluctant to divulge the real reason why it felt such an acute desire to control
the abundant groundwater. Its management problems would be increased
several fold if the details of financing the WBP became widely understood.

1

The willingness of urban residents to pay for the Project would not be enhanced
by the discovery that it was a grossly expensive facility to provide water that
might have been developed at a ridiculous fraction of the cost, via pumped
wells. The Project's operators could hardly a dmit that they needed a

1

For details see Chapter VI, and Appendix IV.
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monopoly on groundwater in order to repay construction costs.

The best

they could do was try to bluff basin residents and the State by speaking in
lofty tones about conservation and efficie ncy.

There is little doubt that their

ultimate aspiration of hydrologi c efficiency has its virtues, but their shortrun necessity was nasty, monopolisti c power, nonetheless.
Under E. J. Fjeldsted's leadership, the District was aggressive in
pursuit of hitherto unappropriated waters.

It tried to buy streams; it applied

for well development rights; it tried to block municipalities from developing
their own well-water supplies.

By 1961 the District and the Project were on

the way toward an unsavory reputation with city managers--probably due in
large measure to somewhat desperate efforts to cope with the dilemma posed
by the newly discovered groundwater.

Its protest of a well application by

Clearfield raised so much indignation that the protest was withdrawn.
did it," Fjeldsted explained to Bountiful City Council,

1

"We

''because a survey

shows there is between 25,000 and 30,000 acre feet of available water on the
Wasatch front.

2

lf we go beyond this, we will be mining water--taking it

from others, who now have an established right." That is the orthodox line of

1
Reported in the Davis County Clipper, 10 February 1961.
2
compare this to the 240,000 a . f. of groundwater for which Ridd
claimed the District petitioned in 1954, and to the thirty wells (approximate
capacity, 180,000 a.f.) which were approved.
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water hustlers, but is obviously lame (and most likely mendacious) in this
1
application --a frustrating retreat.
As a result of this confluence of errors and gaffes, basin residents
and state officials were becoming aware of another side of the situation, which
was no l ess unsatisfactory.

Not only was the Conservancy District trying to

claim governmental powers in the basin, a thrust which could be parried with
relative ease, but it was also a stalking-horse for the federal government. As
Fjeldsted told the Bountiful City Council, "the District does not own a drop of
water. It does not have the money. All the water belongs to the federal
government.

If the water rights in this area are not bought by Bountiful, or

some other local group , they will be purchased by the government , not the
district. "

2

F jeldsted a dded, however, that "when the system is paid for, the

district could own the water if it wants to, and if Congress agrees. No one
has ever asked for the water because they would have to bear all maintenance
costs . "
If reported accurately, Fjeldsted's statement is a slight distortion ,

but it certainly makes admirable use of the bad news to support his own
position. Since Utah water rights are premised on capacity to control for
beneficial use, the Bureau of Reclamation has the rights in the Weber Basin

1

Contrast it to the 1959 testimony of F. M. Warnick, included in
Appendix IV, for example.
2

navis County Clipper.
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case because it owns the facilities.

Once the facilities are paid for by

Project beneficiaries, it is reasonable to expect that possession of rights
would pass to them also.

However, the Bureau has always taken a very

paternalistic view toward its projects, and there are few, if any, cases where
it has actually turned the project over to its users once fully paid for.
This implies that hydrologic efficiency, if pursued with the assistance
of Major Powell's offspring, the Bureau of Reclamation, entails some surrender of state autonomy to an agency of the federal government.

The prac-

tice of water management by drainage basin, as enunciated by Powell and
asserted by Fjeldsted, can conflict with the objective of a State Water Plan if
the water control facilities are built by the Bureau.

Planning implies a

preference for efficiency, but planners may disagree on the objective that is
to be pursued efficiently.

The WBWCD is locked into a preference for

revenue maximization because of its contract with the Bureau. As Pendse
a nd others have observed , this objective is not necessarily shared by State
and basin planners.
Major Powell argued that the residents of hydrologic basins should
manage their own affairs, water included, cooperatively.

His ideological

heirs, probably in honest pursuit of this same goal, have succeeded in
wresting water control away from local groups, away from drainage basins,
away even from states, and have placed it in the hands of a federai bureaucracy.

In retarded and perturbed recognition of this fact, State government
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has put forward an interpretation of its Water Conservancy Act that is quite
different from t he one held by old-line water evangelists like Fjeldsted.

1

1
one of these old-line evangelists was John A. Widtsoe, who freely
and unashamedly a cknowledged that "life under the ditch" entailed a significant
degree of regimentation and surrender of individual liberty. In his view the
potential rewards were well worth it. See reference to his contributions to
Utah water development in Chapter X.
Fjeldsted retired as cheif executive officer of the WBWCD in 1964,
and was succeeded by Wayne Winegar. Although he hews to the officia l
orthodoxy of water hustlers that water is scarce and dessi cation imminent,
Winegar is less dogmatic, and even admits in private that the East Shore could
have survived without the WBP. His more flexible attitude probably had significance for his appointment after Fjeldsted's outwardly autocratic policies
had won some enmity for the WBWCD among its intended clients. This conjecture is reinforced by Fjeldsted's opinion in 1969 that Winegar would not
remain long at the helm of the WBWCD. "Its merely a stepping-stone for
him; he's a politician, not a dedicated water man." (Personal communication.)
Winegar's personal interpretation of circumstances significant to
the WBP were e licited in a 1972 interview, the transcription of which he later
checked for general accuracy: "In the days immediately prior to authorization of the WBP, there was a genuine and widel y recognized need for more
water in south Davis County. It's true there were flowing wells, but they were
flowing less freely than in earlier days, and many people had been forced to
pump their wells. Well technology was backward , and existing wells were
mostly of very small diameter. The population had been growing, contributing
to the apparent draw-down of the water table. In spite of this growth, however,
population was then only one-third of its present level--but a large proportion
of family heads were farmers. In the 1930's there were two rural wards in
Woods Cross, both of them consisting almost entirely of farm families . There
are now only two commercial farms in that district. The movement out of
farming was caused more by higher costs and greater land requirements than
by scarcity of water. Furthermore, the change from an agricultural to a
residential area has probably contrib uted to a net decline in water requirements. The change in land use patterns was not foreseen, however, and there
was real concern to find more water for agriculture and for expected urban
growth. Had the r e been no importation of water, the district may have been
able to support its present urban population with water rel eased from a
declining agriculture, but it would have been a marginal support. Water would
have been scarce a nd expensive, making south Davis a much less attr active
.place to live. "
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Dallin Jensen, legal counsel to the State Engineer's Office says that
a water conservancy district is just another water company licensed under
state law for a particular purpose. Its water rights are granted only on the
basis of a petition to the State Engineer, using the same criteria as apply to
a ll other petitioners. A conservancy district is not superior in water rights
to any other water user organization. It cannot interpose itself between other
users and the State Engineer, as the Weber Basin District tried to do in asking
for rights to all unappropriated waters. A conservance district, says Jensen,

1

has no authority to dictate to the State Engineer in respect of water rights. It
is just another canal company with water to sell from company reservoirs.
What is unique about conservancy districts, in Jensen's view, is that
they are the only kind of water users association with legal authority to
negotiate repaym ent contracts with the federal government for the construction
of large water supply projects that are beyond the capacity of local resources.
That is, the chief purpose of conservancy districts, as the Assistant Attorney
General interprets the Water Conservancy Act, is to provide a means for local
groups (as opposed to the state government) to enter direct contracts with the
Bureau of Reclamation . To revise the conclusion of the preceding paragraph
s lightly, a conservancy district is a canal company whose water right is based
on such expensive storage and diversion facilities that it has to incur a

1
n allin W. Jensen is an Assistant Attorney General. He was interviewed at his office in the State Capitol in October 1969. His writings on State
water law were also cons ulted and are cited where appropriate .
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three-generation debt (well over 90 years in the case of the Weber Basin
Project) to have them built.
To protect the future of its water development activities after the
first 2 decades of experience showed Reclamation to have a shaky economic
foundation,

1

the Bureau has had to devise carefui methods of financial con-

trol. One of these appears to have been the idea of water conservancy districts . Investigations hy civil engineers at Utah State University in recent
years, of wltich the McLean thesis cited in Chapter I is an important product,
have led to the observation that officers of the Bureau of Reclamation practically wrote the water conservancy acts of all the western (Reclamation)
states . Dallin Jensen's interpretation (above) of the Utah Water Conservancy
Act is certainly consistent with tltis assertion. So is the Bureau's confidence
that once its clients sign on the dotted line as a bona fide conservancy district, "we've got 'em. "

2

Rex Greenhalgh expressed that confidence when

interviewed as part of tltis investigation in 1969.

"The Project was built for

residents of the Weber Basin," he said, "and there is no way they can avoid
paying for it. "

1

3

see Chapter IX.

2

Quoted hy Frank Haws, from the investigations described in previous
sentences.
3
creenhalgh is identified in Chapter Ill--a Bureau officer. He was
responding in tltis instance to a direct question about the possibility of a low or
zero price to solve the apparent problem of surplus water in the WBP.
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Thus the pursuit of hydrologic efficiency in the Weber Basin has led
to ridiculous inefficiencies of energy application, and a loss of control over
basin water supply resources by residents of the basin and the state. What
might have happened if Major Powell's prescription of political boundaries by
drainage basin had been foll9wed from the start is an interesting speculative
exercise.

What has in fact occurred seems to be the outcome of two widely

shared goals of occidental peoples, working in opposition to each other. One
of these goals is material progress; the other is individual liberty.

Material

progress is premised inescapably on the expansion of controllable energy
resources and the more efficient use of such resources as exist.
premises imply improvements in technique.
independent of social organization.

These two

Technique is not apart from or

The development of technique and its

application are social functions. If material progress, or even the pursuit
of technology on which it is based, become an overriding goal, then social
organization is significantly constrained by the demands of technique. If the
implicit trade-off between liberty and technological advance is not clearly
recognized and deliberately coordinated (thus planning is itself a constraint
imposed by our state of technological development), the outcome may be a
jumble of contradictions in which neither material progress nor individual
liberty is served effectively or efficiently.

Such seems to have been the out-

come of a combination of water development enthusiasm and conservative state
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government in Utah.

1

If the State government had spent more on investigating

its own water resources it might not have let itself get sucked in so far on
federal goodies and easy time payments, with the result that today it would
have greater control over its own resources and be able to use them at less
expense.

1
rncipient recognition of this problem is reflected in the following
escerpt from the Davis County Clipper article of February 10, 1961, cited
above: "Councilman Kenyon Gurr, who was not present, left his sentiments in
a letter. He believes the city should purchase the canyon streams because no
community has ever had too much water. Future development of the city will
depend on it. The Weber water is the most expensive, and if the district gets
control of all the water it will be even more expensive. Costs multiply when
the federal government is involved, he said. We must keep the federal government from ass uming obligations we should assume ourselves if we are to
slacken the pace down the road to socialism. "
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CHAPTER VIII
THE ROOTS OF AME RICAN PUBLIC RESOURCES POLICY

Preceding chapters have described the Weber Basin Project, and
some details of its operation and management that have attracted the attention
of critics . A partial explanation of why the Project exists in the present form,
with its attendant problems, has been suggested through examination of historical traces from the period of its construction.

The intent of research and

writing has been to identify as accurately as possible the nature and dimensions of such allocation problems as may exist. The endeavor seems to
justify, inter alia, the following general inferences: there is no significant
problem of water scarcity, but there is one of distributing the burden or
repayment for water controlling facilities.

Use of the facilities does not seem

to be pressing on capacity, so that neither water nor control facilities represents a case problem in the use of scarce resources. Any problems
obviously involve the investment decision.

Nevertheless, it cannot be reason-

ably said that the repayment issue has .!!£ effect on the use made of either
Basin water or Project facilities.

The high price of using the WBP certainly

deters its use by municipalities in the East Shore, and encourages the development of redundant facilities.

The fact that WBP facilities were constructed by

the Bureau of Reclamation has given an agency of the federal government control over a large share of the water resource of the Basin--at least until such
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time as the Project is paid for.

This circumstance, which is repeated

several times over in the East Shore alone, as well as in Utah's other drainage basins, presents a major barrier to the implementation of a State Water
Plan.

The state cannot control the use of its own water because a heavy

proportion of the facilities that make control possible are owned by the
federal government. Since it is academic (in the worst sense) to deliberate
over water use in the arid West in the absence of requisite control works,
Utah must live with the fact that it only shares jurisdiction over water use
with the Bureau of Reclamation.
The task for natural resource economics is presumably to prescribe
an efficient policy for this situation, consistent with the definitions of science,
technology, and purposive effort presented in the Introduction.

Chapter XI

will argue that a clear, simple, and scientific prescription for economic
efficiency in the Weber Basin case cannot be found in standard economic
theory.

1

One reason, of course, is that the theoretical premise of scarcity

is missing in this case, or at least that it applies in a fundamentally different
context than theoretical applications normally assume.
in this case was capital.

The scarce resource

Capital was provided out of national resources . The

consequent issue is whether that capital provision was a@ to the State of
Utah (Weber Basin residents in particular) or a loan.

The Bureau of Reclama-

tion insists that it was a loan, but claims the right to operate as if it had been

1

This assertion will be explained in Chapter XI.
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a sale of water rights.

(For reasons that may be inferred from later

chapters , the Bureau may regard itself more like a receiver in bankruptcy.)
The critical point for devising an efficient policy prescription in this case is
that it involves a federal-state conflict over a portion of the national wealth.

1

The conflict is clearly distributive, and is therefore a political issue involving
moral and value judgments.

Chapter XI will argue that natural resource

prohlems similar to the Weber Basin case are not susceptible to clear-cut
prescriptions for efficiency, of the kind implied in the Introduction, but that
they must be analyzed with careful attention to the values that are supposed to
be served by public resource management policies.
intend~

Presumably its designers

program to achieve its policy objective efficiently.

The next three chapters are devoted to support of arguments in the
preceding paragraph.

They will present explanations and evidence for various

policy objectives, at both federal and state levels, that have apparently had an
influence on the Weber Basin case. Chapter XI will draw on this evidence to
argue that natural resource problems of this particular kind are ultimately
ethical and political, and that prescriptions for efficient management policy
cannot be made in isolation from explicit value judgments. Among the sometimes conflicting value systems that have affected water development investments, at least the following will be identified and defined: belief in an

1
It might be argued that the federal interest presumed here is really
the interest of a particular technological interest group--Bureau engineers.
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orderly, knowable, clock-like world in which technological and material
progress are virtually assured, given purposive effort; agrarianism and
equalitarianism; a water-promoting establishment (The Water Hustlers). All
of these disparate elements must be considered in evaluating the effectiveness
of the WBP as a use of public resources.
This is a long chapter and the following three pages are a summary
of its principal arguem nts: Democratic and egalitarian ideals were encouraged
by physical-geographical-economic conditions in colonial times.

The Revolu-

tion was a democratic-egalitarian movement within the colonies as much as it
was a revolt against Government from England . The frontier of virtually free
land through the colonial period and in early republican days fostered expectations of equality that were frustrated when the frontier reached the Great
Plains. Inability of frontiersmen to use the Plains successfully with farming
operations familiar to them contributed to social pressures that culminated in
Civil War. For 2 decades before the war, the Great Plains and Intermountain
Region was looked upon as a great and inhospitable desert, an insurmountable
barrier to the quest of many frontiersmen for freedom and independence .
Frustration and despair gave way, probably due in part to the shaking of
society by civil war, to a period of fresh energy and optimism.

It was partly

justified by the arrival of new technology as railroads opened up the Plains.
But part of the energy and optimism was also based on myth.

People who

desperately wanted cheap land were an easy mark for promoters who told them
the climate of the Plains was changing for the better. At the same time as
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these false hopes were feeding a vigorous expansion into the Plains, John
Wesley Powell and others of his kind (like Mark Twain) were making
methodical and objective assessment of the climate, geography, and resources
of the arid region and coming to conclusions about how it could be most successfully exploited for human use.

There is not enough precipitation in the

region to make all of the land productive, they said. It is therefore necessary
to concentrate what water there is on the best lands by means of irrigation.
This would require special institutions that could hardly be set up after all
the land was alienated in the traditional fashion of homesteading.

Further-

more, Powell warned that current settlement on the eastern Plains was
proceeding on false expectations.
rainfall cycle.

The early 1880's was the wet end of the

He was ignored, of course, but the last half of the 1800's

proved him to be correct, and thousands were driven out of the Plains by
drought and harsh winters . These hardships were accompanied by political
unrest and resentment on the part of the yeoman farmer class against the
powerful and wealthy interests. It was the era of trusts and Populism.
Americans appear to have wanted desperately to believe in the Horatio Alger
myth that anyone could make it big by himself.

The disappearance of free and

unalienated public resources was therefore a severely frustrating event.

The

dream was transformed, under the guidance of Major Powell's imagination,
into a technological utopia that necessarily entailed group action, cooperation,
and solidarity.

Irrigation began to be discussed seriously in the 1890's.
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These strands of aspiration (freedom, independence, equality),
resentment (Populism), frustration (inability to cope witb climate and
geography), and Newtonian faith (belief that science and technology could consquer all) came together in the Progressive Era, and the U.s. Reclamation
Service was born in 1902. Its purpose was to promote the objective of
independent farm steads for vigorous, enlightened, cooperating people by
means of carefully planned and executed feats of engineering prowess. A
critical side effect of Major Powell's vision was to trun most of the arid West
into a perpetual public domain.

People could have homesteads on Reclamation

projects, but they would have to be amenable to cooperation and subject to a
reasonably high degree of control by managers of public resources.

The

United States Department of the Interior was a creation, in large measure, of
John Wesley Powell.

Its purpose was to manage and conserve the natural

resources of the U.S. West in the public interest. Its creation represented
a major turnaround in U.S. policy, away from alienation to the private interest
of whoever came first, and toward management of a community property for
the common good. Would-be exploiters have naturally resisted this policy.
These are important points to keep in mind when evaluating the management
of public resources.
Influence of the Frontier on American Aspirations and
Institutions; the Colonial Period
That egalitarianism and faith in democracy are typical of Americans
seems to be the consensus of historians, sociologists and popular opinion.
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R. A. Billington says no single force bas been more influential in shaping the
distinguishing characteristics of the American people than the westward movement of the frontier.

1

The pattern of frontier expansion was explorers and adventurers first,
speculators and squatters next, then substantial farmers followed by their
suppliers--merchants, lawyers, millers, editors, etc.
merged with settled lands to the east.

The frontier then

One thing the pioneers shared in com-

mon was a weakness for the lure of adventure or the magnet of opportunity.
"Self-improvement, economically or socially was the incentive that lured
most men westward, and the hope of self-improvement bas bulked large in the
American dream from that day to this." Most who answered the urge lived
close to the frontier.

They wanted homes of their own but could not afford to

buy in settled areas.
Experience at Jamestown (1607) proved to colonizers that they could
not force men to work in the same way was at home, where people were
abundant and land scarce. Workers refused to labor on company farms as
servants to produce things just because they were wanted at home in England.
Production improved when 50-acre private plots were offered as an incentive.
"Thus did Englishmen respond to the frontier environment by recognizing that

1
Ray Allen Billington, The Westward Movement in the United States
(Pri nceton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Anvil Books, 1959).
Unless otherwise noted, the points in this section are due to Billington.
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individual enterpris e provided the best inducement for workers in areas where
natural resources were abundant [my emphasis], and that land grants were the
surest magnets to attract settlers."
The first East-West conflict on record came to a head in Bacon's
Rebellion in 1676.

Poor tobacco farmers along the Virginia fall line bitterly

resented the refusal of relatively affluent tidewater planters to let them have a
voice in government or church. Besides suffering this social and political
snobbery, poor farmers were forbidden by the government from expanding
further west into lndian lands.

Nathaniel Bacon led the ensuing revolt. It

was savagely repressed, according to Billington, but the spirit lived on.
Turner says that several times from then until1776, small landowners, newer
immigrants, and indentured servants rose up against entrenched interests.

1

The pattern of settlement was different in New England . Instead of
behaving individualistically, the Puritans were forced by physical conditions
to cooperative effort.

They laid out communities a nd built towns in an orderly

pattern of settlement featuring group effort and fairly rigid, Puritan control.
Profits were subordinated to the perpetuation of God's true faith.

But strong

though religious ties may have been "frontiersmen able to profit by exploiting
nature's riches could never be kept in check." The thin and rocky soil of New

1

F. J. Turner, "The Frontier in American History,'' in The

Historian's History of the United States, Vol. I, eds. A. S. Berky and J. P .
Shenton (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1966), pp. 462-473.
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England was all that made the Puritans content with "sell- sufficiency and
salvation in lieu of wealth. "

1

By the mid-1700's, however, "the acquisitive

instinct so usual on all frontiers" disrupted even the well-disciplined Puritan
church.

People would no longer hold to the town plan, but began speculating

in land.
Expansion into the West disrupted colonial harmony from North to
South, according to Billington.

The Westerners were

arrogantly aware of their ability to tame stubborn nature and hence
sure of their superiority over the rest of mankind. Democratic,
poverty-ridden and infinitely proud, the frontiersmen looked on
easterners as grasping aristocrats whose control of the colonial
legislatures threatened the natural development of American
civilization. 2
Land acts in 1800 and 1804 were passed by Congress in response to western
pressure.

They allowed the purchase of a minimum of 60 acres of public

domain at $2 per acre, one quarter down. It was, therefore, possible to buy
a farm for $80 .

This is when "doing a land office business" entered the

national vocabulary.

In 1820, eastern pressures forced an abandonment of

credit, but a compromise lowered the price to $1. 25 a nd the minimum

1
Billington, p. 17. The parallel with early Utah experience is
striking. Brigham Young, an old New Englander himsell, enforced a rigid,
disciplined, cooperati ve effort. But the mining frontier a nd the railroads
eventually put so much pressure of individual opportunity on the system that
the Church reversed its self-sufficiency and salvation policy and gave its
blessings to the acquisitive e thic of the 19th ce ntury. The Utah pattern of
settlement was also very similar to what Billington describes for New England.
See Lowri Nelson, The Mormon Village.
2

Billington, p. 21.
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purchase to 80 acres, so that one could still buy a fann for only $100. " Good
lands, easily secured, were the magnets that drew men westward.''
Billington makes this significant observation about the socioeconomic
system of the old south: great planters, with an average of 1, 000 acres and
fifty slaves, dominated social and political life, yet were never more than
3 percent of the free population. Far below them were small planters who
owned a few slaves and toiled beside them endlessly. They made up 20 percent of the free population.

The other 77 percent were yeoman farmers (no

slaves) and poor whites, relegated to poor lands that no one else wanted.
"Despite their miserable, culturally barren lives, they were the staunchest
defenders of the slave system, for all dreamed futilely of becoming great
planters themselves when fortune smiled at last." The dream and the situation appear to be persistent.

Lundberg said in 1968 that most Americans

today are peasants, but cling to the romantic notion that they are incipient
capitalists.

1

Billington concluded that two social orders were spawned by the

westward moving frontier: one was dedicated to an aristocratic, rigid class
structure and an inhuman labor system; the other to human equality, social
mobility, and political democracy.

The outcome of the Civil War was

presumably a victory for the latter of these attitudes.

1
Ferdinand Lundberg, The Rich and the Super Rich (New York:
Bantam Books, 1969).
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Political Attitudes in the Revolution

J. F. Jameson noted that the Revolution was not just a political
maneuver to take the seat of government away from London and transfer it to
Philadelphia.

1

That may have been the original intent of some of the aristo-

cratic colonialists who supported it, but Jameson demonstrated that the
Revolution was taken over by more radical leveling elements as it became
more boradly based.

This is the natural history of revolutions, says Jameson,

and cites the English Revolution of the 19th century, the French Revolution of
the 18th, and the Russian Revolution of the 20th.

In each of these, the lead

was initially in the hands of moderate statesmen but moved rapidly through
s uccessive stages in which control was exercised by a group more radical and
extreme than its predecessors.
In 1774, the partisans of American independence were very few, says
Jameson, although in the years after 1776, they were the great majority.
Tories either left the country or conveniently changed their minds.

The

principal secret of Whig success was that they tended to be younger men and
more fired by ardor and enthusiasm for their cause than were the older conservatives for theirs:

1
J. Franklin Jameson, "The American Revolution Considered as a
Social Movement," in The Historian's History of the United States, eds. A. S.
Berky and J. P. Shenton (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1966). Jameson
was considered "a sage without peer among historians " long before his death
in 1937.
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All things considered, it seems clear that in most states the
strength of the revolutionary party lay most largely in the plain
people as distinguished from the aristocracy. It lay not in the
mob or rabble, for American society was overwhelmingly rural
and not urban, . . . but in the peasantry, substantial and energetic
though poor, in the small farmers and frontiersmen. • . . [I]n
the main we must expect to see our social changes tending in the
direction of levelling democracy. 1
Elevation of whole classes of people to the status of voters through expansion
of suffrage e levated them also in social status. "American society in the
colonial period had a more definite and stable organization than it ever bas
had since the Revolution. " James on quotes several contemporaries on the
effects of the Revolution, all bewailing the repression of the artistocratic
spirit and the deficient qualifications of people who had moved into government
positions.

"In our high republican times there is more levelling than ought to

be, consistent with good government. "
A sense of social change pervaded the country. Jameson cited a
writer in South Carolina:
There is nothing more common than to confound the terms of the
American Revolution with those of the late American war. The
American war is over, but this is far from being the case with the
American Revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of
the great drama is closed. 2
There was a popular sentiment in favor of equality in the ownership of land,
and a widespread recognition that slavery was inconsistent with the ideals of
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the revolution.

The Revolution was not merely a series of political or

military events, but a levelling in the social structure, a rejection of the
aristocratic, social, political, and ec onomic hierarchy of colonial times in
favor of much more extensive equality.

It was fueled not by a propertyless

proletarian class, but by peasants, small farmers, and frontiersmen whose
ideals we should expect to see eme rging in social institutions after successful
completion of the revolution.
One of the ideals circulating in the intellectual atmosphere of colonial
times was that of natural rights.

One of the rights claimed by westerners,

according to F. J. Turner, was that of a people to establish their own political
institutions in the area they had claimed from wilderness and Indians.

Colonial

frontiersmen denounced the control exercised by landholders of the coast and
demanded possession of the lands they had reclaimed through their own labor.
Their political position was defended in the writings of Tom Paine a nd Thomas
Skidmore ,

1

who based their arguments in turn on philosophical foundations

laid by John Locke.

Resources and their Distribution in the New Republic

According to Adams,

the United States in 1780 possessed an immense

natural wealth and was occupied by a people whose leaders had a vision of the

1

Thomas Skidmore, The Rights of Man to Property (New York: Burt
Franklin, American Classics of History and Social Science Series 3, 1829).
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greatness that was possible for their country but had few of the resources at
hand that were necessary for exploitation of its great opportunity.

1

for the eastern seaboard, it was mostly still an untamed wilderness.

Except
Only

half a million people had penetrated into lands beyond the Allegheny Mountains,
and they "were struggling with difficulties all their own, in an isolation like
that of Jutes or Angles in the fifth century." "Nowhere did eastern settleme nts
touch the western." Communication between the states was as slow and almost
as irreg ula r as in colonial times.

"Nature was rather man8 master than his

servant," and little progress had been made on the problems of physical
geography in the previous 50 years.

They had no adequate waterways, a nd

the experience of Europe suggested it would take centuries of labor to construct a reasonable system of roads and canals.

"No civilized country had

yet been required to deal with physical difficulties so serious, nor did experienee warrant conviction that such difficulties could be overcome." "The
machinery of production showed no radical difference from that familiar to
ages long past." "The backwardness of remote country districts could hardly
be exaggerated," writes Adams, yet even New England, which claimed to be
the most civilized province, was still poor, plagued by filth, disease, and the
ravages of liquid solace after more than 1 1/2 centuries of incessant industry,

1
11enry Adams, "Hi story of the United States of American During the
First Admi ni stration of Thomas Jefferson, in The HistorianS History of the
United States, eds. A. S. Berky and J. P . Shenton (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1966).
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intelligent labor, and pinching economy.

Her population increased very

slow ly. New York was a frontier state, New York City a 100-year-old local
market town.

"Great accumulations of wealth had hardly begun."

Pennsylvania had gone furthest in the exploitation of her natural
wealth, according to Adams, but only in proportion to her population.
make progress, it was necessary for power over nature to
than number of people.

grow~

To
rapidly

There was recognition of both the potential and the

vastness of the undertaking, says Adams, but also a degree of hesitancy in
plunging ahead.

The situation was symbolized for Adams by the magnificent

plans for the federal capital, which in 1800 featured an unfinished White House
and Capitol, standing naked in two fields separated by a swamp--grandiose in
conception but grotesque in appearance.
A government capable of sketching a magnificent plan, and willing to
give only a hall- hearted pledge for its fulfillme nt; a people eager to
advertise a vast undertaking beyond their present powers, which
when completed would become an object of jealousy and fear--this
was the impression made upon the traveller who visited Washington
in 1800, and mused among the unraised columns of the Capitol upon
the destiny of the United States. 1
In this view, the United States in 1800 was a people poised on the threshold of
an immense granary of natural wealth, smacking its lips over the anticipated
pleasures of exploitation.

2

1
nillington, p. 19.
2
Adams' interpretation of this period is supported by one of the major
themes that Joseph Smith wrote into the Book of Mormon in 183 0. America,
he said, was greatly blessed in natural resources and would become the
mightiest nation ever known by man.
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The people so poised were accustomed to a rough degree of equality
in resource e ndowm ents, if not in social standing.
lion of the United States in 1800 of $1, 80 0,000,000.

Adams suggests a valuaThis amounted to $418 for

each free white hwnan being, and Adams says that deviations around this
average were fairly narrow.

Excepting a few of the s outhern states, a pri -

vate fortune of $3 00, 000 was great wealth. Such inequalities as existed were
chiefly those of a landed aristocracy.

Furnas has shown very graphically that

these were primarily of a social nature and had to be maintained by artifice,
so narrow were the actual differences in personal material wealth as between
class es.

1

Equality was so far the r ule that every white family of five pe rsons

might be supposed to own land, stock or utensils, house and furniture, worth
about $2, 000; to pay little or no taxes, and to earn wages of about $1 per day.
Adams noted that not only were these pe rsonal resources slender, but
they were also not easily converted to the purpose of rapid exploitation of the
hinterla nd.

The rough equality of distribution was also a hindrance to accu-

mula tion of capital pools for the m a jor investments required.

The limited

extent, nature , and distribution of capita l, therefore, put fairly severe constraints on the directions that could be ta ken in e fforts to subdue the vast

1

J . C . Furnas, The Americans: A Social History of the United
States (New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1969).
One of his points is that the landowning aristocrats had one set of fine clothes
each. They dressed up in it about once a year, for an appearance and a portrait , just for a demonstration of their distinction from the peasantry, who
otherwise were about as well (or rather ill) clothed as their masters.
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potential wealth the United States had r ather suddenly taken under its political
a nd military control.
When these circumstances are viewed along with the egalitarian sentime nts encouraged by the recent Revol ution, it is not hard to understand the
Jeffersonian policy of opening the public domain to individuals in farm-size
plots.

That policy institutionali zed an ideology.

The only major change in

this ideal that would emerge in the subsequent "age of Jackson" was a recognition of some facts of life: great fortunes and inequalities were a fa ct , and the
country was not turning out to be agrarian. Jacksonia n democracy was militant Jeffersonianism; a more strident variety, beca use endangered, of an
aspiration that had been around for some time. By the 1850's, when the
assault on the Great Plains began, a popular sentiment for freedom, independence, and equality of opportunity as well established.

The Jeffer sonian Ideology and its
Institutional Expression 1

Je ffe rson's person and the program of the Jeffersonians display some
interes ting ambiguities, as well as come clear preferences.

"The leisure that

made possible his great writings on human liberty was supported by the labors
of three generations of slaves. " He did not fe el that men are equal , but

1
The quotations a nd most of the ideas in this section are from Richard
Hofstadter, "Thomas Jefferson : The Aristocrat as Democrat, " in The American Political Tradition, ed. Richard Hofstadter (New York: Random House
Vinta ge Books, 1948).
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reasoned that they must be so.

He was aloof from the masses.

"He had no

system and lacked the doctrinaire's compulsion to be consistent." "There
were deep ambiguities in his thinking, which made any effort at consistency
impossible." He circulated among men of wealth , learning, and distinction
all his life, and absorbed the most liberal and questionable opinions of his
age . He was a congenial associate of men like Thomas Paine and Joel Barlow.
He became a leader of yeoman farmers, but also of great planters.

" He

wanted with all his heart to hold to the values of agrarian society, a nd yet he
believed in progress." He was head of a popular faction against commercial
interests--but it was also a propertied faction with acquisitive aspirations of
its own.
While Jefferson was in France, reinforcing his republicanism, his
friends were at home worrying about political advances of the dirt farmers.
He was a ppalled at social conditions in Europe and described treatment of the
English laboring classes in the bitterest language.

"Europe fortified his

convicti on that America, with its republican government, broad distribution
of landed property, agrarian economy, and oceanic isolation, was the chosen
spot of the earth. ,.l "A lifelong prejudice is summed up in a few words from
one of his letters to Lafayette: "The yeomanry of the United States are not
the canaille of Paris. "

2

1
Ihid.' p. 22.
2

Ibid., p. 37 .
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When Jefferson apoke of the merits and abilities of "the people," he
meant "the farmers." He did not see a town until he was 18, and "believed
deeply that rural living and rural people are the wellspring of civic virtue a nd
individual vitality, that farmers are the best social base of a democratic
r e publi c . " "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if
ever He had a chosen people. " "Corruption of mora ls in the mass of culti vation is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example."
"Governme nts will r emain virtuous a s long as they remain chiefly agricultural;
and this will b e as long as there shall be vacant lands in any part of America ."
" Farmers , whose interests are entirely agricultural, are the true representatives of the great American interest, and are a lone to be relied on for expressing the proper American sentiments." "The American economy should be
preserved in its agricultural state. "
li e disliked city mobs, "but believed they would not emerge in the
ca lculable futur e because Am erica ' s lands would be open to make substantial
farm e r s of the ragged and discontented . In his First Inaugural he said that
the land wo uld last the American people "to the hundredth a nd thousandth
generation. "

1

The United States would be a nation of farmers, tilling their

won soil, independent, informed, unexcitable, and incorruptible.

Such a

national destiny, he must have felt, would be secured by the Lousiana Purchase.

1

He could not have planned on very liberal immigration laws.
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Jefferson believed that the working c lass is corrupt; merchants are
corrupt; speculators are corrupt, cities ar e " pestile ntial; " only farme r s are
dependably good.

He was later forced to give up many of his agrarian preju-

dices by the march of history.

Modern capitalism has sundered four-fifths of

society from the soil, separated the masses from property, a nd ma de city
working class mobs of them.

The process was underway in his own lifetime.

In Jefferson's view the future would be founded on a propertied class.
He never a dvocated universal manhood suffrage --but he did propose to grant
every white man of full age at l east 50 acres . This was his vital link between
landed property and democracy.

"Jefferson's Federalist opponents feared

. . . power lodged in the majority. Jefferson feared power lodged anywhere
else . " Bad decisions of a majority would be less injurious than selfinterested decisions of kinds, priests, and aristocrats. He looked to mass
education to solve the problem of democratic-repuhlica n government: how can
it resist corruption and decay ? He favored maximum individual development
without limitations of class.
But Jefferson was not completely at odds with the Constitution makers.
He admired The Federalist. He did not think political constitutions could rely
on man's virtue . He differed in thinking it was

th e ~,

orders of society that are especially unregenerate rogues.

not the lower,
He accepted the

idea of checks a nd balances in government to avoid the concentration of powers.
He did not approve of simple ma jority rule.

He did not look at government as

a means of directly helping the poor, but wanted to get it out of the business of
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helping the rich through interest-bear ing debts, taxe s , tariffs, banks ,
privileges, and bounties. Just take these away and "natural economic forces"
would r e store freedom and equality.

Politically, he rejected the notion that

one man has intrinsic superiority over another, but he accepted laissez-faire
with the assumption that if government played no favorites, wealth would be
distributed in accordance with ' 'industry and skill" --not equally, presumably.
He apparently failed to foresee the role of capital in production, plus the
enormous power conferred by huge hereditary fortunes.
In Jefferson's presidency, the division between democratically minded
Americans was between two different kinds of property, not two philosophies.
Hamiltonians were devoted to the mercantile and investing classes, throwing
as m uch of taxes as possible on planters and fatmers.

Jefferson's party

defended landed property. But Hamilton's system was already entrenched and
the Jeffersonians' had to live with it.

He did buy Louisiana to widen the area

for agrarian expansion, reduced expenditures and the public debt, thereby
reducing, somewhat, government service to capitalists a nd merchants. The
Jeffersonians' purpose was to destroy the link between the federal government
and the investing classes.

They were a ntimercantilist rather than a nti -

capitalist. Jefferson was a convert to Adam Smith and J. B. Say. He believed
in " natural law" and in laissez-faire--self-regulation except for laws to prevent men from injuring each other.

" Hamilton had set the government to

helping the capitalists at the expense of the agrarians . The Jeffersonian
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r e sponse was not to call for a governme nt t hat would he lp agrar ians at ex pense
of capitalists, but simply for one that would let things alone. "
Jefferson was not aggressive about redistributing property.
To take from one, because it is thought his own industry and that of
his fathers has acquired too much, in order to spare others, who,
or whose fathers, have not exercised equal industry and skill, is
to violate arbitrarily the first principle of association, "the guarantee
to everyone a free exercise of his industry and the fruits acquired by
it. nl
He a dded that if an individual's wealth becomes so overgrown that it becomes
a danger to the State, the best corrective would not be discriminatory taxation,
but a law compelling equal inheritance in equal degree by all the heirs.

Con-

sistent with this view, Jefferson was instrumental in having primogeniture
and entail outlawed, but he was inconsistent with his democratic views in
countenancing inheritance at all. However, as Adams pointed out, there were
few great fortunes then existing in America , and Jefferson did not foresee the
enormous ones that would arise.

Furthermore, he expected the frontier to

hold out free homesteads for a thousand generations. It lasted barely four.
Jefferso nian laissez-faire eventually became the political-economy of
conservatives and was us ed by them to defend the robber-barons of the late
19th century from gove rnment reform (for the Jeffersonians finally accepted
the whole program of the Hamiltonians). The U.S. had to give up agrarianism
a nd become self-sufficient in manufacturing because of the Napoleonic War .

1

Hofstadter , p. 36,
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By 182 0, the Jeffersonians had driven the Federalists com pletely off the field,
but only at the cost of taking over their entire program: manufacturing, banks,
tariffs, army and navy , etc. This capitulation set the stage for the rise of the
Jacksonian movement, which was essentially a reversion to Jeffersonian
principles, with a little more realism: they gave up the notion of a wholly
agrarian society.
The original Jeffersonian ide al was a n agrarian society based on a
large class of small property owners educated for effective democracy.

They

believed in roughly equal opportmtity and thought they had made adequate
provision for it. As events turned out, they had not. The Jeffersonian party
gave up this platform in favor of mercantilistic laissez-faire , but the ideal
lingered on in the minds of a great many people . There were ambiguities in
Jefferson's attitudes: he wanted both equal opporttutity and vigorous growth .
Apparently he hoped it was possible to have both.

The key to this hope was a

great national endowment of land that could provide a roughly equal freehold
to every white man.

The Age of Jackson: Fixation of the Ideology

After Jefferson's party had capitulated to the Hamiltonian program,
the popular egalitarian sentiment b ecame associated with Andrew Jackson .
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The conclusions of several historians are presented in this section, beginning
with Hofstadter.

1

Jackson was a propertied frontiersman and represented that class of
people, says Hofstadter.

He was nurtured on Jeffersonian ideals.

His

politics ''chiefly resembled agrarian Republicanism of the old school, which
was opposed to banks, public debts, paper money, high tariffs, and federal
i nternal improvements." His people were not given to levelling eq ualitari a nism.

Their ideal was the self-made man.

But they resented the " help" of

banks which foreclosed on them in depression periods.

They did not like

working for "foreign" monopoly power in the form of eastern banks that controlled the money supply.
The people who elected Jackson, however, were the newly enfranchised
propertyless masses.

Between 1820 and 1821, six new states entered the

union with uni versal white manhood suffrage, a nd four old states dropped
property qualificatio!lB .

This was the first time there had been a role for

politicia!lB who cater to mass sentiment--for technicians of mass leadership.
The original program of the Jacksonian movement was for political equality .
They wanted access to government offices on an equa l basis--the opportunity
to get rich through politics.

2

1

Hi chard Hofstadter, "Andrew Jackson and the Rise of Liberal
Capitali sm," in The American Political Tradition, ed. Richard Hofstadter
(New York: Random House Vintage Books, 1948).

2

As examples, see Lundberg, and W. L. Riordan, Plunkitt of
Tammany Hall (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963).
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The panic of 1819 set class against class for the first time since the
Jeffersonian era--a result of reckless speculation in land and wildcat banking.
There was much r esentment against banks who were forced to foreclose to pay
their eastern owners.

Debtors rushed into politics to defend themselves.

There was a popular demand for laws against imprisonment for debt, a
national ba nkruptcy law, new tariff and public land policies. "For the first
time many Americans thought of politics as having an intimate relation to their
welfare. " Jackson's election was more a result than

a~

of the rise of

democracy.
The flowering of manufacturing in the east , and rapid settlement of
the west, gave the spirit of enterprise a large measure of fulfillment.

The

typical American was an expectant capitalist, ambitious, hardworking, for
whom enterprise was a kind of religion. He resented the restraining influence
of banks which prevented new men from getting a start, thereby restricting
competition.

The method of granting corporate charters he saw as special

privilege and monopoly.

Exclusive corporate privileges, such as the power

exercised by the U. S. Bank independently of government, were viewed as
government-in-favor-of-the-few, and a menace to democracy, freedom, and
economic independence.
Jacksonianism stood for equal protection--not privileges for the rich
and powerful. If legal and political equality were assured, the poor could take
care of themselves. It was ''the philosophy of a rising middle class; do not
throttle, but liberate business, to open every possible pathway for the creative
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e nterprise of the people." The core of the Jacksoni an and Jeffe rsonian
philosophies are the same: take the grip of government-granted privileges off
the national economic order.
Daniel Webster said at the beginning of the Jackson era that "society
is full of excitement: competition comes in place of monopoly; and intelligence
and industry ask only for fair play a nd an open field. " Originally a movement
for political e quality, it gained the support of "rural capitalists and village
e ntrepreneurs. " Jackson beca me the hero of the lower and middle classes
who be lieved in e xpanding opportunity through equal rights.

By the time of his

death (1845) they had achieved; America was a nation of self-made men.
1

Potter and Grant observe that between the War of 1812 and the firing on Fort
Sumter, the institutions developed which Americans ever since have regarded
a s characteristic of a democratic society. By the time of the Civil War the
economy had manifest the free-wheeling, individualistic traits that make the
U.S. living standard unique in the world.
Turner's thesis was the first comprehensive explanation for the
growth of American democracy.

He attributed it to the frontier experience,

culminating in the influence of Andrew Jackson--a triumph of Western
Egalitar ianism over Eastern Conservatism. The frontiersman was individualis tic, self-reliant, and roughly equal, because he had to be.

1

Frontier society

n. M. Potter and C. R. Grant, Eight Is sues in American History
(Glenvi e w, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966), Chapter 3 . Until
further notice, all references are lo this source. It reprints views of
historians cited in the text.
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was competitive. It was based on a fair chance for a ll, not on levelling by
arbitrary method s.

The vast extent of unexploited resources prompted

frontiersmen to look upon equality and competitive individualism as completely
consistent eleme nts of democracy.

Competition, in fact, tended to check

rising inequalities; it provided new opportunities.

The election of Jackson

meant that a new, aggressive, expansive democracy, emphasizing
human rights and individualism as against the old established order
which emphasized vested rights and corporate action, had come into
control.
Historians since 1945 have rejected Turner's emphasis on the West as a
unique source, but accept completely the identification of Jackson's party
with the growth of egalitarianism.
A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., identified the issue of the Jackson era as
one between producers a nd nonproducers. Producers did all the work for
the benefit of nonproducers (the wealth owners). Jacksonians urged, says
Schlesinger , that social order depends on laws regulating distribution of
wealth as well as on political organization. Their program was to resist
concentration of wealth and power in a single class (to control the power of
capitalists for the benefit of noncapitalist farmers and laborers in all parts
of the country). It was a revival Jeffersonianism, but accepted ind ustrialism
as a fact of life.

The struggle was between the rich and the poor, not between

frontiersmen and easterners .
The fears of Jeffersonians had become actualitie s to the Jacksonians:
banks and corporations had proved to be inimical to freedom of action and
initiative of the ave rage poor but ambitious man.
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Jeffersonian democracy looked wistfully back toward a past s lipping
further eve ry minute into the mists of memory, while Jacksonian
democracy came straightforwardly to grips with a rough a nd unlovely pre sent.
But although Turner emphasized farmers, Schlesinger labor, and others
pointed to individualistic enterprisers seeking government support against
powerful rivals, a ll historians have recognized clos e connections between
Jacksonians and the emerging era of egalitarianism a nd democracy.
Lee Benson said (1961) that it was just plainly a very widespread
egalitarian trend, and that to call it Jacksonian is misleading.

There was no

causal relationship between Jacksonianism and egalitarianism.

So he would

discard "Age of Jackson" and substitute "Age of Egalitarianism. " The latter
expresses, he says, the ideology of an age . "After 1815, not only in politics
bul in a ll spheres of American life, egalitarianism challenged elitism, and in
most spheres and places, egalitarianism won. " In the 183 0's and 1840's,
political battles were less over ends than means. All parties a ccepted
egalitarianism as the ideology of the Good Society.
The conclusions of these historians suggest that the Jacksonians faced
a fundam ental problem.

They wanted cheap land, and they got it, but they

soon di scover ed that land and hard work were not enough.
developme nt capital as well.
co uld not get it.

They needed

Without "eastern and foreign moneymen" they

Wildcat banking contributed some illusory help through

inflation, but ended up in destructive panics . The s a me problem faced
farmers on Reclamation projects in the 20th century; they had no capital to
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finance improvements, and s o had trouble e ven m eeting payments on their
cheap la nd.

Competitive production in an industria l society requires signifi-

cant amounts of capital in addition to land. But the aspiration is clear, even
if its implications were poorly understood.

Equal opportunity was the goal--

an endowment for poor people without servitude to the proprietors of hereditary we lath. An expert manager can always get his hands on the necessary
capital and extract a good income for his efforts, but he remains essentially
a peasant, plowing someone else's field.
wanted the operator to

~the

field.

The Jeffersonians and Jacksonians

It was their intent to use the national

wealth in natural resources to endow individuals with a roughly equal capital
base . If they could not abolish hereditary fortunes, they could at least try
to give e very family a leg up on accumulating their own fortune. But the
national e ndowment ran out more quickly than expected, producing severe
frustrations, and forcing significant changes in American society around the
turn of the century.
Frederick Jackson Turner published his seminal essay, The Frontier
in American History,

1

in 1893. It was stimulated by the announcement in the

1890 F ederal Census that the fronti e r was finally closed.
Irrigati on Congress was held in 1891.

2

The First National

In the early 1890's, Populism was

1
A. S. Berky and J. P. Shenton, eds., The Historian' s History of
the United States (New York: G . P. Putnam's Sons, 1969) .
2

rn Salt

Lake City.
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approaching the highest pitch of its reaction against the corrupt and unjust
exercise of entrenched powers that arose out of railroading and exploitation
of natural resour ces after the Civil War.

1

A large number of Americans

were frustrated by powerlessness in the face of monopoly power, the end of
cheap or free land, and drought.

The context of his times, expanded upon in

later sections, lends special significance to this long pa ssage from Turner
[my emphasis]:
Quite as deeply fixe d in the pioneer's mind as the ideal of
individualism was the ide.ll of democracy. He had a passionate
hatred for aristocracy, monopoly and special privilege; he believed
in simplicity, economy and in the rule of the people. It is true tbat
he honored the successful man, and that he strove in all ways to
advance himself. But the West was so free and so vast, the harriers
to individual achievement were so remote, that the pioneer was hardly
conscious that any danger to equality could come from his competition
for natural resources. He thought of democracy as in some way the
result of our political inst itutions, and he failed to see that it was
primarily the result of the free lands and immense opportunities
which surrounded him. 0\~casional statesmen voiced the idea that
American democracy was based on the abundance of unoccupied land,
even in the first debates on the public domain.
This early recognition of the influence of abundance of land in
shaping the economic conditions of American democracy is peculiarly
significant today in view of the practical exhaustion of the supply-of
cheap arable public lands open to the poor man, and the coincident
development of labor unions to keep up wages.
Certain it is that the strength of democratic movements has
chiefly lain in the regions of the pioneer . "Our governemnts tend too
much to democracy, " wrote Izard, of South Carolina, to Jefferson,
in 1785. "A handicraftsman thinks an apprenticeship necessary to
make him acquainted with his business. But our hackcountrymen
are of the opinion that a politician may he horn just as well as a
poeL"

1
See John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt (Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison
Books III, University of Nebraska Press, 1961).
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The Revolutionary ideas, of course, gave a great impetus to
democracy, and in substantially every colony there was a double
revolution, one for independence and the other for the overthrow of
aristocratic control. But in the long run the effective force behind
American democracy was the presence of the practically free land
into which men might escape from oppression or inequalities which
burdened them in the older settlements. This possibility compelled
the coastwise States to liberalize the franchise; and it prevented the
formation of a dominant class, whether based on property or on
custom. Among the pioneers one man was as good as his neighbor.
He had the same chance; conditions were simple and free. Economic
equality fostered political equality. An optimistic and buoyant belief
in the worth of the plain people, a devout faith in man prevailed in the
West. Democracy became almost the religion of the pioneer. He
held with passionate devotion the idea that he was building under
freedom a new society, based on self government, and for the welfare of the average man.
And yet even as he proclaimed the gospel of democracy the
pioneer showed a vague apprehension lest the time be short--lest
equality should not e ndure--lest he might fall behind in the ascending
movement of Western society. This led him on in feverish haste to
acquire advantages as though he only half believed his deam . "Before
him lies a boundless continent," wrote De Tocqueville, in the days
when pioneer democracy was triumphant under Jackson, "and he
urges forward as if time pressed and he was afraid of finding no
room for his exertions. "
Even while Jackson lived, labor leaders and speculative thinkers
were demanding legislation to place a limit on the amount of land
which one person might acquire, and to provide free farms.
De Tocqueville saw the signs of change. "Between the workman and
the master," he said, "there are frequent relations but no real
association. . . . I am of the opinion, upon the whole, that the
manufacturing aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes is one
of the harshest which ever existed in the world; . . . . if ever a
permanent inequality, of conditions and aristocracy, again penetrates
into the world, it may be predicted that this is the gate by which they
will enter: But the sanative influences of the free spaces of the West
were destined to ameliorate labor's condition, to afford new hopes
and new faith to pioneer democracy, and to postpone the problem. 1

1

Turner, pp. 6-8.
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A whole generation of historians set to work developing the implications of Turner's thesis.

By 1920, it had gained almost universal acceptance.

Criticism of it began almost immediately thereafter, and in 1936, the foundations of Turner's thesis were given a damaging blow by F. A. Shannon, who
demonstrated that the Homestead Act, "the legis lative epitome of free land, "
had actually been of small benefit to land-hundry migrants.

1

But in the early

years of Reclamation, the Turner thesis was at the height of its acceptability
among historians. Acceptance by the general educated public may be assumed
to last considerably beyond the time it was called in question by professionals
(1936).

The Turner thesis may, therefore, quite plausibly be assumed to

have played a major role in the political acceptability of Reclamation.

Its

sentiments are reflected in every issue of the Reclamation Record and
Reclamation Era, house organs of the U.S. Reclamation Service and its successor, the Bureau of Reclamation.
This section has shown the roots of a Reclamation ideology in American political tradition.

The next sections show what happened when people in

inflamed by that ideology found their hopes crushed by physical obstacles and
an end run by big capitalists in the era of the "robber barons ."

1
Berky and Shenton, p. 461.
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The Great American Desert: Ideologv Frustra ted

Except for the northwest coastal region and East Texas, the seventeen states west of those that touch on the Mississippi Valley suffer from
aridity in varying degrees. A line running roughly through Winnipeg and
San Antonio divides the United States into two very distinctive geographical
and climatological regions.

East of this line the rainfall-temperature combi-

nation provides ample moisture for most agricultural purposes; to the west
of it, rainfall-temperature combinations are such that a crop is not assured
for every year, and over a large portion of the region extr eme aridity preeludes a successful crop in any but the most unusual seasons --without supplemental water.

1

This climatological boundary has had profound effects on United
States history and institutions.

Until the 1850's, westward expansion of the

frontier had always been within the well-watered eastern region.

The

frontiersmen had learned to farm where abundant rainfall supplied all the
needs of their crops; their ancestors, from Northern Europe, had always
been accustomed to plenty of water.

1

"But when the pioneers crossed the

see J. W. Powell, Report on Lands of the Arid Region (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1879). For a version refined by 75 years
of measurement, but little changed, see for example, the U.S. Department
of Interior Climatological map on p. 256 of R. Highsmith, [Al. Jensen, and [A].
Rudd, Conservation in the United States, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNalley
and Company, 1969).

286
Missouri River, they came to an arid country where wa ter was more precious
than land; its presence meant life, its absence death . "

1

Webb noted that westward movement of indigent homesteaders up to
that time had been possible because of the abundance of free land, timber,
a nd water.

2

Once the frontier emerged onto the Great Plains not just one, but

two of these props were suddenly jerked away, and carving a homestead out of
the wilderness took on a new, harsher meaning . As a consequence, the agricultural frontier was held virtually stationary along the 98th meridian from
1840 to 1875.

Efforts to cope with the vast, tree less plain and desert are the

focal point of Western history.
Long before the frontier emerged from the trees it was generally
understood that the region between the Missouri River and the Rocky Mountains
was a great desert.

Coronado was the first European to report it.

The fur

trapping mountain men and traders of the Santa Fe Trail reinforced the image,
and scientific expeditions confirmed it. Starting just after the report of Major
Stephen Long's expedition in 1819-20, the Great American Desert appeared on
U.S. maps until 1858.

Webb says that the notion of the Great Desert as an

uninhabitable waste and absolute barrier to westward expansi on was at its
height in the decade 1850-1860 .

1
Roger Revelle, "Water," 1n Technology and Economic Development
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, A Scientific American Book , 1963), p. 53 .
2
walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York: Grosset &
Dunlap, Grosset's Universal Library, UL-29, 1931).
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The pre ss ure of an expanding population with l and hunger and high
expectations mounted steadi ly through the 1840's and 1850's, along with the
as cendant tra dition of the Great American Desert.
for it as a major source of the Civil War.

Webb urges convincingly

The desert was a worse problem

for the South than it was for the North, becaus e the whole Southern socioeconomic system depended on a warm and humid climate.

The Northern

syste m, based on indi vidual ownership and fre e labor could be modified to
cope with the Great Plains; the Southern cotton kingdom based on plantations
and slavery could not.

Webb demonstrated that from 1789, the South was able

to dominate national politics, or at least hold its own with ease. But beginning
about 1850, says Webb, it must have become increasingly apparent to thoughtful observers that the arid region set a definite limit to expansion of the
Southern system, while only temporarily retarding that of the North. Southern
politicians fought for a nd won the right to introduce slavery in all the unadmitted t erritory of the United States.

(This was established by the elections of

1853 and 1856. ) But the c limatological barrier made it a hollow victory. All
the new states would be free because no southerners were interested in the new
lands, a nd the South must therefore be overwhelmed.

There was no choice

but to secede after the election of 1860 proved that Southern political dominance was at an end.
Prior to the Civil War the Great Desert image discouraged all but a
few efforts to se ttle the arid region. Instead of coping with the desert, some
settlers pre ferred the discomfort of crossing it--to Oregon territory where a
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more familiar climate prevailed. The Oregon TraH was well established by
1843. Only one major settlement effort was successful before the Civil War-that of the Mormons in Utah after 1847.

Their success with irrigation was

predicated on cooperative effort, a complex social organization, and other
accouterments of oriental civilizations based on irrigation, including a significant degree of despotism.

None of tbese are palatable to the prevailing

taste for laissez-faire in America, and given the additional reinforcement of
the desert image, the Mormons were probably justified in thinking they would
have the whole intermountain region to themselves for as long as they wanted
it. They had not planned on gold fever, however, and a miner's frontier
advanced steadily eastward from the coastal ranges after 1849, establishing
camps which drew workers and farmers, until by 1860 a string of settlements
dotted the intermountain region.
the frontier.

1

In a sense, the whole arid region became

Instead of moving steadily along through the trees, as it had done

east of the Mississippi, the frontier of settlement jumped back and forth, in
and out (many efforts failed).

It leaped clear across to the Pacific slope, into

the Great Basin, and began slowly to erode the open country from both sides
and the middle.

1
Billington.
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Surmounting the Barrier: Ideology Supplemented by War,
Technology (Science), and Myth

Th e Civil War seems to have catalyzed and invigorated efforts to
conquer the desert , and to have contributed part of the elements necessary for
success . At least in part it was a test of the ideals of Jacksonian democracy
which, on the testimony of historians , pervaded in the northern and western
states.

The outcome of the War was a triumph for these ideals.

The West

was to be nonslave , based on atomistic agr i culture a nd independent freemen.
Even during the war, the Homestead Act of 1862 promised fre e land in the
West to settlers. After the war, the Industrial Revolution asserted itself
with a vigor that transformed the physical conditions of life in America , and
with them, the zeitgeist of its people .
The pessimistic desert image was rejected in favor of a vision of the
West as a lush, green garden. Six-shooters, saddle horses, barbed wire,
windmills, and railroads made possible at least a partial fulfillment of the
vision.

After the war, ambitious men, fired by vision, swarmed over the

West.

Some brought new tools forged by the Industrial Revolution and were

bent on exploitation for personal gain. Others, no less visionary but mot!vated more by dreams of utopia, m ade quieter efforts to unlock the secrets
of the desert, that through understa nding they might subdue it permanently to
the pleasurable uses of man.

For although spectacular, the stampede of

exploitation was, as already noted, accompanied by much hardship, misery,
and failure.
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Successful domestication of the land resources of the Great Plains
required physical and social techniques specific to its conditions. Until those
techniques were available, says Webb, the Plains Indians had made the most
successful adaptation possible of the region.

The first successful venture by

Europeans was the cattle kingdom. It was made possible by copying the use
made of horses by Mexicans and Plains Indians, and by development of the
six-shooting revolver. But it was also based on open range and free access
to such water sources as were available. The land was owned by the United
States government, whose agents and custodians refused to alienate it in the
large chunks required for ranching, much less extend rights to use the whole
area without boundary identifications.

The cattle kingdom burst forth out of

south Texas after the Civil War, and by 1876 had taken over the entire Plains
area . It suited the technological conditions of its time, hut never achieved the
social sanction required to legitimate it as part of the American way.
Webb places blame for this on the easterners who dominated legislatures and who did not understand technical, geographical, and economic conditions in the West, which most of them had never seen. Legislatures, however, are not motivated solely by what makes technological sense. In this
case, there was the long tradition of yeoman farmers, plus the constant pressure on legislators to provide more free land for small farmers.

Government

policy of long standing, reinforced only recently by the Civil War, favored the
disposal of public lands in relatively small, family-farm size plots, not
baronial estates. Aristocratic and conservative interests feared the inception
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of democratic governments in the 17th and 18th centuries on the ground that
if the masses were given political power (domination in fact) they would use it
to redistribute wealth on egalitarian principles a lso. Western experience
shows this view to have been well founded.

Great fortunes have been accu-

mulated, but their builders have not been allowed to dominate completely as
long as the issues were fairly clear to the voting masses.

The issue was

clear in the case of the frontier, and the democratic ideal of independent free holds carried the day against the would-be land a nd water barons. Against
railroaders and oilmen the democrats did not fare so well; exploiting those
opportunities took a different kind of vision than was shared by the masses and
a different quality of effort.

Against cattle barons the farmers felt they were

fighting on ground they understood, and they successfully defended their
territory.
Although the voting masses could prevent the establishment of feudal
estates , they could not, however, ass ure the success of the family farm ideal.
Wave after wave of settlers tried to farm the plains in the old ways and were
fianlly driven off in desperation by drought . But the relentless pressure of
land hunger spawned myths to sustain hope and fed the search for new techniques.
Barbed wire and windmills made a major contribution to the war with
cattlemen and climate in the eastern portion of the Plains. Use of barbed
wire fences kept ranchers' cattle out of farmers' crops (and also frequently
out of the a ll-important watering holes).

The windmill and well-drillers made
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farmsteads viable away from the banks of a stream by tapping underground
reservoirs for domestic water and farm gardens . With these innovations,
grain crops with relatively low water requirements could be grown in good
water years using cuitural techniques little modified from those employed
further east.

But it was still a tenuous venture and completely dependent

on the wet end of the rainfall cycle, as the late 1880's proved. A solid basis
for agriculture even in this region had to wait upon scientific understanding
of the principles on which dry farming can be successfully practices--as well
as on technological development of the tools to do it on the large scale required.
Barbed wire was one of these, allowing large areas to be fenced economically;
special tillage and seeding equipment were others, and draft equipment
powered by the energy of fossil fuels made possible a further giant stride.
But much of the Great Plains and intermountain region has too little rainfall
even for dry farming.

In those areas supplemental water is essential.

Ex-

periments with irrigation, therefore, went on concurrently with efforts to farm
with available moisture.

The major onslaught of irrigation came later, how-

ever, after all other efforts had failed to open up the remaining lands.

In

the meantime, hope was sustained and ideology maintained by faith in myths.
As already noted, a flood of capital and new techniques wa s poured
into the West after the Civil War. Railroads soon connected the West Coast
to the Trans-Mississippi East, crossing more than half a continent of virtually
empty land between.

Huge grants of this empty land had been used as security

to finance the roads, and both railroad operators and their creditors had a
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common interest in getting settlers on that land.

They mounted a gigantic

and sustained propaganda campaign to bury the notion of a Great American
Desert and establish the myth of the Garden of the World in its place.

1

The Garden myth already had at least one proponent before the
Mexican War. He was William Gilpin , an old Western hand who had been a
friend of Andrew Jackson. Although he had traveled the length and breadth of
the West and lived in it, he kept up a constant barrage of milk and honey nonsense about the arid region into the 1890's. Wallace Stegner used Gilpin with
great effectiveness to represent "the blooming desert" faith, as a foil to the
scientific approach, in his biography of John Wesley Powell. Of Gilpin,
Stegner says:
He saw the West through a blaze of mystica l fervor, as part
of a grand geopolitical design, the overture to global harmony; and
his conception of its resources and its future as a home for millions
was as grandiose as his rhetoric, as unlimited as his faith, as
splended as his capacity for inaccuracy . . . The Great American
Desert . . . was waved away with a gesture. The semi-arid plains
between the lOOth meridian and the Rockies, plains which had barred
settlement and repelled Spaniard and Anglo-American alike, were
no desert, nor even a semi-desert, but a pastoral Canaan . . . .
Gilpin joined the politicians and the railroads, eager for settlers, in
finding most of the plains region exuberantly arable. 2
Gilpin a nd his kind believed there must be ample artesian water under the
prairie grass, that settlement improved the climate, that rain followed the

1

Hicks.

2
wallace Stegner, Beyond the Hundreth Meridian (Bostaon: Houghton
Miffin Company, Sentry Editions, 1962), p. 98-99.
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plow. Although there was little surface timber, the root system of the low
growth was so abundant that one could easily

~

for firewood and find plenty.

Once the wild herds were exterminated, three domestic animals could be
pastured on ground that previously supported one wild one.
The great intermountain plateau region was even more salubrious in
Gilpin's view.

Even houses were unnecessary, so temperate were the sea-

sons. Agriculture was effortless: no forests needed clearing, even plowing
was not essential. Ample water from mountain snow was available and setting
up for irrigation no more difficult than fencing. On any patch of ground that
might be unfit for r a ising crops, there was sure to be a rich deposit of
mineral wealth.

The Mississippi Valley and its adjacent plains could support

18 hundred million people, said Gilpin, and the intermountain plateau region
far more than that.
Owning a territory that stretched from sea to sea . . . ; possessed
of unlimited gold and other resources; endowed with a population
energetic and enduring, which the peculiar geography of the continent
would soon blend into one people; blessed with a political system
divinely appointed to emancipate the world's oppressed millions and
set an example that would recreate the g_Iobe . . . , America lacked
nothing for the most extravagant future.
That this kind of extravagant nonsense was the substance of a propaganda
campaign is thoroughly documented by Hicks.

1
11icks, Chapter I.

2
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The campaign was a huge success; Billington says it "convinced half
the people of the world that the American West was the poor man's Eden. "
Floods of settlers moved into the Great Plains.

1

Even after the disastrous

winter of 1886 and the burnouts of 1887, '88, and '89, the belief lived on.

2

Its ability to obliterate the Great Desert image, and its persistence in the
face of repeated and brutal refutations is a testament to the significance of
freedom and independence as human values of very high priority. As Webb
noted, "whatever man desires, he attains--if not in reality, then vicariously
through his imagination." Major Powell SOW1ded a strong warning in 1878
that settlement was pushing into dangerously arid territory during the wet and
of the rainfall cycle; people preferred to believe the prophets like Gilpin, who
promised them a Garden of Eden.

In a century of explosive population growth,

the constraints to agriculture and human habitation imposed by aridity were
Wlacceptable to land-hungry immigrants. They came full of hope and optimism
and amibition to transform the desert into "a land flowing with milk and honey,"
to make it "blossom as the rose," as the Children of Israel hoped to do with
old Jacob's arid fields.

In time, science and technology would achieve a

significant measure of success in realizing the blooming vision. In the interval, poor men had to be content with dreams.

1
Billington, p. 81.
2
see Stegner, Chapter V, for a graphic recital of the tragic events.
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To a pe ople desperate for independent homesteads, with nowhere to
get them but the desert, the dream understandably turned to belief that water
was on the way.

Webb provides the poignant summary of the thirst that

haunted western attitudes.
Men in the Great Plains, or t he arid region, have wanted rain more
than they have wanted anything else . The shadow of the drought
hangs over them constantly--whether they admit it or not; and when
they meet, much of their talk is of the last rain a nd its effects or the
prospect for the next one. This primitive and elemental desire for
rain . . . is ever present in the mind of the farmer, the ranchman,
the merchant, and the banker. 1
Once the hope that the arid plains was a Garden of Eden was shattered, its
bearers transformed it into a myth that the climate of the arid region was
changing for the better. U.S . government officials issued persistent wa rning
that there was no basis for this belief, starting with the Powell Report on
Lands of the Arid Region, in 1878, but to little avail.
Men must have their myths to make life worth living.

The fact of

cycles in precipitation fed the notion that "the country is becoming more seasonable, " and to assure themselves it was true, people sought reasons.
Powell noted some of them in Chapter V of his report:
An increase in the water supply, so universal of late years, has led
to many conjectures and hypotheses as to its origin. It has generally
been supposed to result from increased rainfall, and this increased
rainfall now from this, now from that, condition of affairs. Many
have attributed the change to the laying of railroad tracks and construction of telegraph lines ; others to the cultivation of the soil, a nd
not a few to the interposition of Divine Providence in behalf of the

1
webb, p. 375.
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Latter-Day Saints. If each physical cause was indeed a vera causa,
their inability to produce the results is quite manifest. 1 - - - - After showing why none of the supposed causes is competent to produce the
effects noted, Powell made this pessimistic but prophetic comment:
But if it be true that increase of the water supply is due to increase
in precipitation, as many have supposed, the fact is not cheering to
the agriculturist of the Arid Region. The permanent changes of
nature are secular; any great sudden change is ephemeral, and
usually such changes go in cycles and the opposite or compensating
conditions may reasonably be anticipated. If it (the increased water
supply) is due to a temporary increase of rainfall . . . we shall
have to expect a speedy return to extreme aridity, in which case a
large portion of the agricultural industries of the country now growing
up would be destroyed. 2
Powell did not personally believe that rainfall had increased by very much,
even cyclically.

Instead, he attributed most of the observed increase in

stream and lake levels (based mainly on measurements in Utah) to destruction
of beaver dams, clearing of driftwood from stream channels, draining upland
meadows, and other effects wrought by man which increase the proportion of
precipitation that finds its way into streams before being evaporated or sinking
into groundwater reservoirs.

3

While some men's myths relied on hope a lone, others resorted to
techniques which had just as little basis in scientific knowledge, variations on

1

2

Powell, pp. 90-91.

Ibid.

3
Ibid. Webb incorrectly attributed the quoted statements to Powell's
colle ague and coauthor, G. K. Gilbert, who made the measurements. See
Webb, p. 378.
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alchemy. As Webb puts it, they hoped to twist Nature's ear--force it to
rain.

1

Many theories were concocted of why tree planting would include rain,

and many trees were planted. Others placed their faith in a means with less
salutary side effects.

They tried to blow rain out of the sky with gigantic ex-

plosions. None of these efforts met with any perceivably consistent success,
and the time, work, and money invested in them underscores the dogged
perseverance of people who wanted water for their farmland desperately, but
were at their wits end over how to get it. Scientific and technical help was
becoming possible, but it would take a political explosion to get it.

Populism and Progressivism: Political Expressions of
Frustrated Ideology2

In the words of Russel B. Nye, "the triple alliance of railroads,
banks, a nd tariff-protected industry dominated the Midwestern economy after
the Civil War." Free land was gradually disappearing and westerners were
forced to face a new condition: there was no place to move to. After 1865,
the primary problem of America was "to resolve the clash between the old
ideals of agrarian democracy with the new industrialism, to reconcile political
liberty with economic expansion. " American business had never accepted
laissez-faire whole-heartedly, had only used it to silence opposition. Its real

1
webb, pp. 378-382.
2

Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics {New York:
Ha rper & Row, Harper Torch Books Edition, 1965), is the major source for
this section.
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attitude was Hamiltonian: government should protect and encourage industrial
prosperity.

"The laissez-faire theories of Adam Smith and the economists

were well enough in the books, but the slogan of "free enterprise and individualism" that had grown naturally out of the eighteenth century no longer
really fitted the new nineteenth century industrial economy."
As industrialism grew during this period people began to notice a
growing discrepancy between the nation's traditional beliefs and its socioeconomic conditions.

In 1890, economist Charles Spahr cal culated that

125, 000 men controlled at least half the national wealth.

People still believed

in freedom, equality, and opportunity, but many were wondering if they actually possessed any of them.
master, nor was the farmer.

"Obviously the wage earner was not his own
The traditionally independent American yeoman

was now in debt to a bank, his selling prices controlled by buyers a nd his
buying power controlled by sellers." Class divisions as clear as those of
Europe were emerging.
alliance.

Political bosses and industrialists formed a natural

Gnawed by a feeling that their behaviour was a violation of Christian

ethics, the power brokers adopted Social Darwinism to reconcile spiritual
ideals with social practices. It sounded scientific and laboratory tested, and
lo the popular mind, therefore, trustworthy.

But after 1870, "there was

growing conviction that old-style democracy was gone, or was going fast."
The Spencerian variant of Darwinism flourished a nd its proponents argued that
liberty never did imply equality. By 1899, President George Haws of Amherst
could say, "We have outgrown the crude notion that democracy is equality."
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By 1870, American democracy had reached a turning point:
The nation still paid its respects to the traditional concepts of
liberty and equality expressed so brilliantly by the eighteenth century,
but at the same time developments in economics and politics . . .
pointed away from them. The amassing of huge fortunes, the stifling
of individual opportunity by monopoly, the corruption that inevitably
followed politics-in-business and business-in-politics, the stratification of society that economic consolidation seemed to bring about -all these made it extremely hard to adjust old democratic ideas to
contemporary practice. Yet the "struggle between democracy and
plutocracy," as William Graham Sumner called it, had to be
resolved. 1
While the ideal of an agrarian democracy lived on, the difficulty of realizing
it in industrialized America became more and more pronounced.
Disgruntled westerners of the late 19th century believed that if the
promise of American democracy was not being realized, there must be a
reason for it.

They had ideas of where to lay blame and turned to government

for assistance in adjusting their grievances.

Progress was slow because they

found govequnent to be in the control of the enemy.

Hence, their program was

to take control themselves of the political-economic system:
Ideas of exactly how to gain this control took different forms. The
Greenbackers and free-silver men once thought it might be done by
tampering with the currency. The Grangers and the Populists
thought monopoly should be smashed and governmental authority
extended over economic affairs. Twentieth century progressives
instead advocated reformations of political machinery . . . to make
government more responsive to popular will and less vulnerable to
organized wealth. Theirs were for the most part attempts to tinker
with the mechanics of government, reforms based on the progressive
faith in the ability of the people to rule if given the proper tools.
Their aim was to retain the form and direction of capitalistic
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democracy while attempting to change its spirit. "Don't rant at
the individual," said Tom Johnson. "Get after the system. " They
did. 1
The spiritual heirs of Jefferson and Jackson, struggling with drought, debt,
and railroads on the agricultural frontier of the 1880's and 1890's, were
unsuccessful in their bid for control.
energies too dissipated.

2

They were too scattered and their

Perhaps in their frustrated rage they also failed to

understand fully the nature of their problem, and hence suffered from a lack
of coherence and unity in articulating it.

As Nye says, their revolt ne ver

came to a full boil although the elements for a real political consolidation
were there.

The ideas just did not crystallize into a coherent social or

political movement.
A significant part of their problem may have been ideological blinkers.
To get what they wanted, the agrarians would have to change their principles.
They were in process of shifting from a philosophy of self-reliance and
laissez-faire to one of social cooperation; from individualism to social control
through the

regulati~m

of law.

The Jeffersonian system of limited government

was in process of being exchanged for the Hamiltonian one of powerful government; Jeffersonian ends were being sought by Hamiltonian means. With benefit of hindsight this interpretation is not particularly obscure , but to people in
process of ideological change, the world is in disarray. It is probable that

2

Hicks is the standard work on this subject.
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many people in the United States are still suffering from the same internal
confusion over Jeffersonian ends versus Hamiltonian means, and it may well
be a significant factor in issues of natural resources management.
William Jennings Bryan represents the culmination of Pop ulist
aspirations a nd efforts. With him, according to Nye,
the Democratic party picked up the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition
it had dropped before the Civil War, the tradition that the Populists,
Greenbackers, and Anti-Monopolists barely kept alive. . . .
Notably, Jefferson and Jackson were the only two statesmen Bryan
ever quoted consistently, and it is equally notable that after 1892 the
Republicans stopped celebrating Jefferson's birthday and organized
Hamilton clubs. 1
The agrarian crusade blew itself out in Bryan's 1896 defeat.

The Populist

Revolt was crushed, but the old issues still remained, and it was the political
movement that died not the ideas.

2

For the American dream, says Nye,

simply was not coming true .
The Progressive movement of the early 1900's regrouped the army
and mounted new offensives.

Muckrakers exposed fraudulent, misrepresenta-

tive government, monopoly, industrial immorality, trusts--the same elements
criticized by the agrarian radicals of the 1870's.
The Grangers, and their descendants, the Populists, had said the
same things in a general way. The muckrakers offered proof and
gave dates, names, places. The Grangers and Populists turned to
government for help with little success. Now it was clear why.

1

!bid.

2
Hicks has documented the lasting significance of the issues they
raised in his concluding chapter, "The Populist Contribution."
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Government itself was under the thumb of the very forces they were
fighting, as the Midwestern farmer and small businessman suspected
all along . Like Populism, and later Progressivism, muckraking was
an attack on privilege, on the exploitation of the many by the few,
on social and economic malpractice. (Progressivism was the) lineal
descendant of nineteenth century agrarian revolt , . . . traveling in
the same direction . . . (it) attacked capitalism, not in its essentials but in its operations. . . • The drift of Progressive thought
. . . was away from its Jeffersonian-Jacksonian-frontier sources.
The ends remained the same, but the methods changed . . . , for in
the industrial nineteenth century individualism by itself was hardly
e nough to secure democracy. . . . The Granger and Populist . . .
found paradoxically that preservation of individualism required the
introduction of certain restraints upon it. 1
Progressivism shifted away from individualism toward social control; restrictiona on laissez-faire were looked upon as a means of preserving laissez-faire
itself.
Twentieth-century Midwestern progressivism operated mainly within
the Republican party. Populism in its later phase had been a manifestation of much the same spirit within the Democratic party.
The new Republican progressives . . . grafted Populistic and
Bryanistic principles on the Hamiltonian-Republican tradition . ln the
process they exchanged the Jeffersonian concept of limited government
for the Hamiltonian concept of strong government as the tool by which
to fashion Jeffersonian ends. 2
William McKinley died in 1901. Federal Reclamation was born in 1902.

"The

assassin's bullet that cut down McKinley put a man already committed to
progressivism into the White House . "

2

3

Ibid .
Nye, p. 224 .

3

Until well after World War II, official
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publications of the Bureau of Reclamation continued to reaffirm its allegiance
to the modified Jeffersonian ideals of the progressive movement.
The major theme of Nye's book, reiterated over and over again, is
expressed compactly in this statement:
Progressivism was considerably more than a swing toward honest
government. It was a definite, and coherent political philosophy, a
concept of democracy that grew out of Grangerism and Populism.
Behind it . . . (was) a distinct! vely . . . agrarian, Jeffersonian,
frontier tradition. 1
Professional historians do not appear to have quarreled seriously with Nye's
interpretation. John D. Hick's comments on it are reproduced in the Harper
Torchbooks edition cited here.

He says simply that most of it is not new.

Gabriel Kolko has argued that Progress! vism was in fact a triump of politicalcapitalism: the Hamiltonians won .

2

Ferdinand Lundberg's, The Rich and the

Super Rich, Galbraith's, New Industrial State, and Estes Kefauver's, In a Few
Hands,

3

all support Kolko's position. Big business reaped most of the divi-

dends, it is true, says Kolko, but the aims of the movement were genuinely
"progressive"--to improve the welfare of the masses as against business;
nonbusiness supporters of the movement were just naive about the probable
outcome.
1

2

lbid .• p. 209 .
Potter and Grant, Issue 6, "The Progressive Movement. "

3
Lundberg is cited earlier in this chapter. J. K. Galbraith, The New
Industrial State (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967);
Este s Kefauver, In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in America (Baltimore,
Maryland: Penguin Books, 1965).
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Nye's comments under "The Capture of the Ivory Tower" are significant in a consideration of the importance of ideology: both religion and
scholarship were drawn into the struggle between plutocracy and democracy,
he says.

The "social gospel" arose to do battle with the "gospel of wealth" in

the field of ethics.

ln the social sciences, post-Civil War economists simply

reapplied laissez-faire economics of the 18th and 19th centuries to the new
industrial age . That people are happiest when they get what they want, that
only an individual knows what he wants, and that no government should interfere with the pursuit of happiness, were preached as Holy Writ in textbooks
of economic theory.

But there were dissenters such as Richard T. Ely,

John R. Commons, Thorstein Veblen, Lester Ward, and Simon Patten.

They

founded new organizations for the exchange of information and to attack social
and economic problems from a new viewpoint--the American Historical
Association, the American Economic Association, the American Political
Science Association, the American Sociological Association, and others.
What they had to say squared not at all with the older prevailing theories.
They attacked the right of individuals to hold and bequeath great fortunes, and
argued strongly for governmental supervision and control of wealth.
The key to Ely's economic thought was his belief that economics
was a humane, ethical study, not "a science to be used as a tool in
the hands of the greedy and avaricious for keeping down and oppressing the laboring classes. " Once ask the question "What is the
purpose of economic life?" he said, and its ethical basis becomes
clear. Economics concerns itself not with what is, but with what
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1
ought to be.
"The ethical school of economists," he once wrote,
"aims to direct in a certain definite manner, so far as may be, the
most perfect development of all human faculties in eacb individual
which can be attained in harmony with the ethical ideal of Christianity. 2
The same ideals were carried forward to the New Deal era by the students a nd
intellectual heirs of Ely, Commons, Veblen, and company--Rexford Guy
Tugwell, Henry Wallace, Isadore Lubin. Assuming these ideals of the founders of AEA to have been built into Reclamation as part of the Progressive
program, and reinforced during the New Deal era, they are the ends that must
be kept in mind by those who wo uld evaluate the efficiency of Reclamation in
reaching social goals--unless the evaluators can either demonstrate that goals
have changed, or make a powerful case that a different set of ends s hould be
adopted on purely ethical grounds.
The goals of Reclamation were slightly more complex than s imply
government promotion of Jeffersonian freedom, independence, and equality,
however.

There were (and are) strong elements of Manifest Destiny, a dream

of making desert wastelands bloom, and an urge to engineer the last drop of
water and the last grain of sand into producing an abundant living fo r the
ultimate number of people. We turn finally, therefore, to further consideration
of John Wesley Powell and his vision of technological utopia.

1

Frank H. Knight shared this perspective as may be inferred from
vario us essays in On tbe History and Method of Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books Edition, 1963).
2

Nye, p.227 .
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John Wesley Powell: Synthesis of a New Ideology

Previous sections have established the existence of a political and
ideological commitment in America to rough equality in wealth distribution,
and a policy of alienating the public domain in small parcels to individual
farmers as a means to achieve that end.

They have also demonstrated the

frustrations engendered when Nature proved uncooperative, and suggested
some of the directions in which frustrated energy was vented.

They have

pointed to the staying power of myths and ideologies, even in the face of
stunning refutations, and have a lso indicated more rational, problem-solving
approaches to the dilemma of western aridity.

Most significant of the latter

were shown to be scientific efforts to conquer the desert by technology, and
political movements designed to achieve the old aspiration of freedom,
independence and equality in spite of uncooperative Nature.

This section will

demonstrate the fusion of those two ideas in the broad, synthetic vision of
John Wesley Powell.

The next chapter will document the partial institu-

tionalization of his grand design in the United States Reclamation Service, and
its successor, the Bureau of Reclamation.
His interest in the West, stimulated by experiences there during
service in the Civil War, led shortly after the War to Major Powell's exploration of the Colorado River and its canyon lands .

1

By this service and his

1
Biographical information is from Stegner.
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perceptive and analytical reporting of it, Powell won government a nd ins titutional support to continue his studies of the region.

His major purpose,

according to Stegner, was "to guide the development of agriculture in the
greatest practical area, and to preve nt hardship from ill-considered settle ment and the failure of homesteaders on family-sized farms." His Report on
Lands of the Arid Region was published in 1878. In it he predicted decline
of the cattle companies, the drought, floods caused by denuded watersheds,
a nd subseque nt clamor from settlers for governm ent a ssistance . He was made
a good prophet by the winter of 1886 which destroyed t he cattle kingdom, the
droughts that followed, and the Johnstown flood.

In 1888 he was appointed

head of the U.S. Irrigation Survey , a position giving him great power over the
use of natural resources . He was already head of the Geological Survey a nd
the Bureau of Ethnology. His powers were curtailed sharply after 1890, and
he retired in the mid 1890's.
While the Major was at the height of his power he published a series
1
of three articles in Century Magazine in an effort to rally public s upport for
his programs.

Entitled " Irrigable Lands of the Arid Region," "Non-lrrigable

Lands of the Arid Region, " and "lnsti tuti ons for the Arid Region, " they were a
major sour ce for Walter Prescott Webb's view of the significance of the Plains
and Plateau r egions to American hi story.

Together with Powell 's 1878 Report,

they demonstrate a fertile imagination, wide breadth of vision, great synthetic

1

March, April , and May of 1890.
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power in analysis, and ample rhetorical skill.

They are fundamental to an

understanding of institutions affecting natural resources management in the
West.
The other major source for material in this section is Wallace
Stegner's biography of Powell's career.

1

Stegner used William Gilpin (see

the sections on the desert barrier) as a buffoon to dramatize the contrast
between the rational, methodical approach of Major Powell and the extravagant
nonsense preached in the name of Manifest Destiny and the Garden of the World.
Powell was a scientist; but he had dreams as well. It is true that he established
a firm foundation for management of natural resources; it is also true that his
purpose in so doing was to make it "blossom as the rose." The flavour of
his commitment is revealed in the following series of statements from his
first "Irrigable Lands" article:
Why should the naked plains and the desert valleys of the far West
be redeemed? Why should our civilization enter into a contest with
nature to subdue the rivers of the West when the clouds of the East
are ready servants? Gold is found in the gravels of the West; silver
abounds in the cliffs; copper is found in the mountains; iron, coal,
petroleum, and gas are supplied by nature. The mountains and
plateaus are covered with stately forests; the climate is salubrious
and wonderfully alluring.
Arid lands are not lands of famine and the sunny sky is not a
firmament of devastation. Conquered rivers are better servants than
wild clouds. The valleys and plains of the far West have all the elements of fertility that soil can have. As the blood in the body is the
s tream which supplies the elements of its growth, so the water in the
plant is its source of increase. As the body must have more than

1
Stegner.
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blood, so the plant must have more than water for its vigorous
growth . These conditions of plant growth are light and heat.
[My emphasis .] 1
It is noteworthy that the water hustlers in Utah seem seldom, if ever, to have

held a meeting without one or more solemn intonations of "water is the life
blood of the land." And a slogan identifying water as our "life blood" was
adopted for the masthead of the Utah Water News (publication of the Utah
Water Users Association) which began publication in 1954 .
The arid lands of the West, last to be redeemed by methods first
discovered in civilization, are the best agricultural lands of the
continent. Not only must these lands be redeemed because of the
wants of the population of that country, they must be redeemed
because they are our best lands.
Ultimate ly the whole region will be covered with a mosaic of
ponds fringed with a rich vegetation; and crystal waters, and green
fields, and blooming gardens will be dotted all over the burning
naked lands, and sand dunes, alkali stretches, and naked hills will
be decked with beautiful tracts of verdure.
By the use of all the perennial streams during the season of
irrigation, by the storage of the surplus water that runs to waste
when irrigation is not practised by the impounding of the stormwaters, by the recovery of the floods accumulated in valley sands,
and by the utilization of the artesian fountains, a vast area of the
arid lands will ultimately be reclaimed, and millions of men,
women, and children will find happy rural homes in the sunny
lands. 2
Later sections will demonstrate that the U.S. Reclamation Service and Bureau
of Reclamation have hewed closely to these aspirations of their ideological
parent.
In his· "Irrigable Lands" article Powell described the drainage basins
and irrigation districts of the West and pointed out problems of allocation that

3 11

had already arisen in them because of premature development and illogical
political boundaries.

He had predicted in his 1878 Report that unless strong

government meas ur es were taken before settlers moved in there would b e
wastage of both water and the best lands--plus an eternity of senseless strife
over water rights.

Individual settlers could not afford major irrigation works

and so would divert streams at high e levations where they were manageable .
If unchecked, this would eventually lead to the full appropriation of late

season flows to irrigate upper valleys, leaving unwatered the broad valley
below, where climate and topography held out by far the greater agricultural
potential. Development of the full .potential of the arid region must be done on
a collective basis and with federal ajudication of drainage basin districts
based on an exha ustive topographic a nd hydrographic survey. If the piecemeal, incremental, individualistic procedure of previous frontier settlement
was follow ed, the result would be a tragic waste.
He outlined the steps that must be tal<en to realize the full potential
of the arid region, as follows :
1. Select the land to be redeemed.

2. Sele ct reservoir sites.
3 . Select canal sites.

(Both canal and reservoir sites should be

declared public lands

tha~

cannot be sold to individuals or

groups.)
4.

Determine the extent of flood waters in valley sands, and a
method for using them.
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5.

Discover the extent and value of artesian basins.

In order to make the above determinations, an extensive program of scientific
investigation is necessary, said Powell.

There must be:

(a) A topograp hic survey.
(b) A hydrographic survey--to measure rainfall, streamflow and the

"duty" of water (the amount of water needed to service an acre
of land).
(c) An engineering survey--to locate reservoir and canal sites and
estimate their cost.
(d) A geologic survey--to explore the nature and extent of groundwater reservoirs.
In 1888, when he was invited to head the new Irrigation Survey, he had been
chafing to put his program into effect for 10 years.

1

He knew that unless

action was taken quickly to stop unguided development, it would become
impossible to effect the institutional reforms necessary to make the most of
the arid lands.

Pressure from the far West finally gave him the opportunity--

but only after it had been proved over and over that irrigation was the only
re liable way to farm the desert. As Stegner has it, when the opportunity
finally appeared, "Powell rose to the Secretary's letter like a starving cat to
a sardine.

1

11

rts essentials appeared in the 1878 Report.
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The mandate of the Irrigation Survey included authority to examine:
that portion of the United States where agriculture is carried on by
means of irrigation, as to the natural advantage for the storage of
water for irrigation purposes with the practicability of constructing
reservoirs, together with the capacity of streams , and the cost of
construction and the capacity of reservoirs and s uch other facts as
bear on the question. 1
An amendment tacked onto the appropriation bill withdrew from settlement
"all lands made susceptible of irrigation" by the reservoirs and canals which
could be built.

The effect was to suspend all existing land disposal laws for

the irrigable region.
Powell was now "the most powerful man in the United States, so far
as development of the West was concerned." He "had despotic powers over
the public domain." "He could practically distribute the nation 's remaining
resources of soil and water according to this own plan and philosophy." The
Irrigation Survey was " more explosive in its social and political implications
than all his other work combined." It gave him authority to remove public
lands for settlement. One of his first acts was to close down the government
land office.
Major Powell now proposed the end of laissez-faire, the beginning
of government supervision to prevent not only land and water
monopolies but the danger of individual failure among settlers. In
1878, he had advocated cooperative control of irrigation by the
settlers within a natural district. Now he appeared to assume that
only federal intervention could be effective. Government should now
say to pioneers what lands they could settle, and enforce its directives by control of the water. Settlers should now be limited in

1
Stegner, Chapter IV.
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their anarchic personal rights and brought up sharp against a
thing that until now few bad bothered to consider: the common
interest. The justification was the abidi ng aridity of the West.
Indian and Spaniard and Mormon had all been ultimately forced to
community morality. Mutuality was a condition of survival. But
community morality, especially if it was to be enforced by federal
law, was a new and alarming notion in 1889, and especially in the
West. 1
Powell did not make these plans public at first, but they became apparent in
the behaviour of his bureaus.
Powell had a grand design, a General Plan, as Stegner bas named
it, to manage all the land, range, forest, and water resources of the West
from a central authority with regulations based on hydrologic principles.

2

He proposed that political divisions should correspond to drainage basins, not
arbitrary lines, because timber, grazing, and agriculture are all tied
together by the controlling element of water.

The purpose and justification

for this ambitious design was "to guide the development of agriculture in the
'greatest practical area' and to prevent hardships from ill-considered settlement and failure of homesteaders on family-sized farms." From the great
mass of articles, speeches, and correspondence turned out by the Major in
1890, Stegner has summarized his, by that time, thoroughly consistent views
about the arid region:
His plan reached to embrace the related problems of land, water,
erosion, floods, soil conservation, even . . . hydroelectric power.

1
2

rbid.

Hence my earlier (Chapter I) terminology of hydrologic efficiency.
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Behind the plan was a settled belief in the worth of the small
farmer and the necessity of protecting him both from speculators
and from natural conditions he did not understand and could not combat. The key ideas were hammered at over and over in an attempt
to break down tradition and the feeling that it was unpatriotic in a
Westerner to admit that his country was dry. The best and safest
agriculture, and the oldest, was irrigation agriculture. And it was
fatal to believe that tillage altered the climate. . . . Climate
depended on meteorological forces too sweeping to be changed by any
local expedients. And no one shollld expect to reclaim all the western
lands. . . . Water would have to be available, and most of it would
have to come from the large rivers. Dams on these rivers would
have far-reaching effects. Properly engineered, they would protect
from floods--instead of causing them as at Johnstown. They would
allow the reclamation of arid lands on the headwaters and swamp
lands near the mouths, and they would permit a controlled flow that
would prevent wasteful runoff. Also, one of the first needs in the
utilization of these great rivers was a legal one, for rivers were an
interstate, sometimes an international, matter and as yet there was
no clear body of law covering their ownership and use. The best way
to approach that legal question was by first organizing the West into
hydrographic basins which would be virtually self-governing •. .
Inter-basin water law would offer a sound basis for the development
of interstate water law, whe reas to permit development of water by
local franchise was to permit monopoly and waste and peonage of the
small farmer . Moreover, no individllal or company could afford the
enormous engineer-works that were necessary for proper development of the great rivers and the maximum use of water. The ideal
way was cooperation: he would have supported federal construction
only as a preventive of local grabbing . . • Over and over he repeated
and explained and illustrated his thesis that the new conditions of the
West demanded new institutions. 1
But the national ideological pendulum had not yet swung far enollgh.
As Powell's intentions became clear, opposition to them mounted
rapidly from the very sources that had brought him to power. Realization
dawned that he was not going to release any lands for settlement until the West

1
stegner, Chapter IV.
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had been completely surveyed, and, extrapolating from its current pace, it
looked like the survey would take forever.

The western politicians who had

created his Irrigation Survey now found that
by their own act they had instituted federal planning on an enormous
scale, put one man in almost absolute charge of it, and totally
fouled up the local and water interests to whom they were all bound
to give a polite if not obedient ear.l
In spite of an intense campaign by Major Powell to win people to his cause, of
which the three articles in Century Magazine were a part, Congress stripped
him of the power to restrain settlement of public lands.
Without that power he could not implement the General Plan. It was
the major defeat of his life and the beginning of the end of his career. Bernard de Voto assessed the consequences in these words:
"Powell's 1878 Report" is a tragic document . . . if we could have
acted on it in full, incalculable loss would have been prevented.
. . . We did not make an effective effort to act on it till 1902.
Half a century after that beginning, we are still far short of catching
up with it. The twist of the knife is that meanwhile irreversible
actions went on out West, and what we did i~ error will forever prevent us from catching up with it altogether.
Part of the fault seems to be a human weakness for ideological commitment
that retards needed changes in attitude until the period of their maximum
potential has passed.

2

rn his "Introduction" to Stegner's book.

3
Arthur Koestler calls it a delusional streak, and attributes to it
mankind's greatest tragedies . See The Ghost in the Machine (London: Pan
Books, Ltd., 1970).

3
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With a little more luck in timing or perhaps only with the assistanc e
of some s hrewd pollsters , political a na lysts, a nd organizers, existing e l em ents of s upport might have bee n mars halled into a n effectiv e coalition.

As

Stegner says:
It would be a mistake to ass ume that Powell's notions could have
fo und no popular support. They might have found a good dea l in
1889 , for . . . the Populists were beginning to mutte r in terms
close to Powell's in their political and economic significance.
Those "cranks " a nd "radicals" . . . we r e a lready turning for he lp
to the only power which was apparently able to resist or control the
r a ilroads a nd the trusts. Precisely at this Lime as Frederick
Jackson Turner points out, "the defense of the pioneer democr at
bega n to shift from free la nd to legislation, from the ideal of indivi dua lism to the ideal of social contro l through regulation by law. "
But this influ ence, after a brief triumph in the election of 1892 ,
would be considerably de layed in its e ffects , a nd for a long time th e
m an who thought in these ter ms would re main a crank and a crac kpot. . . . The myths s urrounding free land were a mo ng the mo st
durable the nation eve r deve loped . 1
Powell's General Plan co uld have easi ly fit into the Populist pla tform of 1892:
Certainly its purpose of relieving a nd preventing agricultura l distress, extending scientifi c government a id to farmers, and portecting
small landholders aga inst monopoli stic practices and th e inequaliti es
or inadequacies o f the laws, were complete ly in harmony with what
(Ham lin) Garland had preached from soapboxes in Nebrasks a nd
Dakota. It is an ind ex of how little Powell's ideas ha d been able to
e nter the publi c consciousness and how intracongr es sional a matter
hi s defeat really was, that even an awar e a nd militant and experienced
agrarian like Garland had apparently never heard of them. 2
Unfortunately for the Plan, Populism tended to be mostly a movement of the
se miarid plains , whereas Powe ll' s grand design was intended for t he arid

1
stegner, p. 275.
2

lbid ., p. 28G.
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Plateau and Intermountain region .

The Populi sts wo uld ha ve bee n with him in

spiri t; their fro ntier was essentia lly closed.

But in the fa r west the spirit of

s peculation, exp loitation, and rugged indi vidualism still reig ned, a nd it was
the far western politicians who defeated Powell's program.

It took them

a nother decade to realize what midwestern farmers a lready knew--that
Laissez-faire as practiced in the late 19th century did not yield libe rty,
equality, a nd fraternity i n a satisfying degree . "The American yeoman might
clamor for governmental assistanc e in his trouble , but he didn't want a ny that
wo uld m ake him c hange his thinking. "

1

1
The freq uently tragic effects of ideolog ica l com mitme nt is an
important theme of philosophers a nd historians of science. See the following
bibliographi cal e ntri es: William S. Beck, Modern Science and the Na ture of
Life (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books , 1961); He rbert
Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Scie nce, Revised e d. (New York: The
Free Pr ess , 1965); Jacques Barzun, The Hou se of Intellect (New York: Ha rper
& Ro w, To rchbooks edition, 19G1); Garrett Hardin, Nature a nd Man's Fate
(N ew York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 196 1); Erich Fromm,
Escape from Freedom (New York: Hearst Corporation , Avon Books , 1965);
Erich Fromm, Man fo r Himself (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1969);
Erich F r omm, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Pre mier
Books, 1955) ; Herbert J . Muller, The Uses of the Past (New York: New
American Library, Inc., Me ntor Books, 1952); Hom e r Smith , Man and His
Gods (Ne w York: Grosset & Dunlap, Universal Library , 1952); Richard
Hofstadte r, T he American Politica l Tradition (New York: Random House,
Vintage Books, 1948); Richard llofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American
Life (New York: Handom Jl o use, Vintar;e Books, 19G4); Arthur Koestler , T he
Sleepwalkers (llaltimorc, Maryland : Penguin Books, 1968); Jose Ortega y
Gassct, Th e llcvolt of the Masses (N"w York: W. W. Norton & Co m pany ,
1932); J e rom e Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Garde n City , New York:
Doubled ay , Anc hor Books, 1963); Sir ,John C . Eccles, Facing Reality (New
York: Springer-Ver lag , 1970); Abraham Mas low, The Psychology of Science
(Chicago, Illinois: He nry Regncry Co mpa ny , Gateway Edi tion, 1969); Karl R.
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Harper, Torchbooks edition,
1968); Karl R . Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972 ).
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It would be a mistake to attribute defeat of Powell's General Plan to
a simple matter of wickedly stupid ideology against pure, neutral, and holy
science.

Stegner says "Science and Re ason ha ve always been on the side of

Utopia; only the cussedness of the human race has not." This statement is
acceptable only if it is true that there are objective standards of human values,
that they a re the only goals pursued by Science and Reason, and that the
" cussedne ss of human nature " is in large part a refusal or inability to recognize the "true goals " and accept the word of scientists on the most efficient
means for reaching them .

Many notions of utopia are possible; Powell's

vision was of a technological utopia . It incorporated as Stegner says, Powell's
whole knowledge, experience and faith, which was that
all science must eventually be practical; the Scie nce of Earth and the
Science of Man led to the sam e end, the evolving and developing of
better political, artistic, social, industrial, and agricultural institutions, "all progressing with advancing intelligence to secure justice
and thereby increase happiness. , l
This describes a kind of Newtonian vision, very similar to that held by
Brigham Young and his Utah cohorts of the 19th century. It seems to have
been a popular sentiment of that period--a residual of the Age of Reason in
combination with the materialistic optimism of America.

But in John Wesley

Powell it was combined with a conviction that its realization required particular economic and political institutions. His point of view was none the less
ideological for being a technological one--a faith in reason and science.

1

stegner, p. 298.

320
Unfortunately, the requ.ired institutional arrangements clashed with
the popular preference for laissez-faire. Stegner says that
somewhere in Major Powell's small, maimed, whiskery person there
burned some of the utopian zeal of Brook Farm and New Harmony.
His vision of contented fa rmers controlling their own timber, grass,
and water clear to the drainage divides, and settling their problems
by a n extension of the town meeting, is touched with a prophetic ,
perhaps a pathetic, piety. 1
In his essay on " Institutions for the Arid Lands" Powell said that the federal
government should make complete and thorough topographic, hydrographic,
geologic, a nd engineering surveys of the West; then establish local (and state)
governments by hydrographic basins.
Residents of the basins could then organize themselves and cooperalively bu.ild the necessary dams and canals, borrowing outside capital if
necessary.

The rate of return on investment would surely justify it, in

Powe ll 's opinion, because lands of the s unny West are the most productive in
the nation--once they can be watered.

He said of the people already living in

the West that they
are intelligent, industrious, enterprising, a nd wide awake to their
interests. Their hearts beat high with hope, and their aspirations
are for industrial empire. . . . Their love of liberty is unbounded,
their obedience to law unparalleled, and their reverence for justice
profound; every man is a fr eeman king with power to rule himself,
and they may be trusted with their own interests. 2

1
Ibid .• p. 307 .
2

Ibid.

p. 311.
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The critical point in his technological utopia was that it required the engineering of people as well as nonhuman Nature. He fully recognized, from the
model he had seen in Utah, that the kind of West he foresaw required the individual will to be subordinated in part to that of the group.

Institutions for the

arid lands must provide the machinery to ensure conformity.
Powell predicted that unless the machinery of government were
inserted to assure cooperative effort by atomistic units, the future of the West
would be one of gigantic corporate farming enterprises, because of the necessity of controlled water supplies for irrigation.

The following series of state-

menta from his " Institutions " article provides the essence of his argument
and ideological commitment:
In the practice of agric ulture by irrigation in high antiquity, men
were organized as communal bodies or as slaves to carry on such
operations by united labor. Thus the means of obtaining subsistence
were of such a character as to give excuse and cogent argument for
the establishment of despotism. The soil could be cultivated, great
nations could be sustained, only by the organization of large bodies
of men working together on the great enterprises of irrigation under
despotic rulers. But such a system cannot obtain in the United
States, where the lo ve of liberty is universal. [My emphasis.]
The history of two decades of (irrigated agriculture) exhibits this
fact: that in part the irrigated lands are owned and cultivated by
men having small holdings, but in larger part they are held in
great tracts by capitalists, and the tendency to this is on the increase. . . . The farming industries of the West are falling into
the hands of a wealthy few.
The people of the West are e ntering upon an er a of unpara lleled
spec ulation, which will result in the aggregation of the lands and
waters in the hands of a comparatively few persons. Let us hope
t hat there is widsom enough in the statesmen of America to avert
the impending evil.
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Undcr free governments the tendency is to transfer power from
hereditary and chosen rulers to money kings, as the integration
of society in industrial operations is accomplished through the
agency of capital.
Farming corporations and water corporations of the West have often
failed to secure brilliant financial results .
. . Thus there is war
in the West between capital and labor . . . .
l love the cradle more than the bank counter. The cottage home is
more beautiful to me than the palace. I believe that the school house
is primal, the university secondary; and I believe that the justice 's
court in the hamlet is the only permanent foundation for the Supreme
Court at the capital. Such are the interests which I advocate. 1

Thomas Je fferson would have been proud to acknowledge the father of Reclamation as his own ideological progeny.
Although his technologically utopian program did not become a reality,
Powell's inCluence on U.S. institutions and attitudes has been significa nt--and
in the dire ction he seems to have approved.

During his later years in Wash-

ington he was the High Priest of Science, to us e Stegner's term.

His admini-

strati ve energy was responsible for getting the government deeply involved
in science.

It was not a move welcomed by proponents of laissez-faire , ac-

co rding to Stegner:
The concept of the welfare state edged into the American consciousness and into American institutions more through the scientific
bureau of government than by any other way, and more through the
problems raised by the publi c domain than through any other problems, and more through the labors of John Wesley Powell than through
any other man . In its origins it probably owes nothing to Marx , a nd
it was certainly not the invention of Franklin Delano Roos evelt a nd the
Brains Trust. It began as public information a nd extended gradually

1

"Institutions for the Arid Region," Century Magazine, May 189 0.
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into a degree of control and paternalism increased by every national
crisi s and every step of the increasing concentration of power in
Washington. The welfare state was present in embryo in Joseph
Henry's Weather Bureau in the eighteen-fifties. It moved a long step
in the passage of what Henry Adams called America's "first modern
act of legislation," when the King and Hayd e n Surveys were established in 1867 . It had come much further by . . . 189 0, and it would
assume almost its contemporary look in the trustbusting and conser-.
vation activities of Theodore Roosevelt at the dawn of the next
ce ntury. But what Powell and the earlier Adams and Theodore
Roosevelt though of as the logical deve lopm ent of American society,
especially in the West, was by no means universally palatable by
1890--or by 1953. It looked dange rous; it repealed the long habit
of a wide open continent; it recanted a faith. 1
Ideologies change slowly; history provides ample evidence that people would
r ather suffer physically than give up t he comfort provided by their mental
image of what the universe is or ought to be like.
This chapter has shown gradual alterations in a national ideology
during a dynamic century. It has concluded with exposition of a fairly dramatic
change promulgated by one man of extraordinary vision, and the rejection of
that ideological alteration by a people who, though quite accustomed to changes,
were not prepared to keep in step with so bold a leader .
A new perspective on familiar phenomena, sometimes even a
coherent explanation for the diverse phenomena of everyday experience, takes
time to becom e a popular outlook.

More than a century has e lapsed since

Charles Darwin created a consistent explanation for diverse and hitherto
anomalous observations about the variety of living things and the relationship

1

Stegner, pp. 320-3 21.
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of man to other elements of his environment.

ln spite of extensive testing

and overwhelming success in applications since then, the consequences of his
essential ideas for values and social policy have still not become part of the
world-view of Western peoples.

1

The idea of energy as the ultima tely scarce

stuff of the universe and of its control as the common objective of most purposive, scientific activity, has been shared by physicists for over a half a
century, yet in spite of its obvious relevance to their subject, has not bee n
adopted by economists .

2

And although the passage of 200 years and an indus-

trial and technological revolution have wrought fundamental changes on socioeconomic and political institutions, a large proportion of North Americans,
some economists included, still speak as if they believe Adam Smith's explanation of economic society to be an accurate description of reality--or at worst
an ideal of what ought to and easily could prevail.

3

Because most people have

1
Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, trans. Austryn Wainhouse
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971). Monod, a Nobel Prize winner, is
director of the Pasteur Institute in Paris.
2
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, "Energy and Economic Myths," The
Ecologist, June and July, 1975.
3 Lundberg's book, cited earlier, is a best source for this idea.
Contemporary discussion of economic policy in Canada ce nters around implications of the explanation of economic organization proposed by J. K. Galbraith. After several weeks of hot air, neither press ana lysts, politicians,
business leaders, nor directors of economic bureaus seem to have grasped
that a testable explanation lies at the root of the dispute. All treat it as a
matter of social values and political preference, with only the faintest glimmer of recognition that it involves looking at the same old contemporary
events with a different perspective--not necessarily with different values.
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fixed the ir outlook on a n explanation they wish to believe by the tim e they
are 30, it takes a whole new generation, and sometimes s eve r al, to e ffect
a cha nge in popular perspective .

1

1

See John Ziman, Public Knowledge (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1968); and Jose Ortega y Gasset, Man and Crisis (New York : W. W.
Norton & Com pany, 1958), on the sociological nature of knowledge and the
significance of the generation.
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CHAPTER D<
THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: A PRODUCT OF TECHNOLOGIC
AND DISTRIBUTIV E IDEALISM

By 1890, there were over 3, 000,000 acres under irrigation in the
West.

1

1840's.

It began, of course, with the Mormon settlement of Utah in the late

The next extension was the Unio n Colony in Northern Colorado,

established in 1870 under sponsorship of Horace Greeley.

Major irrigation

efforts on the Santa Ana River in Southern California began shortly thereafter.
Golze estimates that total irrigated land in the Western States in 18 70 probably
did not exceed 250 , 000 acres, of which two - thirds was in Utah . Dy 1880 this
had expanded dramatically to about 1, 000,000 acres--all of it in the river
bottoms of western streams.
From 1880 to 1890 there was a speculative boom in irrigation, para!le ling the boom in the Great Plains following the Desert Land Act of 1877.
Stocks and bonds were sold to finance irrigation works,
s uecceded after morlj';age foreclosures and refinancing.

2

some of which
A long with the cxpira-

tion of the general spcculati ve boom, this period of irrigation development
e nded in the ear ly 1890's.

The census of 1890 was the first to gather figures

1

Alfred Golze, Reclamation in the United States (New York: McGrawHill, 1952), Chapter 1.
2

see Hicks on the speculati ve fever that made it easy.
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on irrigation.

It reported 3,361 , 381 acres irrigated.

By that time private

financing of irrigation works was in trouble--partly, of course, because of
the general depression of the 1890's.

It was an age of great faith in laissez-

faire, however, and promoters of irrigation were generally not ready to nsk
for federal financi ng (and its concomitant control) of irrigation projects.

They

asked instead for public lands to be t urned over to the states , who could then
operate their own reclamation and resettlement (see the Carey Act of 1894).
Irrigation remained a strictly private undertaking until the end of the century,
however.
John Wesley Powell's prescriptions and warnings for successful use
of the arid region were m ade when American faith in laissez-faire (and greed
for unexploited resources) was riding high. His warnings of 1879 went unheeded.

But disaster struck both cattlemen and farmers in 1886. A fierce

winter killed 30 to 40% of some herds and was followed by a drought that lasted
a decade.

As a consequence of the drought and hi s earlier work , Powell found

himself in a position to implement his comprehensive plan for land and water
management.

But before he could get it fairly la unched, he had been stripped

of authority by the enemies of planned settlement and government involvement.
Irrigation they wanted, but not if it meant smaller profits for land speculators .
Nevertheless, irrigation's time had come.

The drought crisis of the

late 1880's coincided with the official end of the frontier.

1

see the previous chapter .

It was quite clear

1
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that beyond the lOOth m ericlian agri c ulture was impossible without s uppl emental wate r.

Yet there was still abundant land available and ne ither land

speculators nor believers in the "Garden" myth could stand to admit that it
was use less for agriculture. The r ec ent drought and the short-live d promine nce of Powell's Irrigation SurvPy had convinced both classes that the
remaining frontier belonged to the irriga tor . In 189 1, just 1 year after the
demise of Powell's grand plan, the First National Irrigation Congress was
he ld in Salt Lake City.

Major Powell was invited to address the Second, he ld

in Los Angeles in 1893.

To his clismay, however, Powell found the de legate s

" ta lking as if the whole billion acres of public domain could be irrigated, as
if the whole Wes t could be reclaimed .

The ancie nt myth of the Garden of the

World, climmed by drought and hot wind and dust storms, cam e back green a nd
lush at the first irrigation of hope . ,.l Powe ll set aside his planned speech and
told the m they were mad.

No more than 12 percent of the remaining la nd

could be irrigated; there simply is not enough water to supply the land.

He

was booed . Both of these first Congresses went on record favoring s tate control of irrigation. This could be accomplished, they said, if the federal
government would turn over large amounts of public land to the states.

2

This

position was quite opposed to that of Powell, who maintained from the start

1
stegner, p. 343.
2
Bowman Hnw kes , "Irrigation in t he United States," in Conservation
of Natural Resources , 4th ed., ed. Guy-Harold Smith (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1971) .
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that rational deve lopment (hydrologic efficiency) depended on being able to
direct whole watersheds from one center of government.

It also conflicted

with Powell's democratic ethic , which favored federal control over public
lands to achieve the Jeffersonian ideal.
Powell's foresight has been amply demonstrated, by the Colorado
River hass le alone, and he lived just long enough to see passage of the Newlands Act, creating the U.S. Reclamation Service .

1

Its objective and methods

were those he had proposed with his Irrigation Survey, and its operations
covered the seventeen states of the arid region. Old Powell colleagues and
disciples such as Frederick Haynes Newell, Arthur Powell Davis, and Elwood
Mead were the guiding hands of Reclamation until Mead 's death in office (Commissioner of Reclamation) in 1936.

The Bureau's purposes, as seen by these

men, were Powell's ideals of relieving and preventing agricultural distress,
extendi ng scientific government aid to farmers,

2

and protecting small land-

holders against monopolistic practices a nd the inequalities or inadequacies of
the laws.

1
In spite of its disagreements with Powell's ideas of hydrologic
efficiency, the National Irrigation Co ngress was used by the Powell disciples
to win passage of the Newlands Act of 1902.
2
The Bureau had a paternalistic extension service before the SmithLever Act of 1914 which enabled USDA cooperative extension.
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Conservation Ideology

The 19th ce ntury was a great Age of Expansion.

From the Ag e of

Enlightenment, it inherited a glowing faith in science, technology, and
democracy.

It discovered major bodies of resources in hitherto unknown

places and created the technical means for exploiting them--including transportation, communications, and inte rnational trade mechanisms.

Populations

expanded rapidly in response to r esource availability and better sanitation.
Resource use was profligate. But the discovery a nd exercise of this heady
power over the earth was follow ed very shortly by a growing realization that
there were limits to the earth, a nd that human action, as aided by the new
techniques, was causing very notic eable and long-lasting altera tions in the
earth a nd its desirable resources.

The previous chapter has documented the

thinking along these lines that was occasioned in the United States by the Great
American Desert. ln r etrospect , the Conservation Movement seems inevitable.
It was the reaction of people imbued with fa ith in science and democracy to

profligate a nd damaging resource us e and to growing inequity of resource control.

Reclamation in the United States was part of the outcome of this growing

concern. We have a lready seen the combinati on of faith in science and zeal
for democracy that motivated John Wesley Powell, a leading light in the formative stages of the Conservation Movement, and t he founding father of Reclamation.
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Interpreting conservation in the er a of the WBP
T he Progressive Co ns ervation Movement, of which Reclamation was
the first m ajor component, reintroduced the e lem ent of scientific planning and
bureaucratic cont rol that had been the objective of Major Powell's Irrigation
Survey in the late 188 0's.

1

Its clearly avowed and constantly reiterated pur-

poses were the scientifically efficient planning for maximum us e of all the
resources of the United States, and t he distribution of control over resources
according to the precepts of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian democracy.

The Pro-

gr essives ' m acroscopic, multipurpos e approach to resource management a nd
their co mmitment to atomistic distribution of rights to resource use a nd control does not appear to be contested by a ny of the major writers on the Progressive pe riod.

2

There is a curious element in the product of post-War writers on
Cons ervation, however (except Stegner) . They appear reluctant to acknowl edge or discuss the ve ry broad range of objectives pursued by the Cons ervationists, as if they do not really be li eve that a ll of them were part of a consistent program.

Samuel P. Hays, for example , discounts the e thi cal - politi cal

1
see previous chapter and Stegner .
2
T he re we r e dis senters to this poi nt of view, l ed by John Mui r, who
promoted nature for nature's sake , for natural beauty and mysterious val ues,
a kin to orientalism--q uite different from Newtonianism. But they were not in
powe r. See the collage of views in D. Potter a nd C. Grant, Eight Issues in
American His tory (Glenview, Illinois : Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966) .
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distributive element as mere rhetori c a nd window dr essing.

"Its esse nce was

rational plarming to promote effici ent development and use of all natural
resources. "

1

"One mus t discard completely the struggle against corporations

as the setting in which to understand conservation history." "It is from the
vantage poi nt of applied science, rather than democratic protest, that one
must understand the historic role of the conse rvation move ment. " " The
po li tical implications of cons ervation . . . gre w out of the political implicati ons of appli ed science rather than from conflict over the distribution of
wealth. " Hays asserts that his point of view is a new approach, one that must
be distinguished sharply from the traditional view of Conservation as a struggle
for individual freedom and independence against the rising tide of corporate
gianti sm--the Robber Barons who threatened to turn American democracy into
a new form of Oriental De spotism . This prevailing theory, he says, has been
r e cently restated by J. Leonard Bates.

2

T urning to Bates , we find him ma king the opposite claim .

Cons erv a -

tion in the 20th century has meant to average citizens and government admi nistrators the careful managem ent of natural r esources with e mphas is on efficicncy of use.

Tllis is an inac curate representation of the actual Cons erva tion

1
s. P. !lays, Cons ervation a nd the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge ,
Massachusetts: Ha r vard University Press , 1959) , p. 2.
2

J. Leonard Bates, " Fulfilling American De mocracy : The Cons ervation Movement, 1907 to 1921, " Mississippi Valley Historical Review, June
1957, pp . 29~57.
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Move ment, says Bates.

"The organized conservationists were concerned

more with economic justice and democracy in the handling of resources than
with mere prevention of waste." They repudiated laissez-faire and Social
Darwinism and attempted to build a social conscience . "They had a program
which may be described as limited socialism in the public interest. "
Judgment on which of these writers is more accurate in his assessment of the view of Conservation that prevailed in the immediate post-War
period requires more evidence than was readily available for this investigation, but the distinction they are trying to draw may be futile and pointless.
The Progressive Conservation Movement was comprehensive . It included
both social conscience and technical efficiency, and one need go no further
than these two sources to be convinced.

Bates acknowledges the importance

of the applied science aspect in his opening paragraph, and Hays admits Bates'
critical points in his final chapter on "The Conservation Movement and the
Progressive Tradition." As he will see, leaders of the movement, especially
in Reclamation, were as zealous for democracy as they were for scientific
management.
The tone of resource management discussion since 1950 lends more
credence to Bates' claim than it does to Hays'.
social use of resources
sense.

for~

The emphasis is all on the

and society in the abstract and collective

Distribution of control and ownership privileges to resources is dis-

cuss ed only as it affects the abstract questions of what use, how much use,
a nd when.

The whole modern literature treats national resources as a
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collective endowment which must be managed, in the aggregate, for the common benefit of all the people. But explicit discussion of individual ownership
or control of resources seems to be studiously avoided . Instead of wrestling
with individual rights of access to resources, contemporary a uthors consider
only

the~

that is made of those resources by the age ncies or individuals who

in fact do have control.

They may recommend government policies to change

the use patterns, but not ownership or use privileges.

Instead of rights to the

actual resources, citizens are viewed as having rights to the co lle ctive product of those resources .

That is, they have rights to income and employment.

There is tacit acceptance, apparently, of the existing distribution of ownership or us e privileges .

This approach is typical of natural as well as social

scientists.
It would be interesting to investigate how, when, and why this trans-

formation in perspective took place, for a transformation there has certainly
b een.

From a vigorous faith in and policy for democracy in the early part of

the century, the U.S. emerged from World War II with what Ferdinand Lundberg has aptly described as a feudalistic outlook.

1

Ownership a nd control of

resources is reserved for a few; the great mass of peasants and serfs is cared
for paternalistically.

They may work on the resources owned by the wealthy

a nd receive a s hare of the output in return.

This is a far remove from the

philosophy of John Locke, Adam Smith, Tom P ai ne , Thomas Skidmore, and

1
s ee Lundberg.
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others, who argued that mixing one's labor with land or resources i s the
origin and justification for title of ownership to those resources .

1

Hays argues that the Conservationists (the Roosevelt group) believed
that efficient use of resources for the greatest benefit of mankind lay in a
particular kind of social organization that included atomistic units of resource
ownership within a larger, scientifically plaWled system of control.

Such was

precisely the kind of organization that the Reclamation Service instituted,
invoking the precepts of John Wesley Powell, who had observed the operation
of s uch a system under Brigham Young in Utah.

That is, the Progressive

Conservation Movement, of which Reclamation was a major part, regarded a
particular distribution of resource ownership as important to their grand
objective of the efficient management of natural resources in the interest of
natural resources in the interest of the nation and its people.

It was an

ethical and political judgment, necessarily, but it was also a theory, an
hypothesis.

It was also a legitimate political decision with the venerab le

tradition of Jeffersonian democracy behind it.

Hays' argument does not pro-

vide sufficient reason to ignore the re mnants of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian
tradition; he, therefore, fails to establish that efficient use of resources (in

1

The experience of t he Great Depression a nd the emergence of
Keynsian-type aggregate economic analysis may have played a key role in the
transformation. Keynsianism as a step forward in technology, in energy control, carried with it the usual concomitant of more comprehensive organization and, th us, le ss independence. Surviva l, or at least physical comfort,
was purchased at the expense of some individual freedom.
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the aggregate, abstract sense) was the only objective of the Conservationists'
preference for atomistic ownership.
Hays acknowledges that Theodore Roosevelt had an agrarian bias
that bordered on mystical faith.

He feared social unrest and class struggle

and felt that "independent, property-owning farm families were the major
source of social stability and a bulwark against internal conflict." Roosevelt
also bad •·an almost unlimited faith in applied science. "
He faced two directions at once, accepting the technical requirements of an increasingly industrial society, but fearing its social
consequences. In this sense, and in this sense alone, Roosevelt
sought Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian means. . . . He
considered his irrigation program as one of his administration's
most important contributions. It expressed in concrete terms his
own paradoxical nature: the preservation of American virtues of
the past through methods abundantly appropriate to the present. 1
In this statement Hays has encapsulated the early Reclamation program very
tidily.

He leaves open, however, an inference that it was only Roosevelt who

had this combination of faith in technology and commitment to Jeffersonian
values.

ln fact, it was the faith of the whole corps of prominent Reclamation-

ists from John Wesley Powell through at least Elwood Mead, the first Cornmissioner of Reclamation, wbo died in office in 1936 (Golze) . And the Bureau
of H.eclamation, through its official publications, was still emphasizing the
importance of the small family farm, and antimonopoly in land ownership as

1

Hays, pp. 268-269.
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late as 1946.

1

(Faith in technology burns as brightly as ever in the speeches

of Ellis Armstrong, a very recent Commissioner of Reclamation. )

2

Contemporary writers on resources management are clearly more
comfortable with the Hays interpretation than with the openly ethical and
political judgments that come through so very clearly in the writings of preCold War years . It is as if Hays were performing a task for his whole generation in putting down or explaining away the side of Conservation that the
post-War generation of positive science specialists does not care to look at.
Certainly the efficient use theme, in its aggregate and abstract sense, is
the one that pervades the literature of the last 3 decades (almost).

Hays is

referenced frequently; Bates and Stegner hardly at all. A popular textbook of
this period is that of Guy-Harold Smith, Conservation of Natural Resources.
Now in its fourth edition (1971), the book first appeared in 1950.

The first

chapter discusses the history of Conservation in the United States, ignoring
completely the distributive, democratic element.

The author, Harold Rose,

says there has always been a dualism in Conservation philosophy but identifies
the two sides as those who promoted development a nd use, and those who
favored nonuse.

He calls these the ecologi cal and the economic-technologic

1

See, for example, Bureau of Reclamation, Landownership Survey
on Federal Reclamation Projects (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office , Bureau of Reclamation, 1946). Quotes FDR on the theme (1943).
2
EUis Armstrong, "Wake Up, America!" Remarks delivered at 28th
Annual Convention, the National Limestone Institute, Washington, D. C.,
January 1973.
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schools of Conservation.

1
Another established text defines Conservation as

an endless program of stewardship--the maintenance and improvement of the
fundamental capital of a society.

Neither of these general approaches to the

subject includes mention of what Hays identified as one of the key programs
of the Progressive Conservation Movement--the promotion of efficient use
by means of atomistic ownership.

2

Biologists, geographers, and others

interested in conservation voice varying degrees of criticism of private
ownership in general, as it applies to resource use, but neither they nor
economists grapple with the positive issue raised by Hays.

That is, modern

writers ignore the purely distributive implications of the Progressive Movement, citing Hays as an excuse, but fail to consider seriously the issue that
acceptance of his viewpoint necessarily entails: does a tomistic ownership
promote efficient use of resources, or does it not ?
Conservationists had a utopian vision.
scale for the best interests of all the people.

They wanted to

~

on a huge

This necessarily involved

ethical and aesthetic judgments as well as technological ones. They favored
atomistic ownership of resources, in line with Jeffersonian democracy, plus
overall guidance and planning by bureaus of government scientists. As one

1
Highsmith, Jensen, and Rudd.
2
very few conservation writers of the post-War II era seem to have
a clear idea of their objective. They speak of efficiency but do not specify the
goals they wish to pursue e fficiently . H. Barnett and C. Morse complain of
this also. See Scarcity and Growth (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins
Press, HJG3), pp. 95-97.
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would expect, they were opposed by special interest groups who lobbied and
schemed to have their particular interests advanced regardless of the effects
on society in general.

This was expected by the Conservationists; it was one

of their principal reasons for instituting central government planning and control.

They asserted an ethic where there prev iously had been none.

(Unless

essentially amoral laissez-faire, or might-is-right be regarded as ethics.)
They believed government should attempt to reconcile conflicting interests by
means of a consistent ethic--an overall, collective goal.

They recognized

that resource allocation inevitab ly involves distribution among people, and
they fearlessly announced the distributive ethic they preferred. It was a positive, democratic ethic.
The choice of a distributive ethic is not easy. It is the great problem
of human relations.

The Progressive Movement asserted an ethic . It is an

arguable one as all ethical judgments are.

Against this, special interest

lobbies tried to pry a bigger or different share for themselves through political
means.

There was compromise, logrolling, a power struggle, indeterminately

bounded by the thin veneer of custom, tradition, and constitution that we call
civilization. When civilization breaks down completely, there is nothing but an
amoral struggle for the spoils.

Sooner or later, however, from either fatigue,

stand off, or the emergence of a clear victor, institutions re-emerge to put
limits on the struggle, to give it some system.

The Progressive Movement

was an effort to add a larger element of system and ethics to the amoral
laissez-faire that typified America in the last half of the 19th century.

Its
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success represented a political decision by voters that the revolutionary
atmosphere of constant struggle was not good for man nor the earth.
Hays says the Progressive Conservationists aimed for efficiency. He
did not identify with precision, unfortunately, just what goal they were trying
to achieve efficie ntly.

On one thing there does not appear to be serious dis-

pute among historians, nevertheless. One clear goal that the Progressive
Cons ervationists repeated over and over again was Jacksonian, Jeffersonian
democracy.

They wanted to assure equal opportunity to every family, to

every young male (white?) American. One of the means they saw for accomplishing this was the great, but limited and perishable, U.S . resources
endowment.

Conservation as seen by a contemporary
Walter Weyl, described by Walter Lippman as "by far the best-trained
economist of the progressive movement, "

1

clearly identified conservation with

the main objective of progressivism, which he identified as socialized democracy.

2

According to Charles Forcey, The New Democracy,
summed up progressivism's main drift more thoroughly than any
other work of the time. . . . The first half of his book described
in detail the way the United States • . . Had fallen firmly into the
hands of what he called "the plutocracy" . . . . The New
1

walter E. Weyl, The New Democracy (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., Torchbooks Edition , 1964).
2
see the various interpretations of Progressivism represented in
Potter and Grant's textbook treatment.
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Democracy argued that the frontier experience had greatly
accentuated a rapacious m aterialism that had been part of the
American character from the beginning and, in so doing, had
prepared the way for the lawlessness and greed of the tycoons
of the late nineteenth century. 1
Weyl said,
Some men believe that an eventual democracy . . . will come as
a free gift from omnipotent millionaires. . . . This theory is
idyllic. There is a spirit in America. The new spirit is social.
. . . It involves common action and a common lot. It emphasizes
social rather than private ethics. . . . Indivi dualism struck its
frontier when the pioneer str uck his, and society, falling back upon
itself, found itself. . . . In obedience to this new spirit we are
slowly changing our perception a nd evaluation of the goals of life.
. . . We are ceasing solely to adore successful greed, and are
evolving a tentative theory of the trusteeship of wealth. . . . The
inner soul of our new dem ocracy is not the unalienable rights,
negative ly and individuali stically interpreted, but those same rights,
" life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, " extended and given a
social interpretation. . • . Today no democracy is possible in
America except a socialized democracy. . . . In the socialized
de mocracy towards which we are moving, . . . [government] will
be used to accomplish great social ends, a mong which will be the
more eq ual distribution of wealth and incom e . . . . Today the
c hief restrictions upon liberty are economic, not legal. . . . The
democracy of tomorrow, being a real and not a merely formal
2
democracy, does not content itself with the mere right to vote.
Absolute socialism, of the kind that abolishes all private property, is
not on the horizon for Am erica, said Weyl, because American socialists
recognize that the group of small farmers and shopkeepers is larger than the
industrial proletariat and is not on the decline.

1

Farm ownership is not being

Charles D. Forcey, "Introduction " in The New Democracy, Walter
E. Weyl (New York: Harpe r & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1964), Introduction.
2

weyl, pp. 8- 10.
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supplanted by tenantry; the small farms are not being absorbed by large ones.
Socialists know they must have the s upport, or at least the nonopposition of
this class of property owners.

1

Nevertheless, said Weyl, the goal of the new

democracy is the socialization of industry.
In Weyl's analysis, democracy is not possible without a social surplus . An example of his reasons argues that "in earlier ages, when population pressed sharply upon the means of subsistence, inequalities of wealth
were often the truest national economy. Wealth more evenly divided would
simply have meant more babies." This is a similar argument to one attributed
to an oriental potentate,

2

and to that of J. M. Keynes in "Economic Possibili-

ties for Our Grandchildren. " It is a variant of the argument that inequality in
wealth and income is necessary for economic growth--one that received
important support from the consuming and saving behavior studies that followed in the wake of the Keynesian Revolution. From his perspective in
Britain, in 1930, Keynes believed that "the time for all this [equality] is not
yet.

For at least another 100 years we must pretend to ourselves and to

everyone that fair is foul and foul is fair, for foul is useful and fair is not.
Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. "
But the light Keynes saw at the end of the tunnel was Weyl's social surplus,

1
Weyl cites John Spargo, who wrote an interpretation of Socialism for
America, published in 1909.
2

wm. Paddock and Paul Paddock, Famine 1975! (Boston,
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 19.
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combined with population control, to produce a per capita wealth that could
usher in a golden age of equality, decency, and moral, aesthetic and intellectual advancem ent.

Weyl believed, in 1912, that the time had already come

to begin making the change to more equality in wealth and income.

" For the

indi vidual man . . . the goal of profits (within bounds of law a nd decency) is
legitima te.

For the nation the conception is self-destructive .

. . . The

instinct of individual gain is individually an end, but socially , only a mea ns. "
The Progressives, of whom Conservationists and Reclamationists made an
important part, had their eye on a social goal.

They were not willing to wait

as long as Lord Keynes for a share i n the great social surplus of America .
We yl 's definition of the emergi ng democracy encompassed Conservation.

Opposition to Conservation, he said, arises from fear of government

ownership and operation of resources.

But the th r eat of exha ustion of critical

resources like timber and coal forced a socializing outlook.
Yet despite this threatening dearth, public foresig ht is so utterly
at variance with our former free-handed American practice that
thousands of our conservatives were found to be bitterly antagonistic to cons ervation. Intrinsically, conservation is nothing but
saving; it is the common lot against the looters. . . . In reality
Conservation is opposed, not to use, but to private appropriation,
or at least to unfair, unequal, and wasteful appropriation. Conservation is merely a pplicy of protecting the public interest in
our n ational forests, policy, mines, and water powers. 1
As a consequence of the Progressive Movement, major portions of natural

1

weyl, p . 49 .
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resources were returned to or retained in public trusteeship, and controls
over use were imposed .
Readers will have noted that Wcyl's analysis contradicts Hays' theory
directly.

The " best-trained economist of the progressive movement" (also a

founding editor of The New Republic) definitely did not support atomistic
ownership because he thought it would promote the growth of total social
resources.

He seems, on the contrary, to have shared the view of Keynes

that !_!!equality was an engine of growth.

But he disagreed with Keynes in

thinking that the time had already come to share the wealth among the prese nt
generation and with future ones.

The perspective of a post-war politic an

Most writers on conservation acknowledge that it is a difficult conception to pin down precisely. Prominent place has been given to Hays'
treatment because of its proximity to the rise of natural resource economics
in the post-War period.

Barnett and Morse seem to have accepted his inter-

pretation as authoritative.
tive of Frank E. Smith.

1

At least as convincing, however, is the perspecSmith describes himself as having spent 20 years

inside conservation as journalist, legislator, and agency director.

He says

his book is the first outline of the political history of conservation, and no one
appears to contest the claim. Smith says that during the 12 years he spent in

1
Frank E. Smith, The Politics of Conservation (New York: Random
House, Pantheon Books, 1966).
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Congress (covering the fifti es) , there were more legislators working on
na tural r esources than ever before:
Each of us had his own motivations, part innate idealism, nece ssarily
part self-serving. Mine was the driving need to improve the economy
of th e South . Few of us had a really coherent und erstanding of the
growth of conservation do ctrine and philosophy in the United States,
but most of us rapidly learned that to achieve anything we would have
to master the multiple art that is pork barrel politics. 1
Pork barrel has be come a te rm of opprobrium, says Smith, but
virtually every conservation s uc cess in U.S. his tory is the outcome of pork
barrel politics . Smith declares a decided bias in fa vor of vie\ving conservation as an essential element of the democratic faith of America.
The great conservationists of our history--both the techni cia ns like
Powell, McGee, and Pinchot, and the politicians like the two
Roosevelts and Senators Newlands and Norris--have been more concerned with economic justice in the handling of resources than with
the mere prevention of waste. . . . It is not coincidence that most
m ajor conservation a chieve ments have been associated with political
movements labeled progressive or libera l. 2
It is noteworthy that Smith, whose book comes closest to those
examined to an explicit recognition of what is going on in resources management, still finds it necessary to speak in almost apologetic te rms a bout tbe
process, a nd to reveal through terms like pork barrel and logrolling the sense
of distate that Americans fee l for the way in which they allocate r esources.

1

Ibid ., all quotes from the "Introduction. "
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Smith complains that pork barreling was the

£!!!r way to

get results because

of the "haphazard handling of resource development in both the executive and
the legislative branches of our government." I suggest that the meaning of
this phenomenon is that the United States has never had an accepted system
for handling resource allocation decisions in the sense with which Edmund
Burke, for example, might view a system. Democracy probably implies a
ceaseless struggle for precedence and control, or at least for equality of use
privileges. It does, after all, promise equality. Openly aristocratic systems
have quite a different resource ethic, and most members of society understand and accept it. Democracy must perhaps be perpetually uncivilized in
the American laissez-faire and pork barrel sense until the implied promise of
democratic equality is fulfilled.

As many observers have noted, consistent

thinking has to link democracy with some form of socialism in wealth or income distribution.

The Jeffersonians tried to make this link through atomistic

landownership. It is abundantly clear that the goal of the original Reclamationists was Jeffersonian, egalitarian, agrarian democracy.
never coalesced into a system.

But that goal has

Neither has any other, although we may be

approaching one that resembles feudalism in its critical features.

That is,

control of resources in the hands of a relatively few families, with a relatively
large number of small, peasant freeholders, a large professional caste (the
clergy of medieval Europe), and a great mass of serfs with a paternalistic
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guarantee of a certain income as their democratic right.
not firmly in place either.

1

But this system is

The proletariat is large, vocal, and militant. It

makes demands, and, if well organized, gets them.

The situation is still

fluid; resources are still allocated by means of a naked political power
struggle.
Economic analysis to help resolve allocation contests in such circumstances cannot help but be misleading. For analysis based on market data implies an accepted system when in fact there is none. It is not uncommon for
decision-makers to react with frustrated rage to the conclusions and recommendations of economists (Ellis Armstrong and Eugene Whelan are good
examples).

The reason for their frustration is that their opponents are not

fighting fair, but neither seems to understand just what the problem is.
Economists try to shift grounds, to conduct the debate within the narrow confines of their own reasoning, which presumes an accepted political economic
system--i.e., a market system and given resource endowments.

Politicians

and lobbyists are trying to change the situation that economists wish to
assume as settled.

Land Use Policy in the Age of Ex pansion

The past two hundred years have been an absolutely exceptional
period in the million-year history of Homo Sapiens. It has been an
orgy of expansion and exploitation of irreplaceable environmental

1

see Lundberg.
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riches . We are only a few moments a way from the end of the
orgy . . . which will never be repeated. The rich mineral deposits
lying near the surface, the apparently boundle ss virgin forests, !.he
incredible concentration of marine fishe s-a ll, all will be ~one,
neve r to retur n. The openness of the world will be gone.
The industrial and technological revolution has coincided with the
opening up of major new resources in the Americas , Africa, Australia, and
Central Asia. One of the effects of the revolution is to make it possible for
fewe r and fewer fa rmers to feed m or e a nd more people . This fact is the
single most significant sociological phenomenon of modern times. It bas not
only pro vided the leisure and resources to fuel the knowledge explosion, but
has a lso yi elded urban blight and proletarian dissatisfaction, dissidence ,
violence, a nd despair. Rural poverty has also been one of its concomitant
circumstances . The change in ma n-reso ur ce relationships has bee n so
dramatic a nd dynamic, that socia l and polit ical institutions have never r eally
been able to cope with it.

Edmund Burke was trying to sandbag a tida l wave;

it was vai n to hope t hat old institutions could make sense of th e new realities.
It i s in this context that we must examine efforts to handle the ethical problem

of r e source a llocation.

British and French antecedents of American attitudes
The Age of Enlightm ent gave birth, a long with economics , to the
dream of a rationalist, technological, utopi an society. The American and
l

Garr et Hardin, Exploring New Ethics for Survival : The Voyage of
t he Spaceship Beagle. Quoted in Real Time 2 (Garden City, New York :
Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1973 ), p. 117.
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French Revolutions gave political expression to these ideals . In both
countries, a major plank in the utopian platform was the roughly equal distribution of landed property. In Britain, the democratic revolution was resisted.

1

Instead of extending landownership to the poor, as in France and

America, the process of enclosure that had been going on for hundreds of
years, was accelerated at an alarming rate, along with the application of
science to farming.

This produce d, in Britain, an efficient agriculture and a

tide of displaced, impoverished proletariat.

As the enclosure movement

coincided with industrialization, this army found employment in mines and
factories.

The greed of the landed aristocracy created the urban proletariat

and the wealthy bourgeoisie.

The latter two then combined their forces to

repeal the Corn Laws, removing the privileged position of the agricultural
aristocracy and setting Britain clearly on the road to dependence on nondomestic food and fibre.

Instead of plant energy, Britons burned coal. By

means of the free trading area which she set up, plus her colonial e mpire,
Britain enjoyed her days of dominance in the e nergy binge.

Her problem was

a lways the em ployment-depende nt proletariat. Small wonder that Britain
inspired Marx, the socialist-labor movement, and Keynes.
France, inspired by the radical rationalists and supported by the conservative a uthority of an overwhelmingly agrarian society, elected instead to

1
rnformation for this section is mostly from A. Whitney Griswold,
Farming and Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., Inc.,
1948).
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preserve democracy by means of near equal distribution of land. Democracy,
said the philosophers, can only flourish in a nation of small farmers.

France

pursued this policy at the expense of productive efficiency , a nd in the mid20th century, was still a nation of small farmers.

It was also democratic.

Britain, in the 20th century, was also democratic.

It had become

so in spite of aristocratic landownership . The sheer weight of her urban
proletariat forced democratic reforms out of her ancient institutions.

Britain

pursued efficiency; while France opted for equity. At the dawn of the 20th
century it seems safe to say that Britain's aggregate wealth exceeded that of
France. In the third quarter of that century, the comparison is not so sure.
Perhaps it was not so much the effficiency of her factory system and the ski ll
of her people that made Britain wealthy as the coal that is now depleted, the
cheap surplus food from Canada and Australia, and the industrial raw materials from colonies who accepted a monopsonistic price.
The reaction of two other European peoples to the filling up of their
lands is well known.
an heroic scale.

The Dutch employed reclamation of land from the sea on

The Germans, in good Malthusian form , tried to extermi-

nate some of their neighbors and take over new territory.
American political institutions were founded on the utopian rationalism
of the French Enlightenment, with the important addition of Locke's views on
the ethics of landed property. Jefferson was in full agreement with the French
that an agrarian society is the vital basis of a democratic society. Democracy
was the goal of the Jeffersonians, and they considered the family farm to be a
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critical means to the achievement and preservation of that end .

Locke pro-

vided the philosophical basis for their ethical position that one m a n is entitled
to only as large a portion of the earth's resources as he can effectively husba nd.

The United States was launched with a commitment (on the part of an

important portion of its people at least) to democracy, to small property
ow nership and to farming as the indispensable basis of a free, indepe ndent,
and intelligently self-governed people.

Griswold's book, Farming and Democ-

racy, demonstrates how that ideal was maintained right into the post-World
War II e r a.
since then,

Others have r eviewed its relevance and persiste nce in the de cades
1

and Harold Breimyer observed in 1975 that it is still with us.

The United States commitment to the family farm is still strong and will
probably continu e , he said at an Agriculture Canada seminar in Ottawa,
March, 1975.
Griswold does not conclude that Jefferson was right about democracy
being dependent upon a society of independent, landowning farmers.
the British experience as a refutation of that theory.

He cites

But he does demonstrate

that Am erican society is devoted t o the idea of family farming, and that it has
r epeatedly committed itself to preserving the family farm as a higher goal
than economic expedie ncy or effici ency. The British expe r ience shows what

1
John M. Brewster, " The Relevance of the ,Jeffersonia n Dream
Today , " in Land Use Policy and Problems in the United States, ed. Howard
W. Ottoson (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1963). Also
Harold E. Breimyer, Individual Freedom and the Economic Organi zation of
Agriculture (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 196 5).
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happens if maximum effici ency is pursued, says Griswold, while France
illustrates the extreme opposite policy of subdividing land to the ridiculous
ex treme where even a single vine is r egarded by its owner as his " farm."
American experience has been different from e ither of these.

Most impor-

tantly, its conditions have been vastly different, until the frontier disappeared
at least, a nd American policy has tried to find a point between the two
ex tremes . There must be family farming, but it must be on an efficient scale.
The rushing tide of technological development, resource exploitation,
population expansion, and the social changes they entailed was so rapid that
Jefferson modified some of his own ideas.

But neither he nor his ideologica l

heirs gave up the ideal of independent family farms as the vital base of democratic society.

This included an implacable opposition to absentee ownership

and tenant farming.
Griswold demonstrate s that from the days of Jefferson, the goals of
farm policy have subordinated economic efficiency to social and political
objectives.

He recites the roll of government meas ures from the abolition of

primogeniture and entia!, through the Homestead Acts, to the multifaceted
programs of the New Deal. Reclamation fits into this evolutionary pattern
perfectly.

Its objective was to extend the frontier of land available for s mall

farmers a fter it had apparently run out in the deserts of the West. Strangely,
however, and perhaps significantly, the word reclamation appears only once
in Griswold's text, and not at all in his index.

And in that one case, it is not

Griswold who brings up the subject, but Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace,
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whom Griswold is quoting: "Our homestead and reclamation move ments
we re aimed primarily at putting the agricultural land of the Nation into the
hands of owner-operators." Wallace made this statement while testifying
before Congress in favor of New Deal legislation aimed at encouraging and
promoting the ownership of farm homes.
Technological, demographic, geographic, and social changes have
made agriculture an altogether different kind of thing from what it was when
Jefferson first idealized the family farm . Before the full weight of the Industrial Revolution had made itself felt, the family farm was a subsistence-plussurplus operation. From it directly the family drew virtually all of what it
cons umed and sold or bartered only a relative ly small surplus.

Technological

and commercial development forced a gradual but inexorable shift away from
subsistence and toward complete commercialization, to the point where most
farm families produce neither their own eggs, milk, and butter nor, in many
cases, even their own garden vegetables. Growth of industry-provided
markets, an opportunity for commercial farming.
make mone y from farming.

Those who wished could

Those who may have wished (if there were any)

to have stayed with subsistence, would have found themselves at a distinct
socioeconomic disadvantage not in keeping with Jefferson's ideals. It is
unlikely they would have wanted, therefore, to resist the trend to commercial
fa rming, but even if they had, they would have found it almost impossible
because of the rising value of their property and the necessity of paying taxes
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on il in money.

This is a necessary consequence of industrialization within

a given geographic region with its concomitant population growth .

New Deal poli cies
During 1939, under the leadership of Secretary Henry C. Wallace, the
United States Department of Agriculture undertook a major assessment of the
social and economic state of agriculture, including a review of agricultural
history and government policy. It was published as the 1940 Yearbook of
Agriculture, Farmers in a Changing World. In his foreword, Secretary
Wallace identified the objective of the Roose ve lt administration as economic
democracy and notes that the yearbook is dedicated to presenting facts that
are essential to achieving that end.
In his introductory summary of the Yearbook, editor Gove Ha mbridge
noted that the 1930's had been a decade of unprecedented change in U. S.
agricultural viewpoints and policy.
Yet this decade does not stand a lone as something cut off from
the past. It simply felt the cumulative e ffect of the longer period
of change, beginning near the turn of the century, during which agriculture has been virtually revolutionized by modern scienc e . . .
In the last few years Americans have become aware of a rather
startling fact: A third to a half of the farm families in the United
States contribute little to our commercial supply of food and raw
materials . They have little to sell; they are unable to compete in
the commercial market; they live for the mos t part in great poverty;
many of them are homeles s migrants. They seem to have little
e conomic function. But they produce relatively more children than
any other social group. 1
1

Gove Hambridge, ed., Farmers in a Changing Mood: 1940 Yearbook of Agriculture (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1940),
pp . 2 a nd 4.
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I-lambridge and his contributors credit technological development for this
change (along with sociological problems).

Notice the tone of surprise in

Hambridge's revelation that so great a proportion of farms were subsistence
rather than commercial operations. It suggests that the transition from the
Jefferso nian ideal to commercialization had hardly been recognized in the
19th century binge of private gain and rugged individualism.

Griswold's

references suggest that no major efforts to explore Jeffersonian democracy
as it applied to agriculture had been attempted by social philosophers or
historians before the 1940's--during which time there were several. But
events of the 1920's and 30's, says I-lambridge, made Americans much more
conscious of the word democracy.

"Americans are re - examining their origins

and looking into the meaning of democracy more intensively than at any time
since the Republic was founded." Griswold's treatment demonatrates that the
soul-searching carried through to the end of the decade.
I-lambridge identified the fundamental problem for farm policy and
noted that it pervades the text:
On the one hand we push forward agricultural efficiency, with the
inevitable consequence that fewer people are needed for production;
on the other, we advocate inefficiency, or at any rate tolerate it,
by an extension of subsistence farming as a way to take care of
1
those who are displaced by improved techniques.
Throughout the yearbook this inconsistency is acknowledged clearly as a significant problem that must be resolved.

1

.
Ibld.' p. 3 .

The editor and contributors call
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frequent attention to the need for an explicit policy. Judging by Breimyer's
remarks in 1975, that clear policy has never yet emerged.
One of the contributors, Harvard philosopher, Wm. Ernest Hocking ,
observed that
We have thought we knew what we anted; but we have not always
known what we wanted most : we have lacked a scale of values .
We have been wobbly in our principles--by the way, what are our
principles? We have in short, been in need of a philosophy. 1
While no explicit philosophy has come forth, as Breimyer noted, we have had
policy, and we have had economists.

The policy seems to have been to p r op

up commercial family farms with subsidies, export people from farms to
employment in the cities and, as Michael Harrington would insist, try to
ignore the squalid subsistence group.

The right to an education and to a job

replaced the right to propertied independence. By an ironic twist of fate
(and fossil fuel technology), a property-less, urbanized, dependent prol etariat
became representative of the American way of life, and the advocates of
freedom and independence through preservation of roughly equal property
rights for all, instead of being conservatives of old American traditions, were
branded as radical socialists and communists (Henry Wallace and Rexford Guy
Tugwell among them). In the great mass-consumption orgy of the 1950's and
'60's, economists and laymen alike seem to have convinced themselves that
Keynes and technology assured us of a Golden future--so long as we could

1

lbid .• p. 49.
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avoid nuclear war.

And the policy inconsistency that bothered authors of the

1940 Yearbook seems to have been buried in the same way: make farms
efficient, whether they be family farms or corporate farms.
farmers to the city and either give them a job or a handout.

Export surplus
Concern for

indi victuals was lost in a rush of numerology--people were shuffled around
and aggregated into statistics.

The grave concern expressed in the 1940's

over the importance of property ownership as a source of the stable and
enlightened citizenry necessary for the preservation of democracy seems to
have died away . So long as people had jobs, they were reasonably content,
and the property issue flickered out.
In 1940, the Keynesian prescription had not been thoroughly tested,
although the authors of the Yearbook were fully aware, as one of them noted,
that both classical economists and Marxists prescribed that surplus agricultural labor should be emp loyed in ind ustry.

They were not quite sure how to

provide jobs for the surplus farmers when there was general unemployment.
Several contributors, therefore, speculated on the possibilities for a return
to subsistence agriculture--of a modern variety.

Their comments are in the

same vein as articles in early extension publications of the Bureau of Reclamation.

Farm families should provide as much of their own living as is con-

sistent with a desirable life style directly from the farm.

1

One author noted

1
see , for example , M. L. Wilson, "Beyond Economics."
Wilson was Director of Extension Work, USDA.
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that in the context of surplus farm products, further reclamation would hardly
be advisable if agriculture was to be a predominantly commercial venture.

1

However, if farming was to be a place for the self-sufficiency economy of
redundant population, reclamation at public expense took on quite a different
aspect.

The Reclamation Experience

Reclamation was clearly a land use program, initially, not a corps of
consulting hydrologic engineers or a construction company. Its identification
with water was inevitable becuase the land it wished to provide to the landless
was useless without artificial provision of water.

This fundamental fact is

quite transparent in early publications about reclamation and in the house
organ of the Reclamation Service.

Elwood Mead, one of tbe most prominent

of the second generation of Reclamationists (he died in office as Commissioner
of Reclamation in 1936) , wrote a book on the subject of Helping Men Own
Farms in 1920,

2

in which he analyzed deliberate government programs in

Europe, North America, and Australia that were all aimed at assisting
propertyless people to landed independence.

This idea was maintained, with

difficulty, during the long agricultural depression between the world wars and
1

L. C. Gray, Assistant Chief, BAE, "Our Major Land Use Problems
and Suggested Lines of Action, " p. 412 .
2

Elwood Mead, Helping Men Own Farms (New York: MacMillan
Company, 1920).
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seems to have come back rather strongly toward the end of World War U,
as Griswold's book and his reference demonstrate. An intensive study of
British experience with such efforts was published in the United States while
Griswold was writing his book. It shows the origin of the sentiment for such
policy in mid-19th century movements, especially on behalf of soldiers
returning from war, and assess the success of the effort.

1

The author con-

eluded, like Griswold, that the experiment (1860-1937) had been less than a
brilliant and demonstrable success. After Griswold's 1948 book the subject
seems to have attracted little interest. John M. Brewster revived it in an
article written for a volume commemorating the lOOth anniversary of the
Homestead Act of 1862.

2

He concluded that Jefferson's ideal is fulfilled by

providing opportunities for people, regardless of whether they are in farming,
commerce, or professional sport.

Essentially, this means providing educa-

tional opportunity for rural people. Brewster's program, therefore, is
efficient farming, education for potential urban employment, and economic
growth to provide jobs. It Is the standard post-Keynesian formula.

lnstead

of trying to distribute a limited quantity of resources in an equitable fashion,
it focuses on increasing the aggregate Income from that resource base and

1

Newlin R. Smith, Land for the Small Man (Norningside Heights, New
York: King's Crown Press-Columbia University Press, 1946).
2

Howard w. Ottoson, ed., Land Use Policy and Problems in the
United States (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1963). The
article by John M. Brewster Is called "The Relevance of the Jeffersonian
Dream Today."
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ignores the is sue of ownership control.

The distributive problem is ha ndled

under the head of employment.

lnitial period
A variety of forces contributed to the Reclamation Act of 1902 .

1

The

outcome, nevertheless, was clearly t he establishment of agrarian democracy
supported by benevolent, scientific planning as a goal of policy.
was for homes.

Reclamation

1n its early years, the Reclamation Record bore a shield on

its front cover showing small homesteads with farmers irrigati ng their fields.
After 1914, the Record became a very comprehensive farm journal containing
everything its editors could think of to s upport the ideal of farm home and
community development.

This pattern continued without abatement until the

close of World War I.

After World War I
At that time, Reclamationists propose d a major expansion of the
program to make it national rather than regional.

It would move into cutovers,

1
on this theme, general treatm ents are: William E. Warne, The
Bureau of Reclamation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973); Alfred Golz.!,
Reclamation in the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952); George w.
James, Reclaiming the Arid West (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1917).
Probably significant sources I have not consulted are: William E. Smythe,
The Conquest of Arid America (New York: 1905); Elwood Mead, Irrigation
Instituti ons (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1903); Frederick Haynes
Newell, Irrigation in the United States (New York: 1906); Ray P. Tee le,
Irrigation in the United States (New York : 1915). Excellent short treatments
a r e found in articles on reclamation in the Smithsoni an Annual Reports for
1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1915, 1919, 1922, and others.
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swamp lands, and abandoned farms east of tbe Mississippi and reclaim these
lands as farms for veterans.

1

Money was appropriated for an investigation

of this project by the Reclamation Service, and it got as far as a message to
Congress from President Wilson in 1920.

2

Then, in the summer of 1920,

agricultural prices fell and continued to fall.

This was a severe shock because

there had been a general expectation throughout 1919 and the first half of 1920
that the wartime market for American goods and produce would continue and
even increase . Effective demand proved to be feeble, however, and there
followed 2 decades of agricultural depression and apparently surplus farm
population.

3

In spite of this unexpected setback, dedicated Reclamationists

kept r emi nding themselves that their first goal was farm homes for people;
expanding the national wealth was explicitly and repeatedly relegated to second
place behind this sociological objective.

4

1

c . A. Bissell, "Progress in National Land Reclamation in the United
States," Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1919. See also issues
of Reclamation Record for this period.
2
Hays explains its demise in his Chapter XI, "Congress Rejects
Coordinated Development. "
3
c hester C. Davis, "The Development of Agricultural Policy Since
the End of the World War, " in Farmers in a Changing Mood: 1940 Yearbook
of Agriculture, ed. Gave Hambridge (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1940).
4
see , for example, F. H. Newell, "National Efforts at Home Making, "
Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1922. "Too much agriculture as
a business, and too few farm homes are not necessarily incompatible conceptions," he said. Production of men is more important than production of
money, within reasonable limits .
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It was not long after the summer of 1920 before cries were heard of
"surplus farmers." Farmers on Reclamation projects were hav ing trouble
making the ir repayments to the Reclamatio n Fund and were discontented with
the Service.

They res i sted collection efforts, hoping for a write-off of their

obligations . They c laimed that Reclamation Director Arthur Powell Davis
wanted fast payment so he could finance mor e dams.
element of truth in this.

1

There was, no doubt, an

The nature of the Reclamation Fund put a clear

constrai nt on expansion of the work, a nd its continuation depended on repayment.

In a decade of declining farm prices, finan cing was a critical problem.

It was this dilemma, says Smith, that " finally pushed the reluctant bureau into

recognizing the value of hydroelectric power as a product of reclamation
dams . "

2

Boulder Dam, authorized in 1928, was the first to make open use of

the idea that power users could pay for rec lam ation of land for farmers.

From

that point it was a relatively short step to municipal water sales, conservation, recr eation , etc., as paying partners for the principal objective of making
fa rm homes through reclamation of arid lands.
After the collapse of farm prices, "the whole s tatus of farming as a
business a nd a way of life beca me a matter of serious public concern. " The
outcome, according to Griswold,

1
smith, pp . 167-168.
2
3

Ibid.
Griswold, Chapter 5.

3

was a strong reinforcement of the
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Jeffersonian ideal.

Even the National Industrial Conference Board and the

National Chamber of Commerce concluded in 1927 that farming is far more
significant to the nation than a mere industry.

It is a public function , they

said, and farmers are the "custodians of the basis of national life." Agriculture was accepted as a "special national interest requiring a special public
policy." These decisions were taken during the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era
with the leadership of industrialists, who noted that government bad assisted
commerce and industry; now it was time for the nation to help its farmers.
Until the New Deal era, that help was mostly in the form of parity price supports and the Smoot-Hawley tariff.
An exception to this general rule was the Reclamation program. It
maintained its dedication to the ideal of land for the small man through the
post-War agricultural depression, through the Great Depression, and into the
present era.

(Wm. E. Warne gives Stewart Udall major credit for " holding

the original reclamation line as originally laid down by Theodore Roosevelt
and Frederick Haynes Newell.") Even before World War I, it was recognized
that the ability of farmers to make repayment of constr uction costs in 10 years
was unrealistic, and the Reclamation Extension Aet of 1914 extended the repayment period to 20 years . During the post-War and 1930's depressions,
there continued to be defaults and there were many moratoria on annual payments.

The Fact Finders Commission of 192:!-24 was a step towards

relinquishing the Jeffersonian dream, because it imposed selection standards
on reclamation settlers--including a minimum amount of capital. It also
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closed loopholes that had previously allowed speculators to get rich at the
expense of a program designed to promote small family farms.

In 1938, a

Repayment Commission made recommendations that lead to the Reclamation
Projects Act of 1939, wltich is still a basic part of reclamation law . By that
statute, there is a 10-year development period during wltich no payment on
construction is required, and after that there is a 40-year repayment period.
Since that time, there have been no defaults in water-user payments, according to Warne.

1

In the Great Depression

In the New Deal era there was a great expansion of reclamation
activity, which was due only in part to the pump-priming objectives of the
Public Works Administration.

The idea of reclamation as land for the small

man was also given strong and explicit support by Franklin Roosevelt and his
new generation of democratic idealists.

The Jeffersonian family farm was an

explicit ideal of this group, which included Henry Wallace, Jerome Frank ,
Thurman Arnold, Abe Fortas, Alger Hiss, Adlai Stevenson, and Rexford G.
Tugwell.

2

Land reform, says Baldwin, was one of thei r chief objectives .

1
william E. Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1973), pp. 62-64.
2
Sid ney llaldwin, Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the
Farm Securi ty Administration (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of
North Carolina Press, 1968).
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The Farm Security Administration (Farme r 's Home Administration
after 1946) was established as the agency responsible for coordinating the
national effort to preserve the family farm.

Griswold says that the establish-

ment of the FSA (1935) and passage of the Bankhead-Jones Act (193 8- -loans to
farm tenants and dispossessed owners) confirmed in both law and political
philosophy that the United States had elected to defend that agrarian way of
life and the family farm against economic pressures.
social r ehabilitation.

The goal of FSA was

"It represented a decision not to let economic and

technological trends run their course, as the British had done, but to resist
them." Griswold quotes Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace, testifying
before Congress in favor of the Bankhead-Janes Act:
Our homestead and reclamation movements were aimed primarily at
putting the agricultural land of the Nation into the hands of owneroperators. . . . But we failed . . . to such an extent that a large
proportion of our best farm land fell into the hands of speculators
and absentee landlords. Today we are faced with the problem of
stem ming the tide of tenancy, a nd reconstructing our agriculture in
a fundamental manner by promoting farm ownership among the tillers
of the soil. 1
The bill's title said that its purpose was "to encourage and promote the ownership of farm homes and to make the possession of such homes more secure . "
In 1943, the Administrator of FSA told a House Committee that the one central
purpose of the agency was "fostering property ownership by family-type

1

Griswold, p . 165.
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fa rme rs and thereby preserving and strengthening the traditionally American
family-type of farm operations."

Holding the line
Although the powers of Reclamation to promote agrarian democracy
were checked in the early 1920's, its objective did not change. It was reaffirmed in the 1946 Survey of Landownership on Feder al Reclamation Projects
(Bureau of Reclamation) . In the year that the Weber Basin Project was
authorized, Harry Truman said that "irrigation waters should serve family
farms a nd not land speculators. ,. l As already noted, Stewart Udall gave strong
s upport to the 160-acre limitation. In his commentary on current challenges
to Reclamation, Warne made this obs e rvation:
The federal reclamation program was adopted in 1902 because .P!!vate and state irrigation developments were absent or failing. . . .
The 160-acre limitation was the price the fede r a l government
exacted in the interest of its homemaking policy for providing irriga tion projects in the West. To sacrifice the 160-acre limitation .
would be a complete negation of national policy. 2
The same is true of the subsidization of irrigation by hydro power and
municipal water users. Reclamation alone was unable to meet the Jeffersonian
objective, and other measures like FSA, administered by the Department of
Agriculture, were brought in as supplements to it.

l

2

Warne, p. 19.
Ibid., p. 225.
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"Times changed" in the early 1950 ' s,

1

howeve r, with the advent of

renewed agric ultural surpluses, McCarthyism, and a Republican admi ni stration.

Support for the ideals of Wallace, Tugwell, and their cohorts of the

New Deal withered away in the face of unsalable commodities and the Red
scare. 2 USDA programs of the 1950's took on a qulte different complexion.
Reclamation clung to the old Jeffersonian idea, however, if only because it
was written into its enabling legislation.
Public awareness of the Jeffersonian intent of Reclamation seems to
have declined to such a degree in the post-Truman era that it is not even a
part of the standard literature of natural resource economics.

3

Resources for

1

This was the explanation given by a veteran farmer of the Lake Plains
region when asked why there was no interest in reclamation farming there (with
water from the Willard-Layton system).
2

contrast the well-known views of Ezra Taft Benson, for example, to
this statement of one of his church colleagues, who made it in the days of
Chamber of Commerce support for assistance to agriculture , just a few years
before the inauguration of FSA: (Levi Edgar Young on "Irrigation" in The
Improvement Era 31, No. 12 (October 1928): 999.)
The work of the Reclamation Service is founded deep in democracy
and the needs of the common people, for it gives the lowliest,
poore st, and humblest the opportunities to have homes and the
comforts of life for themsel ves and the ir children. The reclamation
work, as fostered by government, is the first example in the history
of the world where irrigation works of gigantic magnitude have been
built for the benefit and profit of t he people. The people are to own
and maintain them. Land is not to be the property of the few, but of
all the people. Herein is American democracy expressing itself as
never before in history .
3
r talked about this with A. N. Halter in February of 1975. He professed genulne interest, and said he had just learned that the same distributive
element was the primary purpose of TVA--a fact not normally accounted for in
economic analyses of the TVA.
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the Future, as a major contributor to the field, has perhaps been responsible
for part of this shift in interest. As its title suggests, the focus of RFF has
been quite different from the Jeffersonian, distributive ideals of the Progres sive Movement and the New Deal with which Reclamation is impregnated.
When a perspective typical of the RFF approach is brough to bear on a situation
like that of the Weber Basin Water Cons er vancy Dis trict, the outcome is proposals for action like those of Appendices I and III.
Although evidence for the r e distributive thrust of Reclamation is
abundant and widespread,

1

a succinct but comprehensive review is available in

Part 3 of Landownership Survey on Fede ral Reclamation Projects .

The rele-

vant section is entitled "The Historical Background of Reclamation Law a nd
Policy with Respect to Excess Land Limitation."
Distributive idealism has not been the only motivation behind reclamation, however.

Part of its appeal has be en an optimistic vision of technological

utopia and a liberal element of interstate greed, logrolling, and pork barrel
politics.

These elements have already been foreshadowed in Chapter VIII.

Chapter X will expose them a little more completely in examining the political
lobbies that have been associated with reclamation.

1

See, especially, Smithsonia n Annual Reports and the house organ of
the Bureau of Reclamation (progressively titled Reclamation Record, New
Reclamation Era, and The Reclamation Era).
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CHAPTER X
THE RECLAMATION LOBBY

A Western Organization

The National Irrigation Congress was introduced in Chapter IX as an
important Western lobby for Reclamation. It was composed of western boosters, men whose interest in seeing the desert blossom was at least as fiscal as
it was esthetic or technologic.

They wanted public lands turned over to the

states, where it was easier for local interests to control them.

When they

could not get that control away from the more powerful eastern establishment,
they settled for federal reclamation as next best.

George H. Maxwell, an

Arizona-bred lawyer, is credited by historians for having guided the National
Irrigation Congress to tbis position.
The leading Reclamationists, and their Conservationist allies , were
visionary, zealous do-gooders.

The rank and file of the lobbies they orga-

nized had understandably narrower, self-interested perspectives.

Western

interests wanted federal investment because it was necessary to make western
resources valuable.

They supported the visionary leaders whose objective was

a technological and humanitarian utopia. Those leaders were able to sell
Western reclamation to the controllers of the nation's purse-strings, at least
in part on the strength of their democratic and self-help ideals.

The price that

Western interests had to pay for this transfer of wealth was the 160-acrc
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limitation.

1

That limit was imposed by the eastern establishment to conform

with the vision they bought from Powell and his heirs --a vision that conformed
to a long-cherished Jeffersonian ideal.
George W. James included a dedicatory page (seep. 371 of this
paper) in his 1917 book, Reclaiming the Arid West.

This effusive tribute

epitomizes the attitude of the people it praises, who were the first generation
of reclamation boosters.
Act.

They did not stop with passage of the 1902 New lands

Their goal was human control over the total fresh water resources of

the nation.

They extended Powell 's notion of hydrologic efficiency to the whole

continent.
Senator Newlands worked tirelessly toward coordinated, multiplepurpose river development until Congress finally gave it a firm rejection by
adopting the Water Power Act of 1920.

2

George Maxwell organized people

interested in controlling the lower Mississippi (flood control and swamp
reclamation) into the Louisiana Reclamation Club, in 1912 . Hays says that
this organization was the seed that grew into the National Reclamation Association, which carried the fight for the New lands proposals.

3

Especially after

1914, the Reclamation Record featured many articles by Newell, Davis, and

1
This is an hypothesis suggested by what I have read. Warne supports it explicitly. It needs to be tested by historians.
2

see Hays, Chapter XI, "Congress Rejects Coordinated Develop-

ment."
3

His only support for this is 1912 minutes of the group. It is probable
he has made a mistake on the NRA connection.
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George W. Jam e s, Reclaiming the Arid West (New York: Dodd,
Mead, a nd Company, 1917), Dedicatory page.
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other prominent Powell disciples about extending the democratic reclamation
idea to swamps and cutovcrs, to provide farm homes for the sturdy and
independent people on which the national life was deemed to depend. Soldiers
returning from the World War were one of their principal concerns.

Veterans

deserved a grant of land--by an old European-American tradition. But there
was no more to be had, except as Reclamation created it.

Rejection of the

Newlands measure seems to have been a defeat for the democratic aspirations
of the promoters on James' list. Given the pork barrel nature of such decisions, it is possible that the equalitarian ideals lost out in the collision of
private interests.
There is an element of confusion, or at least inconsistency, between
Hays and Warne . As noted in the previous paragraph, Hays said that the
Louisiana Reclamation Club was the nucleus of the National Reclamation
Association a nd that the NRA spearheaded lobbying support for the Newlands
bill.

Warne's treatment, which is more consistent with other evidence

examined, portrays the NRA as a western organization put together by western
governors to support the Bureau of Reclamation projects. Warne says that
Elwood Mead took a leading part in organizing the NRA because the National
Irrigation Congress, which played a major role in winning tbe Reclamation
Act of 1902, had by the 1920's become fractionated a nd divided to the point
that it was no longer an effective support for reclamation in general. It is
quite evident from Reclamation Record thnt the same old private interests that
had inspired NIC members in the first place destroyed its support of the
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Reclamation Service. Instead of helping to expand the reclamation program,
the Irrigation Congress turned its attention t.o destroying it by calling for
cancellation of the indebtedness of reclamation farmers to the Reclamation
Fund.
As the National Irrigation Congress declined in interest and potency,
other reclamation boosters came forward.

Warne says they included rail-

roads, chambers of commerce, newspapers, irrigation project developers,
and various civic and political clubs with local boosterism as their aim.
"These groups freq uently shifted their interest from the general philosophy
of federal support of Western development through the construction of irrigation projects to the promotion of specific project proposals in their sectional
spheres of influence. "

1

Reclamation has been a high priority for many

Western senators, says Warne, and he gives a list of names.

The importance

of senatorial support for reclamation is reinforced by the records of Utah
water promotion organizations .
Warne says that when Elwood Mead, as new Commissioner of
Reclamation in 1924, found that he could not count on effective support from
the National Irrigation Congress, he "called upon Western governors to help
him organize the National Reclamation Association." The railroads, cham bers of commer ce, and other boosters rallied around, Warne adds . New

1
warne, pp. 190-191.
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Reclamation Era supports Warne on this.

1

As Warne suggests, support for

reclamation was available but was not represented in the National Irrigation
Congress . Evidence for this other support is provided in the Reclamation
Record, house organ of the Bureau. It reported a meeting in November of
1919,
way.

2

just as the agricultural and reclamation crises were getting well under

Delegates from thirteen western states (excluding North and South

Dakota, Kansas, and Oklahoma) met in Salt Lake City at the call of David
Davis, governor of Idaho.

w.

They formed a "permane nt" organization to he

called the Western States Reclamation Association, and assessed dues to each
state, ranging from $1,000 for Nebraska to $4,000 each for Utah, California,
and Texas.

Perhaps not all of the delegates were governors and so could not

actually commit funds for their states, for not many traces remain of the
Western States Reclamation Association. Shortly thereafter, Reclamation
went into eclipse and was almost terminated.

That the WSRA had some effect,

however, seems probable from the fact that David W. Davis was appointed
Commissioner of Reclamation as of July 1923.
The 1920's agricultural crisis hit reclamation farmers very hard.
Their fixed payments were relatively high compared to those of other farmers
because their lands were recently and expensively acquired. As the depressed

1

see issues of 1929 through 1932, New Reclamation Era replaced
Reclamation Record as house organ after the 1924 reorganization of the Bureau.
2
January 1920.
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level of commodity prices most of the m simply could not meet a 20-year
repaym e nt schedule. In January of 1923 , the F ederated Association of United
States Reclamation Project Water Users was formed at a meeting in Salt Lake
City.

1

They were one of several groups whose purpose was relief from pay-

ments, e ither by moratoria, longer r epayment schedules, or other schemes.
There were some temporary moratoria granted during the early 1920's, but
by 1923 it was becoming clear that the agricult ural d epression was not going
to fade away in the near future.

The idea of r e clamation was challenged

because it was an expensive duplication of already redundant agricultural
resources. Reclamationists responded to this by insisting that the products
of reclamation farms were not the commodities affected by farm surpluses ,
and that besides, Reclamation was of overriding importance as a home builder,
as a breeding and training ground for the class of people on which the national
life depended.

Economic efficiency, in their view, must take a back seat to

the higher values of Jeffersonian, Jacksonian democracy.

1
2

2

Reported in Reclamation Record, February 1923.

Reclamation Record for July 1923 reported a speech given by
President Warren G. Harding in Spokane: Wise development of natural
resources does not result in disastrous diminution--it expands them . This is
especially true of water resources, he said. The public domain should , therefore, not be thought of as a treasure house of potential wealth to be locked up
against the day it is needed. Such a policy would prevent it from being ready
when needed. (There are many statements associated with Reclamation that
imply a refusal to accept the idea of scarcity.) Harding affirmed that his
party stood for independent family farms as the proper use of Western land.
It was not to be the prey of bonanza corporations seeking to exploit it for
stockholders living elsewhere.
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Early in 1923, Albert B. Fall fell from grace and was replaced as
Interior Secretary by Hubert Work.

By June, Work had persuaded Reclama-

tion Director Arthur Powell Davis to resign, and installed David W. Davis
as the first Commissioner of Reclamation.

Work then called together a group

of sympathetic, well-informed agrologists, politicians, and promoters to help
him find a way to save Reclamation.

Called the Fact Finders Commission,

its members included:
Julius Barnes, president United States Chamber of Commerce
Oscar Bradfute, president American Farm Bureau Federation
James H. Garfield, former Secretary of Interior
Elwood Mead, engineer and author of books on irrigation and
reclamation
Thomas E. Campbell, former governor of Arizona
David W. Davis, former governor of Idaho and Commissioner
of Hcclamation
Dr. John A. Widtsoe, former president of University of Utah and
Utah State Agriculture College 1
The Fact Finders made their report in April of 1924, and Elwood
Mead was named Commissioner of Reclamation immediately thereafter.

In

the meantime, after a stormy career with Reclamation, Frederick H. Newell
retired in November 1923.

He and A. P. Davis had opposed repayment

extensions, moratoria, etc., a nd after 1912 were frequently under fire for
being more interested in building dams than in forwarding the Jeffersonian
ideal of Helping Men Own Farms (the title of one of Elwood Mead's books) .
Hays says that the Wilson administration was more sympathetic to water users'
problems than the Bull Mousers had been.
1

Wilson's Interior Secretary,

The Reclamation Record, September 1923.
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Franklin K. Lane pr9.ised the construction work accomplished by the Roosevelt
crew, but accused them of callousness toward the '"human problems" involved.
"They did not realize that, primarily, these lands were being reclaimed for
human occupation.

They were interested in making wonderful clams and

reservoirs--not in making the people industrious and contented. "

1

Tbe Wilson

administration extended the repayment time from 10 to 20 years and removed
F. H. Newell from the Reclamation Service (a nonpermanent change, as it
turned out).
Either there were some communication problems (or simple political
hay-making) or Newell was a smooth liar, because some of the most fervent
statements in support of the Jeffersonian ideal were written by him--including
one of the best of thos e quoted in the 1946 Landownership Survey on Federal
Reclamation Projects (cited above).

Regardless of reasons, the first genera-

tion of reclamation leaders was out, in 1924, and Elwood Mead, who had been
waiting all the while in the wings, was in.

The major change in reclamation

that followed the Fact Finders Commission was greater care in selecting
projects and settlers.

It was the beginning of benefit-cost analysis, however

primitive, in preproject planning.
not muted in the slightest degree.

2

The ideal of helping men own farms was
There was an admission, however, that not

1
Hays, quoting Lane, p. 248.
2
Articles on reclamation economics and project feasibility begin to
appear in New Reclamation Era immediately after Mead's installation.
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all men are capable of the e ntrepreneurial effort required to succeed on a
high-cost reclamation farm in an age of commerc ial (as opposed to subsistence) agriculture.

Creeping technologic necessity was starting to nose out

atomistic idealism.
By 1929, reclamation was under attack as a "'racket," and in July of
that year western governors, congressional delegations, and Interior Department representatives met in Boise to plan a defense.

The next month Western

governors called a conference in Salt Lake City, inviting interested people
from all over the West.

They made a propaganda counterattack, aimed at

eastern and midwestern business interests whose market included western
farmers.

Similar conferences were sponsored by the Western governors in

1930 (Salt Lake City) and 1931 (Portland) . Their efforts were not meeting
with much success, as they depended on the proselyting efforts of individual
delegates.

The Reclamation Fund was virtually exhausted and more aggres-

si ve action was imperative. In 1932 they met again in Salt Lake City and
committed themselves to state financial support of a national lobby- -the
National Reclamation Association was born in utah in 1932.

1

Now that the seventeen states of the arid region were committed to a
group effort, supporting paid lobbyists no doubt, they had to fight within the
organization for NRA support of their own state programs . They were a l ready

1
lnformation in this paragraph is mostly from Golze's Heclamation
in the United States, p. 84 .
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locked in conflict over allocation of the existing water supply among themselves, so it is not difficult to understand why a clear threat of losing federal
reclamation altogether was necessary to bring them together in a united
effort to salvage their common pork barrel. Instead of fighting openly among
themselves before Congress, they hoped to further their cause by presenting
a united front.
themselves.

This meant bashing out some common recommendations among

Each state would have to lobby with the NRA, as well as with

Congress, if they were going to get anything out of the common effort.

That

is why local promoters have been heard frequently emphasizing that Utah must
hustle to make sure of getting its fair share (Benefit-cost analysis of potential
projects is more a method of ranking projects than an either/or decision.

It

is a question of when rather than whether, and even then, as Warne acknowledges below, lobbying strength is the most significant element in the final
decision.)
Several kinds of motivation have clearly been a part of Reclamation.
There are the democratic-egalitarian-yeoman farmer ideal, technological
purposiveness or the dream of the blooming desert, and interstate conflict
over water rights and federal resources (with which may be included chamber
of commerce growthmania and other manifestations of economic self-interest. )
If technological purposeiveness may be expanded to include a measure of self-

interest, one can infer a theory of behavior for scientific bureaus (including
universities).
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All of these motivations are evident in the history of Utah water
development, although the Jeffersonian ideal is very well muted in the postWorld War II traces.

The hypothesis about bureaucratic behavior suggested

in Appendix II finds support in other Utah experience.

Technological pur-

poseiveness in the urge to make the desert bloom has been strong. Interstate
conflict over the Colorado River has been a major preoccupation of Utah water
hustlers in this century.

The background of most Utahns made them partie-

ularly susceptible to success on reclamation projects because they were
already accustomed to the degree of regimentation and cooperation necessary
for "life under the ditch . " A curiosity is that Mormons emerged from a highly
centralized environment and embraced the 19th century ethic of rugged individualism at the precise moment when the reclamation movement was accepting
the necessity of government sponsorship and control.

1

In fact, the social

program of reclamation as set out by Major Powell was borrowed from what
he observed of the Mormon experience in Utah, according to Wallace Stegner.

The Utah Lobby

As with other states of the arid Mountain West, most of Utah's
precipitation falls on her mountains (80 to 90 percent).

2

Climate and

1
r have commented more extensive ly on this anomaly in a paper prepared for the 1975 conference on Economics and the Mormon Culture at
Brigham Young University: "The Nature and Significance of Mormon Political
Economic Thought. "
2
rnformation in this paragraph is from a report tabled by George D.
Clyde at the September 1949 convention of the Utah Water Users Association.
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topography of the high mountain valleys limit their agricultural applications
severely, and heat and aridity constrain the uses of the lower valley fioors.
But water from the mountains plus the dependable sunshine and flat alluvial
plains of the valleys make a highly productive combination. Early Utah
settlers therefore looked for a permanent stream issuing from the mouth of a
canyon. There they laid out fields and built a town.

Late season flow

dictated the maximum acreage of crops requiring full-season irrigation.
Small groups cooperated to build ditches and divert the stream for tbeir
mutual use.

Such projects were not terribly expensive (but wasteful, in upper

valleys, said Powell) and could be built and maintained by the efforts of the
cooperating farmers, their animal power, and eq uipment.

Irrigation com-

panies in Utah are still dominantly small, coope rative, mutual companies
(1949).
By 1900 all such easily exploitable water sources were used up where
suitable land was available.

Further expansion of irrigated acreage or a full-

season water supply to currently irrigated acreage would require entrapment
of early season flows for release in late season (or development of groundwater, which UWUA minutes rarely mentioned).

This would require building

large dams in the mountain valleys or canyons, a nd was too ambitious for all
but a few hardy groups.

Consequently, there was very little expansion of

irrigated acreage in Utah between 1900 and 1949.
about through federal reclamation projects.

What little there was came

382
Compared to some of her neighboring states, Utah had very little
action in the early years of the Reclamation Service. Strawberry Reservoir
was one of the earliest Reclamation projects, begun in 1906, but except for
the Weber River dam begun in 1927, it was the only one started in Utah until
after the depths of the depression.

1

Perhaps it was because Utah felt no

pressing need for more land or water; no doubt a good many of her native sons
took on new homesteads in neighboring states with large Reclamation projects.

Whatever the reasons, perhaps obsolescence and decay of existing

irrigation works, Utah began to take an active interest in the 1930's. Judging
by the sudden accretion of reclamation projects at that time, Utah found its
dues to the NRA worthwhile. Interest in rehabilitating, improving and increasing water supply facilities picked up.

Dry years in the 1930's, a water

shortage in Salt Lake City, and some bad spring floods ca used by overgrazed
watersheds probably contributed to it.
Some lobbying groups no doubt got underway in the 1930 's, but effective organization for action was not really operative until the end of World
War II.

2

By that time inadequacies that began to appear in the 1930's may

1

2

Hyrum -1934
Ogden R . -1934
Sanpete -1934
Source: Reclamation Project

Provo R. -1938
Newton -1941
Scofield -1943
Data, 1948.

whe n this era for the founding of the UWUA was mentioned to him,
DeLore Nichols snorted that "it's a lot older than that." He also says that
the DCWUA was born out of the Davis County Correlation Committee of the
1930's. While technically inaccurate, his view of the antiquity of a group
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have become more generally obvious. Before the war was finally over (late
1944) the Utah Water Users Association (UWUA) had been created by an act
of the State legislature. It was the successor to an earlier organization called
the Utah Water Storage Commission, and was charged with promoting and
coordinating water development activity in the State of Utah . An accompanying
law enabled county governments to appropriate money for the support of the
UWUA and its activities.

There was also a special fund for use of the UWUA

set up in the State Engineer's Office.

The first objective of the UWUA was to

organize a water users association in every county so that the State would
have recognized groups to work with in every political jurisdiction of the State.
Counties having common water interests were grouped together into districts.
Originally there were six districts, each of which elected at least one director
of the UWUA (note that the Davis County Water Users Association dates from
1945. Davis County was in District 2 of the UWUA, along with Weber, Box
Elder, Morgan, and Cache).

The twelve-man Board of Directors had an

advisory committee of twenty-five prominent Utah water promoters.

The tax

support for the UWUA had to come directly from the boards of county commissioners. If the commissioners tended to forget, (and even in counties like
Davis and Weber where considerable water development was taking place, the
commissioners were not always enthusiastic supporters) the county water

similar to the UWUA (no doubt composed of the same people) is consistent with
the nature and origins of the NRA in 1932. (Personal communication, 1971.)
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users association was expected to apply pressure on the commissioners to
pay up.
Once county water users were organized, each was assigned to make
an inventory of water resources in its county and a priority list of development and conservation measures needed to achieve more efficient use of the
available water.

"Orderly development, control and use of the State's water

resources" is an obligation of State government and the UWUA was recognition that some action was needed to discharge it.

1

Many old water supply

facilities were badly run-down, obsolescent, inadequate.

The urban area

along the Wasatch Front had begun to grow rapidly, and municipal water
works were also run-down and inadequate. A resolution of the UWUA in 1950
declared that three-quarters of the state's irrigated land needed supplemental
water (mainly for the late season). These supplies could be made available
through medium sized construction projects such as lining canals, installing
pipelines, building small reservoirs, and other salvage and conservation
operations. Suth r ehabilitation and improvement projects were beyond the
reach of private capital resources and were not eligible for Bureau of Reclamation development.
With its inventory of projects in hand the UWUA designed an agency
to build them and lobbied it through the state legislature. It was called the

1

Policy statement of UWUA written by G. D. Clyde, J. A. Howell,
E . J . F jeldsted, 1949.
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Utah Water and Power Board and was given a $1 million revolving construction
fund.

Water and Power Board members were nominated by the State Water

Users Association, and the UWUA made the priority ranking of projects for
the Board to undertake.

1

Water users from every county were therefore

required to thrash out some agreements on priorities at the level of the state
association . The UWUA lent a strong guiding hand to the UW&PB in its early
years--several men sat on the Boards of Directors of both organizations
simultaneously. It was eventually decided (on the advice of Judge J . A. Howell
of Ogden, a founding member) that the UWUA was a lobby while the UW&PB
was an arm of the state, and the practice was terminated.
We have seen that the DCWYA was given birth through the UWUA, the
UWUA through the State of Utah, and both through concerns of national (at
least western) scope. Records of the DCWUA and the D-WCMWDA contain
little indication of the philosophical position of participants, although they a re
valuable for the day-to-day operations and tactics of a water lobby, as demonstrated by the us e made of them in Chapter IV and Appendix II. But the idea,ls

1
Jt is interesting that most of these projects were designed to
rehabilitate old irrigation structures. This suggests a question about how the
structures were financed originally. W.1 s it by private savings, cooperative
effort, or state funds? If they were not state-financed initially, why was state
effort necessary to rehabilitate them? Had the real cost increased beyond the
scope of private effort, or had the return on additional investments in more
water facilities fallen below that of other opportunities for private savings?
That is, was the UW&PB a manifestation of creeping, technological necessity,
or of water hustling insistence in spite of redundant facilities?
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and attitudes of the local obbyists can be read out of minutes of the UWUA, for
they we re essentially the same people (E. J, Fjeldsted, J. A . Howell, DeLore
Nichols, a nd D. D. Harris, for example, are names that frequently appear in
all three records), and the state association frequently served as a forum for
policy deliberations .
According to Clyde's report of 1949, irrigation e ffi ciency then averaged only 25 to 30 percent. One-half of the water diverted from streams was
being lost before it ever reached farmers' headgates. Raising efficiency by
only 50 percent, said Clyde, wo uld be the e quivalent of adding 1, 000,000 acre
feet per year to the water supply.

This could be accomplishe d by means of

conc r ete linings, covers, pipelines, etc., and further efficiencies could be
realized through applied research into plant, soil, and water relationships,
drainage, and distributional ins titutions. Beyond the se efforts to make better
use of existing supplies, the only way to get more water , said Clyde, is
thr ough massive federal reclamation projects.

The Utah Water and Power

Board was designed to promote larger effective water supplies through
efficiencies in transportation. F unds for research into the other areas for
increased efficiency would have to be sought from state and federal agencies,
according to Clyde. And for major increases in the absolute supply of controlled water, promoters would have to lobby at the federal level for Bureau
of Reclamation construction. Clyde's recommendation to the UWUA and its
adopted policy, was ever to press forward on all three levels at the same time,
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It is again noteworthy that in his catalog of water possibilities, Clyde made

no mention of groundwater.
Adoption of this broad program was a secondary development, bowever. The proximate reason for initiating the UWUA was quite clearly to get
the Water and Power Board established. By mid-1947 that mission had been
successfully accomplished, and members of the UWUA asked themselves if
they should disband. Among UWUA members, however, were some veteran
campaigners and specialists in the cause of more water--men like Wm. R.
Wallace (President), John A. Widtsoe, George D. Clyde, E. J. Fjeldsted,
J. H. Howell, Gus Backman, Wm. Peterson, Orson Christensen, D. D.
Harris, and several state engineers.
far-reaching.

Their aspirations were ambitious and

They convinced the rest of the group, with no apparent diffi-

culty, that they should continue to operate as a promotional organization and
as Utah's representative to the National Reclamation Association (UWUA paid
Utah's dues in the NRA out of its budget from the State). The comprehensive
program outlined by G. D. Clyde in 1949 was not well defined until that time,
but the Association was active in the interim supporting the UW&PB, which
continued to need lobbying efforts on its behalf and in making brave talk in
support of the Central utah Project.
UWUA,

1

Wm. R. Wallace, president of the

had been actively interested in Colorado River development for all

1

Reclamation News (organ of the NRA) reported his death at age 91
in the January 1957 issue. He resigned as president in 1956, after 50 years
of fighting for reclamation.
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his adult life.

The UWUA minutes make reference to several major reports

(published and otherwise) he made on the subject, including the very first
annual report of the UWUA.

The Association went on record in its first year

of life in strong support of the C. U. P. , and of efforts to assure Utah of its
full "share" of the Colorado.
The objectives in the late forties and early fifties, therefore, were
at least four-fold:
(1) Increased transport efficiencies through the UW&PB .
(2) Increased efficiency in application through government support
of university research.
(3) Lobbying effort on behalf of greater Recla mation effort in Utah.
(4) Assuring a liberal share for Utah in bargaining and adjudication
with other states over river basin rights.
A special committee (E. J. Fjeldsted, G. D. Clyde, J . A. Howell)
was appointed in 1949 to draw up a formal program for the UWUA that could be
endorsed by the group.

Their general proposal was that the UWUA should

serve as an effective spokesman for all water users in the state (i.e., a lobby).
They made the following specific recommendations:
(1) Active participation in legislative programs involving water and
water rights.
(2) Affiliation with and active support of the National Reclamation
Association. Mentioned specifically were contacts with Congress
and the Bureau of Reclamation on the Bear, Weber, a nd Colorado
river problems, and lobbying pressure in favor of t he Central
Utah Project. All projects of the UW&PB and the Bureau of
Reclamation were to be actively supported.
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(3) Study and check court decisions affecting water both interand intrastate.
(4) Support research in water, soil, and plant relationships, about
which Utah water users presently know very little. "Water is
a limiting factor in Utah ' s agricultural development. The state
must not only develop all [emphasis added] of its undeveloped
water resources, but must use more efficiently the waters that
are now appropriated." Research on water supplies, requirements, methods of application, drainage, and irrigation institutions are all urgently needed. The UWUA should lobby for funds
for these kinds of research.
(5) Keep water users informed on issues affecting them. "The
UWUA is organized for the purpose of securing unbiased information on all water matters. Where huge reclamation projects
are proposed, the people involved who will use and must pay for
the water must be advised as to the effect of such projects on
their welfare. Such projects will help some and hurt others."
To help explain these and other matters the proposed program
suggested that the UWUA conduct a two-day conference every
year to disseminate available information to all water users in
the state. 1
The report of the policy committee was adopted by the Board of
Directors as the program of the UWUA on July 22, 1949. Copies of a resolution based on the accepted program were sent to press and radio and to all
water user organizations.

Later that year the directors eliminated the third

function, reviewing court decisions, and substituted "active cooperation with
the State Engineer and USAC in all matters related to water development. "
The present investigation did not include a search for precise origins
of the UWUA or the identity of its prime movers. It is reasonable to suppose

1
uwuA policy statement, pp. 7-8.
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that men like Wm. Wallace (president), John A. Widtsoe, J. A. Howell, and
E. J. Fjeldsted were influential in getting the state legislature to call it
together.

They may have been trying for years to get some kind of action,

but found their efforts futile without government muscle. It is quite certain
that many of the group had been virtually professional water promoters for
their whole adult lives (Wallace, Widtsoe, and Clyde, for examples).

Condi-

tions during the depression and war years aroused a public interest in the
water situation and paved the way for legislative action.

The legislators

apparently did not feel a great degree of competence in the area of water
development, but because of some evident interest (or perhaps persuasion)
appointed an advisory council consisting of men with the longest records of
harping on water resources development.

Tbey charged the Association to

come up with a program for the State government.

Conceivaly the legislators

assumed the advisory committee (UWUA) would fade away once favorable
action had been taken on their proposals.

The UWUA carved out a more

expanded role for itself than had been anticipated originally, and made a considerable effort to fill it. DeLore Nichols credits Wm. Wallace with an
important contribution of influence in winning final approval of the Weber Basin
Project.

(See Chapter IV.)
Members of the UWUA were clearly active supporters of t he NRA

before the UWUA was ever formed.

Several members of the latter group had

served as officers in the NRA, and continued to do so. D. D. Harris, president of the Davis-Weber Canal Company, was prominent in the NRA, as was
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Wm. R. Wallace. Once the UWUA was formed, there was a period of slight
uncertainty over relationships with the national organization, but they were
soon clarified. Discussions of the issue revolved about whether or not the
UWUA was the official representative of the State of utah in the NRA, and
whether the UWUA should pay Utah's dues to NRA directly out of its own budget
or apply lobbying pressure on the state government to pay. It was decided
that UWUA would pay the dues, making it essentially the official Utah representative of NRA. Utah's representatives on the NRA Board of Directors
were thereafter nominated by the UWUA, out of their own membership. Judge
J. H. Howell of Ogden, prominent in the D-WCMWDA and the WBWCD, served

one or two turns as an assistant director (to Wm. Wallace) of the NRA.

1

The NRA held its 1949 national convention in Salt Lake City, and the
UWUA took advantage of the opportunity to make a strong case for Utah's

1
The UWUA minutes of October 3, 1951 record passage of a motion
approving a report by the Basin Development Committee of NRA (delivered at
a meeting at Spokane in November of 1950) so far as it dealt with irrigation.
The Utah motion added a proviso, however, that federal practice should be
c hanged so that projects are operated by water users once paid for, rather
than remaining in the hands of the Bureau. (This rule still stands according
to Warne, and Rex Greenhalgh, but Wayne Winegar claims that the WBWCD is
almost unique in having almost full operational control of the WBP--which is
not even paid for.) Is it possible that Utahns are more insistent than most in
grabbing at federal resources as if they were their own? They certainly seem
loath to acknowledge federal dependence. Such behavior is consistent with
the kingdom-building aspirations of Brigham Young and the early Mormon
Church, and especially with the 20th century transformation of that aspiration .
See Leonard Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1958); and my "Interpretation of the Nature and
Significance. "
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interest in the Colorado River , and especially for the Central Utah Project.
They co mbined their efforts with the State Engineer's Office and the lo cal
offices of the Bureau of Reclamation to be assured of a strong united front.
As suggested above, interest in Colorado River developme nt was a major con·
cern for at least several prominent members of the group (Wm. R. Wallace
especially), and none appear to have dissented. Discussion of interstate
litigation over the Colorado, or progress on securing approval of the C. U. P.,
were a prominent part of virtually every meeting. In June of 194 7, at the
meeting when they raised the issue of whether or not they had a function now
that the UW &PB was launched, the UWUA voted to spend $500 on folders
advertising the C . U. P. -- at the request of the Bureau of Reclamation.
The UWUA counted among its membership and advisors some
extremely knowledgeable men who had made water resources a lifelong study,
including several scientists, such as Wm. Peterson , Wynn Thorne, a nd G. D.
Clyde of USAC.

They were intellectua l heirs of John Wesley Powell.

The

hypothesis of Appendix II, that promoters of the WBP had only a dim view of
what they were doing, and that they were , th'lrefore, unwitting tools in a
kingdom-b uilding operation by the Bureau, must b e heavily modified to be
consistent with evi dence from the UWUA records.

A Technological Imperative

The Utah water promoters displayed prominently an attitude which,
it is probably fair to infer, was shared by their counterparts in other
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Reclamation states: "There is unused land available; there is unused or
wastefully used water that could be irrigating land.

We cannot rest until

all the available moisture is completely used up in the most efficient manner,
watering the maximum amount of land and the maximum number of people."
Their faith in a technological utopia is expressed in the final sentences of a
book by one of their most influential members, John A. Widtsoe:
Man, by his intelligence, compels the laws of nature to do his
bidding, and thus he achieves joy. "And God blessed them--and
God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the
earth, and subdue it. [Widtsoe's italics .] 1
Members of the engineering faculty of Utah State Agricultural College read
much of the following information into the minutes of the UWUA: (George D.
Clyde and William Peterson were the major contributors, but non-university
people made occasional contributions.) There are roughly 52,500,000 acres
of land in Utah.

Of that total, the cultivated acreage consists of 1, 324, 000

irrigated acres and 400,000 acres dry farmed . However, of the irrigated

1

L . H. Bailey, ed., Dry Farming, The Rural Science Series (New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1911) , p. 416. The followi ng quotation from
Widtsoe's Introduction is even more utopian :
The possibilities of dry-farming are stupendous. In the strength of
youth we may have felt envious of the great ones of old; . . . We
need harbor no such envyings, for in the conquest of the non-irrigated
and non-irrigable desert are offered as fine opportunities as the world
has known to the makers and shakers of empires. We stand befor e
an undiscovered land; through the restless, ascending currents of
heated desert air the vision comes and goes. With striving eyes the
desert is seen covered with blossoming fields, with churches and
homes and schools, and in the distance, with the vision is heard the
laughter of happy children. The desert will be conquered.
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acreage, only 250,000 acres have a full-season water supply. In an average
year there is 7, 500,000 acre feet of water in Utah streams, of which only
4, 000, 000 acre feet are allotted (1950).
used is mainly flood season flow.

The 3, 500, 000 acre feet not being

If this unused water could be captured, it

would fully irrigate another 608,000 acres of land. There are about 340 ,000
acres of land in Utah not now irrigated that could be if water were available.
To the UWUA this appeared as a great waste of Utah's most important
resource (next to people, they always hastened to add), and to them it implied
a clear directive to make great efforts to control spring floods for delivery
of stored water in late season.
Controlling floods for late season use implies more than dams,
reservoirs, and canals . It means further study of plant, soil and water
relationships, and the implementation of what is already known of these into
policies that prevent overgrazing, overcutting, and other damage to watersheds. Some of John Wesley Powell's studies had shown in the late 1870's
that the reason for the rise in stream flow to Great Salt Lake (which the
Mormons attributed to divine intervention in their behalf--God has moderated
the climate) was due to thegrazing, cutting , clearing, straighteneing channels,
etc. --all measures that lessened the power of soil to retain moisture (see
Powell's Report on Lands of the Arid Region, 1879). Furthermore, the extension of such studies could provide more exact information on just how much
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water it takes per acre of ground to yield the maximum crop.

1

It would a lso

provide information necessary to get policies enforced that could alleviate
the eroding of lands, silting up of irrigation works, and water-logging.
Further studies are needed, argued the university people, to measure ever
more accurately the exact extent of Utah's water resources (little or no mention was ever made of groundwater, however) and arable lands.

2

It is interesting that a catalog of arable lands was recommended,

since the Powell principle was that there is vastly more land in the arid
region than there is water to go with it.

But figures given above s uggest there

is enough water in Utah to supply about twice as many acres as there were
(1950) unused acres of potentially arable land.

The Wilson report cited above

gives figures of 5,629, 200 acres for total arable lands, however, and
2,219,000 acres for current croplands.

Another 2,159,000 acres of salt and

alkali lands could be irrigated with installation of drainage and leaching.

The

research program suggested 20 years earlier by the UWUA is vindicated,
therefore, in an engineer's eyes.

There is more usable land than the State has

water to service .

1
Powell had estimated that far less water was needed than early irrigators were actually using. See also the article by Wm. Palmer about an
early incident in Utah demonstrating excessive water use--"Utah's 'Water
Courts,"' Reclamation Era, November 1947.
2

see L. Wilson, T. Hutchings, and P. Shafer, "Arable Land Resources of Utah," Utah Resources Series 42 , Utah Agricultural Experiment
Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, in cooperation with SCS, USDA,
and Bureau of Reclamation, February 1968 .
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As noted above, the initial thrust of the UWUA program was to cut
down the "lavish" (Clyde's word) use of water in Utah by improving conveyance facilities.

By Clyde's figures in 1949, enough water could be saved

through a 50 per cent increase in water use efficiency to almost double the
1950 irrigated acreage of the state.

(Darrel Stokes, Davis County Agent,

says that when owners of low la nds in the county found out how mucht the WBP
was going to cost, they lined their ditches and started recapturing waste
water.) Their research program did not end with the natural sciences.
Powell's warnings of legal, sociological, and political-economic snarls had
been amply demonstrated. The program of the UWUA, therefore, included
research to unravel the legal and institutional knots that impede maximum
efficient use of land and water resources, and, of course, more effort on
the political front to push through necessary reforms.

The water research

program at USU in recent years has reflected the sociological concern.

(The

McLean thesis cited in Chapter I is a good example.)
There is a compelling and unmistakable consistency in this technological approach.

The goal, in a vast semidesert, is to use every avail-

able drop of water on every level piece of ground in just the right way to
produce the maximum of luxuriant vegetation. In a well-worked phrase,
water hustlers aim to make the desert "blossom as the rose. " If it takes
dams, reservoirs, turbines, generators, concrete-lined canals, and pipelines,
they will build them. If it requires a knowledge of soil, plant, and water relationships, they will petition legislatures for appropriate research grants. If
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it means studying political, economic , and legal institutions, they will either

undertake it themselves or get larger grants to hire appropriate specialists.
The combination of desert sun, sand, water, and fertilizer is an entrancing
one . It does produce even more abundantly than the humid region. If, therefore, it turns out that there is still desert land left over, unwatered, after all
the efforts to squeeze the last ounce of "duty" from the last drop of moisture
falling on the arid region, the engineering attitude does not blench at devising
even more spectacular projects like Rocky Mountain Trenches and North
American Water and Power Alliances to bring water from areas of surplus
to where desert sun and sand can really make it fruitful.

1

The real reasons underlying the urge to ultimate hydrologic efficiency
are no doubt complex and at least partly subliminal.
"do some engineering" is no doubt a part of it.

The simple desire to

That is an attitude that local

hydrologists will have shared with Bureau engineers. In an age of specializat ion, one must do his thing in order to survive--and to feel useful and fulfilled.
Reclamation appears to be a striking example of a problem that has concerned
many social philosophers of this century: tt:chnology rather than a means to
human ends, becomes an end itself, and we lose sight of any ends except

1
urban sprawl on some or the continent's best agricultural lands is
painful to this engineering point of view, and it is quite consistent with the
general approach to urge that cities be moved away from prime agricultural
lands to places less suitable for tillage and irrigation.
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technologic possibilities.

1

This ethical emptiness is expressed in the

excuse some water hustlers give for their activities: the reason we need
more water on more land, said William Wallace, John Widtsoe, and company,
over and over again, is to support a larger population.
Population growth was at the same time their goal and their excuse.
As local promoters they wanted an expanding population of industrious homesteaders in the blooming desert.

The need for water to feed an expanding

population was their major argument in lobbying for a larger share of the
Colorado River and for federal funds to bring the water to the Wasatch
Front.

Although the Weber System is completely contained within the state,

1
on this subject see various writings of: Lewis Mumford, The
Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (New York: Harcourt,
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1967); Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New
York: Hearst Corporation, Avon Books, 1965); Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1969); Erich Fromm, The Sane
Society (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Premier Books, 1955); E. J .
Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth (New York: Praeger, 1967); E. J.
Mishan, Technology and Growth (New York: Praeger, 1969); Jose Ortega y
Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. w. Norton & Company,
1932); Gunther S. Stent, The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of
Progress (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1969);
Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. Translated by John Wilkinson
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964); John B. Bury, The Idea of Progress
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955); 'Ernes t Lee Tuveson,
Millenium and Utopia (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964); Abraham
Maslow, The Psychology of Science (Chicago, illinois: Henry Regnery
Company, Gateway edition, 1969).
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they used the same argument for the Weber Basin Project (encouraged by
Bureau representatives): if we don't get these resources someone else will.
Alfred Golze's 1952 textbook, Reclamation in the United States, used the same
argument to justify reclamation as a national policy: it contributes to population and economic growth of the West. G. D. Clyde urged the support of the
water research program of the UWUA by asserting that they were necessary
to establish Utah's claim to larger shares of the Bear, Columbia, and
Colorado Rivers.

That concern for pork barrel spoils and a permanent share

of major interstate rivers no doubt goes far toward explaining why "farsighted" water promoters of the 1950 ' s found it easy and expedient to ignore
groundwater exploration and development.
Utah water promoters, no doubt, shared the dream of technological
utopia with Bureau engineers. It is also reasonable to presume that they
derived the same sort of personal advantages from water research and
development programs as did Bureau hydrologists. It meant more and better
laboratories, research grants, graduate students, and publications in their
field of special training.
every project.

Engineers in the Bureau get similar advantages from

The Bureau is an important source of jobs for students trained

at schools where water research grants provide the resources to support
specialized hydrologic activities. Warne's book provides a matter-of-fact
documentation of the "old school tie of reclamation" which "binds together a
loya l but unorganized clientele of considerable importance to the
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Bureau. , l It is hardly a startling revelation, or should not be, considering
the necessarily reciprocal relationships of technologic and economic interest
that draw together agencies like the Bureau , irrigators, chambers of commerce, engineering firms, university faculti es , state departments of water
resources, and water user associations .
In explaining the proliferation of surface water developments in the
West (certainly in Utah), therefore, it is quite easy to see that a common
technological interest, closely tied to a common economic self-interest, can
account for a significant part.

The Bureau would be glad to cooperate with

other members of its brotherhood [Warne's term] in any state, so long as
appropriations could be obtained. Appropriations were the real hurdle (as
commentators like Warne and Frank Smith freely acknowledge), and therefore
depended on Congressional politicking . Warne, himself a member of the
brotherhood, unabashedly confirms the horrified suspicions of Appendix II:
Hounded by theoretical economists who would reduce most political
considerations to mathematical formulas, the Bureau of Reclamation
has fled from one benefit-cost ratio to another in justifying its project proposals and has produced a series of methods of calculating the
repayment of project costs. Since June, 1902, however, new projects have been undertaken where a sufficient number of representattives and senators desired them and when the congressmen who wanted
the work done were strategically placed on committees in which
authorizations or appropriations were originating in order to get the
necessary actions. 2

1

2

warne, p. 196.
Ibid ., p. 218.
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Clearly, it would be naive to expect that economic calculus has ever had much
influence on reclamation inve stment decisions.

Jeffersonian Dreams a s a Pork Barrel Tactic

How is it that seventeen spa rsely settled western states could get
massive infusions of federal funds out of a House dominated by the transMississippi East. Answer: By upholding the ideal of the Jeffersonian homestead, including the 160-acre limitation and subsidized irrigation.

(The books

of Stegner and Webb, cited in Chapter VIU, document the persistent Eastern
opposition to liberalization of acreage limitations on new rights to public
la nds. ) The Jeffersonian objective is a national interest; very little is heard
a bout the redistributive aspect of reclamation in Western circles.

The people

directly involved with either building or using reclamation projects have professional and economic self-interests at heart. Selling the program in the
national interest requires a broader allocative principle, and that principle
has traditionally been an equalitarian one.
During the early 1970's the Utah press gave quite a lot of coverage to
the Central Utah Project. It featured the same old arguments about "dire
need" that were commonplace in meetings of the UWUA in the late forties,
and that were used by the Weber Basin lobby in the same period.

The need is

supposed to be obvious to any Westerner. Water is a constraint to population
expansion and economic growth. Speaker after speaker, report after report,
press release after press release repeat the same theme: We must develop
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and conserve every drop of water.

Progress toward this goal has been sys-

tematic, at least in the postwar period. It has been carried on with the
cooperation of engineers, hydrologists, geologists, agronomists, foresters,
and other specialists in universities and state agencies, and with federal
agencies like the Soil Conservation Service, Geological Survey, Forestry,
even the Corps of Engineers.

The goal of organizations like the UWUA bas

always been local water abundance.

Individuals have also been concerned

with hydrologic efficiency, but until recently efficiency seems to have taken
a back seat to getting a share of the federal spoils.

Probably the distinction

between the two has been blurred for most people most of the time. Joseph
Tracy, State Engineer at the time, told directors of the UWUA in 1952 that if
the federal government would just hold back on its extravagant spending, both
foreign and domestic, there would be ample funds for important projects like
Colorado River development! This kind of statement seems to have been made
and accepted in complete sincerity.

The water lobbyists do not seem to have

recognized their own projects as a transfer of national resources to the interest
of a single state. To them, reclamation was a self-supporting investment that
was clearly in the national interest. At the same time, they also had at least
a dim awareness that it did not pay well enough to attract private or state
financing.
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Treading the Wine Press Alone

The UWUA was vigorous in the late forties.

It began with a part-time

secretary to the president, and his duties expanded to secretary-treasurer
and then to full-time secretary-manager before 1950. In 1952, the group
decided to issue a newsletter. It was designed to be a quarterly publication,
and the first number appeared in 1954. Along with its title it carried the
slogan "water is the life-blood of the land." As time passed there were
problems of maintaining enthusiasm among the grassroots county organizations . Leaders of the organization were concerned that it be a lobby for the
real interests of all people in the state.

1

They manifested a sincere concern

over water and did feel that more of it was vital to everyone in the state.
Minutes show a more or less constant problem of arousing the same feeling
among the population at large. A major source of funds to the UWUA was
the dues of counties--which had to be voted by county commissions.

For the

UWUA to get its money, the county association had to lobby with its county
comm issioners to get them to pay up.

They were frequently reluctant, even

in counties that had ongoing water supply construction projects.

The policy

committee of the UWUA resolved in 1951 that the Water and Power Board
should not endorse projects for investigation or construction in any county that
had not paid its dues in full to the UWUA.

1

In 1954, DeLore Nichols appeared

Wm. Wallace and John Widtsoe are both on record with this sentiment in the minutes for December 9, 1949.
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in the minutes with a proposal to force a little more enthusiasm among members of the association.

County associations should appoint delegates to the

annual meeting of the UWUA.
The problem of less-than enthusiasti c local support was apparently
not unique to Utah. At a UWUA Board of Directors meeting in December of
1954, H. T. Godfrey reported on a recent NRA convention he had attended at
Portland: " California had as many delegates there as the other sixteen states
combined" he said. J udging by California's success in snaring water development projects, the local hustlers had reason to worry about the paucity of
support they were able to generate.

It was one of their never-ending concerns

that "if we don't get our share of interstate rivers now, someone else will. "
Given the prior appropriation and beneficial use principles, they may well
have been right.

They seem to have been haunted by the threat of California's

thirst.
Evidence from the records of the Utah Water Users Association is
consistent with that presented earlier from minutes and correspondence of the
Davis County group and the Davis-Weber Municipal Water lobby . All three
provide ple nty of suggestions that the water hustlers were (are) a relatively
small group who see themselves as saviors to a somewhat unappreciative and
blind clientele. While they may have truly benevolent, public-spirited intentions, it is also clear that many of them derive a livelihood from water
development activities . They are frequently disappointed by the lack of
response from the general public.

Reclamation projects seem to have been
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promoted on the basis of very little popular demand--and only slight awareness of what was really going on.
The "old school tie" of reclamation appears to be a case of supply
creating its own demand.

This is certainly not the first observation of an

occupational group that builds a market for its skills by merchandising efforts.
Lawyers are frequently charged with creating work for themselves. Featherbedding in the railroads was a blatant example . The education establishment
made a major sale in the postwar era. Economic research is funded out of
the same pork barrel, by a merchandising effort.

1

It is quite conceivable,

in fact, that the expansion of economi c research into water resource phenomena
after 1950 was due as much to the purposive, zealous snooping of economistslooking-for-a-research grant as it was to a sudden recognition on the part of
old water development bands that some economic advice was indispensable to
their dream of technological utopia.
On the other hand, a hostile demand for critical evaluation of reclamation might reasonably have originated east of the Mississippi with groups
who gained very little from western water development.

That , in turn, would

have stimulated a demand for "professional and objective" evaluations on the
part of reclamation beneficiaries and supporters. Regardless of the source
of interest in economic evaluation of water resources management, however,

1

Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics (New York: W. W. Norton and

Co., 1970), p. 6.
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whether from inside or outside the profession, the actual activity is still tied
to the same pork barrel for funding.
States is inescapably political.

Public resource allocation in tbe United

To perform as an objective critic of this

essentially distributive issue is the self-assigned role of natural resource
economists.

Their activity is, cot1sequently, fraught with pitfalls of value

judgment and conflict of interest.

The task of the final chapter of this work

is therefore to determine what kind of contribution economics can or ought to
make toward an evaluation of situations similar to the Weber Basin reclamation case.

What does the pursuit of efficiency through science and technology

mean in the context of pork barrel allocation of natural resources?
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CHAPTER XI
RETROSPECT, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS

Several hypotheses have been proposed in preceding chapters. All of
them are designed to expand understanding of the Weber Basin situation and to
identify the nature and extent of economic problems relating to water control
and delivery.

Assuming a plausible case to have been made for these explan-

atory hypotheses, the task for this concluding chapter is to draw together a
description of the situation, abstract the iss ues , and assess alternative
prescriptions for social action.

Situation: Specific Hypotheses

The Weber Basin Project seems clearly to include many water controlling facilities that were not needed, and may never be needed. It is quite
plausible that no part of the Project was really necessary.

The latter assess-

ment is made from benefit of hindsight and greater hydrologic information than
was available to decision-makers in 1950.

Nevertheless, the WBP was not a

judicious investment.
Fault in the affair cannot be assigned to a single group.

Probably the

self-interest of Bureau engineers led them to encourage the buildin of facilities
which they must have known were a questionable use of public funds.

The

evidence suggests, however, that a motive quite distinguishable from pursuit
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of pecuniary and symbolic power (the trappings of position, etc . ) was operati ve among the eingeers.

For want of a better name, it has been labelled

technological purposiveness in foregoing chapters. It has to do with what
Veblen called the "instinct of workmanship," with the human urge to simplify
and control the environment, and with the correlated desire to simplify
matters even further by assuming that the tool, technique, or idea at hand
is the one that will solve all important problems.

(At an even more funda-

mental level, as Knight, von Hayek, and Georgescu-Roegen have shown, it
is related to the philosophic notion that the universe, including social
phenomena, operates according to discoverable principles akin to Newtonian
mechanics . / A similar attitude of faith in a single idea seems to have been
a principal motivation of the water lobbyists.

Their objective was lofty and

idealistic--to make the desert blossom into a technological utopia.

Their

accomplishments leave something to be desired . As Koestler said, "On the
historical scale , the damages wrought by individual violence for selfish
motives are insignificant compared to the holocausts resulting from selftranscending devotion to collectively shared belief-systems. "

2

1

F. H. Knight, On the History and Method of Economics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1963); F. A. von Hayek, "The
Counter-Revolution of Science, " and "Scientism and the Study of Society, "
Economica, Vols. 8, 9, 10, 11, 1941; 42, 43, 44--a series of six articles;
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971).
2

Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: Pan Books
Ltd. , 1970), p . 304.
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Voters a nd taxpayers, who must now pay for the Project, cannot lay
total blame for their burden on others. Their own disinterest in the impli ca tions of the Project made it possible for 1 p ercent of e ligible voters to commit
a ll Basin r eside nts to repayment.

This was true not only for the initial phase

of the Project , but also for its expansion at significantly higher cost, eve n
after negative publicity occasioned by the discovery of abundant groundwater
and the Conservancy District's clumsy effort to monopolize it .
A plausible case for need or desire for more water supply facilities
can only be discerned in respect of the small southern portion of Davis County.
It is equally clear that most of the repayment burden was intended to be borne

by urba n and suburban residents of other parts of the Basin.

Less clear, but

potentially quantifiable, is a share of the cost borne by the Reclamation Fund
and U.S. taxpayers in general.

One reason for building such a huge project

when only South Davis was demonstra bly interested, was to spread the costs
around . The South Davis features alone were prohibitively expensive. By
expanding the Project in every direction, Bureau engineers were able to make
the average cost per unit of delivery capacity look much lower . Furthermore ,
it allowed the m to claim nonreimbursabl e federal benefits, and to use subsidized capital from the Reclamation fund, by appealing to an old egalitarian
ideology.
The extent of the Project's r edundancy, and the exte nt of discrimination in res pect of its benefits and repayment burden, have been obscured by
the Bureau and Conservancy District in their public statements, although as
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public agencies their books have been open. Quite a different explanation
of the water situation can be put together using the water promoters' own
documents, but their version has generally sounded plausible to Western ears,
and its challe ngers have been few a nd unheeded.

This is not to say that the

Project and its operators are regarded with approbation and gratitude by
Basin residents. With a few exceptions, the WBP and the WBWCD are
r e sented by people with strong interests in water management.

The source of

the resentme nt is rarely given coherent expression (although one clearly
justifiable reason is now apparent in the hitherto obscured subsidization of
south Davis County).

The re does seem to be a common element in all grumbles

about the Project, nevertheless, and it concerns autocratic behavior and the
loss of individual and local control over water s upply resources.

There is

also an increasingl y apparent conflict of interest between federal agencies and
the state government over control of Utah wate rs.

Explanation: General HyPotheses

The previous section summarizes the historical or empirical
hypotheses of the text.

Those hypotheses explain observations e ncountered in

the course of the investigation.

They are specific to this case, and have little

or no useful application outside it.

Their level of abstraction and vulnerability

to refutation is, therefore, quite low. Correspondingly, their explanatory
power is very limited, and not much can be gained by refuting them either .
At a higher level of ab straction are explanatory hypotheses which have been
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proposed and defended at various places in the text. These are the more
interes ting and powerful hypotheses because their generality makes them
more vulnerable to refutation.

Because they are more general, they have

application outside the Weber Basin and Reclamation, which increases the
probability that they will have been proposed before in respect of other observations--if they are reasonable explanations.
The most general theme is so well-known as to be almost a truism,
yet it is a respectable scientific proposition, nonetheless.
for short, The Idea of Progress.

1

It may be called,

According to this view, the notion that

progressive improvement in the human condition is possible is a fairly recent
attitude of Western civilization (contemporaneous with the rise of Science, and
Newtonian mechanics especially). Belief in Progress has become a cultural
faith, but a few hundred years ago the very idea was novel.

From this general

idea it is possible to formulate more specific statements that may be tested
by observations encountered in the course of the Weber Basin investigation.
One such proposition has been referred to as a Newtonian or mechanistic
faith--a belief that the universe operates like a clock (Georgescu-Roegen
might add that the clock n ever needs winding). Adherents to this faith believe
that any problem can be solved by finding out the operational secrets of the
clock and then engineering them to serve human purposes.

Previous chapters

1
see J. B . Bury's book by this title, The Idea of Progress (New York:
Dover Publications, Inc., 1960).

412

have shown this attitude to be personified in John Wesley Powell and his
ideological heirs, right down to John A. Widtsoe, George Dewey Clyde,
E . J. Fjeldsted, and Ellis Armstrong.

1

Another variation on the Idea of Progress is the long-held American
faith in e conomic growth, or increasing individual and aggregate wealth.
Closely as sociated with this has been the concern that growth was retarded,
in the West, by the absence of water in the places and times where it is most
needed for agriculture. A drought phobia has been proposed by some historians
as an explanation for many important phenomena in the history of Western
America.

Zeal for growth, drought phobia, and faith in mechanistic science

combine d to produce a n attitude epitomized in the title of a book cited several
times, The Water Hustlers.

This attitude has been proposed as an explana-

tion for the observed behavior of loca l a nd regional water de velopment
promoters.
A related but separable phenomenon is noted in the text as a partial
ex pla nation for the behavior of technical specialists in water supply development, as distinguished from its non-technical supporters.

Technical training

is necessarily specific, and specificity increases with complexity and difficulty. It is hardly surprising to find that people who have mastered difficult

1
some readers will recall t he amusement engendered among members
of the USU economics faculty by Armstrong's simplistic e ndorse ment of this
view in his January 1973 speech, "Wake Up, America!" Essentially the same
attitude has prevailed in the social science outlook of Resources for the Future.
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technical skills wish to use them , a nd to be compens ated for the effort they
expended in acquiring mastery.

They may be expected to take deliberate

efforts to find employment for their specialist skills.

(The recent introduction

of very liberal unemployment benefits in Canada has encouraged worke rs with
even ver y eas ily and quickly acquired skills to refuse work unless it is in
their "chosen field. ") The more complex and s lowly acquired the skill, the
more strenuously and ingeniously will its poss es sors resist change and the
suggestion of technological redundance.
The Phenomenon described in the previous paragraph is a transition
point from the Idea of Progress, to manifestations and consequences of it.
The rule of Science, and faith in the possibility of unlocking the secrets of
Nature, has led to enormous progress in technical mastery by Man over hi s
e nvironme nt, in the last 300 years. One of the consequences, especially in
the last ce ntury, has been the phe nom enon of specialization.

Closely inter-

woven with specialization, as social science writers have noted since Plato at
leas t, is interdependence, and large , complex social organization.

The tech-

niques deve loped by science, as well as the pursuit of new techniques via
scientific e ffort, require greate r and greater applica tions of capital, energy,
and techni cai skill.

This has b een postulated as a partial explanation for the

control over Utah waters that is currently exercised by the Federal Bureau of
Reclamation.

414

Along with technological progress via increasing scientific knowledge,
the conception of e nergy has been developed.

Lynn White, Jr.~ has said that

the idea of a power technology to apply natural energy to human purposes first
appears in traces from the 13th century. At that time several active minds
"were coming to think of the cosmos as a vast reservoir of energies to be
tapped and used according to human invention. "

2

Since that time, progress

has meant, to an important degree, the development of technical mastery over
natural energy sources.

Material progress is increasing net surplus of con-

trollable e nergy. As currently understood by physicists the conception of
energy is a development of the last century, beginning with Rudolf Clausius'
introduction of the idea of entropy and receiving its keystone in Einstein's
statement of the potential interchangeability of matter and energy.

3

A new

branch of physics, thermodynamics, took its place alongside--or rather in
opposition to--Newtonian mechanics.
economic value.

4

Thermodynamics began as a physics of

Only in recent decades have anthropologists a nd social and

economic historians taken up the idea of technological progress as a process

1

Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Fair
Lawn, New Jersey: Oxford University Press, Oxford Paperbacks, 1962),
p. 134.
2

3

4

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See the article on " energy."
Ibid.

Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic
Process (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 3.
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of releasing and controlling a net surplus of natural energy.

1

From this

point of view, economic growth, or progress in aggregate economic welfare

1
Technological history is ve ry recent. As late as 1931 Charles A.
Beard could say that "technology has received very little attention from
historical thinkers." (Introduction to Bury, p. xxi.) White (Preface) said that
this was still true in 1962. Wm. H. McNeill, author of The Rise of the West
(Chicago, Illinois : University of Chicago Press, 1963), argued in his 1947
Ph. D. dissertation ("The Influence of the Potato on Irish History," Cornell
University) that technological and economic influences should be considered
as more powerful than political and military plans in interpreting the past, as
they underly social, cultural, and political events. This perspective illuninates his book, which, he says, was conceived in 1936 and commenced in
1954 (Preface). Best statements of the idea of energy control as it is used
here are Carlo Cipolla, The Economic History of World Population (Baltimore,
Maryland: Penguin, 1962), and V. Gordon Childe, Man Makes Himself
(Mentor Books; original published in 1936. Also see Childe's Penguin book,
What HapPened in History). The idea was first given a reasonably clear
statement in Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population. Malthus credited
David Hume and Adam Smith for the germ of the idea. Malthus' statement was
a major source for Darwin's interpretation of the origin of species, their success and disappearance. (The evolution of special adaptations explains both
initial success and eventual failure. V. Gordon Childe demonstrated that man,
on the other hand, has been successful because his brain and hands enabled
him to be adaptable to many environments, and to gradually accumulate technical mastery over it. Arthur Koestler suggests in The Ghost in the Machine
that man's downfall will probably be caused by a defect in the brain which leads
us to endow initially rational explanations with a kind of infallibility. This
explains misplaced devotion to causes and the resistance to changing cherished
ideas about the way things are. ) The reason why Malthus was right came out
only with Clausius' statement of the Entropy Law, in the same year that
Jevons published The Coal Question. (See Georgescu-Roegen, pp. 295-296.)
Jevons worried about the implications of reliance on fossil fuel, but understandably did not grasp the Entropy Law. Instead, he founded the mechanistic
perspective of standard economics, building on the static analytical perspective of Ricardo rather than the historical one of Malthus . Contemporary with
Jevons was the historical school in economics, which began focusing on the
kinds of questions that led to the conception of agricultural and industrial
evolutions- -to the importance of technological development in releasing controllable energy. Biologists and anthropologists have been leaders in
emphasizing the importance of energy control to the use of civilization. Alfred
Marshall emphasized biological analogies in economics, but his lead seems not
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means increasing the net surplus of usable energy , and depends critically on
technological development.

Ultimately, usable energy is the scarce resource .

The economic problem, therefore, includes increasing the usable energy
supply, making the existing supply do more work, and distributing the right
to power over controllable energy among individuals.

1

This perspective on technological progress and the idea of energy is
exemplified in the history of Western water development (Chapters VIII to X).
Along with the discovery by hydrologists that fresh water is abundant all over
the continent (if sufficient energy can be applied!), it justifies the hypothesis
announced in Chapter I that water is not the economic good in the Weber Basin

to have been followed. Instead of the biological model, wi th its affinity to
the physical Entropy Law, economics has tended to be patterned after
Newtonian mechanics. Although resisted strenuously by such economic
philosophers as Frank Knight and F. A. Hayek, the mechanical analogy
has prevailed in standard economics- -even in the study of natural resources
where the subject matter itself might have been expected to suggest a perspective more like that of Georgescu-Roegen's .
1
As Georgescu-Roegen takes pains to demonstrate, increasing the
supply of usable energy is only possible for a limited period of time; the total
supply is finite. John Wesley Powell may h ave perceived this dimly (his
objectives for hydrologic development were limited), but his successors
appear to have leaned more to the roseate views of William Gilpin (see references to him in Chapter VIII) and the faith in Newtonian mechanics to make
every desert a rose garden. The engineering perspective of the Bureau of
Reclamation has consistently been one of rolling back the frontier, of making
desert lands into farms just as productive as those of the trans-Mississippi
East. Although economists have had sharp differences with Reclamationists
over how this should be done, few appear to have disagreed with the fundamental notion that it is possible. The very idea of economic growth implies
a denial of scarcity, if carried far enough, and when stabilization policies
are premised on maintenance of growth, faith in never-never land is
implicit.
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case. Water is naturally abundant; what is scarce is energy applied to its
control and transportation.

Water problems, at least of this kind, may,

therefore, be looked upon as identical to transportation problems.

Hydrologic

efficiency, as the term was introduced in Chapter I, means making water
available at places, times, and rates of flow desired, using the least possible
expenditure above that represented in the gravitational potential of mountain
water.
As noted above, part of the problem of dealing with scarcity is the
distribution of scarce things among the members of society. Several chapters
of the text explored what appear to have been distributive preferences in
United States resource disposal policies, as well as the outcome of distributive decisions as they seem to have obtained in the Weber Basin. Overall, it
appears that a strong agrarian, egalitarian sentiment has pervaded Reclamation, a nd that its promoters have found justifiable the taxation of urban water
and hydroelectric users to pay for the high energy cost of reclaimed desert
land.

This decision has been ratified repeatedly by Congress, in authorizing

Reclamation projects and in appropriating resources to build them.

Abstracting the Issues

Two large questions about the WBP remain to be resolved, and the
a nswers depend on the outcome of some issues with far broader application.
The first question concer ns the s e ries of investment decisions that led to
creation of the Weber Basin Project. Was it a bad use of resources, all
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things considered? Regardless of the anser, its water controlling facilities
are in place.

The second question, therefore, concerns improvement of their

effectiveness.
Taking the questions in order, it does not seem that a very good case
can be made for the wisdom of the investment decision.

The Project cost

was a lmost $100 million, in prices of the 1950's and 1960's. Its intended
delivery capacity was less than 180,000 a. f. per year (see tables in Chapter
V).

Calculations presented below indicate that the same amount of water

could be developed from underground reservoirs at a cost of $6 million (in
1975 prices).

Furthermore, construction of the WBP by an agency of the

federal government has effectively taken away control of what the State
regards as its own water resource s (Chapter VII). Since water management
is virtually mea ningless without physical water controlling facilities, water
management, a State Water Plan, really means m anagement of the control
facilities.

State water planning is therefore frustrated, even presumptuous,

because a heavy proportion of water controlling facilities within the state are
federally owned. Thus the urge for technological progress, unwisely directed
perhaps, has led to a large element of central direction and a concomitant loss
of local and individual autonomy.

A third important and unfortunate conse-

quence of the investment decision is that individuals, companies, and
municipalities persist in duplicating already redundant water supply facilities.
They do this because of the two consequences already cited: well water costs
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less than WBP water, and they want to retain local control of their water
supply resources.
Central direction of large organizations seems to be an ineluctable
consequence of technological development, whi ch is in turn th e price of
greater efficiency in the use of available energy.

Thus a trade-off between

technical energy efficiency (economic growth) and individual a nd local liberty
or autonomy is one of the large philosophic iss ues which is r e levant to the
Weber Basin case . This particular investment decision does not appears to
have been at that level of inevitability, howeve r . It is true that technological
development entailed loss of local autonomy, but it is also reasonably clear
that the loss was avoidable. Furthermore , the development itself was
grossly inefficient.

Groundwater development would have been much less

expensive in terms of both energy and local autonomy .
Assigning blame for poor publi c decisions is difficult because they
are made almost

anonymotL~ly

by a multitude of persons and impersonal

influences . Nevertheless, it does seem r easonable to suggest that the Weber
Basin fiasco could have been prevented if people with sufficient influence had
been as king the right questions in post-depression Utah. One of the ineluctable consequences of technological development and the age of the technical
s p ecialist seems to be that fewer and fewer public decision-make rs ca n stand
up again st the press ures of special interest groups and assure that the right
questions have even been asked in respect of particular decisions. If a
majority of hydrologic specialists say we need more water development, what
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politi cian or budget manager is going to say they are wrong? Publicly controlled resour ces seem to become a larger and larger share of total or
national resources, concurrent with technological progress, which means that
more and more resources are allocated by bureaucratic technicians a nd
legislative bodies.

The B ureau of the Budget may employ specialists in

benefit/ cost analysis to evaluate a nd rank proposed projects, but ultimately
the de cisions are made via the political pork barrel.

Thus the urge to "get a

fair share" of national spoils has the effect, as in Utah, of tying state and
local r e sources to centralized, federal control.
The second question identified above concerned what can b e done,
if anything, to improve the effectiveness of existing WBP facilities.

The

answer to this question obviously depends a good deal on what is wanted from
the Proj e ct. Just as obviously, it depends on what is physically possible.
Any proposals that would e nta il significant i ncremental investment cannot be
considered as an improvement in resource allocation because there is overinvestment in the Basin already.

Improvements must therefore be effected

through institutional change alone.
On the question of wants, water delivery (at the lowest possible price)
is an obvious selection. A satisfactory policy should also discourage further
investment in water supply faciliti es.

Strengthening of local and state control

over water resources seems to be a widely held objective . Unfortunately, the
preference for local self-government conflicts in this case with national
interest in recovering at least a part of the national resources that went into
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the creation of the WBP. Another national interest that may require consideration is agrarian , economic democracy--the ideal of land endowments
to help preserve a semblance of equality in wealth.
The issues of local control and wealth redistribution via land disposal
policy could be handled rather summarily: if residents of the Weber Basin,
or the State of Utah at large, do not like federal operation of local water works,
they might buy the WBP (and any other federally-constructed works) and
operate it according to their own preferences.

1

Such an action would make

possible the implementation of a state water plan.

The issue of agrarian

democracy would then be subsumed under policy objectives of the local water
plan and could be rethought or totally obliterated with no violence to national
objectives. A similar outcome would be possible if the Conservancy District,
with backing from the State, repudiated its debt to the Reclamation Fund.
Appendix II contains a similar proposal, made when available evidence suggested that the WBP had been imposed on basin residents by the Bureau. It
is obviously not an alternative to be entertained seriously.
A Stake take-over would not make an essential difference in the nature
of the first two problems identified above. Sunk costs would still have to be
paid some way.

The following sub-sections demonstrate that the burden of

1
Suggested by Frank Haws in "A Study of Alternative Methods to
Modernize Water Institutions and Eliminate Problems of Multiple Jurisdiction
and Conflicting Objectives," a project report of the Utah Water Research
Laboratory, Utah State University, Logan, Utah, September 1975.
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repayment is the chief barrier to more effective use of the water supply facilities, regardless of who holds the mortgage.

Allocative efficiency in the WBP
The economic principle of efficient resource allocation is that every
resource should be employed in functions and quantities so that the value of the
marginal unit (whether as a productive or consumptive good) is the same in
every use. If no scarcity rent is involved, the price of each unit of the
resource should be the cost of providing the marginal unit, because that is the
price that would prevail under the conceptual model of ultimate efficiency-perfect competition. The literature of public utilities pricing generally
presumes that the allocative optimum will be approached as closely as is
practically possible if the service is provided at a price equal to the cost of
the marginal unit.

Consumers will then, in their own interest, use the ser-

vice (if it is not scarce) up to the point where its value to them (for either
consumption or production for resale) is just equal to its cost--the price they
pay.
Principal empirical hypotheses of this study are that neither water
nor the means for its conveyance are scarce in the Weber Basin.

This means

that whether we focus on the water or the conveyance works, allocative efficiency requires a price equal to marginal cost.
Although water is free and abundant, storage and conveyance works
may be scarce in specific locations.

ln arid regions, therefore, water
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resources may be defined to include catchm ent basins in a ppropriate places,
and control and conveyance works to

tr~. nsport

water to places where it may

be used . P iles of earth and rock, ditches a nd pipelines, no matter how
marvellous ly constructed, do not constitute water resources unless they are
so located that they trap available water and are capable of carrying water
to where it may be beneficially applied. Intent and design are therefore
critical to the definition of a water resource.

They are also critical to its

e ffectiveness, because once in pla ce s uch a resource is very restricted in
application.
The Weber Basin Project, as constructed, is a water r e source .
From the evidence of Chapters V and VI, no part of it is so fully us ed that
scarcity rents are in order. As a public utility, therefore, the price of its
service to each wate r use r should be the cost of providing it to him (preferably
the cost of the marginal unit, if such precision were feasible).
The water supply of the WBP is costless. It falls, literally, as the
dew from heaven. Owners of the Project pa y nothing for this water, to either
t he state or federal government. Water rights are granted by the state of Utah
to individuals or groups able to demonstrate that they can control and put to
beneficial use a quantity of water to which no one else has been given the right.
Water rights may acquire a marketable value, but it is quite consistent with
observable circumstances to interpret that value as pertaining to th e r e lative
ease with whi ch the water may be conveyed to the desired location of use.
Thus it is the time, location, and r ate of flow that are the elements of the
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water right that have value, not the water itself. The State Engineer stands
ready to grant new water rights at zero price to anyone who can demonstrate
that he has the water under control and plans to use it.

Getting such a right

is far from costless, but the expense lies totally in designing and building
the control system.

It is that expense, in precisely analagous fashion to

Ricardo's marginally productive lands, that endows less costly diversion
works with a marketable value--a site rent.
There is a temptation, stemming no doubt from the understandable
presumption that water is scarce in the arid region of the U. S. West, to look
upon water in reservoirs as a scarce resource which it is somehow wasteful
to us e for nothing but recreation.

Neverthe less, the water in any reservoir

is part of an annual supply that has been roughly constant for centuries,
even millenia. If it is not used beneficially and consumptively now, it was
not previously e ither.

The difference between now and then is the interposi-

tion of dams, spillways, canals, etc. The only scarce resources in the reservoit are therefore the energy and materials that went into its construction.
Control and conveyance works represent the scarce resources in respect of
which concern for effective use is appropriate.
Once control and conveyance works are in place, effective use is
simply a matter of keeping them busy. Assuming the storage reservoirs to
have sufficient capacity to keep the delivery system full during the peak consumption season, efficient use of water works means keeping the pipes full.
The water is free; the works are a sunk cost, and the only additional expense
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of keeping them full is operation a nd maintenance.

Therefore the pri ce of

water service , assuming excess capacity as in the WBP, should be a proportional share of the operation and maintenance costs incident to the actual
delivery of water to a customer . If there is exce ss capacity at this price, it
simply means that the system is larger than it needs to be, given the current
uses for water in the delivery area .
The rule for efficient use of the Weber Basin P roject is therefore as
follows: the price for each unit of water delivered to a customer should
approximate as c losely as possible the cost actually incurred by delive ring
the marginal unit to that c ustom er . Actual practice of the WBWCD is to
charge "a fair proportionate share" of a nnual operation and maintenance
charges to each customer . This cha rge is calculated on an acre-foot bas is,
and is added into the c ustomer ' s total contract payment.

1

That is, a customer

pays a share of O&M based on his contract amount, rather than on the amount
of water he actually uses . No effort has been made as part of this investigation to make actual calculations of marginal cost.

The practice of charging

O&M for water not actually used is a viola tion of the efficiency rule , however.
Effici e ncy in the use of WBP resources could the r efore be improved by efforts
to calculate the marginal cost of operation and maintenance, and then charging
it only for wat er actua lly de livered. Although the expe nse of making a nd
e nforcing such a calculation may be high, it is probable that some net benefit

1

s ee P e ndse .

426
could be gained, especially because current practice does not restrict the
O&M charge to water actually delivered.

The fixed cost problem
The previous section demonstrates that except for the practice of
assessing O&M charges on contracted rather than delivered quantities of
water, WBWCD pricing policy is not far from the allocative rule. Nevertheless, management of this and other water supply networks had been criticized
by several analysts because they charge prohibitive prices, require very long
contracts, and conBequently inhibit the tranBfer of water among uses and
users.

This, say the critics, is inefficient because it does not allow water

to be used in accordance with the principle stated at the start of the previous
section.

From the perspective made possible by the hypotheses proposed

and supported in this work, that criticism seems unjustified. It tends to
ignore the inescapable fact that shifting water to and fro is impossible without
expensive storage and conveyance systems.
The situation does become confusing unless one focuses steadfastly
on the fact that the conveyance facilities represent the scarce resource, not
the water. It is true that many of the conveyance facilities would not be
needed if rainfall were abundant, and if no one wanted delivered water.

Tbus

it is reasonable to argue that the demand for delivery systems is derived from
a demand for water. It may also be reasonably asserted that people do not
want to wash, they just want clean clothes; they do not necessarily want to
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drink, just not to be thirsty; above all, farmers do not enjoy irrigating,
but they do like to get a crop. Similarly, people do not necessarily want to
cross a bridge, they just want to be on the other side of the chasm. Assuming
uncrowded public lands on both sides of the chasm, the state of being on one
side or the other is free; building a bridge to exercise the choice is decidedly
expensive. Nevertheless, water is more tangible stuff than the state of being
free to move about (to people with functional legs living in an open society, at
least), and given American experience with the West as described in Chapters
Vlll and IX, it is hardly surprising that most analysts focus on water as the
scarce good, rather than the conveyance system. Excusable or not, failure to
distinguish between the free and the scarce resources in water supply systems
is a barrier to clear thinking about them. It does not follow necessarily from
the fact that water is useful and desirable that it is also scarce, and hence an
economic good.
Reclamation engineers and their like-minded friends and associates
go only half-way toward recognizing the point of the last paragraph. They
know it is the conveyance and storage works that are critical, but they cannot
bring themselves to say the words "water is abundant. " The pricing structure
imposed by the Bureau to get its money back is a tacit recognition of the facts,
as we shall see, but Bureau spokesmen are obviously not accustomed to
thinking of it that way. Bureau practice clearly distinguishes a repayment
assessment from an operations and maintenance charge, but then lumps them
both together and refers to the sum expli citly as the price of water .
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Discussions with Wayne Winegar of the WBWCD exposed some suggestive
terminology used by water professionals.

Reference has been made in pre-

vious chapters to a large agribusiness firm that rents its substantial water
right to its client farmers, on a yearly basis. In a slightly different context,
Winegar mentioned that a source of revenue to the WBWCD is wheeling the
water of other companies in WBP facilities. It is quite clear that wheeling
amounts to the r ental of WBP facilities for the transportation of water to which
othe r persons have the right.

The fees derived from this are perfe ctly

analogous to a bridge toll or a railway freight or passenger charge. When
its facilities are not needed by its own long-term customers, the WBWCD
increases its revenues by renting them to someone else. It is quite conceivable that the very water referred to above as being rented by U&I Sugar
Company to farmers passes through some WBWCD facilities.

On the surface,

this usage of rental seems peculiar, for it appears rather that the company is
selling water on a short-term basis.

(This was given by Winegar as a reason

why farmers in the area west of Ogden do not feel a need to sign 60-year contracts with the WBWCD.) The usage is correct, however, for the subject of
this transaction is not water per se, but the right to a flow of water at a
particular location. It is really kinetic energy in the form of moving water
that is the s ubstance of a right.

This has been the position of Utah rights

ajudicators and the courts up to the Murray City well decision reported in
Chapter VII, although the courts as well as the engineers (and latterly
economists) have ob viously been troubled by an inability to distinguish clearly
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between water itself and the power to apply it where desired.

The energy of

mountain water is constantly renewed in the hydrologic cycle by solar energy.
It is not exhausted by using it, and the rental terminology in respect of the

s ugar company is, therefore, appropriate.
This brings us, at last , to the question of why the WBWCD cannot
operate in the same way as U &I Sugar Company. Why does it not "rent"
water on a yearly basis instead of requiring 60-year contracts ? And even
though it does require long-term contracts, why can it not allow contractees
to rent their rights to others ?

1

Such practices, if permitted, would obviously

allow a closer approximation to the allocative rule.
There are at least three parts to the answer. In the first place, the
WBP was an enormous expenditure of energy and materials, which was
financed out of the Reclamation Fund and must be repaid.

Some criticisms

of the consequent a llocati ve constraints on efficient use of Utah water
resources seem to ignore this fact.

A second reason for the long-term con-

tracts is evident from reading the history of Reclamation in the U.S.
Beneficiaries have always wanted to avoid paying for project construction, and
in several cases they have b een successful. The Bureau relies on Congress
for its resources, however, and building water works for the benefit of
western farmers at the expense of eastern industrial, commercial, and labor
interests is not easy to sell. In order to maintain Congressional support,

1

This policy constraint is identified by Pendse, pp. 72-73.
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therefore, the Bureau has had to maintain at least an appearance of getting
its money back. The Reclamation Fund was built with revenues from the sale
of public lands and other public resources, and was intended to be maintained
intact by the beneficiaries of reclamation projects. It has not been easy to do,
because reclamation farming tends to be energy inefficient compared to rainwatered farming, and because the United States has generally been glutted
with agricultural produce throughout its history. The Bureau has had to
devise default-proof contracts to maintain its own viability, and as the cost
of projects (net energy expenditures) has gone up, the term of the contracts
has had to get longer a nd longer. As noted in earlier chapters, the Bureau
has sometimes been able to avoid the worst consequences for water users by
paying for most construction costs from the sale of hydroelectric power.

For

reasons not explored here, that method of repayment was not elected for the
WBP, and the Bureau cast the burden on municipal water users instead.
A third reason for holding users strictly to their contracts a nd not
allowing them to rent their rights to neighbors is the abundance of water in
the Weber Basin. If the Conservancy District did allow this practice which
critics advocate in the name of allocative efficiency, it would jeopardize
District chances of selling a long-term contract to the renters.

If services of

the WBP were truly needed, its managers would not have to worry about
losing revenues through interpersonal transfers of water service.

Thus a

chief cause of the transfer restrictions which critics deplore as allocative
inefficiency is the abundance of water supply facilities.

This is paradoxical
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because efficient allocation is only supposed to be a problem in respect of
resources that are scarce.
The enormous fixed cost of water works like the WBP clearly
complicates the use of the facilities once constructed.

The most ludicrous of

these complications is the compound redundance in municipal and industrial
water supplies (see details in Chapter II).

The patent reason for developing

groundwater instead of buying WBWCD contracts has been that such supplies
were much less expensive.

The reason for the high WCD price is, of course,

the necessity of paying the sunk cost of water works. If previous investments
had been efficient, there would be no cost incentive now in developing further
resources.

Thus bad investment decisions in the past are now the cause

(aided by ineffective financial institutions) of creating even more redundant
facilities.

The Probable Effects of a Marginal Cost Pricing Policy

The previous section detailed a problem, but proposed no solution.
The necessity of paying fixed costs is the source of transfer restrictions,
price discrimination, and continued redundant investment, all of which constitute violations of efficient allocation principles. This section explores the
possibility of improved resource use via pricing changes.
Chapter V identified the kind and location of unused capacity in the
WBP system. Since use of none of its facilities is pressing hard on capacity,
there is no significant scarcity of either conveyance or storage. As already
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s uggested, this calls for marginal cost pricing to increase the use of redundant capacity.

The following discussion of the probable effects of such a

policy assumes that only the currently unused capacity wo uld be offered at
marginal cost.
The effects in Ogden Valley would be negligible, since facilities are
already used to virtual capacity.
although it is by no means certain.

Upper valleys of the Weber might use more,
More use probably depends on younger

a nd more aggressive farmers--to whom the present price of water is not
like ly a constraint.

In the service area of the Davis and Weber aqueducts

the outcome is uncertain. It is unlike ly that present prices a r e a constraint to
commercia l agriculture.

The North Davis and Uinta blocks have probably

been unresponsive because they are shifting out of agriculture into suburban
us e.

Current WBWCD prices for individual (Class D) contracts are not likely

a serious deterrent to would -be home builders. It is more likely that municipalities would be interested at the low price--especially if the WBWCD also
treated the water and delivered it through its own system , also at marginal
cost.

Furthermor e, from the evidence in Chapter V (see Weber River

Facilities Used at Virtual Capacity) it may be that winter-time expansion of
M&l sales is the only possible expansion of us e for these facilities.

(The

Davis aq ue duct may actually be at summer capacity.) Except for winter use,
expansion of M&I service is predicated on well development.

(Remember that

M&I sales were designed to raise money; the price is hardly related to the
cost of providing the service . ) If there is in fact more M&I capacity, however,
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marginal cost pricing would a lmost certainly use it up, since falling water
requires no pumping.
Nevertheless, even if marginal cost pricing could get r id of all excess
capacity on the Weber system above Slaterville, it could not move any more
than about 20,000 a. f. (see Chapter V), compared to idle storage in Pineview
and Willard Reservoirs of 250 ,000 plus.

The major obstacle to moving the

Willard and Pineview water is that there is no place for it to go except into
Great Salt Lake.

Pineview water could be squirted through Ogden City water

mains at almost no additional cost to the WBWCD, merely be releasing water
into the Ogden River.
potable water.

But Ogden has only one water system, which must carry

This means the city would have to treat the water even i f it

were delivered free to its treatment plant.

That fact, plus the physica l con-

straints of the City system, make the prospects for expansion very slight in
comparison to the unused storage.

Since there is excess water in the Ogden

River anyway, the unused storage in Pineview has to go down the river a nd
Ogden could take as much as it wanted for free whenever the flow was higher
than required to serve downstream rights holders . The cost of taking it is
obviously higher than the benefit to be gained. As noted in Chapter V, the
only other diversions from the Ogden between Pineview and Slaterville send
water north a nd south from the mouth of Ogden Canyon in conveyance systems
tha t are a lready full.
At Slaterville, water can be diverted to serve lands in the lake plains.
If water were priced at marginal cost to irrigation companies in this region (a
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very low cost because it is simply a matter of releasing water into tbe river
at Pineview dam, and shifting headgates at Slaterville), it is reasonable to
expect them to take some. It would be a strictly marginal increment, however, since no new lands would be served, and most irrigated farms no doubt
have close to a full season water supply already.

The objective of irriga-

tionists has a lways been a full water supply, by which they apparently mean
application to tbe point where the marginal physical product of water goes to
zero . J udging by the practices described in Chapter VII, it is highly unlikely
that ma ny farmers have a very precise notion of the value of the marginal unit
of water in terms of saleable product.

The purposive, teclmological instinct

in many farmers probably impels them to prefer maximum total product over
maximum net r evenue, even if they understa nd the difference.

There are

several indications that, at least in the past, water has been applied beyond
the point of maximum total productivity.

1

These considerations are grounds

for believing that not much scope exists for an expansion of water deliveries
to irrig a tion companies in the lake plains region.
Pineview and Willard reservoirs were designed for a major expansion
of irrigated farm land via reclamation of waterlogged and salt-impregnated
lake plains . It was never intended that existing irrigation companies would
take more than a miniscule portion of the water in those reservoirs. The land

1

wm. A. Palmer, "Utah's Water Courts, " Reclamation Era,
November 1947.
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has not been reclaimed ; the proposed delivery system to the lands has not
been completed. No water can be delivered to such lands, therefore, without
a significant additional investment of energy and materials. For reasons that
are abundantly clear in Chapter II (Synopsis of the Lake Plains Problem)
reclamation farming is not going to become popular in the East Shore under
immediately foreseeable economic conditions. And since it cannot without
further investment, the question is not even properly considered in the present
context of pricing changes to effect better allocation of existing resources.
(The recurring urge to do something with the store of water is a consequence
of slipping back into the frame of mind that sees water as the economic good
instead of the works that store and transport it.)
The outcome of this thought experiment appears to be that the only
significant benefit to be gained by giving away WBP surplus at marginal cost
is a reduction in the price of municipal and industrial water (on a limited
scale), and a cessation of the ridiculous practice of drilling for even more
water.

Now let us consider some costs.
In the first place, we did not propose giving away all WBP services

at marginal cost; only the currently uncontracted portion.

Such an action

would inevitably raise howls of protest from holders of long-term repayment
contracts.

Since the major proportion of their assessment is a fee for repay-

ment of capital costs, they would have a legitimate complaint that they were
being forced to subsidize a class of free-loaders who have hitherto steadfastly
refused to help pay for the WBP.

Thus it is probably a politically impossible
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policy.

Furthermore, it would put an end to any hope of selling more high-

priced repayment contracts, and therefore jeopardize the WBWCD 's ability
to meet its obligation to the Reclamation Fund.
The crux of the problem is, of course, the sunken cost of bui lding the
WBP.

If the investment had been an efficient a llocation of resources on strict

e conomic pri nciples, then it would now be possible to sell all the water the
Project can deliver , without discrimination, long-term contracts or transfer
r estrictions, at a price t hat would cover full costs, including a market rate of
interest.

The principal reason that such an efficient allocative policy cannot

be instituted now is that water and water works a re abundant, and it is necessary to clutch paying customers with grim tenacity.

Is A Compromise Solution Possible?

Because of the fixed cost problem, the only hope of achieving a more
nearly efficient a llocation of existing resources is to find that demand for
delivered water is elastic, or at worst, of unitary elasticity. That hope has
a lready been blasted in respect of the redundant s torage in Willard and Pineview, beca use of the high investment requirement in land reclamation.

The

only other place where significant improvements could be hoped for is in
respect of M&I water.

As Appendices I and III argued, the elasticity of

de m a nd for Weber Basin M&I water depends on the cost of alternative supplies.
The ma in alternative in the East Shore area is well development.

Therefore,

the cos t of well development and operation is the principal determinant in
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predicting what kind of revenue changes could be expected from lowering the
WBWCD price of M&I water.
The cost of constructing a well is roughly constant, no matter where
it is located (speaking of the East Shore area).

1

The procedure is routine.

Regardless of the flow desired, the same diameter of hole is drilled (about
1 foot).

That allows the most efficient size of well screen to be installed,

assuring maximum flow of water to the well regardless of how much pumpage
is desired.

If full capacity is not required, a smaller well casing and pump

can be installed, depending on the rate of flow desired. Drilling and development costs are the same, therefore, regardless of the capacity desired.
Differential costs are the well casing and pump.

The only other capital

expenditure is a pump house. A well lasts as long as its casing--60 to 100
years.

The wellscreens are stainless steel a nd so last indefinitely.

Pumps

are pulled on an average of every 10 years for an overhaul--a process which
currently costs abo ut $5, 000. 00. With this kind of maintenance a pump will
last 40 to 50 years. An excellent well can produce 2,000 g.p. m. at capacity,
and a good one 1, 500 g. p.m . Actual pumpage from these would be 1, 600 and
1, 200 g. p.m. respectively, however, because capacity pumpage could draw
down the well and force a lower yield for a lime . Capacity pumpage also
increas es the flow of sand and silt into the pump, reducing its life.

Pumping

1
rnformation on well costs from Hugh Wheelock of Templeton, Linke,
and Alsup, Consulting Engineers, Salt Lake City, Utah. Personal communication, September 1975.
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costs $ 15 to $20 per acre foot, depending on the hydraulic head of the well
and the pressure desired.

Except for hardness elements, no treatment is

required for gro undwater from deep wells, so that this completes the catalog
of costs associated with getting a well -water supply to a city's water mains .
(Unless the well is a long way from town!) This is how Wheelock compares
the costs of well development over the past 15 years:

1960

1965

Drilling and development
Pump

(Dollars)
1972
25 ,000

1975
40,000

17-20,000

25-30,000

15,000

18 ,000

55-60,000

80-90,000

Pump House
TOTAL

40,000

45 ,000

ln 1969 Bountiful City's pumping cost was about $10 per acre foot.

1

(Com-

pare to 1975 figures from Wheelock above .) The yield from an excellent well,
if pumped constantly, amounts to about 2, 580 acre feet per year.

If the

entire capital cost were paid off in the first year of operation, it would require
a charge of only $3 1.00 per acre foot of water (as suming an $80,000 well).
After that, the only cost would be pumping and occasional maintenance. In
1960, of course, when the problem of groundwater competition was just

becoming obvious, the charge per acre foot to pay for the well in 1 year was
only $15.50.

The comparison is so pathetic that there really is not a ny point

in a morti zing the cost of well deve lopme nt over 60 years to make a parallel

1

tion.

According to Wayne Carlson, City Enginee r.

Personal communica -
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comparison of annual costs with Weber Basin Water.

The only really sig-

nificant factor is pumping costs , which are rising.
There is a difference in the cost per unit of water depending on the
productivity of the well. But the figures above show that it really is a n
insignificant difference, compared to WBWCD prices, because the whole
capital cost can be repaid in 1 year anyway.

Pumping costs vary according

to the amount of water lifted, not the flow to the well screen. Nevertheless,
groundwate r conditions do make a difference.

As Chapter III explained ,

aquifers in the western parts of the East Shore are l ess efficient than those
closer to the mountains.

The sediments are finer and the waterbearing

strata thinner and poorly interconnected.

This means that a lthough plenty

of water may be present, it is not easy to develop a high-capacity well.
Water does not flow to the well casing fast enough even when it is perforated
at many levels.

Thus, although the cost of wells is the same no matter where

they ar e drilled, the probability of getting one worth pumping varies from
place to place. Sometimes a city will try drilling in a different location if a
first well is disappointing.

Not enough observations are available to make

reliable estimates of probability in the questionable parts of the region.

They

are the sparsely settled areas a nyway, and the total signifi cance of their water
requirements is quite minor compared to the total.

The WCD can reasonably

expect to sell their future water requirements, as it already does provide a
growing proportion of their current cons umption. Its principal customer in
this category is Roy City.
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Sales prospects for the WBWCD a re not as bleak as this suggests,
however. It is selling more and more water for industrial purposes , for
which it requires only $15 as capital repayment since the water is not treated .
Thus, it can compete quite favorably with pumping costs . The fact that the
District was recently willing to take on repayment responsibility for 1, 000 a. f.
of M&I a nd 1, 500 a . f. of irrigation water annually until the full allotment is
sold is a reasonable sign that they believe it can be done.

1

The information about we ll costs helps further to understa nd what has
happened in the Weber Basin.

The WBWCD was expected to sell 50, 000 a. f.

of M&I water a nd turn over $15 per acre foot p er year to the Bureau as repaymeat for the WBP. At 2, 580 a . f. per year per well (see above), the total
50 ,000 a. f. could be produced by fewer than twenty wells.

Even at 1975 prices

($80, 000 per well) the total investment to provide this amount of M&I capacity
would be only $1. 6 million. By contrast, the fig ures of Table 1 in Chapter VI
s how that municipal and industrial residents and taxpayers ar e expected to
come up with close to $50 million as their share of the WBP repayment
burden (including direct payments, 20 years of overpayments, interest and
taxes) .
One hundred wells of this kind (or larger) , at a total capital cost of
$8 million (1975 prices) could produce 258 ,000 a . f. of water per year.

That

1
wBWCD 1974 Summary of Operations, and pe rsonal communication
with Wayne Winegar in 1972.
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is more than the developed capacity of the entire WBP (see Chapter V), which
cost $100 million. Of course , it might not be quite that simple. It might be
necessary to make some deliberate capital expenditures for spreading water
over recharge zones , perhaps involvi ng the removal of some lands from
private us e . But the issue is probably academic because there is no foreseeable use for that much water . Half that many wells would produce all that
is us ed from the WBP.

Nevertheless, well s must be pumped, and the energy

cost rises consta ntly, wh er eas inflati on constantly reduces the rea l price of
the energy supplied by water in WBP mountain reservoirs.
Thus it appears that if there was a ny wisdom in the decision to build
the WBP, it was based on the expectation of inflation. Not only does the relative cost of WBP water go down, but revenues of the Water Conservancy District go up, thanks to its 1-mill levy on the assessed value of all real property
in the Basin.

1

As ene rgy prices get higher, e lastic ity of dema nd for M&I

water will probably increase because more and more firms and municipalities wi ll find it worthwhile to cease pumping, or at least to buy their incremental r eq uirements from the WBWCD. As that stage develops, it may
a ctually become possible for the WCD to increas e its revenues by lowering
its price . It is far from certain, however, because there is so much water
around in the East Shore area.

1

For financial details see Chapter VI, a nd Pendse .
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As already noted, increas ing population does not necessarily increase
the demand for water, because suburban land use is less consumptive of water
than agriculture.

This means that irrigation companies like the Davis and

Weber Counties Canal Company are going to have idle capacity on their hands,
which they could sell very cheaply to municipalities and suburban residences.
(Thei r control and delivery facilities are much older than those of the WBP,
and the fixed cost in current dollars is consequently much lower.) Frank
Haws suggests that the company already has surplus delivery capacity, and
wonders what deters its operators from competing directly with the WBWCD
for the M&I business in the Canal Company's service area.

1

(Recall from

Chapter VI that its service area is the intended victim of the WBP.) Wayne
Winegar provided a possible explanation, unintentionally, while trying to make
points in the Bureau 's favor: "They are good guys, " he said, "always w.mting
to help.

They fixed up the Davis-Weber Canal Company's East Canyon Dam

(built a brand new concrete-arch dam) and called it a necessary part of the
WBP." That is, the Bureau developed 20,000 a. f. of unneeded water at a
cost of $3. 5 million and charged it to Weber Basin residents.

The chief

beneficiary is the Davis-Weber Counties Canal Company. If this circumstance
is not the full or exact reason for the Company's reluctance to undercut the
WBWCD 's price for M&I water, it comes close to being sufficient.

2

Personal communication, 1975. This would have to be untreated
water, of course.
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Paying the Fixed Cost

Previous sections (and chapters) have devoted much space to demonstrating that the price discrimina tion, transfer r e strictions and long-term
contracts which engineers and economists a like have deplor ed as hindrances
to the efficient use of Utah water resources, are virtually inescapable effects
of paying the capita l cost of s torage a nd conveyance works . Although water is
fluid, water works are very specific to certain locations, and the limits to
water distribution are likewise quite restrictive . Once the works are in place,
possible allocative decisions with respe ct to water are narrowly defined . As
has bee n shown, the marginal cost pricing rule is not capable of effecting
large allocative changes in the post-investment stage. Because it is surplus
energy that is scarce and expensive, rather than water, the important
allocative dec isions in respe ct of water supply a re vi rtually all at the investment level. Once the works have been built, the economic resources ha ve
already been allo cated; water itself has become incidental.
In the post-investment stage, the resource to be allocated is energy
potential and pipe space, both of which are essentially constant in quantity
and location.

The effi ciency principles for that situation have been explained,

applied , a nd found to be virtually impotent to correct the frustrating impediments seen by critics of State water management.

Pla nners and critics are

frustrated because they have traditionally focused on the wrong part of the
water s upply problem . Once the relatively minor adjustment toward marginal
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cost pricing has been made (see above) further efforts to improve the situation
must focus on the fixed cost. Since the investment cost is already sunk,
arrangements for repaying it are a purely distributive problem.
T hus the WBP problem, as viewed in the 1970's, is only an issue of
efficient resource allocation in respect of the investment decisions made in
the 1940's and 1950's.

The a llocative questions are historical, therefore, and

have been treated as such. Issues for the present time are almost entirely
distributive, an ethical and political problem of who should pay for the WBP.
(Distribution of benefits is not amenable to much debate, because of their
fixed and permanent nature.) The relevant economics literature, therefore,
concerns the equity problems of taxation and the pricing of high-overhead
public utilities.
Two widely applied principles of taxation are that beneficiaries should
pay, and that the burden of distribution should take account of ability to pay.
Knut Wi cksell suggested as a further consideration of justice that whenever
possible, persons likely to be taxed should be given the opportunity to s ubmit
voluntarily.

1

All of these considerations have been accounted for in distribu-

ting the repayment burden for the WBP.

The 1-milllevy on a ll real property

in th e Basin satisfies the benefits principle probably as well as any tax could,
since available water has an obvious beneficial effect on land values.

1

The

Knut Wicksell, "A New Principle of J ust Taxation," in Classics in
the Theory of Public Finance, ed. [A] . Musgrave and [A]. Peacock (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1967).
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repayment assessments (that is the word used by the Bureau of Reclamation),
while arbitrary, certainly do discriminate between users and non-use rs .
Furthermore, they were submitted to voluntarily, because they appear as
the price of a long-term contract for delivery of a specific service.

In com-

bination with the marginal- cost pricing principle, which is approximated in
the separate O&M charge, these levies and assessments amount to a voluntarily accepted two-part tariff,

1

plus an arbitrary tax on beneficiaries who

might otherwise escape payment.
This arrangement is hard to fault on principle, a lthough there may be
many coge nt arguments against the way in which it currently distributes t he
burden . We have seen that an agrarian democratic bias has no doubt had
something to do with its design. It also seems that south Davis County is
being subsidized deliberately by Ogden and other cities (not necessarily by
conscious, volunta ry choice).

The evidence examined would also s upport a

conclusion that the Bureau 's primary distributive criterion i s what - the-trafficwill-bear.
It is conceivable that if the State had complete control of the WBP

(and all other works constructed by federal agencies), it could effect several
distributive changes that would a llow for more efficient allocation of water
works.

But it could not, barring the highly improbable event of successful

1
A standard pr actice in public utilities ' pricing, as explained in
E. A. Phelps Brown, and J . Wiseman, A Course in Applied Economics
(London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1964), Chapter VI.
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theft, avoid the problem of making repayment somehow.

The principles of

benefits, ability to pay, and voluntarism would no doubt be operative in the
State decision on distributive burden, just as they were for the Bureau . Quite
possibly, Utah's preference in distributive arrangements could be worked out
with the Bureau, so that the Chief benefits of a State takeover might be
psychic.

Recommendations

The most important step that can be taken toward improving the
e[[iciency of water management in the State of Utah is to increase public
knowledge of the current water resource situation.

That will be difficult until

the fraternity of water specialists itself begins to tell the truth, or face the
truth, or even learn the truth . The public record of the Weber Basin Project,
as examined for this investigation, is replete with obscurantism from earliest
promotion to current operations. It is hard to believe that some of the evasion
is not deliberate, but it is abundantly clear that honest self-deception has
played a major role in obscuring the facts and the issues.
The goal of re-education must be to get rid of the notion that water is
scarce, along with its corollary that more water development is an unqualified
benefit.

The natural but unfortunate tendency to focus on water seems to get

in the way of understanding that the expensive resources in water development
are the contro l a nd conveyance works.

If the necessity of paying for these

works, long afte r their completion, and the problem and details of distributing
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the burden were made clear to the public and decision-makers, the economic
rationality of future water works investment would have to improve.

Very

likely, such investment would also diminish.
The necessity of making some distribution of the repayment burden
after the fact of investment can hardly be prevented altogether from effecting
the allocation of resources, especially if the benefits principle of equity and
fairness is to have any part in the decision . In the Weber Basin case, the
distributive burden does not appear to conform to most peoples' notion of
justice . Economic rationality (as well as political beat) could be served by
publicizing the explicit details of how the benefits and burdens are actually
spread aro und.

A major portion of the actual burden was incurred by the

building of Pineview and Willard dams, neither of which was needed or wanted
by the local promoters. It may be that administrative rules or legislative
acts forced the Bureau to build these white elephants in order to have sufficient
paper benefits to justify building the aqueduct for south Davis County. Or
maybe they just wanted to build a dam. Either way, it was a bad allocative
decision, a nd the necessity of paying for it perpetuates and induces even more
inefficient allocation of water supply resources in the Weber Basin.
Nevertheless, the WBP is an accomplished fact, and if the State really
wanted to prevent further misallocation of resources in water supply, it should
have followed the lead of E. J. Fjeldsted when he opposed the first post-project
well developments at Clearfield.

Certainly it would not have been fair to indi-

viduals and groups who can get cheaper water from wells than from the
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WBWCD- - especially in places like Clearfield and Ogden which pay for more
than they get--but it would be more efficient allocation of aggregate resources ,
nonetheless.

Straightforward pricing policies have been unable to rectify the

situation precisely because the WBP was such an egregious allocative decision. If the circumstances had been understood more c learly , however , some
other means might have been devised to keep the repayment problem from
causing even more ineffici ent investment.

All well development should be

prohibited in the WBWCD service area until its M&l facilities are fully used .
The repayment burden should then be redistrib uted to accord more closely
with actual benefits received.

The share of cities like Ogden a nd Clearfield

should be red uced via a general reduction in the pri ce of M&l water.

Revenues

should then be r eplenis hed by higher taxes on suburban irrigators, especially
in the Bountiful subconservancy district, and by high user fees for recreational
facilities asso ciated with Pineview and Willard Reservoirs.
Changes of this nature are unlikely to be initiated by the Bureau of
Reclamation because they would entail admis s i on of unpleasant facts that it
has appare ntly preferr<>d to disguis e, ignore, a nd obfuscate.

Forcing the

Bureau to acknowledge the distributive and a llocative abuses in its operation
.>f the WBP might be difficult, b ecause it would entail an acknowledgement
also t hat many of its Projects are unwis e investm ents.

It might, therefore,

be more effective to follow Haws' suggestion of having the State of Utah a ssume
all Reclamation indebtedness . State water planners could than rearrange payment burdens to cause the least possible interference witb efficient allocation
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of existing waterworks.

The problem of efficient water management cannot

be solved until the facts of heavy fixed cost and repayment distribution are
squarely faced.
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<
dATE R PRICES, MISALLOCATION OF WATER RESOURCES,
AND THF. PUBLIC INTEREST: THE ~-lEBER BASIN
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
by
Keith D. Wilde and All e n D. LeBaron*
A general concern over ''water shortages " has partially obsc ured the
arguments of a number of economists that more rational pricing policies
«Ould temper needs for new f 'lc ilities.

This view holds that water :>ricing

policies and certain transfer restrictions are responsible for misallocation of this scarce r esource.

A c orollary is t hat concentration on water

"needs" has somet i.mes led to creation of exces s supplies.

As yet this

form of misallocation has not caught the attention of economists to any
great degree; yet e xamples are not unfamiliar.

In our region the Weber

Ba sin Wate r Con serva ncy Distri c t come s most readily to mind.
According to s t ateme nts found in the Distr ict' s Seven-Year Summary,
the Webe r Basin project «as initiat ed in 1949 under the stimulus of "dire
need " for domestic uat e r, and with the intent of reclaiming all the wast e
water in the Webe r drainage bas in.

Ant ic ipated bene fits were s ummed up

und e r the headings of municipal and i r rigation water supply, flo od control,
recreation, water fo«l refuge, and expansion of arable irrigated farmland .
Con s truction of dams, reservoirs, tunnels , aqueducts, pumping s tations,

and drainage of marshlands were undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation.
Work is to be concluded in June of this year with the original obje c tives

*Gradua te St ude nt and As socia t e Pro fes s or in Department of Agricultural Economics, Utah State Unive rsity
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mostly obtained .
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1

In 1969, 20 years after initiation , it appears tha t the project
has been se riously overbuilt.

The "d ire need " for domestic water ex-

pressed in pre-project justifications has been replaced by a restiveness
on the part of munic ipa li ties who wish to get out of their contracts
with the WBWCD.

Town councils a nd city managers have discovered it is

less expensive to create and operate their own water supplies than to
buy from the District.

In addition, many thous ands of acre feet of water

are evapora ted and drained from Willard Bay Reservoir each year because
landowners in the area do not find it in their inte rest to have their
land drained free of charge by the Bureau of Reclamat ion on the sole
sti pulation that they buy irrigat ion water from the WBWCD.
It is irrat ional and wasteful of resources to construct depreciating
assets such as dams, canals, and tunnels before there is a demand for
them as manifested by a willingnes s of the people to pay for their services.

Willard Dam, it now appears, could have been postponed for many

years.

It traps unwant ed «ater that remains unused except for recreation

and as a water fowl sanctuary (neither of which leads to d irect reimbursement of project costs).

Part of the expense of dams and aqueducts on the

Weber River could have been postponed simply by creating a recharge area
at the mouth of Weber Canyon and developing the underly ing aqui fer to its
full capacity .
Insufficie nt information, no doubt, made a significant contribution
to project misplanning.

An over-optimistic view of the value of agriculture

1
rhe major exception is the drainage of marshlands an4 creation of
canals in the Willard-Warren area (due to lack of interest).

-3-
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in the Utah economy 5eems to have inflated the estimate of "ater demana
in the marshlands of the Willard-Warren Di s trict.

Had the s tudy of the

Weber Delta Di s tri c t by the U.S. Geological Su rvey bee n completed by
1950-51 the observed

quit e different.

need ' ' for domes tic water supplies may have bee n

Results of that survey h ave s ince s hown that the market

area of the WBWCD is underlain by a large aquifer which is ca pable of
a s ustained yield of over 60,000 acre f ee t of good water per year.

(The

total projected sup ply of WBWCD dome s tic wat e r wa s 52 , 000 acre feet.)
Only 25,000 acre feet are be ing extr acted from the aquifer at the present
time.

Furthermore, it can be recharged very rapidly from an area at the

mouth of Weber Canyon.
However , now that the f ocilitie s are in place, the economic prob lem
is one of dec iding how to use this publicly-created resource in a «ay
that will either maximize social benefits or minim ize lo sses .

The object

of our propos ed r esearch is to devise a lternative pricing policies for
the WBWCD that can best meet e ither of the se goal s .
Under it s pre se nt price s tructure, whi ch was large ly imposed bv th e
Bureau of Reclamation, the WBWCD is able neither to pay fo r the project
comfortably nor to meet satisfactorily the demands of would-be customers.
The theory of pric e asserts tha t profit s are maximized (or losses minimized) at the level of output wher e marginal cost is equa l to marginal
revenue .

The same body of theory def ines t he optimum for society as the

level of output at t>hich pri ce of the product i s just equal to th e marginal
cost of production . I . e . , since the costs of impounding the water are mostly

-4-
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sunk , why not move all the water pos s ible if operating costs are at
least covered?

These two optima do not coincide except for firms in

"perfect competition."

Public utilities are monopolies by nature, so

we must expect that the pricing policy that maximizes profits (minimizes
losses) for the WBWCD will not be the same as the one that maximizes
social benef it s .
Without further research all that may be said is that the present
discriminatory price s tructur e does not maximize social welfare, for the

price to all categories of users is higher than marginal cost, according
to the breakdown of its costs and prices as published by the WBWCD.

And

whether the WBWCD comes anywhere near maximizing its returns (minimizing
losses) is completely unl•.nown .
An estimate of the marginal revenue function facing the Conservancy
District is esse ntial for describing and evaluating the proposed policy

manipulations.

Determination of marginal revenue requires knowledge of

a functional relationship between price and potential water sales.
This eame knowledge is required before it is possible to ascertain the
prices and water sales that would lead to a social optimum.

Therefore,

a fundamental objective of the proposed "esearc h is to develop potential
marginal revenue schedules for municipal-industrial and agricultural water
use as faced by the WBWCD.

Detailed research procedures are spelled out

in subsequent sections.
Once. such schedules are i.n hand, it is a straightforward matter to
predict the sets of price s

<~hich

goals postulated earlier.

Marginal cost data for each of the products

will be necessa ry to achieve each of the

which it sells (irrigation water, untreated municipal and industrial

- 5-

wat er, and tr e at ed water for domes tic a nd industrial use) are availabl e
from the WBWCD .

Since the Distric t sel l s es se nti al ly thr ee di sti nct

product s, having three distinct marginal cost functions, it is not

possibl e to use th e textbook model of the di s criminating monopolist
wh o equates a point on his singl e MC function t o th e sum of the MR
functi ons facing him in s e parate markets.

But we can equate MC to MR

in each of the three markets to find a set of prices and outputs that
will maximize revenues.

Using the same information the "social optimum"

se t of prices and output s may be found by obs e rving the intersections
of the demand functions and marginal cost curves in ea ch of the three
markets.
11

As present prices are all higher than margina l coat, the

social optimum" implies an increas e in sales (as s uming a negatively-

s loped demand curve).

This potenti a l increase may then be compar ed with

the avai l able supp ly facilities.

And finally, the net effect upon revenue s

of WBWCD may be related t o adoption of one or the other water a llocation
goals.
Since there is at le ast a pos s ibility that, at lower prices, the
pres ent excess supp ly in the Web er Basin would be conside r ably diminished,
foreknowledge would be of immenez value to the Utah Water Resources Committee , which is charged by law to develop a nd implement a s tate water plan
by 1970 .

In addition, certain chemical companies are interested in magne-

s ium extraction from the brines of Great Salt Lake.
fresh water will

~e

required .

Large quantities of

The s tate engineer will be in a better

position to rule on pe rm i ts for new wells vs. conservancy district water
if the WBWCD has any effective means to set prices to achieve the desired
amount of water movement.

-6473
A Utah State University agricultural ec onomist, Dr. B. De lworth
Gardne r, pr ovided the Utah Wate r Re sources Commit tee with a phil oso phical
position tha t might govern deve l opment of a ma s t e r water plan.

Other

r esea r c h conduct ed i n the Economic Re sea rch Center has been dir ected
toward s es timat es of the value of water in variou s us es, but the research

prop ose d herein will be essen tially the fir st attempt to work out a
s y s tematic way of helping a complex water s upply institution, a conserva ncy di s trict , better achie ve some cl ea rly defined economic goa l s .
CONCEPTUAL SOLUTION
At some po int in time, during the organization of the WBWCD, ther e
exis t ed an aggr ega t e demand f or treated wa ter in the Weber Ba s in.
thi s be s hown as DD in Figure 1 .

Let

Exi s ting s upplies were equal to ON.

Vuriou s increment s of treated water could be s uppli ed to users at ever
increasing cost s, SS. Town counci l s and city managers, envi s i oning

futur e s hift s in dema nd (D'D'), rec ogniz ed that they could obtain a n
equilibrium o f s upply from tradit iona l sourc es only a t cos t OX.

This

amount was necessa ril y great e r tha n the pr o posed conse rvancy district

pric e o f $42.50 s inc e, in fact, t he ci ties chose to buy amount NM fr om
the district.

Thu s we s ay th a t Point A mu s t lie on some demand curve

whe r e the marginal va lu e of the Mt h unit of water was $42.50, ot he rwi se
mor e than NM would have been pur c ha sed .

Since th e municipalities do

ha ve alterna tive s up p ly sources, it is almost certain that th e WBWCD ca nnot take D'D' as a n ind ica ti on of d emA nd

problem:

for~

wat e r.

Thi s poses a

is Po int A really on D'D' as s hown or i s it on s ome ot he r demand

curve, one s tri ct ly asso ciated wtth WBWCD selling pos s ibilitie s?

In fact
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it turns out that Po int A is on both demand c urves simultaneously, i.e.,
th e y inters e ct at Point A.

$

R

D"
D'
D

'

:

'.i

'·

s

X

4 2. 50 1··- -

D"

D'
D

0 ·· ---- · -- - · -

N

Q

M

Figure 1

$42.50 wa s s omewhe re near the intersection DD and SS, near enough
that city a uthorities could not get the amount they wanted for the future
at less than $42.50.

Thus at the time they contracted with the WBWCD

their alternative new s ources constituted a schedule over and above th e ir

existing stock (r e presented by Vert i cal Line RN).

We know that at $42.50

they bought all the difference in demand, D' D' less DD, from WBWCD (NM).
On the other hand, if the District had charged any price higher than OX,
the city authorities would have relied upon their alternative sources
c ompletely.

Thus we obtain the flatter derived demand for WBWCD water

(dw) that the district faced when it first entered the water market.
intersection of D'D' and dw at Point A is now apparent.

The
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We ca n use analogous reasoning to evaluate their situation at the
pr~ s ent

time (Figure 2) .

Demand (total) has increas ed over time and the

new function may be repres en t e d as D"O".

tional facilities have fallen

But costs of

creating~~

(new and bett e r drilling and pumping,

high er water table, more geological information, etc. ) .

The municipaliti es

continue to make use of some existing stoc k of water provided by their

own facilities.

$

Their supply

of~

D"

,R
I

sources i s a schedule of increasing

I
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Figure
costs per acre foot rising from a point on the vertical line representing
their stock.

(This will actually be somewhat greater than ON since some

wells have bee n drilled in the interim.)
before but

ON i s larger.

NM (WBWCD water) is the same as

RN represent s municip a lities' existing stocks.

S'S' repres e nts their new supply capacities .

D"D" gives an equilibrium price of P

1

Int e r se ction of S'S' and

i f we ignore th e WBWCD water .

municipalities will not be willing to pay a higher price than P

1

Th e

becaus e

they can satisfy their t otal demand at that price by producing their own
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water.

But, th e y will be willing to

price as l ow as P

2

buy~

their requirement s at a

since it i s bel ow the cost o f pr oducing thei r own.

So the derived dema nd curve,

d~,

und e r prese nt c ir cumstances is given

by sub tr ac tin g the S'S' from D"D" be tw een P

1

and P .
2

The relevant demand curve that we desir e for purposes of predicting
WBWCD sal es is the kinked function r ep r esented by

d~D" .

The elasticity

of th is function plu s those for o th e r uses, whe n comb ined with cost

data from the WBWCD, compri s e all that is ne eded to predict the prices
th at will ma ximiz e profit s (MC = MR) .
d~D",

The de mand curves for various uses,

whe n combined with cost data, se t the social op timum output where

P = MC.

Initi a l Condi tions
The initial conditions fall \Ind e r two hea dings:

(1) Model pa r ameters.

Loc ation of function s requires a number of

obs e rvati ons on cu r re nt and historica l c os t s faced by municipalitie s in

a tt emp t s to supply their cu stome r s with water.

Th ese data will provid e

a bas is for es tima ting the l oca t ions, slopes, and e lasticities of the

total dema nd a nd alternative supply functi ons in the model .
(2) Institutions.

Other initia l co nditi ons , s uch as the cost s truc-

tur e o f t he co nse rvancy distric t, t he amount of its potential wa t e r

s upply, a nd it s installed facilit ies, ar e t a ken as g iven and ap propriate
allowances mad e f or the ir effect s.
Predi ctions

The combination of the e stima t ed model and initial conditions pr ovide the means where by the nec ess ary prices t o ac hi e ve pos tulated goal s
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can be predicted .

The test o f the overall hypothesis requires that the

specified prices be o ffer ed; ei the r the pre dicted amount o f WBWCD water
i s take n off the ma rket o r it i s not .

The results cannot be exa ct in

such work , so it i s difficult to say jus t how much error would co ns titut e
a refutat ion .

The predictive model requires the l oca tions and e la sticities of
th e t o tal demand curve and s up ply c ur ve o f alternati ve sources that are

take n as initial cond itions.

A r easona ble me thod f or asc e rtaining the

alternative supply curve comes to mind readily enough, but the demand
curve i s l ess tractable.

As in previous sections the case of ·treated

municipal wa ter will be used t o illustrate.
(1) The s upply curve of a lternative sources:

Data for this function

come fr om cost estimates of providing a new sourc e of given capacity.
Several municipalities have constructed new faciliti es in rec e nt

month s, a nd nearly all have exami ned the pr ospe c ts.

Regardle ss o f the

ex ac tness of s uch est i mates, they r e pres e nt Web e r Ba s in water user s '

und e r s tanding o f the co st situation they face with r espect to new sources

of su pply .

The se estima tes a re those wh ich ci ty au thorities use to

c ompare with the cost of WBWCD water.
Onc e the data on cos ts for given quantiti es a re in hand, the y may

be ranked by price leve l and the qu a ntities in each rank summed.

At a

l ow pric e ( or cos t) per acre foot the total of expec ted potential supply
in the r e gion wi ll be less th an if a higher per-unit cost is allowed.
At a price significantly ab ove $42.50, sa y $100 per AF , a great deal of
wa t e r could be provided from sources o ther tha n the Conservancy Di st rict,

and there is some price bel ow whi c h no t own ca n produce a supply of it s
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own.

It is cl ear that this procedure will pr oduce an upward- s loping

curve that may be reasonably labeled a •' supply function."

(2)
obsc ure.

A satisfying conc ep tion of the total demand functi on i& more
Several alternative procedures have been rejected in favor of

the following:

From municipal water authorities we will obtain a weighted

ave rage of the price paid for the average amount of treated water purchased per customer.

Repetition of this in each town will produce a

sca tter (more likely a cluster) of points to which a species of crosssection demand curve may be fitted.

If the resulting "curve" is then

multiplied by th e number of customers in the regi on, the result should
be an approximation of total demand for treated water in the Weber Basin.
Several qualifications and r e fin ements may help to improve this
result.

Other studies have shown that indoor use of water is virtually

constant in all seasons, thus allowing isolation of demand for water used

in lawn and garden irrigation.

1

Indic atio ns are that these two use s of

treated water have different price elas ticiti es.

The procedure described

above can be applied in both cases to get two a ggrega te demand curves
whose sum may be taken as the total demand for treated water.

If the

scatte r of points i s so clu s tered as to throw doubt on the shape of the
line fitted to it, elasticities rep orted from other studies may be used
far comparison ancl perhaps even borr ov1ed.

One such study was conducted

2
here in Northern Utah , and it s r es ult s s hould be most relevant to our
1
c. W. Howe and F. P. Linaweave r, Jr., "The Impact of Price on Residential
Water Demand and Its Rela tion to System Design and Price Structure,"

Water Re s ou rc es Research. Vo l. 3, No. 1 (1967).
2
B. D. Gardner & S. H. Schick, "Factors Affecting Coneumption of Urban
Household Water in Northern Utah," Bulletin 449, November 1964, Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, Utah.
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area of s tudy.

Unfortunately the elas ticiti es r eported in the various

s tudi es range fr om zero to -1.0.

The value of our study will obviously

be enhanced if sufficie nt spread ca n be obtained infue data to produce

a convincing slope coefficient.

The presence of two kinds o f demand for

treated water, with presumably higher elasticity in the case of spri~ k
ling demand, should prove helpful .
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APPENDIX
Intelligent choice amo ng price-policy alter natives i s impo ss ible

without a n understanding of demand elasticity i n th e pertinent ma rket.
Refere nc e has be e n made to evide nc e suggesting that WBWCD prices for
municipal water are too high.

The requirement of repaying fixed cos ts

constrains the water a uthority from lowe ring its pr i ce in fear that total
revenue will be reduced.

Subh a n eve ntual ity would be intolerable, as

the Conservancy District is j ust bare l y able to meet its obl igations
to the Bu reau of Reclamation under the present pricing policy.

However,

if i t ca n be s hown tha t the dema nd curve facing the WBWCD is clastic,
both the Conservancy District a nd the Municipalities it s e rves can

from lower prices.

bc~Pfit
~

priori considera ti ons and the

fet-~

water demand st udie s e xta nt

i ndica t e a n ine l as ti c dema nd for water (espe c ially trea ted dome st ic
water).

Be ca use it is no t th e so l e source of s upply, however, it is no t

unrealis tic to hy pot hesize that the derived demand fa ci ng the HBI·ICD is
eLlstic.

In f i gur es I a nd

above th e derived demand, ow' i s define d as

the diff e renc e between total de mand, DT, and alternative supplie s , SA,
of pot e ntial WCD cus tomer s:

As all component s of this eq uation are functions of the pri ce of
water, It may be differen ti a ted with r rs pect to price , P :

dDw

dDT

dSA

""dP

'd'P

dP
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multiplying both sides by
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p

o•
w

p

dO

w

p

dDT

p

D

dP

D

dP

D
w

w

w

The term on the left-hand side is equivalent to the r elat ive change
dO
dP
.
l
..
in quantity over relative cha nge in price, ~
p-,
or pr1ce e ast 1c1 ty
w
of d e rived dema nd,~/(
.
0
w

Now if th e right-hand terms are multiplied by unity:
p

p

i wl

D

w

dO

T

dP
p

p

dP

dP

or

where

r( D

T

a nd (

S

A

are

the e lasticities of total demand and alternative sup ply, respectively.
Thi s result requires that i f

~(o and~
T

(+ a nd - respectiveyl)

.7('0

S

have the usual signs

~A

must be more elas ti c (more nega tive ) than
DT
is
/( DT, no matter . ,hat the other mognitudes may be. The value of
w

0w

grea t e r than one for all prices higher th a n the one at which OTand Ow
become coincide nt (P in Figure 2), and the highe r the price, the greater
2
. DT
. If Figure 2 is a real istic representation of the present sit uation ,
1s

0

w
DT .
.
SA
.
th e current price is high and
0w 1s at 1ts maximum value . 0w var1es from
OT
a figu re equal to
(at PI;) to less than one as price gets closer to P •
0
2
w OT
~
At the present time,
/ l, according to th e model impli ed by Figure 2.
0
0

w

w
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Investigations co nduc t ed to this da t e permit only very tentative
assignment of numerica l magnitude s , but th e a ttempt may give some indica-

tion of wha t to expect .

The WBWCD has con tracte d to sell 26 , 000 acre

feet of treated municipal water.

As they must pay f or their con tra ct ed

amount , munici pa liti es use all of their WCD wa t er before tapping their
own supplies.

Ogden City ha s cont r ac t ed to buy 8,500 acre feet, or 1/3

of this amo unt.

It ca n deliver 25,000 ac r e fee t more from its own sourc es,

but rarely r equi r es thi s muc h.

In r ecen t years it has supplied about

16,000 acre feet from its own sources, for a total consumption of 24,500
acr e fe e t.

Other communities in the region ha ve generally less than pro-

portional s upply ca pac ities compared t o Ogd e n.

On the purely arbitrary

assumption that they get 3/4 of thei r domestic supply from WBWCD (17,500
acre feet), th eir total consumption i s 17,500 •

t

23 , 333 acr e feet.

With its curr ent price s tructur e, therefore, the WCD sells a total of
26,000 acre feet, and its cus t omers supply th emse lve s an addit iona l
21,833 a c re feet for a total water consumptio n of 47,833 acre f ee t , or
DT
SA
DT
47, 8 33_., 1
Conseque ntly :
26,000
. 8 ' and
0

o-

w

w

o-·
w

1.8

1. 8

Results of o ther demand s tudi es suggest a n
-0.7.

C:-

Es

T(

01

A

of betwee n -0.5 and

will vary from one community to a nother , de pending on their
SA

pr oximity t o a good source of s upp ly .
well over one.

It c oul d vary from almost zero to

If i t is given a co ns erva ti ve estimate of 0.4 and

one of -0 .5 , the ca l c ulated value of
1.8 (-0 .5 )

1.8 (0 .4 )

-r( Ow is:
-0. 9

o. 72

-1.62

7-( DT
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Thes e pr e liminary and tentative calculations suggest that our research
may well lead to a prediction that the WBWCD could reduce its present
pric e for trea ted water without suffering a decrement in revenue.
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Appendix 1! : Historical Notes on the Weber Basin Project,
Suggesting Possible Origins for
Allocative Inefficiencies
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HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE WEBER MSIN PROJECT,
£jGGZS'f:.:}' G I'OOSII:LZ JRIG-.:NS FOR
ALLO::A'£IONAL I Neli'F!GIEHCIES

Beginning in 1952, the Bureau of Reclamation (United States
Department of the Interior) spent sixteen years constructing a large
system of dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, power plants and pumping stations
on the Weber River and its tributaries (Weber Baain Project, Utah).
With cooperation of business and civic leaders in Davia and Weber counties
the Bureau created a local organization that haC: to shoulder the
responsibility for reimbursing the U. S. Treasury for construction costs.
This institution, the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (WBWCD), is
an official arm of the State of Utah, and can raise the necessary money
by selling reclaimed water and by taxing water users and landowners.
Water aales were expected to be brisk a:>d few "worried'"aboac taxing.lpl:Jver
(which, in any event are limited by state law).
realized

a~d

Expectat~ons

have not been

the Conservancy Dictrict's financial position is very tight.

Under its current price structure, dictated by the Bureau of
Reclamation, the WBWCD is unable to meet price competition from local
culinary water supply aources.
met 1950 expectations.

Furthermore, irrigation demand has not

Consequently, facilities of the Weber Basin

Project (WBP) are used well below capacity and municipalities are
simultaneously investing in new aources of supply.
expensive to Weber Basin residents.

This waste is

If the WBWCD is forced to default

on ita scheduled payments, a 1939 amendment to the Reclamation act will
allow their contract to be re-written for a longer repayment period.
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The original period was sixty years, with no interest, and that was
twenty years longer than authorized by reclamation law at that time.
If it is extended further, with no interest, the waste of resources will
spread beyond the Basin to affect the state and nation.
At least two problems for economic analysis are suggested by this
inefficient allocation of resources:
WBP by prevented?

(1) How may further waste on the

(2) What can be learned from the WBP to guard against

poor planning on similar projects in the future?
A conceptual solution to the first problem is quite simple:

reduce

the Conservancy District price to a level necessary to prevent any
further duplication of facilities .

The empirical problems involved seem

to be manageable, but there are some policy alternatives that must be
weighed.

Total revenue would vary according as the district discriminates

or sets a common price for all users.

Unless demand turns out to be

elastic, the drastic fall in price required to meet competition would
cause a significant drop in revenue.

This reduction could be minimized

by discrimination, since alternative supplies vary in cost from town to
town.

If revenue is reduced, more or higher taxes will be necessary to

meet the repayment obligation - unless the excess of costs over revenue
is to be absorbed by the federal government, which has already paid for
the project.
The issue of taxes reveals that the innocent-sounding solution to
problem (1) really involves the whole set of allocation, welfare, and
financial dilemmas that plague public sector economics:

Should Weber

BAsin tax-payerA he forced to pay the whole cost of the WBP?

Are the
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benefits they receive greater than or equal to the coats they must pay,
or do non-residents reap a substantial portion of benefits?
far should the repayment obligation be extended?
or the nation?

If so, haw

to the state, the region,

Are total benefits as great as coats?

If not, should some

group of people be required to pay the costs all over again (the federal
government paid initially), or should the excess of costs over benefits
be written off like a bad debt?

What !!! tha total benefits anyway?

Haw do you calculate the recreation benefits, the insurance-againstdrought benefits, the value of new industry attracted by availability of
water, and the population-attracting influence?

Is some income redis-

tribution toward Weber Basin residents a desirable national objective?
If a regional group makes a bad investment, should they be allowed to
spread the burden to those innocent of the mistake?
mistake anyway?

Should they be liable for special assessments?

the question of
problem.

Who made the

mistake

leads directly to the second general

Why does this undesirable situation exist, and what can be

done to prevent ita repetition in other places?

Answers to these

questions can only be found through historical study of the institutions
involved.

Utah groundwater laws had an influence on the decision to

build the Weber Basin Project, and on its subsequent dirficulties.
Inadequate study of alternatives led local chambers of commerce to favor
the WBP.

Part of the inadequacy may be attributed to state laws which

had retarded measurement of Utah's groundwater resources.

the nature

and disposition of government bureaus must carry a large share of blame
for r••ource wasta in tha Weber Basin.

Preliminary investigations
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indicate that significant improvements could be made in the planning
of large, integrated water developments such as the WBP.
A.

The Weber Basin Water Conservaycy District is a smokescreen to
hide bureaucratic expansionism
In the popular ideal, a federal agency such as the Bureau of
Reclamation is a service like a water pressure system, ready to
deliver at the turn of a faucet, and just as convenient to shut
off.

Just as water pressure involves costs, even when the tap is

turned off, non-free Bureau of Reclamation research projects
provide a pressure potential for immediate action when the government tap is turned for an extreme local need, income redistribution,
or compensatory fiscal policy.
The Bureau's existence may be justified therefore, even when
it is not engaged in construction of reclamation facilities.

The

great weakness of this analogy is that whereas the pressure behind
a tap is from water, the pressure in a government service agency is
from people.

Unlike the water behind a faucet, a government agency

baa ways of reaching around to turn the tap and let itself out,

and

it is inordinately difficult to turn off.
It is more accurate to view the Bureau as a gigantic construetion firm, bidding aggressively for a contract.

In its case,

however, the contractor is the only bidder, and in addition is

1. The principal sources for this history were files loaned by
E. J. Fjeldsted, a prime mover in local water development. He
served as secretary-manager of the WBWCD until 1965, and was
simultaneously manager of tho Ogden Chamber of Commerce from 1929.
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trying to sell its intended customer (Congress) a construction
project generated in the mind of the contractor instead of the
customer's.

The ideal has it that Congress innovates and agencies are

itA

passive servants; in reality it is often the other way round.
Government agencies have a built-in ratchet effect.

Universal abhor•

renee of unemployment gives them a cushion against constricting
their level of operation.

The natural instinct of people, and

managers especially, for expanding their own importance and
influence provides an upward impetus.

If a manager's imagination

is limited, the easiest way to puff his own importance is to get
more people doing more of the same thing that is already familiar
from the manager's experience.
In 1958 a "Seven Year Summary of the Weber Basin Water Conser·
vancy District" ascribed initiative for the Weber Basin Project to
local civic leaders.

The "Summary" states baldly that "dire need"

for domestic water "started the ball rolling" on the Project, and
that the Davis-Weber Counties Municipal Water Development Assoc·
iation (D·WCMWDA) was formed in 1945 and 1946 to cope with an
urgent culinary water shortage.

"They were forced to act imnediately,"

goes the report, and through their organization consisting of
municipal officials raised enough money by a fractional mill levy
"to make a full engineering and factual study of water requirements
in the area."

(This impressive-sounding project was conducted and

written by engineer. Win Templeton over a period of less than six
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months and will be analyzed in another place.)
Armed with this data and with the support of all
water groups, they requested the Bureau of Reclamation
in ~ to make a comprehensive study of the water
resources of the Weber Basin. The study was completed early in 1949, and a report prepared
outlining and recommending a comprehensive reclamation project in the Weber Basin. (My italics)
It

is clear that this publication of ''historical" details conforms

to the "spigot" image that people expect and which a government
bureau tries t o project.

But, it is a story involving chronological

inversion of some key facts .
It is partially true that the Bureau of Reclamation began an
investigation of the Weber Basin in 1946, but it is
they were there at the request of the 0-WCMWOA.
"investigating" the Weber Basin since 1904.

~true

that

They had been

The current spate of

"investigations" had begun in 1942, were discontinued during the
war years and resumed in 1946 .

A bureau report in January, 1946 ,

ent itl ed The Bonneville Bas i n , "outlined potential projects, including
the Weber Basin Project, that may be coordi nated into a comprehensive
plan for .•• beneficial (water) use .•• in the Bonneville Basin . 2

It

must have been quite a feat for the 0-WCMWDA to have initiated the
whole thing 1946 when the Bureau had already made a report on the
project in January of that very year!

The story that the 0-WCMWDA

"started the ball rolling" is demolished completely by the fact

2 . Weber Basin Project , Utah.
2nd Session, p. 117.

Senate Doc. 147, Slat Congress,
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that the D-WCMWDA was organized on April 8 , 1948.

Isolated municipal

officials may have been concerned about their culinary supplies as
early as 1946, but they were working individually.

(In late late

1947 Win Templeton had been studying Ogden's water situation for 1
year).

The Weber Basin Project was a living thing inside the Bureau

of Reclamation before the 0-WCMWDA was even conceived.
Late in 1947 one man (Joseph Johnson of Davis County Water
Users Association) suddenly perceived that the Weber Basin Project
would appropriate all the surplus (flood) water of the Weber River
System into an irrigation supply, leaving none for nnmicipAl purpost'\a .

(How the idea came into his mind is not known as yet, but some
are noted later).

From this genesis in the mind of one man the

Davis-Weber Counties Municipal Water Development Association came
into being within a period of five months.

It was founded on the

firm belief that the Weber Basin Project was a "sure thing" and that
municipalities must get their fair share now or be thirsty ever
after.

Civic leaders appear to have been in a virtual panic that the

Project would deprive them of something to which they had a sort of
"natural right" unless they arranged at the outset to protect "their
share. u

Instead of a

11

dire" or "urgent" need for immediate increments

of culinary water, minutes and correspondence of the 0-WCMWDA reveal
that every town could report at least a "potential" need for more
water.

After assuring each other that every town would need more water
soon, if not a present, civic leaders from Davis and Weber Counties
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agreed at a meeting in December, 1947 to ask the Bureau of Reclamation
to include a culinary supply with the on-going irrigation project.
They approached Bureau officers and asked for a study of their
culinary requirements and resources.

They were told they would have

to conduct their own study, and in a hurry, since the Bureau planned
to submit its awn proposal to Washington in a few months, and expected
prompt approval.

3

The regional Office of the Bureau was already

fully extended and had no funds for the desired municipal investigation.

In fact, they had already arranged to borrow money from the

Davis County Water Users Association to finance part of their preexisting Weber Basin study.

Subsequently they did borrow several

thousand dollars from the new D-WCMWDA to pay for geological tests
at proposed dam sites.
The Bureau was by no means cold toward the proposed municipal
water development; they fostered it in every way they could .

In fact

they rushed it, as suggested above, by making assurances that the
WBP would be passed into law, and feeding the fear of local advocates
that it might be pa ssed wi t hout the culinary features if the proper
study was not completed in time.

It is certain that the civic

leaders had a hat-in-hand attitude toward the Bureau.

They were

concerned that the Bureau would not be interested in their needs,
since agricu 1 ture was the "top item on the Reclamation program. "

3.

Fjeldsted's Minutes of D-WCHWDA Meeting 4/27/48.

4.

Fjeldsted's Minutes of D-WCMWDA Meeting 12/17/47.

4
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It was at the suggestion of Bureau officials that they formed
themselves into the D-WCMWDA and persuaded their respective municipal
and county governments to give them the proceeds of a small mill levy
to finance the engineering study recommended by E. 0. Larsen, Regional
Director of the Bureau.

Their consulting engineer, Win Templeton,

warned that their report must have "sales appeal" to be sure of
acceptance by the Bureau.

(He made this remark as justification

for the magnitude of the bid he submitted for the job).

Minutes

and correspondence of the Association reflect a constant feeling that
the Bureau's project was virtually certain to come off, and that the
Association report had better be fast and effective if the boon of
municipal water was to be granted by the Bureau.
It is difficult to assess motives in these initiatory
proceedings.

But good intentions are not enough to assure efficient

allocation of resources, and neither is an engineering study of the
kind conducted by Win Templeton.

Fjeldsted's interests in water

development may conceivably have been so strong, and his involvement so intense that he saw himself and his organization as having a
proprietary and initiatory role in the Weber Basin Project.

It

certainly could not have become a fact without them.
The Bureau of Reclamation had every reason to encourage the
0-WCMIWA and its quaverin g-suitor attitude .

Bureau officials must

have known that they had a long way to go to get approval for an
irrigation project of the magnitude of the WBP, and that passage
WRR

not imminent.

Tt would be unfair to their professional
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comp~t~nc~

to

sugg~st

lik~

a municipal

But,

th~y

they

proj~ct

didn't~

they had to have something

in order to have even a prayer for passage.

were in a bind for grass-roots political support for the

project.

It is true they borrowed a few thousand dollars for

seismic studies, and got the Association to conduct and pay for
their own culinary study; but very little reference to Templeton's
study appears in their project proposals and reports, and Templeton
in fact used data the Bureau had already collected in making his
report!

The only
~nthu si asm

r~al

need for the local study was to arouse local

for the Project and to give evidence of that enthusiasm

to Bureau officials in Washington, to Congress, and to the President.
Without local support for the proposal to push it through Congress,
and a local organization to pay for the Project once constructed
there wasn't a chance for it to become a reality.
The D-WCMWDA started with the modest ambition of getting 40,000
acr~

fe~t

of municipal water from a 300,000 acre foot irrigation

development which members thought was already assured.

They wound

up bearing responsibility for having pushed a huge and questionable
reclamation project through Congreas and with the burden of paying
for the whole of it.

For all of this trouble and pain their reward

was a covered ditch instead of the open one planned by the Bureau!
The 14eber and Davis

aqu~ducts

spokesman ) as open canals .

were originally planned (said Bureau

llli~n

culinary water was added, the pla n

was changed to call for pipelines.
~xp~ns~

for winter operation, this

E><cept f or so1.1e additional
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is the only material change in the Weber Bas i n Project

t~at

definitely be attributed to inclu3ion of culinary \later.

can

The WBWCD

was forced to issue bonds in its own name to pay for constructing
treatment and delivery facilities.

A portion (about 1/3) of the

price charged municipalities by the WBWCD (about $42.5 0 per acre
foot) for cultnary water goes toward payment of interest and
principal on those bonds.

Many towns can create their own culinary

supplies from groundwater reservoirs for less than $15.00 per acre
foot.

Thus, even economies of large scale cannot overcome the cost

advantage of ground over surface water in the Weber Basin.
It may not be a great exaggeration to say that culinary water
users in the Weber Basin have been trapped into paying for a huge
white elephant subsidy to farmers, and gotten nothing but an inefficient cul i nary supply in return.

Not only do they pay an

excessive price for expenses that are definitely assignable to
culinary water, but they a lso pay an enormous sum toward repaying
government costs for building an egregiously under-used irrigation
project.

To put i t still another way, they pay an excessive price

for benefits received, and an even larger price for benefits
received.

~

The intended beneficiaries of this largess are farmers,

but they don't appear to be interested in more than a fraction of the
irrigation suppl ement.
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A copy of the original WBP plans was submitted by the Salt Lake
Regional Office to the Washington head office in early 1949.

The

original plans should make it possible to determine exactly what
extra costs were incurred by the Bureau in adding a culinary supply
to their project.

There are reasons to suspect the added features

did not come as a shock to Bureau planners.

It has already been

suggested that they urgently required the sponsorship of a local
organization if they were to get approval for construction .

The

next section will present reasons for believing that Bureau planners
know that without culinary features the Project could in no way
produce a benefit-cost ratio greater than unity.
clear to them that even if irrigation benefits

Surely it l<as

>~ere

large,

a e riculture alone couldn't afford to pay for the Project.

The

creation of a municipal water users association solved all of these
problems.
There does s eem to have been some degree of local concern about
water supplies in the Basin generally.
to rationing in summer months.

Some towns had had to resort

But, whatever the source of their

idea of "need" ::. t ~i dn' t ha,rc t!1e l:::.nd JZ c on!;eqcences they expected.
L~tce

ex J re:~se~,

::..t

Ha.:; vit;tually taken ,yer ".;-;

;,:~-:.e- Bur&au

o.(

r.ec la'"" tiou· E!nd u: ed to the Bureau's pu>;>oses.

Accusing the Bureau of

Recla~tion

fo r being pushy does not

absolve local leaders and residents from all responsibility for the
exiRting problem.

Members of the Association were probably not as
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careful as they might have been i n examining the true status of thei r
water situation.

The engineering study by Templeton may be read to

sound like the WBP was essential for municipalities.

For exawple,

it did not consider either alternative s ources of supply or examine
the merchandising techniques used by the various municipalities.

A

little attention to pricing policy could have made the rationing
problem disappear.

They were bent on getting a share of the bi g

Project, and didn't want to th i nk about anything that might detract
from its virtues.
This attitude toward anything that looks like a booster for the
local economy was shared by officials at other levels.

Ed Watson,

State Engineer, at one of the early meetings, in December, 1947,
i s re ported to have urged those present to pursue their culinary
intere s t in the Weber Basin Project with all haste.
develop these waters, someone else will get them.

"If Utah doesn't
We must hurry

~

to get them before they do. ,_

Bureau and Association officials pushed ahead virgorously
t hrough 19'•8 and early 1949 until the Weber Basin Project, Utah,
was signed into law, with a provisional veto, by President Truman.
Suddenly the "urgent" need that had fired all their proceedings to

5. This same argument is being made today by the Bureau of
Reclamation for pushing ahead with the Central Utah Project. "If
Utah doesn't take her share of the Colorado River, California will
get it." There may be a degree of plauaibility in the case of the
Colorado, but it certainly seema abaurd to invoke such an argument
in the case of the Weber or Provo Rivers which rise and sink
entirely within the State of Utah .
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that date seemed to subside.

The Bureau had money to do research.

It took three more years to make its final plans.

No one is reported

to have died from thirst between 1949 and 1956 when the first phase
facilities went into operation.

It should have been time enough for

the local folk to do some reconsidering about the marria ge they were
contemp lating; but love it blind.

In December of 1952, the month

construction began, the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, ch i ld
of the D-WCMWDA, signed a contract t hat committed municipalities to
bear most of the repayment burden of an agricultural reclamation
project.

Only 1% (one percent) of the eligible voters cast ba llots

for or against this $80 million obligation.
Po ssibly the basin municipalities deserved what they got.

Local

officials allowed themselves to be overcome by a water scarcity
hysteria.

Bure~u

officials just may have sparked it; they certainly

fanned the flames.

The D-HCMWDA didn't look carefully enough at

alternat i ves to the WBP- - mainly ground water.

The Bureau apparently

ignored most of the evidence Templeton's report did turn up about
groun dwAter sources.

Local leaders were not motivated so much by

efficient allocation of their resources a s they were by the
prospects of the growth expected from a large construction project.
(In the long run , perhaps their "'stir_cts were good) ,

They leaned

on the Bureau for guidance; local bureaucrats led them by the nose.
Every step in the evolution of the

t~eber

Basin

t~ater

District was dictated by the Burea u of Reclamation.

Conservancy
Bureau

offici als said a report of municipal water needs would have to be done
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independently ; civic leaders scraped up the money and made the s tudy.
Bureau officials said local people would have to apply political
p r~ssure

in order to circumvent the normal scrutineers and get the

project passed by the House and Senate.

Pressure was applied .

Pres s ure was required a gain to get the President's si gnature.
it was applied.

Again

President Truman signed reluctantly--there were

s eri ous reservations about the economic feasibility of the proj e cts .
"This bill really has an interesting history," wired Congresswoman
Revs Beck Bosone after Truman had signed.
While waiting for the President's signature, the D-WCMWDA was
busy forming itself into the WBWCD--with Bureau officials leading
all the way.

Every time the Association did something on its own, a

Bureau spokesman showed up to recommend a change.

If the change

was no t made exactly as outlined, the Bureau man was back at the next
meeting .

The local

m~n

were anxious to please.

The attitude of

supplication appears to have prevailed through it all .

The Bureau

had i t s way on the kind of organization, the name of the Distri ct,
its political boundaries, and its political structure--usually
a gains t the original decision of a majority of the

local leade rs.

6

With this evidence of Bureau of Reclamation domination of the
WBWCD, it is hard to suppress a suspicion that the reversal of
fact s in the "Seven

Y~sr

Summary" was dictated, perhaps even written

6. I do no t mean to suggest that Bureau suggestions were not
superior--only that th~y were the guiding hand, not the obedient
se rvan t .
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by the Bureau.

Or perhaps it didn't need to be at that date (1958),

by that time it may have been more damaging to the image of the WBWCD
to admit error than to adopt an attitude of misunderstood saviors
beset by ungra teful nrunicipalities .
This is not to say that there are no positive elements in the
Weber Bas i n Project, or even that benefits do not exceed costa .
But most benefits are of the "intangible" variety that have so far
proved nearly impos s ible to measure with confidence .
The history of the WBP should be written as a revelation of what
can happen with inadequate econom:J,£ study 2f. reclamation projects ,
and as a ca s e study for future projec t s.

Ita lessons should

certainly be applied to the Central Utah Project.

As I understand

it , on e of the chief arguments of t he Bureau for going ahead now with
CUP is that if it is pos tponed Southern California will get
accustomed to using Utah's share of the Colorado River and will then
block appropriation of funds for construction

~ ~

time

~

that Utah needs its water'

That amoun ts to an admission that the

project is not needed yet.

Regardl ess of the size of California ' s

H<JU se delegat i o n compared to Utah's, surely there are other states
who could be induced to vote for fair play for Utah.

California

doesn't control the Appropriat ions Committee.
B.

The Bu reau of Reclamation pushed ahead with t he Weber Basin Project
i n spite of a mpl e warni ngs that it was economically unsound as planned.
The previous section demonstrated that to members of the D-WCMWDA
the culinary water supply they wanted was merely an appendage to an
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irrigation project that was "sure" to become a fact, with or without

facilities for municipal water.

There are clear suggestions in the

F'jeldsted files that Bureau of Reclamation planners were primarily
concerned with irrigation until 1947.

(Talk of changing the project,

agriculture a "top item" to the Bureau of Reclamation, etc.)

At least

they gave that ir.1pression to the civic leaders who formed the D-WCMWDA.
The Bureau did urge the D-WCNWDA to make the Templeton report ("DavisWeber Counties Water Development," Feb., 1949) and send it along with
the Regional Office's Interim Report to the Bureau's head office in
Washington.

~

the Bureau urged this study is not absolutely clear.

They had already made similar investigations, for Templeton used their
resul ts in his own report.

And in the Report of the Regional Director

of July 15, 1949, that became Senate Document 147, it is admitted that
Templeton's study produced results essentially the same as investigations
conducted by the Bureau.

7

Were local Bureau leaders grasping for

some sign of local support for their project?

7. Page 59
The first Bureau reported to Washington was about
Harch, 1949. It is generally referred to as the Bureau's "Interim
Report". The Templeton study was submitted by the D-WCNWDA as a
"supplement" to it. After perusal by Bureau chiefs in Washington the
Interim Report was sent back to Salt Lake City and the Regional
Director prepared the Report dated July 15, 1949 that was the basis for
legislatinn .aqthua.1zjng the Weber Basin Project and became Senate
Document No. 147, 8lst Congress 2nd Session , entitled "Weber Basin
rn>ject, Utah.

II
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Eureau planne:cs had to know that the muni cipal water features
were vital to their project.

It would have nei ther adequate benefits

nor repayment capacity withou t.

There had to be a manifes t demand

for culinary water to get the project off the ground.
document on which the enabl ing legislation was

ba~ed

The very
contains the

evidence of an uneconomi c proposal (Senate Document 147).

Costs

were allocated to the various features as follows (p. 11):
Reimbursable:

$40,2 34, 000
18' 74l• ,000

Irri gation
Municipal
Sub Total

. $58,978,000

Nonreimbursable: Flood Control
Recrest ion
Sub Total

$ 5,900,000
4,656,000

$10,556,000
$69,>%,000

Total.

Thus costs attributable to irrigatimt were estimated to be a little

more than twice those for the municipal supply.
do llar3 i s a

canal.

b ~C

llinete en 11i llion

figure for c onverting an open canal t o a clos ed

There were some other costs added by the r.ttmicipal supply,

howeve r, most of them stemming from the fact that irrigation is
strictly a summar use, while municipal supplies must be delivered
during the cold of winter as well.

This requires heating equipment

to keep gates and aqueducts free from ice in the winter.

Whether or

not these added features justify all of the added expense is something
that might be invest igated further.
pA 1~ae, rn.ph

Figures given in the next

wake it plain why Bureau officials shou ld have been interested

in any higher costs that could be attributa ble to municipal water.
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Page 12 o f Senate Document 147 gives the breakdown of anticipated
payment as follows:
Irrigation
Municipal
Power

i30 ' 102 '000
28,116,000
1,626,000

Total

$59,844,000

lfhile municipal costs are less than half those due to irrigation,
users of municipal water are expected to repay equally with irrJgAturs.
Perhaps the explanation is that benefits greatly exceed costs in the
case of municipal water, thereby justJ.fying the heavy repayn.ent
obligation.

But the project ' s annual benefits are segregated this way :

I rriga ti.mn . .
Municipal
Flood Control
Power . . . .
Recreation

$5,979,000
636,000
161,000
51,000
168,500

Total

$6,995,500

The estimated benefit to agriculture is 9.4 times as great as the
estimated benefit to municipalities!

Municipal benefits were

calculated on the estimate of an alternative supply costing
$23, 300,000.

This alternative consisted of three of the project

renervoirs (Pineview, Perdue, and Jeremy) an aqueduct from Pineview
to the Ogden treatment plant, and the Davis and \-Ieber aqueducts
proposed for the \-Ieber Basin Project plus all the treatment and
delivery facilities to be locally financed .

In other words, the

only alternative considered was a duplication of the proposed project ,
leaving out some

feat~res

particular to irrigation.

The annual

benefit was determined by calculating the annual payn•ent required
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over 100 years to equal a return of 2.5% on the investment of

$23 ,300,000.
estin~te

The use of such a low interest rate makes a modeot

of the benefit so calculated, because the annual payment

increases with higher values of the interest rate.
n~de

No attempt was

to justify this $23,300,000 expenditure--it was just ruled

"indispensable" to the colm11Unities that would be served (p. 107),
Even on this calculat {on benefits to municipal users were 1ess than

their assigned share of the costs.
Although bene fits were calculated over 100 years, plans called
for repayment to be made in 60 years (the Interim Report had called
fo r 65 years).

This caused some consternat ion among the f ew

Washington officials outside the Bureau of Reclamation who caught a
glimpse of the report.

Existing reclamation law called for repay-

ment in 40 years (statement of President Truman to the Senate in
reluctant approval of S . 2391).

However, municipal and indus trial

users were expected to repay their cost allocation within the fortyyear period and then keep on paying for twenty years more to help
irrigation pay their portion of the costs.

This is roughly the

equivalent of allowing the irriga tion portion eighty years, or
double the time called for by law.
admission that the

~Ieber

It seems to be an unequivocal

Basin reclamation project, even as

origina ll y conceived, was only half as sound financially as
"nonnal 11 reclawation projects.

If such a project were to be

justifl.able one would expect a very convincing demonstration of

secondary benefits and intangibles attributable to irrigation water.
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There is no demonstration, but th e re is a pretty bold claim

to such benefits.

Of the total annual irrigation bene fit of $5,9 79, 000

only $2 ,686,000 was expected as increased earnings from agricultural
product ion.

The remaining $3,293,000 was an indirect benefit from

stimulating industrial processing, wholesale and retail trade.
Combine this large figure for "intangibles" with the excessive
repayment period and the implication seems to be that the secondary
benefits from the irrigation portion al one mu st be double those of
reclamati on programs authorized prior to 1949.

What is unique about

agriculture in the Weber Basin that makes it so stimulating to
proces sing and merchand ising?

And if these extremely hi gh secondary

benefits were actually there, should there not have been some
attempt to assign repayment obligations to the beneficiaries?
As things stand in the planning report on which the Weber Basin
Project became law, municipal water users are to pay as much as

irri gators for benefits less than 1/9 as large as those supposed to
go with agricultural water.

In the perspective of hindsight, the

projected cost of municipal water exceeded alternative costs by a
subs tantial margin, even by the low figures of 1949.

Page 112

eiveA ,unnicipAl repayment at $11.72 per acre foot and the cost of

treatment and delivery faci litiea created locally at $31 per
acre foot, for a total of $42.72 per acre foot.
WBWCD charges now).

Most towns can create their own facilities for

less than half that figure.
~iRnlflcantly

(Thata about what

So benefits to municipal water are

lesR than costs.
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The allocation of costs among various purposes of the project
has been given above.

It is enlightening to note how the $59

million reimbursable portion of the total cost was alloC':lted

helwccn

irrigation and municipal use ($40 million vs. $19 million).
The allocation to municipal use was based on the assumption that municipal use would have a prior right to a
firm water supply and thus would require g1·enlt:1· }Jt·opor-

tionate use of storage and conveyance facilities than
irrigation. By the use-of-facilities method both
irrigation and municipal use would share in the economy
of the multiple purpose development, each purpose
realizing a saving over the cost of its cheapest
alternative development. Each purpose would pay in
accordance with its proportionate use of project
facilities and no one purpose would be allocated more
than the capitalized value of its tangible benefits.
By this principle muni c ipal water was assigned at least half the
cost of every part of the WBP that could conceivably be said to
contribute to the municipal supply.

That is 40,000 acre feet of

water used over 12 months was considered the equivalent of 25,000+
acre feet used over seven months.
allocated to municipal use
calculated as a benefit.

~

The $19 mil lion of costs

less than the $23 ,300,000 million

But how by any stretch of imagination

can the repayment of $29 million by municipal users be said to be
"in accordance with its proportionate use of project facilities" and
"no more than the capitalized value of its tangible benefits?"
Regardless of the justice of equity of such a large assignment
of cost and repayment to municipal water use, it does demonstrate
very clearly that the whole project would be unfeasible without
the culinsry features.

It very nearly is with them.

Thus i t
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is hard to accept the no tion (in the "Seve n Year Summary

11

)

that

municipal supply was an after thought or appendage to an agricultural
reclamation project that was "sure" of passage .
Even in the pre-construction planning the re s eems to have been
very little actual concern for whether or not benefits equalled coRts
to muni cipal users.
pay--not benefits.

Repayment assessments were based on ability to
The preliminary or "Interim" report sent by the

Regional Office t o Washington headquarters in March, 1949 proposed
the following repayment assessments:
Dairy farms
Truck farms
Municipal
(minutes, 3/7/49) .

$1.80 per A.F.
3.30 per A.F.
8.80 per A.F.

Four months later the July 15, 1949 Report of

the Regional Director (Senate Document 147) presented an altered
breakdown of assessments:

Foothi 11
Be nch la nd s
Del ta.
Mountain Valleys
Municipal

$ 3. 15
1. 94
1.72
.92
12.26

per
per
per
per
per

A.F.
A.F .
A.F.
A.F.
A.F .

Bureau planners had shortened the propose d repayment period from
65 to 60 year s , and perhaps made some upward revisions of cost .
Municipal users were quite clearly stuck with the difference.
Agriculture couldn't afford to pay more (the benefits weren't
there), municipalities would have to pay, rega rdless of benefit
condisderations.

The foll owing paces reproduces the brea kdown and assignment of
cos t ,; pnhliRhed in .SenRte Document 14-7 .

The generous allocations

~ost

allocations, Weber Basin project, Utah
Joint costs

Direct costs
Item

Reimbursable

Nonreimbursable

Reimbursable

, Irrigation !Municipal\Recration !Irrigattn
Storage facilities: Dams and reservoir s:
Perdue------------------------------·-----------•--------Enlarged Pineview--------------- - --- i ----------Jeremy------------------------------ t - ---- ----- Los Creek---------------------------1----------.
I
Ma gple----- --------------- --------- - j ·----- ----l;illard----------------------------- $ 9,854,000
Diversion dams:
Stoddard---------------------------Ogden------------------------------Slaterville------------------------Huntsville-------------------------Aqueducts and canals:
l~eber aqueduct---------------------Davis aqueduct---------------------Layton canal-----------------------Willard gravity canal--------------Willard pump canal-----------------900,000
Eden canal-------------------------Power plants:
Perdue------------------ -----------684,0001 --------Magpie-----------------------------692,000 --------Pumping plants:
Davis------------------------------490,0001·-------Weber------------------------------180 000 --------Hillard-- ---------- --- - --- --- ---- --1,46o:ooo --------Layton-----------·-···-------------19o,ooo ---------

---------+----------

1

Nonreimbursable

Municipal !Flood control!Recreation

$ 9,997,000\$10,000,000

$5,200, 000

$2,938,000
1,086,000

165,000
160,000
192,000
40,000

135,000
130,000
158,000
30,000

3,850,000 1 3,150,000
5,390,000
4,410,000

____

----=~~:~~~; ::~:~~~
700,000 ----- ~~~;;;1 ·---·;;~;;;t=============
----------- ~ -----------~-------------

~~~~~~~~=~~!===~~~:~~=~!~~~~~-~~~~~::

'-"
.....
0

....
"'

Cost allocations continued
Joint costs

Direct costs
Item

I

Reimbursable

Nonreim·
bursable

Reimbursable

jirrigation !Municipal Recreationiirrigation !Municipal

1

Nonreimbursable
Flood controliRecreation

l

Miscellaneous:
Drainage system·-·-··············--·~$ 3,000,000 -·------·
Lateral system--------------- -- ----1,400,000 --------Ground-water pumping--·------------300,000 ··------Davis County storage charges-------- \
181,000 --------·
Recreational facilities-------------\----------- --------- $632,000 ·-----------·----------180,0001$
180,000
Operation and maintenance during conttruction--- --------- ---------- •$
166,000
164,000
Investigation and surveys---------··t···--·-···· ········Cost of reduction in power to Riverdale
power plant--·----- - -·-····------'1
290,000~--------Total------------------------- $19,621,000 ···------ $632,000 l$20,613,000\$18,744,000

----------1--------·-·r----------- -------------r-----------

1

$5,900,000

l$4,024,000

Irrigation and municipal joint costs • e re allocated by the use of facilities method . After flood-control and recreational allocation were deducted, use cf reservoir for irrigation and municipal use on a proportionate-share basis was
determined to be 50% for each purpose. Use of conveyance features for irrigation and municipal use was determined to
be 55 and 45 P'"rcent, respectively.

Source:

Senate Document 147

"'........

Cost allocations continued
Total direct and joint costs
Item

Reimbursable
Irrigation

Municipal

Storage facilities
Dams and ~eservoirs:
Perdue-------Enlarged Pineview------Jeremy-------- $ 9,997,000 $10,000,000
Lost Creek---Magpie-------Willard-------9,854,000
Diversion dams:
Stoddard------165,000
135,000
Ogden---------160,000
130,000
Slaterville---192,000
158,000
Huntsville----40,000
30,000
Aqueducts and canals:
Weber aqueduct3,850,000
3,150,000
Davis aqueduct5,390,000
4,410,000
Layton canal--385,000
315,000
Willard gravity
canal------Willard pump
canal------900,000
Eden canal----88,000
72,000

Nonreimbursable
Flood contro

Annual operation, maintenance, and
replacement costs
Grand total
costs

Recreation

Reimbursable

($

----------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------700,000
----------- --------------------- --------------------·----

10,940,000
300,000
290,000
350,000
70,000

500
400
500
200

7,000,000
9,800,000
700,000

2,600
2,900
2,600

700,000

8,300

900,000
160,000

6,000
700

(
(

----------·----------------------------------------------------------------------

3,000
2,000
3,000
2,000
3,000
4,000

$2. 938,00C $28, 135,000 (
1,086,000

Total

Irrigation Municipal Recreation

(
(

$5,200,000

Nonreimbursable

$ 3,000

---------2,000 ---------2,000 ---------3,000 ---------3,000
------------------ ---------400 ---------300
---------400 ---------100 ---------3,200 --·------2,400 ---------2,100 ------------------ ----------- ---------------500 ---------<n
.....
""

6,000
4,000
5,000
5,000
6,000
4,000
900
700
900
300
4,800
5,300
4,700
8,300
6,000
1.200

Cost allocations

c~ntinued

Total direct and joint costs

Item
Reimbursable

Nonreimbursable

Annual operation, maintenance, and
replacement costs
Grand total
costs

Reimbursable

Nonreimbursable

I

Tot a 1

Ii ----------~--------+--------------------+----------+-----------------~------~
Irrigation
Flood controliRecreatior
IrrigationiMunicipaij Recreatior
Power plants:
684,000
Perdue---------1$
--------- ] $ 41,100
-------------·---- --- --~ $ 684,0001 $ 41,100
692,000
692,000
41,800
Magpie----------------41,800
Pumping plants:
490,000
490,000
13,200
Davis---------____ .. ____
13,200
- --------~
180,000
180,000
6,900
6,900
\~eber--- ------1,460,000
1,460,000
35,600
\nllard-------35,600
190,000
190,000
7,000
Layton--------7,000
Miscellaneous:
Drainage system
3,000,000
3,000,000
17,000
17,000
Lateral system1,400,000
1,400,000
5,000
5,000
Ground-water
_________ ..,.
300,000
300,000
3,000
pumping----3,000
Davis County
storage charge
181,000•----------181,000 ---------Recreational
1
632,000·----------·-------facilities--~-----------~---------- -------------•$ 632,000
Operation and maintenance d ring
construction
180,000 $ 180,000
360,000•------ - --Investigation ard
surveys----166,000
164,000
330,0001---------- ~ -------Cost of reduction in power lo Riverdale
290 ,000
I--power plant
290,000 ----------Total---- $40,234,000 $18,744,000 $5,900,000
$4,656,00~ $69 ,534,0001 $212,300 J$21,400

-------------------------]
---------

I

-------------r----------

----------~:..:::..:.:.::.I
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to municipal use have already received comment.
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Note however , that

the nearly $10 mi llion cost of Willard Dam is allocated entirely to
irrigation.

It could not conceivably contribute to municipal supply.

In fact, some of the people involved in the D-HCMWDA questioned the
advisability of including Willard Reservoir at all; it would be of
no benefit to them.

There is even evidence in Fjeldsted's files

t hat some planners from the Salt Lake Regional Office of the Bureau
were not entirely convinced o f the wisdom o f including wi ll••u

IJ n m .

But it was included, a nd municipal users wountl up paying for it:
the $ 10 million beyond their cost allocati on of $19 million that
they were to repay just covers the coat of Willard Reservoir~
Why was Willard Dam included if there were reservations about
it even then ?

A large part of the explanation must lie in the fact

that a very major portion of the benefits to agriculture was to
come from openi ng 70,000 acres of new land to cultivation by
drain i ng and irrigating it.

All of this land is in the lower delta,

and was to be served by Willard Reservoir .

The remaining benefits

to agricul ture were to come f rom provid ing supplemental wate r to

30, 000 acres already under irrigation.

Of the $6 ,995, 000 projected

annual benefit, $5,979,000 was to be realized from increased
ird.gati on (S enate Document 147, p. 13 ).

The Willard system had to

be included to have any significant "benefit" stall~
Even before constructi on was begu n there were signs that should
have

CAnRod

son1o

oPcvnd

thoughts .

Five months after the Weber

:BARin Pt-oject was signed by President Truman,

the Ogden Rive r
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Water Users Association asked the D-WCMWDA if the proposed Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District would be able to help them extend
~

repayment contract with the Bureau of Reclamation from forty

to seventy years (not 60, but 70).

8

It seems a fair inference that

they were suffering under their repayment contract.

Apparently

irrigation benefits were not so large in 1949 as they had been
anticipated only ten years earlier.
Even Morgan and Summit Counties were asked to join the WBWCD.
They were threatened that if they didn't join, the new water
conservancy district would charge them double prices.

If the Bureau

was confident of easy sales, why the pressure for prior commitment?
Actually it is admitted in some of Fjeldsted' s recruiting

ooneapondenre

that municipal contracts along the Wasatch Front were vital to
financial solvency.

These threats alternated with attempts to

coax towns and counties to join with the argument that if they
didn't the project would not be "feasible."

There was quite a

bit of concern that Ogden City would not participate, and a bit
of surprise when she did.
All this suggests that the "dire need" for water, and the
"indispensability" of the WBP were not starkly clear to everyone,
even the pushers of the project.

If Ogden and other municipalities

were not anxious to join, what else can it mean but that they we re
not feeling an extreme pinch, or thnt they could foresee ways
of handling their nwn prohlems?

8.

Minutes of T>-WCMIJDA meeting, 12/29/49.
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Mention has been made already of the pressure that was applied
to hustle the enabling legislation past the usual screening agencies
and

throu~h

the hands of House, Senate, and President.

In the

statement issued along with his signature, President Truman
that the bill had circumvented examination by the government
departments who were supposed to give their opinions on legislature
of its kind.

This apparently was exactly what Bureau spokesmen

had in mind when they urged members of the D-WCMWDA to lobby
their congressional delegation in the name of haste.

Yet, three

years elapsed between the President's signature and the beginning
of construction.

In the President's statement to the senate, August 30, 1949,
the Executive Office objected that the bill had been passed on the
basis of a preliminary report by a regional director rather than on
the

recon~endation

of either the Secretary of the Interior or even

the Commissioner of Reclamation, that there had been no opportunity
to review the adequacy of the regional director's report, and that
the bill represented some basic departures from established
reclamation law.
repa~nent

In particular, the Executive objected that the

period was longer by half than regulations called for,

that the large allocation to recreation was unprecedented, that
flood benefits seemed exaggerated, and that the Department of
Agriculture had not been permitted to examine the irrigation
potentials.

However, since "there is no urgency for inunediate

cons truct! on nf the Weber Basin Project" (plans of the Bureau
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called for construction to be spread over 12 years) the President
signed the bill on condition that his objections all be overcome
by thorough investigations.

No appropriations would be authorized

until complete studies had been made by all interested government
departments.

"It would seem that this plan for proceeding with

the Weber Basin Project is only fair to the water users who will
eventually have to return to the United States the investment
allocated to irrigation and municipa l water supplies."
Particular reference was made to investigations by the Department
of Agriculture to determine "ability of water users to repay the
costs of irrigation features of the project."

Some of the required

studies were farmed out to other agencies, such as one on a gricultural potentials which was handed over to the Department of
Agricultural Economics at Utah State Agricultural College.

A

report was issued by Fuhriman, Blanch, and Stewart in December, 1952.
But by the time the Bureau of Reclamation had submitted its Definite
Plan Report, money had been appropriated, and construction was set

to begin in thirty days.
Without municipal participation the project could not have been
lMn~ined

robe

economically or finan cially feasible.

It had to

have participation of all four counties and all towns in those
count i es to be sure of sufficient taxing power to finance the
project.

The

D-I~CMWDA,

ostensibly formed by people concerned with

culinary water for towns in Davia and Weber Counties, eventually
founrl ftAelf cAr1.·y-tng t-he whole load:

doing its own water demand
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study (a vital part of making the WBP sound feasible and necessary
in Washington), urging the legislation on the Utah Congressional
delegation, forming the WBWCD as a legal contracting body,
recruiting members, both municipal and agricultural, raising money
to help finance Bureau of Reclamation research, and finally,
managing money collection and repayment for the whole reclamation
project .

On top of that, after paying for the irrigation oriented

reclamation project, they had to issue bonds to finance their
own treatment and distribution facilities after all!

No wonder

there is so much resentment among civic leaders against the WBWCD .
C.

Part of the blame for poor planning in connection with the Weber
Basin Project may be assigned to state water laws.
Water sales have not come up to preliminary expectations
because the acute shortage presumed in 1948 has turned into an
embarrassing abundance.

What has changed the picture drastically

is the discovery of ample underground reservoirs of high-quality
water .

Municipalities have found that they can create their own

culinary supplies by well-drilling for a cost per acre foot that
is significantly lower than the price charged by the WBWCD.
"The water stored underground in Utah is more than enough to fill
all of the exiating man-made reurvoirs
Some

.!!ill!! 1!!!!!. over. u 9

of the better groundwater reservoirs of Utah lie along the

Wasatch Front in Weber and Davia Counties.

Why was more attention

not given to these less expensive culinary water sources by

9. Ray E. Maraell, ''Utah's Groundwater Reservoirs" Reprinted
fr,_ 8th tiennial Report UUh Wa~r J'<Ner )loard, 1960-62 (incluaive)
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planners of the WBWCD?
Part of the answer to this question is obvious from the discussion
under (A) and (B) above:

The Bureau of Reclamation has s natural

desire to feel that its construction projects are needed.

But other

alternatives could not be ignored if the extent of groundwater resources
were precisely understood and the knowledge widely dispersed among
concerned residents.

Unfortunately the limited information available

in 1948 about groundwater resources in Davis and Weber Counties was
not widely dispersed.

Indications are, however, that enough

known to have made a difference to the Weber Basin Project.

~

A high

quality report on Davis County groundwater was prepared in the early
1940's and was published in the 1948 Biennial Report of the State
Engineer .

A similar report on the Weber Delta District was not

published until 1966.

The research for it had been completed several

years prior to that time, however, and the principal author, J. H. Feth,
had been on loan to the Bureau of Reclamation from the

u.

S. Geological

Survey.
It is unfortunate that groundwater research had not been speeded
up by three or four years and promptly reported-- a costly mistake for
some Utah residents.

But a large part of the blame for the slow pace is

attributable to State Water Law.
Under water law as it developed in Utah the guiding principle for
acquiring water rights was "prior appropriation for beneficial use . "
In the case of groundwater "prior appropriation" was applied to
hydr o at•~ic

pressure as well as to particular volumes of water.

That i s, a person who acquired a water right by drilling a well
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that yielded a certain rate of flow from artesian pressure was
protected by law against pressure loss.

Any other subsequently

drilled well that reduced his well-head pressure had to be plugged,
because it took away water that was his by right of prior appropriation.
Hydrologists had long complained that hydrostatic pressure
was not the same thing as a given volume of water.

What was being

guaranteed to the prior appropriator by the interpretation of
state law was not a given volume of water but a given amount of
delivery pressure .
~

Diminishing the artesian flow of a well does

decrease the quantity of water that can be withdrawn fran it.

It does increase the cost of using the given quantity, however.
As long as this interpretation was upheld by state courts,
groundwater development (and investigation) was understandably
discouraged.

Drilling a well is not an attractive water supply

alternative if there is a good chance it will have to be plugged
up again, or part of its yield pumped uphill to a neighbor's well.
This situation leads to a technical problem:

since hydrologic

studies of groundwater depend heavily on large numbers of welllogs, cataloging of groundwater resources is retarded by a
that discourages drilling wells.

policy

A recent (1969) decision by the

State Supreme Court has reversed this interpretation in a manner
that will be much more favorable to natural development of Utah's
water resources.

Evaluation of groundwater resources
,.,.. rho <.J.,e,-ee

~ha~

~

retarded by this policy

few people responsible for passage of the Weber

~1
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Basin Project were aware of this i mportant alternative.
evidence

~

suggest that such information

~

Available

available before

1952, however, the year that work began on the Weber Basin Project.
~

this information was not given more use and publicity is an

unanswered question.
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Appendix Ill: Weber Basin Overkill:
The Costs of Anhydrophobia
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The need for irrigation in Western States prompted early efforts
to dam and divert existing streams. As the desire for water grew
larger, more extensive dams and reservoirs were required. Eventually it became impossible for a small group to reap all the benefits
from the size of project required if more land was to be brought under
irrigation . The initial cost would have to be spread by borrowing
social capital which could be paid back by beneficiaries over several
years. In recognition of this need the Bureau of Reclamation was
formed in 1902 for the purpose of building expensive irrigation and
drainage projects at public expense. Originally the Bureau was required to recover all costs from direct beneficiaries in ten years.
Then repayment time was extended to 20 years, and later to 40 years
as the projects became more and more expensive while the repayable
benefits per acre of new agricultural land made no spectacular gains.
In 1952 President Truman signed a bill authorizing construction
of several dams, reservoirs, canals and aqueducts on the Weber

River drainage basin in Utah. Known as the Weber Basin Project, it
represents a landmark in Bureau of Reclamation history. Instead of
the customary 40 years, the WBP called for a 60-year repayment period. Then, because agricultural beneficiaries couldn't hope to repay
in even 60 years, the project was expanded to include a municipal
water component, which was new to Bureau policy. This increased
the costs, but also the prospective revenues. Enabling legislation
called for municipal water users to repay their share of the costs in
40 years, then continue paying for 20 years to help agricultural users
pay their share. This amounts to an admission that agricultural benefits were small enough and construction costs high enough that an
equivalent of 80 years would be required to pay for the irrigation portion of the project- -double the then current standard. But that was
not all. Non-reimbursable flood control benefits were abnormally
high compared to previous Reclamation projects. And Weber Basin
was the first Bureau project to include a large recreation component
among the benefits that would not have to be paid for by residents of
the area most directly affected by the project.
The Weber Basin Project, therefore, represents a departure in
Reclamation policy. Instead of building for an obvious agricultural
need, imaginations were strained to count enough benefits to justify
a large construction project. Construction began in 1953, and first
water deliveries were made in 1955. By 1968 virtually all planned
facilities were completed. The local organization (Weber Basin Water
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Conservancy District) which cont r acted with the Bu r eau of Reclam ation has been havi n g trouble me et in g its repayment obligation. Irrigat i on water sales have been far below orig inal expectations .

Munic-

ipalities find it ch eaper to create their own water supplied (by wells,
mainly) than to buy it from the Conservancy District. If payments
can't be met through water sales, the Conservancy District has power
to tax.
The WCD is therefore livi n g with the prospe c t that it may soon
have to ask for a tax levy in order to meet its repayment obligation,
while at t he same time it is seeing its supply potential duplicated by
municipalities because its prices are higher than the cost of drilling
and o p eratin g wells . (Knowled ge of whether or not the demand for
its drinking water is elastic would obviously be very useful to the
WCD . ) Fur thermore, the present price structure of the WCD discrim inates severely a g ainst municipal water users in favor of irrigation. Price discrimination, be ca use it involves the exploitation of
monopolistic power, is inefficient in allocating available resources to
those who are willing to pay for them . It re.stricts output. But if
discrimination were eliminated in the case of the WBWCO, there is a
chance that revenues might decline sharpie. Since there are~ priori
rea s ons to expect that irrigation demand is more elastic than munici-

pal demand, rev enues would be cut both ways if M& I prices were
lowered while irrigation prices were put up.
On the other hand, most of the exc e ss capacity is located at the
lower e nd of the Basin, in Willard Re ser voi r. This portion of the project represents one-half to one-third of the cost of the whole, and is a
white elephant of magnificent proportions. It was designed to bring
new l a nd under cultivation along the low-lying shores of Great Salt
Lake . These lands are now non-arable because of drainage problems.
As originally conceived , the Weber Basin Project was supposed to
drain these lands free of charge to the owners, whose only reciprocal
obligation would be to purchase the irrigation water provided in Willard
Reservoir. Because agricultural interest in these lands proved to be
virtually non-existent, the major reclamation feature of the WBP was
not even undertaken. As a consequence, a very large share of the
water supply made available by the WBP flows through Willard Bay
into Great Salt Lake- -although part of it is sold to nearby game bird
refu ge s.
In summary, benefits to both agriculture and municipal/industrial w ate r users have turned out to be very much lower than expected
because of non-interest in agriculture and the availabilit y of che ap

I

_)
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g roundwater to cities. Some major benefits of the WBP must therefo re be ascribed to recreational features such as water sports and
gam e bird hunting, plus some benefits to flood control. Except for
the latter, these benefits are not at all specific to residents of the
Weber Basin--especially in the case of the game bird refuges. But
it is Basin residents who are under obligation to repay the construetio-;:;-costs. And the burden falls most heavily on municipal/industrial
water users. The WBP therefore redistributes income and wealth
delibe rately from M&I users to irrig ators, and accidentally from
residents to non-residents.
Whether or not such redistribution is desirable is a value
judgment, but it does not seem out of order to call attention to it's
nature and scope. The bulk of intended benefits of the WBP were
planned to accrue to Basin residents, who are required to pay for
t hem, but non-residents (and non-payers) do receive a significant
portion of the lower quantity of actual benefits. Depending on the
quantitative significance of this feature, it might be useful as partial justification for spreading the construction costs over a wider
base than Weber Basin taxpayers and water consumers.
Another kind of problem concerns the allocation of Weber Basin
W a ter resources over time. The service area of the WBWCD is
underlain by a groundwater reservoir estimated to be capable of
delivering an annual quantity of water at least twice as great as the
combined facilities of the Weber Basin Project. Underground reservoirs are clearly superior to surface stora ge on many count s, not
th e least of which is cost of c reation, operation, and maintenance.
Furthermore, surface reservoirs lose capacity as they fill up with
silt. They have a finite life, whereas groundwater reservoirs last
indefinitely. And once a dam site has been used up, it is lost to
human use for the present era of geologic time; good dam sites are
limited in supply. From this point of view the building of the WBP
appears as a grave mistake for future generations as well as a very
expensive one for the present. (Instead of the complex WBP, a dam
on the Weber River a few hundred yards below the mouth of Weber
Canyon would keep the underground reservoir fully charged.) Surely
it would have been more economical to have exploited groundwater
sources fully before resorting to the construction of dams, reservoirs, and aqueducts. On the other hand, spokesmen for the Bureau
of Reclam ation claim that the existence of the WBP reservoirs and
anals is the cause of abundant groundwater. It's a plausible argument, but still subject to the objection that specific effort to recharge
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aquifers would have been much ch eaper than the WBP! The reasons
for this apparent misallocation ov er time are rather obscure and involve Utah water law , the U.S. Geolo g ical Survey, and p ossibly
f raudulent behavior on the part of some bureaucrats. Because the
result of all this has been detrimental to Weber Basin residents and
taxpayers, any light that can be c ast upon it would be useful in assessing the fairness of the repayment burden they bear.
Building the WBP before e xploiting g roundwater reservoirs to
capac ity was uneconom i c, but it is an ac com plished fa ct. The alloca tion problem now is to make most efficient use of existing resources.
Since surface reservoirs have a limited li fe , it seems that the y
should be used to capacity before incurring the cost of drilling new
wells . In or der for water con sumer s to make this choice voluntarily,
the pri ce of Weber Basin water m ust be lowered--perhaps drastically.
This may crea te a dangerous expectation of cheap and abundant water.
If a population and industrial bas e were built on this expectation and
Bureau of Re clamat io n spokesmen are corre ct about the source of
g roundwater in the Weber Basin, then a very serious problem could
arise in fifty to one hundred years when the WBP loses nearly all its
storage capacity and ends its re ch ar ge function as one of the consequences. Of course this would happen g radually, and pri ce increases
would probably assure a smooth adjustment over time; it does not
seem to be a reasonable ar gument against encouraging maximum use
of the Project water now. Nevertheless, it would be valuable to expand existing knowledge of the relationship between WBP wa ter and
the contents of accessible aquifers. The recharge function of the
WBP may turn out to be its most significant benefit! Even s o, that
would not modify the argument that it should be used to the fullest
extent now .

There is another major issue of fairness involved in the Willard
Reservoir feature of the WBP, because it represents a major share
of the total cost and also of the unu sed storage c apacity . Reclamation
law forbids the sale of irrigation rights to any individual with more
than 160 acres of land, or to any m arried couple with more than 320
acres. Indications are that this restriction is a serious deterrent
1
to farmers who might otherwise find irrigated farming profitable.
The fairne ss issue is raised by recent disclosures in The New Republic that this law has been flagrantly violated in Southern California

Conve rsation with Frank 0. Reeder, former Chairman, Box
E lder County Commission.
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where huge landholdings have been blessed with cheap ;rater from the
Colorado River since the construction of Hoover Dam.
If this law
were enfo r ced in California, Utah farming might be more competitive

and the Willard Reservoir water might be put to use by an addition to
the Utah farm population. Since it is not enforced in California, why
should large and profitable farms be excluded from operating in the
Weber Basin?
These issues of fairness and income redistribution are important because the y have a bearin g on pricing policy recommendations
that may be made as an application of the proposed research. A
water conse rvancy district under Utah law is a public agency with
considerab le monopoly power. A lar ge body of economic theory contains the ar gument that public monopolies should price their product
at marginal cost, unless higher prices are needed for rationing. In
other words, the price of WBP water should be set low enough that
all of the yearly water supply is sold. Furthermore, price discrimination is inefficient from the standpoint of public welfare, which suggests that irrigation and municipal water should bear a common price,
except for differences in cost of production and transportation. But
if such a pricing change were made it is possible, and even likely,
that re ve nues of the WBWCD would suffer, making it unable to meet
its repayment obligations. In that case it would have to ask for a
tax levy.
A tax levy would shift part of the repayment burden f rom waterusers to property owners. To the extent that benefits of the WBP do
not accrue to property owners in the same proportion as they do to
water users, resorting to a tax would redistribute income f rom the
former to the latter. A tax will also have inefficient allocative
consequences. Policy-makers must therefore choose between the
inefficiency of price discrimination or the redistribution and inefficiency of a tax. It is important to keep in mind that the WBP is far
from being paid for--and that federal law requires that it be paid for
by the supposed beneficiaries. For reasons alluded to in previous
paragraphs, it may be possible to make a case for socializing the
costs of the Project over a wider base than the one required by existing law. It's doubtful prospect politically, however.
2

Peter Barnes, The New Republic, 8 May
1971, p. 19; 12 June 1971, p. 21 ; 19 June 1971.

1971, p. 9; 5 June
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There are obviously several kinds of problems involved in the
WBP, and they may be summarized under the following heads:
l.
2.
3.
4.

Price discrimination
Wasteful non-use of fixed assets plus duplication
A choice between profit maximization and taxation
Income and wealth redistribution

Acceptable solutions may be mutually exclusive.
natives are i llustrative :

The following alter-

l. Let the WCD discriminate perfectly among its several custamers --selling to each of them at a price equal to the cost of alternative supplie s . Th is would maximize revenues of the Conservancy
District, and minimize the likelihood of having to ask for a tax lev y.
Possibly this method would raise more than enough revenue to meet
costs and repayments so that a modification in the degree of discrimination would be possible in some of the more extreme cases. However, the objectio nable dis crim ination would be even more severe
than it is at present, there is no assurance that all the water would be
used, and benefits other than water consumption would not be paying
an appropriate share.

2 . Set a common pri ce (excl uding cost differentials) to all users
so that all available water is sold each year, with no shortages. This
is the marginal cost pricin g criterion, with prov ision for scarcity,
and comes closer to meeting the requirements of a theoretical efficiency optimum. It is open to the objection that total costs are not likely
to be recovered out of sales revenue, and that the difference must be
made up by means of a tax which is unlikely to be allocatively optimal
and redistributes income as well. The superiority of this method
over the present system could be estimated by measuring consumer's
surplus triangles; i.e. does the ga in to municipal users outweigh the
loss of irrigators? But against this benefit, if positive, must be
weighed the loss imposed by a non-optimal tax. How do you measure
that ?
Of course, there is a possibility that the more nearl y optimal
price might also improve or at least not worsen the revenue situation.
It's a happy thought, and an eventuality that would solve nearly all of
the problems, but it's also highly improbable.
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3. Follow alternative two, but remove the obligation to pa y for
the installation costs of the WBP. This v.o uld solve the first three of
the problems, but would involve a redistribution of income and
wealth from the general U. S. Taxpayer to residents of the Weber
3
Basin. Some people, like Harold Hotelling, would argue that this
is unimpo rtant as lon g as there is a rough randomness in distribution of plums like the WBP throu g hout the country. (As suggested
above , mo re of the benefits from the project have turned out to be
non-specific to Basin residents than was planned.) Regardless of
the val idit y of this argument, it would be very difficult to appl y
politically, bec ause existing law is already against it. Furthermore,
it is disturbing to think that even this che c k on bureaucratic e x pansion should be removed. It would mean that benefit-cost studies
prior to project approval had no useful function at all!
4. The re is a fourth course of action which may be able to
achieve a solution of the first three problems while minimizing the
unfair n es s and administrative slack implied in the third alternative
above. Whe n a priv ate firm makes a mistake in its pre-investment
benefit/cost analysis it pays the penalty of reduced profits--or even
of losses. Since ther e is no reason to suspect that individual bureaucrats are motivated by any other than the self -seeking aspirations
driving all the rest of us, it would seem to serve the cause of
efficiency if th e y f e lt som e pain a kin to lost profits when they undertake a white elephant project like Weber Basin. Preliminary inve stigations suggest that the Bureau of Reclamation acted in ways contrary to th e interests of Weber B a sin residents in order to further
interest of its own staff. Evidence presented in this proposal impli es that the Bureau has impos ed some positiv e " bads " on Basin
Resident s. Considerations of efficiency in g overnment and of
justice therefore sug ges t that the U. S. Government be sued by Basin
residents for redress of wrongs committed by its agent, the Bureau
of Reclamatio n. The amount of damages may be sufficient to allow
marg inal cost pricing by the WB WCD without having to levy an additional tax on propert y owners in the Basin.
This solution still suffers from the objection that it redistributes income from federal taxpa ye rs in ge neral to Weber Bas i n
3 Harold Hotelling, " The General Welfare in Relation to Probl ems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates," AEA Reading s in
the Economics of Taxation (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
1959), p. 156.
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residents, although it does cure price discrimination, non-use o f
water, and the necessity of choosing between the WCD ' s abilit y t o
pay and a tax on Basin residents. The remaining undesirable
feature is mitigated by the following circumstances:
a. The original estimate of general, non-reimbursable
benefits was too low.
b. Actions of the federal agency caused injury to Weber
Basin residents unless the proposed restitution is made.
c. It attaches blame at the source of the mistake, giving the taxpayer to understand that he is suffering because his
agent acted unwisely, if not fraudulently, and puts pressure on
the bureaucrats to be more careful in assessing the consequences
of their empire-building projects.
These considerations take some of the sting out of the redistributive effects, and have the positive general benefit of stimulating greater efficiency in government. It is a principle that
co uld be applied in many branches of goverrunent.
Unfortunately, this line of action would involve the embarrassing fact that only 1 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the
plebescite that authorized the WBWCD to enter into $90 million contract with the Bureau of Reclamation, and suggests some perplexing problems about the efficiency and moral superiority of democracy
as a form of government.

Research Objectives and Methods

List of objectives
1. Specify and quantify as exactly as possible the kind and degree of underuse of the Weber Basin Project, and the financial cir cumstances of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District. Also
identify the Conservancy District s marginal costs of providing
water to its various customers--including the cost of new aqueducts.
2. Review Utah law on groundwater use as it applies to the
Weber Basin problem.
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3. Review the current state of knowledge about groundwater
resources underlying the WB WCD service area, and estimate costs
of withdrawing water in various quantities from those aquifers.
How significant is the WBP as a source of groundwater?
4. Review Reclamation Law and Utah water conservancy district law to determine the exact repayment obligation of Weber
Basin residents. Is ther e any obvious way they could avoid paying
for part of the WBP?
5. Historical research to determine how the WBP and WBWCD
carne into being, including study of planning reports.
6. Review biological research on the environmental consequences of the WBP as a counterpoise to the intangible benefits
claimed by promoters of the Project.
7. Extirnation of demand relations facing the WB WCD in
both irrigation and municipal/industrial water sales.

Method for estimating the
demand functions
T he conceptual approach to finding the demand functions is
different for the two classes of municipal/industrial and irrigation
water.

l. Municipalities need not rely exclusively on the WB WCD since
they have the alternative of drilling wells (or developing unused
rights t o a few remaining streams or springs). The availability of
such alternatives varies considerably from one part of the dis trict to another, however. Each municipality may be conceived of
as possessing a supply function of alternative sources that rises
up to the right in discrete jerks. A town with relatively poor and
expensively developed groundwater possibilities will have a function that lies above and to the left of a town that sits on abundant
and easily exploited aquifers. The cities of Roy and Bountiful are
i llustr ative of cities at the two ends of a groundwater availability
continuwn .
When a municipality wishes to expand the amount of water it

can make available per year, it can choose between buying from the

532

WB WCD or drilling a new well. Other things being equal, it will
select the lowest-priced alternative. This means that the WBWCD
must ask a price no greater than the cost of an equivalent amount
of water from a new well if it expects to sell to that municipality.
That price and increment of quantity represent a point on the
demand curve for water of that particular municipality. Presumably
the city would buy more water if it could get it at a lower price.
(Several studies of water demand have indicated a definite negative
slope to water demand.) However, there is no way of knowing for
sure just how much more the city would buy for a given price reduction, and a questionnaire-type response to this kind of question
is notoriously unreliable. It is bad enough to have to ask the water
manager to evaluate the next needed increment and its likely cost.
Little reliability could be attached to any request for a projection
beyond the most immediately pending expansion of water supply
facilities--which may reasonably be expected to have received some
serious deliberation in a growing community.
Repetition of this procedure in all the Basin municipalities will
produce an array of price and quantity data, from which an aggregate demand function may be constructed on the following principles.
Each such point in a Cartesian plane represents the maximum price
that a particular city will pay for water from the WBWCD. At lower
p rices it might be expected to buy more. Each point represents,
t herefore, the topmost point of a demand curve for WBWCD water in
a particular municipality. (The sperm-like demand functions in
Figure 5 illustrate this fertile thought.) It is well known that an
aggregate demand function may be obtained by the horizontal summation of these individual functions. Unfortunately, the shape of the
tail is unknown in each of these cases; the only data available are the
"heads." One thing that does seem fairly certain, however, is that if
a given city is willing to spend $40 per unit for a given quantity of
water, it will surely be willing to buy at least that quantity at a price
bel ow $40. We may therefore assume perfect inelasticity in the
individual demand functions, in which case the array of sperm cells
takes on a configuration as in Figure 6. When these straight-line
functions are summed horizontally the result must be a downward
sloping aggregate demand function for municipal water from the
WBWCD, for the following reason: Take the highest price first.
Suppose that it is faced by Ogden City, and that it therefore represents
the largest single quantity in the array. This means only that at the
highest price it can expect to get 'at all, the WBWCD can sell a large
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Figure 5.

Conceptual approach to estimating demand forM & I
water.

I( {
Figure 6.

Approximation of minimum aggregate demand.
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quantity of water. At the next lowest price, which might repr ese nt a
very small place like West Point, the WBWCD could sell not only the
full West Point increment (small though it be), but also the full Ogden
amount. Continuing in this fashion a new array of price and quantity
points will be generated through which a line can be fitted (or even
traced, connect-the-dots fasion) that will be as accurate an estimation of the WBWCD's true demand function as is possible without experiments to measure demand in each individual city. It is quite conceivable that such a construction will be elastic. What is certain is
that it will understate the true elasticity because of the unrealistic
assumption of perfect inelasticity in all of the functions being summed.
2. This approach will not work for irrigation water because
the WBWCD price is already lower than the cost of alternative
sources of new water, which are essentially the sam e as those
faced by municipalities.
If an irrigation compan y needs more water,
it has little choice but to buy from the WB WCD, since wells are
gener ally quite a bit more expensive than the low price fixed for agriculture by Bureau of Reclamation policy. With irrigation water
prices as low as they already are and with as much excess delivery
and storage capacity as there is, it may well be that the demand for
such water is very inelastic--in the downward direction. (It may be
quite elastic in the other direction; several farms may cease operations if the price rose appreciably, while very few new ones would
start up even with a sizeable percentage drop in price. )
In these circumstances the most reasonable approach may be to
make an intuitive assessment of the MRP of agricultural water in the
Weber Basin, and on that basis to import an elasticity value from
some water demand study of a similar region. Interviews with farmers and irrigation company spokesmen should help in this effort,
plus a review of any revenue productivity studies that have been done
for areas like the Weber Basin- -or even the Basin itself. With a
borrowed elasticity and one-price-quantity point, an estimate of the
demand function in the region of that point can be constructed. If, on
the basis of policy recommendations stemming from such a function,
a change in price is administered a more accurate calculation of
elasticity would of course become possible .
Once these demand functions are in hand they may be used to
evaluate the policy alternatives proposed above.
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Appendix IV: Notes to Chapter III and Notes to Chapter VII
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Notes for Chapter III

Information in this Note is taken from a manila binder found in
files of the State Engineer 's Office.

The cover bears the followin g

title:
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
Weber Basin Project
Utah
GROU ND WATER RESOURCES
EAST SHORE AREA
May, I95 8
Besides the report promised on the cover (mimeo g raphe d), the binder
contains water use reports and co rresponden ce relating to ground
wat er develo pm ent within the East Shore area that were transferred
between Jerry Tuttle, Water Resources Engineer in the State Engin e er's Office, and E. J. Fjeldsted of the WBWCD.

Included are

several newspaper clippings about the WBP and ground water, dating
f rom 1961.

The binder was active only from 1959 to 1962, and was

the personal copy of Jerry Tuttle.
The Bureau of Reclamation Re port is prod uced imm ediately
below.

It has been edited slightly by excising tables and a two-page

section on water quality.
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GROUND WATER RESOURCES
EAST SHORE AREA
WEBER BASIN PROJECT
Introduction
The East Shore area as far as this report is concerne d is
considered as th e lands lying in Tps. 2 to 8 N., inclusive, and
extendin g from the Wasatch Mountains to Great Salt Lake. S urface water supplies are bein g fully developed under the com prehensive Weber Basin Project but are insufficient to meet the expected near future needs.
Unde v eloped ground water and return flows from irri gation
captured in project drains will be needed to supplement the surface supplies. Approximately 10,000 to 15,000 acre-feet of
ground water will be required annually within the area to supply
the expected demands.

Present Status of Ground
Water Development
Quantity-- In 1955 about 52, 000 acre-feet of ground water
was obtained from wells in the East Shore Area of which about
12, 000 acre-feet was pumped from wells of large yield owned by
municipalities, industries, and the Defense Department. Th e
other 40,000 acre-feet comes from small privately owned wells.
Table 1 shows the discharge from wells in the East Shore area
for several different years.
It is estimated that in 1955 approximately 14,000 acre-feet
of water was used for irrigation, 12,000 acre-feet for large industrial and municipal uses and 26,000 acre-feet for private domestic uses.

Most of the privately owned wells are used for domestic
purposes and stock watering on farms. These wells are of small
diameter, averaging 2 inches, and ranging in depth from 100 to
800 feet. The flows range from leas than 1 g. p.m. to 80 g. p.m.
Generally, these wells are below the 4, 300 foot land surface contour and they flow as a result of artesian pressure.
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TABLE 1
Well Dischar ge East Shore Area

Year

A cre-fee t

193 7
1938
1939
1940
1946
1950

48,900
48,200
4 5,300*
41, 100 ''
4 6 , 400 '"
2 6,50 0

1954
1955
* Estimate.

Measured by

State En gineer
State En gineer
State En gineer
State En gineer
U.S. G.S.
Estimate (excluding
l arge pump w ell s)
50,000
U.S. G. S & U.S. B. R.
52,000
Estimate
Records no t complete for all are a s.

In contrast to the small e r flowin g wells below the 4, 300 foot
land-surface co ntour, most pumped wells are locat ed east of the
4, 30 0 foot co ntou r. These wells range from 8 to 20 inches in diameter and from 300 to 900 feet in depth. Discharge ranges from
about 200 to 1, 800 g . p.m.
As Table 1 shows g ro und water uses have continually increased thr oughout the years. (Readers are urged to examine
Table 1 carefully and t o asse ss the v alidity of this inference.)
Quality-- (This two -pa ge portion has been omitted. It gene ra lly c onfirms that although not all aquifers yield water of equal
quality, there is an abundant supply of excellent ground water.)
Wast e--The g round water resources of the E ast Shore Area
are not fully utilized at the present time. Points in evidence su ggesti n g this a re the following: (1) the presen ce of s eeps into Great
Salt Lake, many of which are visible alon g part of the shoreline;
(2) s prings originating at faults; (3) upward leakage in certain
areas; (4) wells not c apped and water flowin g to was te (from many
wells water wasted year around); (5) the fact that records of water
lev els and artesian pressur e s do not show net declines in the
period 1937-1952; (6) the generallakeward slope of the piezometri c
surfac e, indicating water movement westward across the area; and
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(7) indirect evidence from studies of Great Salt Lake that indicate
estimated flows of about 60, 000 acre-feet annuall y of ground water
by direct seepage to the lake.
Hundreds of spots about 100 feet in diameter containin g thick
grow ths of salt grass dot the salt laden shores of great Salt Lake.
These are fresh water seeps that have their source in the artesian
basin. At least one fresh water spring has been observed in the
shallow waters of the lake, which had sufficient quantity to cause a
small boat to drift away from the source of flow. Near the abandoned salt plant in the lake west of Syracuse, a well 143 feet deep
with a 2-inch casing flows fresh water. These are all indications
that fresh water is moving westward under the lake and bein g
wasted.
Fault zones produce large quantities of water which is g enerally wasted the year around. Upward leakage, uncapped and leaky
wells in the East Shore Area have caused water-lo gged lands and
drainage problems. This is true especially in the West Bountiful
area near the A-1 Drain and c ertain parts of Farmington and Syracuse a reas although uncapped and leaky wells through nonirrigation season can be found in most areas, much of the water wasted
is evaporated or consumed by tules, catta ils, reeds and other
water-loving grasses that grow around bo gs and leaky wells. That
whi ch isn't consumed, flows into drains and sloughs and is carried
off to the lake.
An over -developed ground water area would show a c ontinued
lowering of the artesian pressures and water levels year after year
without complete recovery the following recharge period. In the
East Shore Area, however, this is not the case, with wells recovering fully each year with the exception of extreme drought years.
(S ee hydrographs following this page.)
The piezom etric surface of the water table indicates westward movement of water toward the Great Salt Lake. Further evidence that water is travelin g west to the lake is that in many wells
drilled adjacent to the lake shore good quality water originating
from Weber River or mountain front recharge have been found.
The discharge from irrigation wells during the winter in
the Bountiful distri ct as reported in the State Engineer's report
194 6-48 is estimated to range from 1800 to 2200 acre-feet per
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year, of which at least 1000 acre -feet comes from wells that leak
around the casing. The natural loss from the artesian reservoirs
by springs along the Warm Springs fault and by upward movement
and evapotranspiration has been estimated to be at least 2000 acrefeet annually and may be more than twice this great. This could
be reduced further by additional withdrawals. Ground water losses
and wastes by surface runoff and evapotranspiration in other parts
of the East Shore Area could not be definitely determined, Although not believed to be as great per acre area as the Bountiful
area, wastes are believed to be several thousand acre -feet.

Undeveloped Ground Water
The largest undeveloped aquifer in the East Shore Area
lies in the previously mentioned Weber delta in the eo-call ed 700foot aquifer. A test well drilled 3, 000 feet deep west of Roy has
indicated that underground water development for irri gation can be
extended to depths of about 1, 300 feet. Water of undesirable
quality is found below 1, 300 feet. This well was drilled in what
appeared to be the most favorable location in the East Shor e A rea .
It is located within the Weber River recharge area and in the
deepest fill over basement (bed) rock.
The annual recovery of the water table and preseuilOes in the
700-foot aquifer shows that there is still undeveloped water in
this aquifer. In addition, artificial recharge from the W eber River
is possible and can be supplied to the aquifer at the mouth of Weber
Canyon. Welle drilled anywhere within the Weber River recharge
area and in the 700..foot aquifer will produce large quantities of
water.
This aquifer is very permeable consisting of coarse sands,
gravels, and boulders, and readily allows water to pass through.
As was previously mentioned, Hill Air Force Base, Clearfield
Navy Depot, and many municipalities use this aquifer to suppl y
their needs. It is believed this aquifer extends for some distance
west under the Great Salt Lake.
In the Bountiful area, a few additional large wells prope rly
located are believed poe sible for development. This is supported
b y the fact that the three Bountiful City wells and the Woods Cross
well near the center of Bountiful City, Harold Calder's well on the
east side of Bountiful City, and the Salt Lake Stockyards and
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Wasatch Oil Company wells on the west side of Bountiful, as well
as others in the area , are successfully produc ing lar ge amounts
of water wit h ne gli gible interference. Also, as mentioned in the
s ection under "waste, •• surplus water seems to exist in the area.
Wells in this area should be lo cated with ca r e to avoid the sodium
ch lorid e type water existing to the west. Drillin g wells close to
the mouth of Mill Creek and other conyons is questionable. With
the exception of Harold Calder's well, other wells drilled n e ar
the mountains have failed to yield water.
The N orth O gde n area c onstitutes a small independent gro und
water system . The highe s t a rtesian pressures in the East Shore
Area have been measured in North O g den, the maximum head being about 80 feet above the land surface. The probabl e rechar ge
source for this area is North O g den Canyon, Coldwater Can yon ,
a nd Rice Creek. Quality-wise, this area pr oduces the best wa ter
in the East Shore Area and can be used for any purpose. Development in this area should probably be as deep as 1000 feet . By
drilling at this depth, interfe renee with other wells seems unlikely
inasmuch as most of the existin g wells are at depths up to about
5 00 feet. Quantity-wise, sufficie nt information has not been availab le to determine the amount of surplus water in the area.

In

1955, the approximate dis c har ge of wells in this area was 2, 9 00
acre-feet. It appears a limited amount of additional wat e r c an be
developed in the presently used aquifers with lar g er amounts
availabl e only if aquifers are developed below 500 feet.
In the Centerville-Farmington areas, development of additional gr ound water is also belie v ed practical if the wells ar e carefully located. Water quality sampl e s indicate g ood water around
the Town of Centerville and also in the Farming ton area near the
foot of the Wasatch Range. In the West Farmington area, due to
la c k of wells, only a few water samples were taken. The few
samples indicate sodium bicarbonate water which may not be
desirable for irri gation unless mixed with other waters containing
g r e ater p ercentages of calcium and ma g nesium and l ess concen trations of total solids. This water however , c ould b e used for
domestic purposes without dilution. Further studies in this area
a re still desirable to definitely show whether the w ater is of better
or poorer quality than is indicated by the few samples. W e lls in
the Centerville ar e a have produced lar g e quantities of wat e r wi th
ne gli gible interference. T he few wells in the Farmington area
have also shown no interference.
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Other factors indica ting available water are as follows:
l.

With the introduction of the Weber Basin Project,
many wells will be used only on a part-time basis
or even abandoned. Bountiful City, Sunset, Clearfield, Layton, and others who have been usin g well s ,
have turned their pumps off or used them only part time since surface water has been made availabl e
to th e m through the treatment plants. It is anticipated that many of the smaller communities (whi ch
will eventually have distribution systems from the
treatment plants) will also abandon their wells.

2.

Weber Basin Project river water applied on the East
Bountiful lands and other east bench areas will lose
water by deep percolation from future irri ga tion will
also add to the ground water reserves.

Water to be developed for
Weber Basin Project
The e stimated 10,000 to 15,000 acre-feet of ground water
development necessary in the utlimate development of the Weber
Basin Project will require wells to be used for miscellaneous
purposes including irrigation, industrial, and municipal uses.
They will be located where surplus water of good qualit y can be
found and where possible near distribution or conveyan ce systems.
In order to evantually develop the desired amount of ground water,
the Conservancy District has submitted to the State Engineer for
approval 34 applications for wells throughout the East Shore Area.
Although all applications were submitted at one time, the actual
well program will probably consist of a step - by - step process in
drilling and construction.
This program would cover many
years under close and careful observation and wells would be
drilled only when and where n e eded. The final location of the
wells will be determined with investigation of each indi v idual
well but in general will be close to the p attern of the wells located by the Conservancy District a pplications . An approximate
estimate of the amount of water to be develop ed in each area is
shown as follows:
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Bountiful
Centerville
Farmington
North Ogden
Willard
Weber delta

3, 000
1, 000
1, 000
1, 000
1, 000
8, 000

Total

15,000

(acre
(acre
(acre
(a cre
(acre
(acre

feet
feet
feet
feet
feet
feet

annually)
annually)
annually)
annually)
annually)
annually)

To initiate this program, the Conservancy District drilled
the Laytona Well (5 c. f. s., 800 feet deep) and pur chased an existing well in Roy City. The Bureau of Reclamation is pres ently contemplating either purchasing a private well in Bountiful or drilling a new well under a Conserva ncy District appli cation. The
Bureau is also contemplating the drilling of a well in the Riverdale
area. These wells will be used to supply municipaliti es either
in lieu of or as a supplement to the water furnished through treatment plants and are expected to supply from 3 to 5 c. f. s.

Interference
Probably the greatest single factor which will caus e difficulties in the future development of the ground water in the East
Shore Area is the problem of interference with existin g wells.
It is believed that the amount of water needed for project
purposes can be developed without serious interfer ence with
existing wells if properly located and put down to selected
aquifers.

Among several pertinent inference s that can be made from the
above report, the following are especially noteworthy:
l.

Ground water abundance, even in south Davis County, was
well-known to the Bureau of Reclamation before 1958.

2.

Development of surface water was replacing ground water
sources which had been used for some time.
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3.

In spite of this evident abundance of water, the Bureau
claimed that it must have control o ve r major gro und
water resources in order to meet the servic e require-

ments of the Weber Basin Project.
The next item from Jerry Tuttle's binder is a typ ewritten,
pencil-annotated draft, dated January 20, 1960.

From the style,

choice of terms and gene ral c ont ex t, it was probably written by E.
J. Fjeldsted.

Its location in th e Tuttle binder su gg ests that the

ground wat e r studies to which it refers are summarized in the Bureau report reproduced a bove.

The g raph of population trends it

mentions contains nothing extraordinary, and has been omitted.
(Se e Ch a pter VI for material on trends in population and water use.)
Statement of Plan for Development
of Groundwater in the East Shore Area
to meet future demands
The Weber Basin Water Conservancy Distri ct and the
Bureau of Reclamation as a part of the Weber Basin Project will
develop g roundwater in the East Shore Area to suppl y the Irriga ti o n, Municipal, and Industrial needs of the area. Population
trends (see atta c hed graph) indi c ate that all surfa ce and groundwater available in the basin will be n eeded within the next 25
years to satisfy these needs.
Extensive investigations by the above -named agenci es in
cooperation with the Geologi c al Survey over sev eral years beginning in 1951, have demonstrated that substantial quantiti es
of undeveloped groundwater are available in selected locations
in the East Shore Areas. Th e basic data collected during these
studies has been furnished to the State Engineer. The fa c ts
developed during the investi g ation promp ted the Conserv ancy
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District to file 34 applications to appropriate groundwater.
These applications represent 6 1 different well sites.
Development of g roundwater by the entities mentioned
above began in 1957 with the pur cha se of a well in Roy (certifica te #5 145) and the construction of the Laytona Well (certific ate #5710). These wells have capacities of one and five
second-feet respe cti ve ly. Other details regarding these wells
are on file in the State Engineer's Office.
The Bureau of Reclamation is now undertaking the drillin g of a well in the Riverdale area under the recently approved
application No . 27,650. The details regarding plans for this
well and an explanati on of the availability of water is contained
in a statement made by F. M. Warnick before the State Engineer at a he arin g in O gde n, Utah, on October 15, 1959. Copies
of the Statement have been transmitted to the State Engineer.
This well will be completed and in operation by late summer of
1959.
Three more wells are planned to be dr ill ed by the end of
1962. These wells will be located in the general vicinity of
North Ogden, Clearfield, and Bountiful. Cap acity of these well s
will be from 3 to 5 second-feet. Applications under which these
wells are expected to be drilled are 27, 646; 27, 636, and 27, 643 .
When the well now approved for the Riverdale area and
the wells in North Ogden, Clearfield , and Bountiful are completed
and in service, it is expected that all wells (6) of the Government
District sys tem will be capable of furnishing 20 second-feet of
water when operated simultaneously and would p roduce an average of l, 200 acre-feet p er month. Water from these wells and
from surfa ce supplies developed as part of the Weber Basin
Project will be commingled and used to supply water users who
have purchased wat e r from the Conservancy District.
As th e population in creases additional water will be required .
It is estimated tha t during th e period 1963 to 1966, inclusive, it

will be necessary to construct 5 wells. Wells would be lo cated
in Bountiful, Farmington, Nor th Ogden, and two in the Clearfield
Roy Distri c t. Like the other wells of the system, they will be
inter conn e cte d with the suppl y system of the Weber Basin Pro jec t. Applications under which these wells are expected to be
drilled are 27,635, 27, 6 28, 27,633, 27,648, and 27,647.
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During the period from 1967 to 1975, it is expected that 9
additional wells will be required. These wells would be lo c ated
in Bountiful , Centervill e , F a rmin g ton, L a yton, Hooper, N o rth
Ogden, Willard, and two in the Clearfield -Roy distri c t. Other
wells, covered by the remainin g application of the Distric t ,
would be drilled after 1975 as the population and industrial demands require.
The entire well drillin g pro g ram is based upon supplyin g
water to meet the demands for all uses within the Conservancy
District. It was for this purpose the District was or g anized
and investments have been made.
The important point in the Fjeldsted brief is that the total surface and g round water resources of the Weber Basin will be needed
soon to supply East Shore needs.

Propaganda in the pre-authorization

ph ase of WBP was, of course , that surface supplies were essential
because there w as no si g nifi cant ground water resource.

The WBP

w as explicitly designed with sufficient capacity to handle all pes sible
future needs (see Chapter VI) from surface flows of the Weber River
system.

To be co nsistent in 1960 with the story of need, however , it

was clearly ines c apable for WBP promoters to elevate the nowobvious g round water resource to the status of an important element
of supply.
The r e was also a comp e lli ng financial reason fo r this interest
in g roundwater.

If they could no t get control of the groundwater re-

source , they would not be able to monopoli ze the municipal and industrial water ma rket.

Without such a monopoly, the repayment
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capacity of the WBP was thre a tened, for it depended on bein g a bl e
to gou g e M&I customers (see Chapte r VI).

T he commi ngling of s ur-

fa ce and g roundwaters mentione d b y F j eldsted is ve rifi e d by t he 1959
DPR , as reported in Chapter V I.

In that chapter it is shown, b y th e

i nfe ren c e from the DPR, that most of the proposed M &I c ontr ac ts
'M>uld be supplied from wells.

The information reprodu ce d in this

appendix provides confirmation of that inferen c e.

The importa n ce of

this confirmation is its support of the ar g ument that the M&I pri ce o f
the WBWCD is purely arbitrary.

That is, it is not intended t o b e ar

any relationship to the actual cost of prov idin g water to M &I cu stome rs.
Those customers are expected to pay for the c onstruction of hug e
surface supply facilities, but the water they ge t comes f rom mu c h
less expensive ground water sources.
The followin g statement by an officer of t he Bureau of Re clam ation was found in files of the Stat e Engineer ' s Offi c e:
Statement of F. M. Warnick at Hearing on
Thursday, October 15, 1959, at Ogden, Utah
before the State Engineer regarding the Application of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District to drill a well in the Riverdale Area of
Weber County, Utah
Application No. 27650
As a part of the Weber Basin Reclamation Project it is
planned to construct a well ••• in the Riverdale area •••
Extensive investigations of g round water conditions have
been carried on by the Bureau o f Reclamation over the las t
seven years and the following explanation is taken from those
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studies. This dis cussion will be treated in two parts to
coin cide with the prot ests of water users who object to the
drilling of the well for two different reasons.
First, one group of protestants claim the withdrawal of
water from the artes ian aquifers in the Riverdale area will
lead to grea ter losses from the surface stream (Weber River)
and therefore interfere with their diversions from the river .
The second group of protes tants have wells which take water
from the artesian aquifers in the general area and believe additional wells will deplete the supply to such an exte nt that
these prior users will be r equired to go to extra expense to
obtain their water.
In the first instance we have found that a continuo us clay
barrier separates the unconfined ground water which is fed
from the river from the confined ground water (artesian aquifers)
over a large area extending from a point near the mouth of W ebe r
Canyon to and beyond the easte rn shore line of Great Salt Lake.
Logs from the many deep wells drilled in the area show this
clay barrier and verify its conti nuity. The only place the Weber
R i ver contributes to these artesian aquifers is at the mouth of
Weber Canyon. Here deep river grave ls accept water readily
and carry the water to the artesian aquifers below the clay barrier. The water table in this rechar g e area is more than
17 5 feet below the river level. An observation well (# 1) more
than 200 feet deep and a well on the north side of the W eber
River east of Kendells Junction give evidence of this condition
The clay barrier is not found at Observation Well No . 1
but was encountered by a well (Observation Well 3A) approxi mate l y one mile west and by other shallow wells in the South
Weber area. Water table readings in Observation Well 3A and
other shallow wells in the vicinity shows the slope of the ground
water table to b e eastward toward the mountains. Immediately
west of Well 3A the slope is to the west with the slope of the
river .. ,, With the depth of water in the recharge area at or
below the clay barrier at all times it is consistant to conclu d e
that withdrawal of water from the aquifers below the clay barrier
will not increase the loss es in the river system. It follows then
that the de velopm ent of a well in the Riverdale area to take
water from the aquifers below the clay barrier will not decrease
the supply of water available to users of the natural flows of
Weber River.
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The second group of protestants imply that the artesian
basin be l ow the clay barrier is already fully developed and
therefore additional withdrawals will take part of their supply.
The extensive investigations of the Bureau of Reclamation show
that large quantities of water from these aquifers is still leaking
into Great Salt Lake. Hundreds of seeps can be identified along
the shores of the lake which have been found by chemical comparison to be the same water as found in the artesian aquifers. As
lon g as these seeps continue to discharge into the lake, water in
excess of the withdrawals by existing wells is available and
subject to appropriation. This fact alone should be sufficient
to permit the State Engineer to approve the application bein g
discussed. No individual or g roup should object to the recover y
and use of water now wasting into the lake. Further evidence
that the artesian aquifers below the clay barrier are not fully
develop ed is found in the longest well records of the area. The
hydrograph of the J. D. Hooper well extends over the period
1937 to date. This record while showing the effect of drought
does not indicate a steady and continuous decline characteristic
of over-developed ground water basins. This evidence should also
indicate to the protestants and the State Engineer that undeveloped
water is available for appropriation.
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Notes fo r Chapter VII

The items in this note demons trate

the reluctance of its sup -

porters to make a clear acknowledgment of the principles by which
the WBP is financed, and the purposes and p eople which it serves.
The first is excerpted from an article that appeared in the Davis
County Clipper of February 10, 196 1--part of which has alread y been
quoted in the text.

The spokesman is E. J . Fjeldsted, and the o c ca-

sion was a meeting of Bountiful City Council.

All emp hasis and paren-

thetical remarks have been added :
Main problem of the district, Mr . Fjeldsted pointed out,
is to repay the c osts of setting up the district. (The reporter
seems to have co nfused the District with the Project throughout--although it i s not impo ssib l e that Fjel dsted was deliberately loos e with his terminolo g y , as some of the instances are
favorable to the c ase he was trying to make.)
When it was propos ed in 1949, engineers estimated it
would cost $ 70 million, of which $57 million would have to be
repaid. But expenses have g one hi gher than expected.
For exampl e , the Willard Bay project, on which everything else de pends, (constantly r eiterated, but never demonstrat e d satisfactorily) was estimate d to cost $ 7 million. It is
going to cost $1 6 million •• ,
Anoth er higher cost is the in c r eased amount of water that
the district will handle. This has been raised from 178, 000
acre feet to 212,000 acre feet, The amount available for
municipalities has been raised from 40, 000 acre fe et t o 50, 000,
(The irony of this statem e nt will be clear after reading Chapter
VI .)
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This means the cost is now expected to reach $97 million,
of which $81 million must be repaid.
The major part of this money is interest free. There is
two percent interest on the part for municipal water, but this
is plowed back into the system, amounting actually to a form of
subsidy. (If they only knew!)
Where the pinch might develop is in the $5,400, 000 bonds
for development of the filtration plants. lf we can sell more
water, we will be able to pay off these bonds sooner, before
enlargement of them becomes necessary. The major parts of
these plants were designed for maximum developm ent of the
area (! ). However, ~parts will (may?) have to be enlarged
in the future.
After the bonds are paid, there is a possibility the price
of water could be reduced, Mr. Fjeldsted said.
There will have to be an election, also, probably this fall
to approve the additional cos t for the district system, he said.
By 1975 we must sell 50, 000 acre feet of water to pay for the
system. (Presumably his audience understood that Fjeldsted
had reference here to municipal and industrial water. If reported
accurately, Fjeldsted made it appear that municipaliti es were being asked to buy water from the District to pay for its own system ,
i.e., the treatment and delivery facilities for M&I water. In
actual fact, as Chapter VI demonstrates, municipalities are
saddled with paying for more than half of the entire Weber Basin
Project--including the Willard Reser.voir which Fjeldsted implied
was of significance to municipal users.)
The election to which Fjeldsted made reference above was the subject of another article in the Davis County Clipp er, on June 2, 1961.
Afte.,- announcing the date of the e lection, the article reported reasons
for the cost increase as give n by Elmer Carver, chairman of the District•s board of directors:
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He stated that since the repayment contract was si g ned in
1952 by the Conservan c y District the steady rate of population inc rease, chang es from open ditch to sprinkler irri gation, more
trunk lines, more land to water, inflation and other factors,
increased the project c ost. (Of this list, "inflation and other
costs" is believable.)
Added income to pay off the project will be obtained throu g h
g reater consumption and additional users who will buy the w at er,
he said. (Although Carver was clearly making an effort to justify
increased cost on the basis of larger size to satisfy g reater need,
what was really underway was an increase in the absolute and
relative amount of total Project costs that was being shouldered
onto municipalities. See Chapter VI.)
The Weber Basin proj ect is now about 50 p ercent finished.
A key featu re yet to be built, the Willard Bay Reservoir, would
enable the system to catch water now runnin g to waste into
Great Salt Lake . (Despite the rationalizing of th e next para gr aph
the real reason why Willard was the key to the Project is shown
in Chapter VI to be the big benefits from l and reclamation that it
promised. Without it, the overall benefit/cost ratio of the
Project was dismal.)
There are now no dams on the west side of the mountains
to catch and store water not held in the dams and reservoirs inside the Weber and O g den canyons. Willard Bay ••• would store
2 1 5,000 acre feet of water--nearly twice the amount held by
Pineview Reservoir.
By pumpin g, water exchanges and by use of the Davis and
Weber Aqueducts and other physical facilities of the system, the
additional water of the Willard reservoir would provide adequate
suppl y for all users of the Weber Basin project, Mr. Carver
said. (It is noteworthy that this list does not mention reclamation of lake plain lands. By 1961 it must have been reasonably
clear that aggressive agricultural expansion was not in the ca rds
for the East Shore area. Instead of emphasizing the enormous
benefit to reclamation via Willard facilities, on the basis of which
the WBP was authorized by Congress and the President, Carver
talked as if it was of major significance to municipalities and
lands already under irrigation. That is still the line taken by
Bureau spokesmen when pressed to justify the Willard system,
as shown in Chapter V. )
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If vote rs defeat the issu e, there would be res trict ion to
some degree on con st ruction with the result the entire district
would suffer. (T his sentence, as w e ll as the headline, impli es
that the coming vot e i s a bond issue. Such was not in fact the
case . The only bond issue that had eve r been invol ved wit h
the WBP was th e $5. 4 million to build district treatment and
delive ry fa c ilities for M&I wate r . This v ote was ov er a pr oposed increase of $ 24 million in the basin's repayment obli g ation
to the Bu r ea u of Reclamati o n. It wa s a major opportunit y to kill
the worst fea tures of the Project-before con stru c tion on them had
even started. The Bureau must have been holding its breath.)
Reluctance to cast li ght on deta ils of the Weber Basi n investment
may be res ponsibl e for the failure of Bureau and District officials to
experime nt with som e measures that might improve both the financial
status of the Project and the efficiency of basin water resource s management.

Jo s e ph Sax, a specialist in wat er and natural resources

law, says that judici al decisions suggest a ri ght of the United States
Governme nt (Bureau of Reclamation) to r ecapture seepage from i ts
projects .

1

This means that if the WBWCD (Bureau) could prove that

its irrigation w a ter is rechar ging a quifers tapp ed by municipal wells,
it (the Bureau) co uld claim the water a s its own and force the munici-

palities to pay for it.

Both Conservancy Distri ct and Bureau spokes-

men claim that the apparent abundance of ground water in the East
Shore area is a direct consequence of water spread by means of

1
Jo seph L. Sax, " Federal Reclamation Law," in Waters and
Water Rights , Vol. 2, Section 117. 4, R. E. Clark, ed. (Indianapolis,
India na : The Allen Smith Company, Publishers, 1967), pp. 117 -8 0.
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irrigation from the Davis and Weber Aqueducts.

Recent U.S. G. S.

investigations , cited in the previous chapter, tend to support this
claim.
Seepa ge r ecapture s eems to be a p articularly stron g possibility
in the Bo untiful-Woods Cross district, where drillers are prepared
to g uarantee a well in any lo cality.

Thomas and Nelson made a

pessimistic report on the capacity of the g round water reservoir
(bedrock sloped ri gh t off to Great Salt Lake wi th no fault barrier as
in the north; aquifers are ill-d efined and p oorly p ermeable) and des cribe d its recharge areas.

We ber Basin Project water has been

spread on those recharge areas , a nd g roun d water is pl entiful in the
aquifers they are presumed to cha r ge .
Deliberate spreading o f irri g ati on w ater combined with vigorous
g r ound water de velopment would be an acceptable and l ess costly means
of pro viding municipal supplies than the existin g treatment and delivery
facilities of the Conservancy District.

It would also acknowled ge some

of t he present treatment capacity as permanentl y redundant.

This

would still be financially superio r to ge tting no returns at all on the
seepage wa te r.

When the possi bility of s eepa ge recapture was sug-

gested to Wayne Winegar in 1972, he manifested genuine surprise and
expr e ss ed an intention to pursu e the matter.

When questioned several

weeks later, he preferred not to comment on p rog ress, implying that
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lhe subject was under acti ve investigation.

Since the Sax ar gwnent

was based on judicial decisions involving Reclamation spe cifically,
it is hardly believable that Bureau officials with responsibility for
over seeing the Weber Basin Project could have been unaware of the
seepage recapture idea.

The fact that they had not press ed it, there-

fore, suggests there are some complications involved which diminish
its worth in their eyes.

The most obvious of these deterrents is the

inference it allows that the municipal and industrial features of the
Weber Basin Project wer e not needed in the first place.

Another is

the emphas is it would undoubtedl y give to the fact that the abundant
gro und water was known to the Bureau long before most Project
facilities were co nstructed.
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